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**The “Two-China” Problem in International  
Non-governmental Organisations**

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**Centre for Contemporary Asian Studies**

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THE "TWO-CHINA" PROBLEM  
IN INTERNATIONAL  
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

by  
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About the Author

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This article aims at analysing the origin, development and implications of the so-called "two-China" problem in the area of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs).

The "two-China" problem refers to the political complications arising out of the competing claims of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) to be the sole legitimate government of all China, including Taiwan. INGOs refer to those international or transnational organisations that serve as mechanisms for cooperation among ordinary citizens and "private" (as opposed to governmental) national groups in international affairs, especially in the economic, social, cultural, humanitarian and technical fields.<sup>1</sup> Multi-national corporations with interest in commercial gains are excluded from this study.

Two reasons account for choosing INGOs as an area of investigation. First, there is so far no publicly acknowledged, official intergovernmental contact, direct or indirect, between China and Taiwan. Apart from indirect trade, meetings of students from both sides in foreign countries and of academics at international conferences, and family visits made by people from Taiwan to mainland China through third countries, INGOs provide the only forums

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for open, organised and regular contacts involving representatives from both sides.

Secondly, recent works on Chinese participation in international organisations (IOs) are centred around intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), especially the United Nations. Little has been done in the area of INGOs.<sup>2</sup> By taking the non-governmental perspective this article offers some fresh insights into China's evolving relationship with the world community.

The article will first discuss the origin and development of the "two-China" problem within the context of the Chinese participation in INGOs in general and in UNESCO in particular. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation had ties with more than 300 INGOs in the 1970s (over 500 by the end of 1983),<sup>3</sup> making it an ideal focus for the analysis of the subtle relationships involving China, Taiwan and INGOs. The article will then examine the "Olympic formula" of the International Olympic Committee and the "ICSU formula" of the International Council of Scientific Unions for handling the "two-China" problem in their respective organisations. The applicability of these two formulas for tackling similar problems in INGOs and IGOs will be scrutinised. The article will conclude by assessing the implications of the formulas for China's effort to reunify Taiwan and the prospects thereof.

#### The "Two-China" Problem: Origin and Development

The "two-China" problem has been a recurrent source of conflict in Chinese international relations since 1949. It has forced many governments,

organisations and individuals -- especially those of Chinese origin -- to take sides either with China or with Taiwan, resulting in miserable consequences for some -- and often for all -- concerned. In the competition for international recognition, the PRC had been fighting a gradual, uphill battle until 1971 when it finally won entry to the United Nations. This was due partly to its conflictual relationships with the two superpowers -- especially the United States which had exercised considerable influence in excluding China from the international community, and partly to its own intermittent bouts of self-imposed isolation from the world such as the one during the height of the Cultural Revolution.

The year 1971 marks a watershed in China's relations with international organisations. Before that date it had largely been excluded from them, but afterwards it was able to utilise its newly acquired membership of the United Nations (UN) as the basis for asserting its right to replace the ROC in other UN organs and specialised agencies, including UNESCO. Through these agencies the PRC put pressure on related INGOs to expel Taiwan. Consequently China's membership of international organisations, both IGOs and INGOs, increased substantially.

In order to understand how the present state of Chinese participation in INGOs came about, it is necessary to review the past changes of China's membership in international organisations. These changes, together with those of Taiwan, are shown in Figures 1 and 2. (Note the different vertical scales.)




FIGURE 1 : MEMBERSHIPS OF CHINA AND TAIWAN IN IGOS

Source Yearbook of International Organisations (YIO) 1983/84 and 1986/87, Vol. 2 (München, New York, London, Paris: K.G. Saur, 1983 and 1986), Tables 3 and 4.

Note The data for 1983 and 1986 are based on sections A to F of YIO whereas the rest are on A, due to a revised classification of the sections.




FIGURE 2 : MEMBERSHIPS OF CHINA AND TAIWAN IN INGOS

Source : Same as for Figure 1.

Note : Same as for Figure 1, except the data for 1983 and 1986 include section R as well.

