马库斯・加布理尔教授
马库斯・加布理尔教授
波恩大学教授及知识论、现代与当代哲学讲座教授
马库斯・加布理尔教授2005年于海德堡大学获博士学位，2008年获特许任教资格。2008–2009年，于社会研究新学院担任哲学助理教授。2009年，获波恩大学聘为知识论、现代及当代哲学讲座教授，是德国史上最年轻的哲学教授；2012年，兼任波恩大学国际哲学中心主任至今；2017年开始，与一位理论核物理学家共同担任波恩大学科学与思想中心主任，作跨学科研究。2020年，新学院任命加布理尔教授为哲学及新人文科学杰出讲师（他也是该校哲学及新人文科学学院的创院主任）。曾于加州柏克莱大学、纽约大学、巴黎索邦大学、里斯本大学、巴勒莫大学以及其他地方担任访问职位。
加布理尔教授是第三十位唐君毅访问教授。他将以「思想的意义──人工智能的限度」为题主持公开演讲；之后也会主持本系师生研讨会，讲题是 “Being Wrong—Subjectivity and Fallibility”。
着作选录
Der Mensch im Mythos. Untersuchungen über Ontotheologie, Anthropologie und Selbstbewußtseinsgeschichte in Schellings „Philosophie der Mythologie“. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2006.
Skeptizismus und Idealismus in der Antike. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 2009.
Why the World does not Exist. Cambridge: Polity Press 2014.
Fields of Sense. A New Realist Ontology. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2015.
I am not a Brain: Philosophy of Mind for the 21st Century. Cambridge: Polity Press 2015.
The Limits of Epistemology. Cambridge: Polity Press 2019.
The Meaning of Thought. Cambridge: Polity Press 2020.
Fiktionen. Berlin: Suhrkamp 2020.
思想的意义──人工智能的限度
摘要：
当代许多人工智能的研究，都忽视了其关键研究对象的本质：智能。为了填补这方面的不足，我在本演讲中试图提供一个关于智能的本体论述，从而确定人工智能系统在甚么程度上可以正确地描述为「具备智能」。人工智能的研究，通常着重于智能的「效率」，然后以此属性与系统可测量的解难能力联系起来。通过援引生物学外在论的观点──根据这个观点，我们的心智词汇与生物行为的选择，在本质上关系密切──我认为，鉴于生物参数（biological
parameters）是关涉问题空间（problem space）的先决条件，因此将心智属性归因于非生命系统，在范畴上并不合适。在这个背景下，我认为人工智能系统是「思想」模型，它不应被理解为「能够思想」的模型：我们有智慧地利用人工智能去解决问题；假若脱离这个背景，而认为有智慧的是人工智能，这实在于理不合。在人工智能系统中，真正具备智能的，其实是一个混合人类和机器的界面，它是由人类使用的技术和人工智能程式所一起构成的。最后，我维
持这个看法：思想本身是一种感觉管道（sense modality），它和与生俱来的、与背景扣连的理解形式息息相关，这些理解形式并不能被任何一种非生物的人工智能系统所取代。
英文主讲
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Existence, Non-Existence, Fiction and the Imagination
2月26日 (星期五), 2:30 – 5:15pm, Zoom
3月5日 (星期五), 2:30 – 5:15pm, Zoom
3月12日 (星期五), 2:30 – 5:15pm, Zoom
There are many things: Classrooms, bosons, neurons, numbers, justice, time etc. At the same time, there also seem to be things whose existence can be disputed: values, colors, consciousness, God(s) and so forth. But what exactly are we asserting or denying when we ascribe existence or non- existence to some class of entities? What is it for them to exist or not to exist respectively? Specifically, how is it possible to refer to fictional and imaginary objects (such as literary characters and systematically distorted sensory presentations of ordinary objects of perception, not to mention hallucinated objects) without thereby overturning their alleged ontic status as non-existent? Ever since the founding gesture of philosophy, the concept of being has been threatened by a paradox, most prominently articulated in the Eleatics. The paradox culminates in the conclusion that it is impossible for anything not to be/not to exist in virtue of the fact that any assertion of its non-existence entails its existence qua target of an intentional state directed at the entity or kind of entity charged with non-existence.
In this course, we will look at various formulations of the paradox in order to become acquainted with contemporary strategies of solving or re-solving it by way of ontological theory-construction designed to make sense of assertions both of existence and non-existence alike. In this context, we will discuss the ontology of fictional and imaginary objects, because they can easily be used as litmus tests for the various ontological frameworks on offer in contemporary philosophy with a focus on so-called New Realism.
Being Wrong – Subjectivity and Fallibility
摘要：
We are evidently capable of knowing how things are. In indefinitely many cases, how things are is implicitly or explicitly open to human thought and action. Reality is unconcealed. Yet, by virtue of our very ability to know, we are at the same time aware of the fact that we sometimes get things wrong. We are fallible. In my departmental lecture I will investigate the nature and scope of our fallibility on the basis of an assumption about subjectivity. This subjectivity assumption maintains that to be a fallible thinker means that we are subject to a constitutive and often wide-ranging ignorance as to which of our beliefs are actually true and which false. To be a subject is to be wrong about some things without ever being in a position to settle once and for all which of our beliefs are non-accidentally true (and thereby constitute knowledge) and which of our actions are morally good.
In my lecture, I will argue that human subjects are not only fallible knowers, capable of getting things right or wrong. Rather, what constitutes our individual perspective on reality (including on our individual perspective, which also belongs to what there is), is the fact that we are never in a position to set our epistemic record straight once and for all. We cannot replace all our false beliefs with true ones. To be someone is thus to be a bearer of false beliefs many of which remain undetected. If we had only true beliefs, we would merge with reality. Being and thought would form an indissoluble whole. Thus, being someone puts us at a partial distance from what there is, a distance which itself belongs to what there is. In light of these considerations, I will propose an epistemic account of reality according to which the category reality is essentially tied to our self-portrait as fallible thinkers. This will shed new light on the issue of realism in epistemology and ontology.
英文主讲
欢迎参加