LRR-DPUF: Learning Resilient and Reliable Digital Physical Unclonable Function

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# **Introduction**

### **Conventional analog silicon PUFs**

- **Figure 1** Transistor analog intrinsic randomness
- $\triangleright$  Vulnerable to environmental and operational variations
- $\blacktriangleright$  Need error correction

### **Expected digital silicon PUF**

- **Boolean** type randomness source
- $\blacktriangleright$  Immune to environmental and operational variations
- $\blacktriangleright$  Less to no error correction
- $\triangleright$  Strong resilience to attacks

# **Introduction**

### **Related work**

- $\blacktriangleright$  Hybrid FPGA digital PUF however need analog PUF to start up [FPL'14]
- $\triangleright$  First digital PUF by interconnection uncertainty yet only conceptual and less feasible for practice [ISQED'15]

### **Contributions in our work**

- Quantitative justifications of the use of interconnect randomness
- Strongly skewed latches to ensure deterministic transistor behaviors
- Novel highly non-linear logic network to ensure strong security

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# Lithography variations

### **Identify a feasible source of Boolean randomness is half the battle to make a digital PUF.**

Two slightly differed mask stripe-pairs are eventually mapped to have different connectivities on silicon.



Interconnect under lithography variation. Left: mask split of 20*nm* for top, 28*nm* for bottom. Right: shapes on wafer.

# Lithography variations

### **Lithography variation categories**

- **> Systematic:** dose, focus, etc.
- ► Local: mask, line edge roughness (LER), etc.

### **Mask error for interconnect randomness**

- $\triangleright$  Position two interconnect layout line-ends close to each other
- An electron beam system can easily lead to large mask variations

Mask variation further maps to different connectivity in wafer

# Lithography variations

### **Quantitative justifications of lithography variations**

- $\blacktriangleright$  The existence and control of the configurations to
	- $\blacktriangleright$  Augment the local variation
	- $\blacktriangleright$  Suppress the systematic variation



Interconnect connectivity rate under lithography variations:

Left: layout split distance under mask error stdv. of 4*nm*; Center: mask error stdv. under split of 46*nm*; Right: dose values.

### **Conclusion**

Lithography variations can be utilized by careful configurations of layout split and E-beam accuracy.

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# Unit Cell

### **Naïve random interconnection is incompatible to digital CMOS.**

- **Short-circuit:** direct current from Vdd to Gnd, uncertain region, etc.
- **Open-circuit:** floating gate, etc.

Goal: Pure logical circuit compatible for normal and open circuits

### **Strongly skewed latch!**



Handling dangled poly-gate by strongly skewed latch.

Left: inverter pair based skewed latch: Right: the VTC relation of a strongly skewed latch.

# Unit Cell

### **Exclusive-OR (XOR) cell property**

**Exercise** Linear non-separable



Linear non-separable nature for XOR logic.

### **Equal output probability**

If  $Pr[a = 1] = Pr[a = 0] = 0.5, \forall b \in B$ , then  $Pr[y = 1] = Pr[y = 0] = 0.5$ .

# Unit Cell



A unit cell may or may not invert its **key** depending on **virtual connection**.

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A N-row by M-col LRR-DPUF architecture. Some boundary virtual connections are marked by "*Z*" indicating dangling status.

Each row is a *signal tunnel* where the 1-bit input signal may be inverted depending on the virtual connections associated to this row.

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### **LRR-DPUF formula**

$$
k_{i,j} = \begin{cases} k_{i,j-1} \oplus (v \cdot k_{i+1,j-1} + \overline{v}), & i \text{ even}, j \text{ even}; \\ k_{i,j-1} \oplus (v \cdot k_{i-1,j-1} + \overline{v}), & i \text{ even}, j \text{ odd}; \\ k_{i,j-1} \oplus (v \cdot k_{i-1,j} + \overline{v}), & i \text{ odd}, j \text{ even}; \\ k_{i,j-1} \oplus (v \cdot k_{i+1,j} + \overline{v}), & i \text{ odd}, j \text{ odd}. \end{cases}
$$

Here *ki*,*<sup>j</sup>* refers to *i*-*row j*-*column* output, and *v* refers to virtual connection status.

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Logic cone of  $out_2$  is highlighted in red color.

### **LRR-DPUF properties**

- $\blacktriangleright$  The non-linearity of LRR-DPUF increases along with a higher connectivity rate.
- $\triangleright$  There is a sufficiently large space of unique LRR-DPUFs even if the connectivity rate is high.
- Increasing the number of columns strengthens the resilience to learning attacks.

 $\blacktriangleright$  Any subtle change on virtual connections will be reflected to multiple outputs.

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### **Statistical evaluation**

Table: Statistical evaluation on  $8 \times 8$  LRR-DPUF with 256 exhaustive CRPs



Table: Statistical evaluation on  $64 \times 64$  LRR-DPUF with 100K CRPs





Under high connectivity rate, the adversary prediction via one bit change at a time is **no better** than a simple random guess.

### **Adversary attacks: 8-row by various number of columns**



SVM attack for 8-row LRR-DPUFs over different configurations: Left: connectivity rate of 0.2 over different column sizes and training sizes; Right: connectivity rate of 0.9 over different column sizes and training sizes;

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### **Adversary attacks: 64-row by 64-colum**



Left: SVM attacks over different connectivity rate and training size. Right: additional learning model attacks including i) Artificial neural network (ANN) with 10 hidden layers using Sigmoid function, and ii) Random Forest (RF) with 15 trees in the forest.

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# **Conclusion**

- $\triangleright$  A novel learning resilient and reliable digital PUF
- $\blacktriangleright$  Justification for the use of interconnect randomness

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- $\triangleright$  Strongly skewed latches for CMOS compatibility
- $\triangleright$  A highly non-linear logic architecture

# Thank You

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