The charts are rather crude due to the use of irregular and wide time intervals. Annual data would have permitted a clearer and more useful picture to emerge, but unfortunately such data are practically impossible to obtain.<sup>4</sup>

Three interesting points emerge from these charts. First, China's membership in IGOs declined slightly from a very low base from 1960 to 1966 but then increased considerably from 1977 to 1986. The turning point (minimum) of the trend of growth obviously lies somewhere between 1966 and 1977. Certainly it could not have occurred before 1971 because between 1966 and 1971 the Cultural Revolution was at its height. The only possibility is that it occurred in 1971 or thereafter. The trend for Taiwan is the reverse: its membership increased from 1960 to 1966 but remained at a low level from 1977 to 1986. The maximum in this case lies also somewhere between 1966 and 1977. A comparison between the two trends supports the contention that Taiwan started to be replaced by China in IGOs in 1971.

Second, both the levels of membership of China and Taiwan in INGOs increased over time from 1960 to 1986, although at different rates. The biggest increase for both occurred during the same period, from 1977 to 1983. For China the increase was the result of the Open Door policy affirmed at the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Communist Party Congress in December 1978. Taiwan's increase, however, was due mainly to its determined effort to expand its non-governmental relations so as to counteract the loss of recognition it had suffered on the intergovernmental front, especially the shift of United States' diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China on 1 January 1979. The

implementation of the Olympic formula in 1979 and of the ICSU formula in 1982 by the various parties concerned facilitated these parallel increases.

Third, a time lag intervened between China's participation in IGOs and its participation in INGOs: the highest percentage increase in its membership of IGOs occurred before 1977 (from 1 in 1966 to 21 in 1977), whereas that of INGOs occurred thereafter (from 71 in 1977 to 307 in 1983). Three reasons account for this lag: (1) China paid more attention to membership in IGOs than in INGOs before 1977, as a priority in establishing its exclusive claim to legal, governmental legitimacy in the world of IOs; (2) a more liberal policy in both domestic and external spheres was adopted after 1978; and (3) the complications arising from the "two-China" problem tended to delay China's admission to most INGOs. Following the UN example, many IGOs recognised the PRC as the sole legitimate representative of China, including Taiwan, so that the PRC had little problem in securing membership of IGOs. However, INGOs are on the whole far less political in emphasis: most of them accept individual and group members irrespective of their political denomination, so members from both Taiwan and China are welcomed. Before 1979 this created for the mainland Chinese a "two-China" situation which hindered their admission to these organisations.

Throughout the seventies and early eighties China exerted much pressure in an effort to cut off Taiwan's external relations. The effort was quite successful, but eventually a certain limit seemed to have been reached. At the end of 1985 Taiwan still maintained: (a) full diplomatic relations with

twenty-three countries; (b) substantive, though "unofficial" links (commercial and consular services) with more than 140 others; and (c) membership in ten IGOs and 663 INGOs.<sup>5</sup> Taiwan's relatively high level of representation in INGOs at present is mainly the result both of its own concerted drive to break out of its diplomatic isolation and of China's policy adopted since the late seventies to tolerate coexistence with Taiwan in INGOs under certain conditions, as exemplified in UNESCO.

#### The "Two-China" Problem in UNESCO

UNESCO was the first UN specialised agency to recognise the PRC<sup>6</sup> -- on 29 October 1971 -- thus providing a sufficiently long time span over which to observe China's behaviour towards Taiwan's membership of INGOs affiliated with UNESCO.

In its effort to oust Taiwan the first step that China took was to introduce a resolution at the 93rd session of the UNESCO Executive Board meeting in 1973, urging all INGOs associated with UNESCO to sever ties with "bodies or elements linked with Chiang Kai-shek".<sup>7</sup> The resolution was adopted overwhelmingly. To put it into effect the Executive Board invited the Director-General of UNESCO:

- (1) to communicate this resolution to all international non-governmental organisations maintaining relations with UNESCO,
- (2) to request the international non-governmental organisations concerned to inform him of the actions they have taken to comply with the resolutions, and
- (3) to submit a report on this subject to the Executive Board at

its Spring session in 1974.<sup>8</sup>

Accordingly the Director-General sent in November 1973 a circular letter concerning the resolution to the 319 INGOs which had relations with UNESCO, requesting them to inform him of their connections with Taiwan. By March 1974, 220 of them replied: 182 said that they had no branches, sections or individual members in Taiwan while 38 said that they had.<sup>9</sup> In the same year three organisations informed the Director-General that they had decided to suspend relations with their Taiwan members: the International Music Council, the International Federation of Library Associations, and the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources.<sup>10</sup> Seemingly delighted, a Chinese delegate to UNESCO urged others to follow their examples.<sup>11</sup> However, most of the INGOs which had ties with Taiwan, including the important International Council of Scientific Unions and the International PEN, did not waver, arguing that they were non-political.

Because of the large number of INGOs involved and their special relationships with UNESCO, it was difficult for China to achieve its aim of expelling Taiwan from most of them in a short period of time. So China found it necessary to effect the passage of a similar resolution every year thereafter when the Executive Board met to discuss the Taiwan issue. At the invitation of the Board the Director-General would send a circular letter to all the INGOs concerned, requesting them to inform him of the measures they had taken to implement the resolution. He would then report the replies which he had received from the INGOs to the next session of the Board meeting in the

following year. The whole process became a sort of ritual to be repeated annually.

From 1975 onwards the circular letters from the Director-General were directed to the forty or so organisations which had previously informed him of their membership connections with Taiwan. But the situation of the Taiwan issue in UNESCO remained more or less stagnant in the ensuing years. In fact the number of INGOs having relations with Taiwan increased slightly over time: 37 (1975), 37 (1976), 41 (1977), 41 (1978), 41 (1979), 45 (1981).<sup>12</sup> The reasons for this phenomenon were revealed in the 32 replies to the Director-General's letter of February 1981 to the 45 INGOs, inquiring about their relationships with Taiwan. These reasons were:<sup>13</sup>

- (1) Ten organisations did not wish to break off relationships with their members in Taiwan for reasons of principle or for legal reasons, their statutes not permitting them to do so.
- (2) Seven had no relations with the government of Taiwan but did have relations with nationals from that region.
- (3) Three were referring the matter to their governing body or general assembly for a decision.
- (4) Eight had sought or were seeking appropriate means to implement the resolution.
- (5) Two had members both in the PRC and Taiwan.
- (6) Two had no members from Taiwan.

By the end of 1983 most INGOs had complied, to the satisfaction of the Chinese delegation to UNESCO, with the resolution requesting them to break off relations with Taiwan. For a few which had not, a Chinese representative suggested that "UNESCO should refrain from establishing more extensive co-

operative relations with them, admitting them into a higher category of relations, or complying with any requests for subventions."<sup>14</sup>

During the seventies and the early eighties China must have taken note of the reasons put forward by the INGOs, studied them carefully in the context of its overall foreign policy objectives, and made some modifications to its stance on the Taiwan issue. The successive changes of its attitudes can be gauged from statements made by its delegates at various meetings of the Executive Board's Committee on INGOs. At such a meeting in October 1976 Zhou Jiji said:

Among these organisations, some even go so far as to claim on the one hand that "they're non-governmental, apolitical and essentially professional organisations", "do not represent their governments" and "do not want to get involved in political activities", while on the other hand they continue to receive bodies and individuals controlled by the Chiang clique. They are in essence, playing such political tricks as creating "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". This is a phenomenon both abnormal and intolerable.<sup>15</sup>

At a similar meeting in October 1978 Tian Liren admitted that:

Some NGOs...are trying earnestly to find a solution to the question. We appreciate this positive attitude even though some of the formulas they offered need further studies. We have to point out meanwhile that certain organisations remain passive in the implementation of the resolution of UNESCO. They put forward some specious arguments, and use "the principle of universality" and the regulations of the Constitution of the Organisation as pretexts to justify themselves for retaining the Chiang clique. This is regrettable.<sup>16</sup>

At another meeting in September 1980 Tian declared:

We are not opposed to persons from Taiwan being members of non-governmental organisations or taking part in their activities in a personal capacity or on behalf of an institution of Chinese Taiwan considered to be a Chinese local institution. But we are



firmly opposed to any attempt to create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". We therefore request the non-governmental organisations concerned to conform to the spirit of the relevant resolution of the Organisation [UNESCO] by taking forthwith such measures as will prevent institutions or persons from Taiwan from being included in their membership or from taking part in their activities while using the name of "the Republic of China" or "China" or that of "Taiwan" purporting to be a "territory independent of China".<sup>17</sup>

The most significant change in China's policy came in a statement made by Yang Bozhen at a meeting in September 1981:

We are resolutely opposed to any action by any international NGOs linked with UNESCO trying to scheme for "two Chinas", "one China, one Taiwan", or "the independence of Taiwan, thus treating Taiwan as "an independent political entity". We consider that it is permissible for any one person concerned in Taiwan to participate in an international NGO linked with UNESCO in his own name; it is also permissible for any related organisation in Taiwan to participate in an international NGO in the capacity of a local organisation of China. But it must be clear that only the related organisation in the People's Republic of China can enjoy the status and the rights of a "National Member".<sup>18</sup>

The above four separate statements indicate in broad terms the progressive changes of China's position towards the Taiwanese participation in INGOs from (a) totally rejecting any membership from Taiwan, to (b) acknowledging that the proposals put forward by some INGOs for handling the Taiwan issue were worth considering, to (c) accepting Taiwan as a member on the basis of individuals and local organisations, and finally to (d) permitting only related organisations from the PRC, and not those from Taiwan, to enjoy the status and rights of a national member. These changes show that China was at least responsive to the opinions of the INGOs concerned and that China could not have all things its own way if cordial working relationships with UNESCO and some

INGOs were to be maintained. China, in short, had been engaging in a give-and-take process. Throughout this process one basic principle remained unchanged--there must not be "two Chinas", "one China, one Taiwan", or "Taiwan as an independent political entity or a region distinct from China".

To ensure the stringent adherence to this basic principle, the Chinese Ambassador to UNESCO, Su Lin, sent a letter on 10 May 1984 to the Director-General, requesting that the "Taiwan Province of China should be written as 'Taiwan of China' at present wherever it is referred to in the documents of the current Executive Board session and those of UNESCO in the future as well as in documents and publications of all the INGOs having relations with UNESCO."<sup>19</sup> To illustrate his point Su gave an example: it would not be sufficient to change the so-called "Association for the Promotion of the Welfare of the Aging of the Republic of China" to the "Association for the Promotion of the Welfare of the Aging in Taiwan", but should change to the "Association for the Promotion of Welfare of the Aging in Taiwan of China".<sup>20</sup> In compliance with Su's request his letter was distributed to all the members of the Executive Board. In May 1984 the Board decided to adopt the use of the designation "Taiwan of China" in UNESCO documents.<sup>21</sup>

Although China's condition for expelling Taiwan from INGOs has been relaxed progressively, it has not formally forsaken its policy of demanding Taiwan's expulsion. It has not, for example, dropped completely its effort in bringing about the annual resolutions in the Executive Board of UNESCO or similar biennial resolutions in the General Conference to demand INGOs to sever

links with Taiwan. Nonetheless China has come to realise the limits of its influence. The constraints on its actions come from various sources, including those built into the constitutions and statutes of the INGOs concerned, the attitudes of their leaders and the functionally diverse nature of the organisations, the different types and qualifications of membership, and the history of Taiwan's relations with them. An important case can be found in the International Olympic Committee (IOC).

#### The Olympic Formula<sup>22</sup>

This formula is an arrangement devised by the IOC to handle the "two-China" problem in the sphere of international sports. It has helped to settle the competing claims of the PRC and Taiwan to be the sole legitimate representative of China in the Olympic movement and in other international sporting activities. Under this formula both countries participated in the Los Angeles Games during July/August 1984 for the first time in the history of the Summer Olympics. Previously the PRC had refused to take part in any Olympic Games because of the participation of the Taiwanese team in those games.

The fundamentals of the formula were laid down in a resolution passed at an IOC executive meeting held in Nagoya, Japan, in October 1979. According to the resolution, the national Olympic committee of the PRC would be named the "Chinese Olympic Committee," using the flag and anthem of the PRC; and the Olympic committee of Taiwan would be named the "Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee." The latter's anthem, flag and emblem would have to be changed after prior approval from the Executive Board of the IOC. The resolution was

immediately submitted by the IOC chairman to the 89 IOC members for a postal vote. Results of the postal ballot, announced at the IOC headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland, showed 62 in favour of readmitting China, 17 against, 2 ballots spoiled, and 8 members did not return their ballot papers.<sup>23</sup> Henceforth the Chinese Olympic Committee and the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee were recognised by the IOC and were entitled to participate in all Olympic activities.

Taiwan at first refused to accept the formula for fear of jeopardising its independent international status, but finally accepted it after reaching an agreement with the IOC at a meeting in Lausanne in March 1981. According to the agreement, the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee was entitled to participate in future Olympic Games, as well as in other activities sponsored by the IOC, like every national Olympic committee, with the same status and the same rights.<sup>24</sup>

Thus the question of Chinese representation in the IOC was settled. For the PRC there was no "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." Taiwan was subsumed under China -- at least it was so suggested by the names of the two Olympic committees. The outcome helped to facilitate communication between China and Taiwan through sports and was conducive to the process of reunification of Taiwan with China. For Taiwan there was no option but to accept the resolution if it wished to remain in the Olympic movement. The whole situation was brought about by political circumstances quite beyond its control, since it elected to opt out of direct negotiations with the PRC and

the IOC, in accordance with its government's policy of not negotiating with China. The fact that it was given the same treatment as any other national Olympic committee meant that its status remained more or less intact. More importantly the Taiwanese authorities could show to the world that there was a Chinese entity in Taiwan, separate from the one that existed in mainland China. For the IOC the resolution had settled one of the most difficult problems that had been plaguing it for the last twenty years; since neither Chinese claimant was barred from the movement, the principle that young people should be allowed the opportunity to compete freely in Olympic sports, irrespective of colour, race or creed, was upheld. In short all three parties derived some satisfaction from the arrangement.

#### The Applicability of the Olympic Formula

How applicable is the Olympic formula in handling a similar "two-China" problem in other sporting organisations? In making an assessment the scope of sporting organisations considered here is limited to international federations (IFs) whose sports are included in the Olympic programme, for three reasons. First, these IFs control the majority of sporting activities at the international level. Second, they work in close liaison with the IOC in promoting sports activities. Third, the availability of source materials makes a study of them feasible. According to the Répertoire Directory 1984 of the IOC,<sup>25</sup> there are twenty-eight IFs, including such big ones as the International Amateur Athletic Federation and the International Amateur Basketball Federation.

Figure 3 indicates that China is a member of twenty-six out of the twenty-eight IFs and Taiwan a member of twenty-seven. In those IFs where China is not yet a member, Taiwan can still maintain its membership under the name of the Republic of China. These include the bobsleighbing and boxing federations. However, in IFs where both China and Taiwan are members, Taiwan's membership name is "Chinese Taipei". In the canoe federation where China is a member and Taiwan is not, the problem of "two Chinas" does not exist; should Taiwan apply for membership under the name of Chinese Taipei, it is sure to be accepted. In the near future it is highly probable that both China and Taiwan will be members of all twenty-eight IFs and that Taiwan will be represented under the name of "Chinese Taipei." In contrast, at the end of 1978, China was a member of only eleven IFs<sup>26</sup> and Taiwan fifteen,<sup>27</sup> with no coexisting membership. These changes indicate that the Olympic formula has exercised an enormous influence over the decisions made by international sporting organisations. It is certainly applicable to resolving the "two-China" problem in the sphere of international sports. Both China and Taiwan can rely on it to increase their memberships of IFs, thereby enhancing their participation in sports, to the benefit to both.

No. of Federations




FIGURE 3 : MEMBERSHIPS OF CHINA AND TAWWAN IN INTERNATIONAL SPORTS FEDERATIONS

- Sources :
1. Information from the library of the Olympic Museum and Study Centre, and the IOC headquarters.
  2. Chiu Hungdah (ed.), Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, 1985, pp. 248-50.
  3. Correspondence with the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee and some federations in 1985.

### The ICSU Formula

This formula was pioneered by the International Union of Biochemistry (IUB), and was put into practice first in the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) and the International Astronomical Union (IAU) before being adopted by the International Council of Scientific Unions. Because of the high standing of the ICSU in the international scientific community and the role it played in the admission of the PRC to other scientific unions, it is appropriate to use its name to identify the formula. Briefly the above situation came about as follows.

The Academia Sinica of the PRC joined the IUB in 1956, but withdrew in 1965 in protest against the admission in 1963 of the Academia Sinica, Taipei. Similar incidents happened to the ICSU and other unions in the 1960s.

After the resumption of scientific contacts with the outside world in the early 1970s, both Chinese scientists and their foreign colleagues abroad hoped that China would rejoin the unions. Most of these unions, however, welcomed the admission of the PRC in its own right, but not at the expense of Taiwan's expulsion.

In October 1976 the ICSU general assembly passed a resolution that provided a guideline for the IUB in its negotiations concerning the admission of China. According to the resolution, the ICSU

recommends that all scientific unions of the ICSU adhere to the principle of the universality of science, and not exclude from membership any community of scientists which effectively represents the scientific activity in a definite territory;


expresses its eagerness to welcome into the ICSU and the

affiliated unions, national memberships representing the great scientific community of the People's Republic of China; and

recommends that the scientific unions of the ICSU provide for adherence through appropriate institutions by scientific communities which effectively represent scientific activity in a definite territory, provided they can be listed under a name that will avoid any misunderstanding about the territory represented.<sup>28</sup>

Soon after its formation in May 1979 the Chinese Biochemical Society applied for IUB membership and requested to replace Taiwan, saying that positions for a vice-president and a council member in the Society had been reserved for Taiwan. But the IUB realised that under the prevailing circumstances it was impossible for biochemists from Taiwan to take an effective part in the activities of that Society. To admit the PRC Society under its stated conditions would effectively terminate, for the time being at least, any representation in the IUB of biochemists from Taiwan.<sup>29</sup>

This impasse led IUB leaders to suggest the idea of two adhering bodies from China. Discussions to this effect were held at the International Congress of Biochemistry in Toronto in July 1979 involving representatives of China, Taiwan and the IUB, resulting in an agreement. The names used by these two bodies were sorted out during visits made by the IUB Secretary-General to Beijing and Taipei in late August. They are now listed in the Union's record as:<sup>30</sup>

China  Chinese Biochemical Society  
Biochemical Society located in Taipei, China

The new name for the Taiwanese society, originally suggested by its own

representative,<sup>31</sup> was changed from the Academia Sinica to avoid misunderstanding about the territory represented. This change of name, together with the admission of the Chinese Biochemical Society, took effect on 1 March 1980.

Both the PRC's and Taiwan's willingness to entertain such an arrangement can be seen in the light of their modified policies towards the problem of Chinese representation. On the one hand, the PRC desired to get into closer contact with Taiwan and to tap Western science and technology to help its modernisation through participation in scientific organisations. On the other hand, the policy-makers in Taiwan had to go along with the compromise solution or risk the possibility of expulsion, thereby further isolating itself from the world community without achieving any compensating enhancement of its overall claims to legitimacy either internally or internationally.

The success achieved at the Toronto conference was immediately conveyed by the IUB to two other scientific unions which were meeting at about the same time to discuss, among other things, similar representation problems: the IAU meeting in Montreal in August and the IUPAC meeting in Davos, Switzerland, in September. The IUPAC moved faster than the IUB and the IAU in reaching an agreement each with China and Taiwan on 8 September 1979.

The two agreements were identical in contents, one was signed by PRC representatives and IUPAC officials, and the other by Taiwan representatives and IUPAC officials. The agreements stipulated that there would be two adhering organisations to be designated in the membership list as:<sup>32</sup>

China The Chinese Chemical Society

The Chemical Society located in Taipei, China

In order to overcome the obstacle posed by the statutes restricting membership to one national organisation for a country, the President of the IUPAC exercised his authority to rule that:<sup>33</sup>

In the case of a country in which present circumstances make it impossible for all chemists to engage in coordinated scientific activities over the whole territory, "country"... shall designate a definite geographical territory, in which a community of chemists pursue independent scientific activities.

This ruling, together with the two agreements and the membership application filed by the Chinese Chemical Society, were approved by the IUPAC Council with 134 votes in favour and none against.<sup>34</sup>

Thus the IUPAC became the first among the then eighteen international scientific unions comprising the ICSU to have members from both China and Taiwan. Its official journal Chemistry International reported that this event "shows that cooperation within science can precede, and possibly set the stage for, cooperation in the political forum."<sup>35</sup>

In the case of the International Astronomical Union, the PRC withdrew its membership in the early sixties in protest against the admission of the ROC in 1960. On 1 May 1980 an agreement was reached between China, Taiwan and the Union to allow one member country from China with two national adhering bodies: the Chinese Astronomical Society, Nanjing, and the Astronomy Union located at Taipei China<sup>36</sup>

In the ICSU the first community of Chinese scientists was admitted in 1937

under the Academia Sinica, Nanking,<sup>37</sup> which was changed in 1952 to Academia Sinica, Peking. However, outstanding fees for several years were paid in 1954 by the Academia Sinica, Taipei, which thus acquired the membership registration. During the seventies the ICSU was under pressure from UNESCO to expel Taiwan but refused to do so, arguing that the Council was non-political and that it welcomed scientists and scientific bodies regardless of their provenance. As a result it was accused by the PRC of creating "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". The successful resolution of the problem of Chinese representation in the IUB, the IUPAC and the IAU eventually led to the reinstatement of a scientific organisation from China.<sup>38</sup> A decision was made at the 19th session of the ICSU general assembly held in Cambridge, England, in September 1982. Under what has become known as the ICSU formula, "China" is designated as one member country, but is represented by two adhering organisations: the China Association for Science and Technology, Beijing, and the Academy located in Taipei, China.<sup>39</sup>

#### The Applicability of the ICSU Formula

The handling of the "two-China" issue within the ICSU has been of great significance because of the high international standing of the Council. As the parent organisation for twenty international scientific unions, sixty-six national members, nineteen scientific and five national associates,<sup>40</sup> its position in the science world is comparable to that of the IOC in the sports world. Once a precedent is set at the ICSU, other unions find it easy to follow along. The ICSU formula has thus a catalytic effect, similar to the

Olympic formula, among its member unions. The extent of this effect is shown in Figure 4.

In 1979 China was a member of only three unions, compared to Taiwan's thirteen, with no co-membership between them.<sup>41</sup> Since then memberships of both have steadily increased, as has the number of co-memberships: 3 (1980), 5 (1981), 6 (1982), and 11 (1984).<sup>42</sup> As of 1985 China is a member of nineteen unions and Taiwan seventeen, with fifteen co-memberships, all of which have followed the ICSU formula.

Other international science and technology organisations outside the umbrella of the ICSU have also followed similar methods in handling this problem. For example, in the International Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, both the Chinese Society of Geodesy, Photogrammetry and Cartography, and the Chinese Taipei Society of Photogrammetry were admitted as members during the International Congress of Photogrammetry in Hamburg in 1980, both being listed under the heading "China" in the membership list.<sup>43</sup> In the International Society for Urology, the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, Beijing, and the University Medical School, Taipei, are national committee members placed together under China in the Society's record.<sup>44</sup>

The ICSU formula is similar to the Olympic one in several ways: first and foremost, both the PRC and Taiwan can be accommodated within the same INGOs, each party controlling activities within the area under its jurisdiction; second, with few exceptions,<sup>45</sup> both enjoy the same membership status and rights in the organisations; third, Taiwan has had to change its membership name and

No of Unions




FIGURE 4 : MEMBERSHIPS OF CHINA AND TAIWAN IN INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC UNIONS

Sources : 1. Year Book of International Council of Scientific Unions (Paris: ICSU), 1979, pp. 11-3; 1980, pp. 13-5; 1981, pp. 13-5; 1982, pp. 13-5; 1983 & 1984, p. 17; and 1985, p. 20.

2. Updated by correspondence with some unions in 1984 and 1985.

Notes : 1. The data for 1983 and 1984 are amalgamated in accordance with the Year Book.

2. The ICSU is included in the graph.

other national symbols. The only obvious difference is that in the ISCU and the vast majority of scientific unions, both are listed under a single entry---- China,<sup>46</sup> whereas in the IOC and sports federations, they are listed separately. Apparently this difference does not bother the PRC over much, since in both groups of organisations Taiwan's membership designations strongly suggest that Taiwan represents a local region of China.

The positive outcome of cooperation and compromise in the International Olympic Committee and the International Council of Scientific Unions has spread over to international sports federations and international scientific unions respectively. The influence of the Olympic formula in the sports field and that of the ICSU formula in the science field have also spread to other areas. A considerable number of INGOs outside these two fields have followed a similar method in dealing with the "two-China" issue. Examples are the International Political Science Association,<sup>47</sup> the World Energy Conference,<sup>48</sup> the International PEN, and the International Union of Railways, to name but a few. In general both China and Taiwan can be accommodated within the same organisations at non-governmental level. The "secret" of this achievement lies in the spirit of compromise, mutual benefit, and the ability of top decision-makers on both sides to perceive it as such--and act accordingly. Deng Xiaoping of the PRC and Chiang Ching-kuo of the ROC were known to have been separately involved in approving the settlement of the "two-China" problem in scientific unions and in the IOC respectively.<sup>49</sup> Can this same spirit be carried over to intergovernmental organisations?

### The Applicability to IGOs

As of 1986 China was a member of ninety-four IGOs and Taiwan nine,<sup>50</sup> with no coexistence between them in these organisations. Two cases are, however, being tested: the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

Founded in 1923 Interpol has 135 members. The ROC became a member in 1961, whereas the PRC showed serious interest in joining in the early eighties. In May 1984 the PRC formally applied for membership on three conditions: (1) the name of the Taiwanese representation must be changed from the "Republic of China" to "Taiwan, China," (2) the words "Republic of China" must not be used in the records of the organisation and the ROC flag must be banned, and (3) the full membership of the ROC must be changed and be attached to the membership of the PRC.<sup>51</sup> China's overall stand was to allow Taiwan to remain in Interpol under its (China's) terms, that is, Taiwan should recognise the PRC delegation as the sole legitimate representative of China by complying with the above conditions.<sup>52</sup>

At the 53rd general assembly of Interpol held in Luxembourg in September 1984, three separate ballots relating to the membership issue were taken. The first two dealt with China's admission and the third its imposed conditions of entry. The result of the first ballot was fifty-seven for and thirty-seven against, but China nevertheless failed to get the two-thirds majority required by the Interpol constitution to acquire membership.<sup>53</sup> It was successful, however, in the second ballot: seventy-two for and twenty-seven against.<sup>54</sup>



The third was a forty-eight to forty-eight split. Hence the China National Central Bureau, under the Criminal Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security of the PRC,<sup>55</sup> was officially admitted as a member, whereupon the Taiwanese delegation walked out of the assembly in protest, after releasing a statement condemning the admission of its rival.

Taiwan's defiance is understandable because if it were to accept China's terms, its position in the international body would probably be downgraded to one similar to that of Interpol Hong Kong Sub-Bureau--deprived of a voting right. In fact, after the admission of the PRC as a member, the Secretary-General of Interpol made no change in the total number of Interpol members. This implied that the ROC had been deprived of a voting right and hence its membership.<sup>56</sup>

However, some international legal experts employed by Interpol to look into the membership issue concluded in their memorandum of 1 February 1985 that

The Republic of China has not been expelled from Interpol, nor has its Membership status been modified, either by any effective action of the General Assembly under the Constitution of the Organisation or by operation of international law.<sup>57</sup>

Taiwan's case has been referred to the Interpol's executive committee for further study.

The Asian Development Bank is the most important IGO among the few that Taiwan still maintains a relationship with. Here Taiwan holds a relatively stronger position than in most other international organisations: it is a founding member in good standing and has turned into a creditor country after having been a borrower before, its participation being based on the

geographical size, population and economic indicators of Taiwan. It enjoys the support of the United States which welcomes the admission of the PRC provided it is not at the expense of Taiwan's expulsion. The US has threatened to withhold its funding to the Bank if Taiwan's position is adversely affected, a Senate resolution to that effect having been passed in May 1985 by a vote of seventy-five to nineteen.<sup>58</sup> Moreover, some member countries were worried that China's membership might drain the Bank's resources in the medium term.<sup>59</sup>

When China applied for membership in February 1983,<sup>60</sup> its condition of entry was the expulsion of Taiwan, but since then it had softened its demand: first to require Taiwan to change its membership status from full to associate, and later to require it to change its present registered name of the "Republic of China" to "Taiwan, China."<sup>61</sup> This marked a significant shift in China's policy, because it was prepared for the first time to coexist with Taiwan at the international governmental level. Taiwan had agreed earlier to the change of name in return for Beijing's acceptance of two parties representing China in the ADB.<sup>62</sup> But the Sino-British Agreement on Hong Kong signed in December 1984 induced Taiwan to reject the suggested new name, because acceptance would imply submission to the relegation of its political status to a "Special Administrative Region" like "Hong Kong, China" after 1997. To avoid being accused by some members of intransigence and of deliberately blocking China's entry, Taiwan proposed to change its name to "China (Taiwan)."<sup>63</sup> This proposal also represented an important change in Taiwan's policy of not acceding "to any sort of name change in connection with membership in the ADB."<sup>64</sup> According to

Taiwan's interpretation, the word "China" in "China (Taiwan)" meant one China, and the word "(Taiwan)" meant "the territory of Taiwan," with no implication whatsoever of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan."<sup>65</sup> However, the PRC saw it differently and rejected the proposal. For the two annual meetings of the Board of Governors of the Bank held in Amsterdam in April 1984 and in Bangkok in April 1985, China's application was treated as improper because of the conditions attached, and was excluded from the agenda, obviously to avoid forcing a showdown which would be detrimental to the Bank.

Quiet diplomacy involving the various parties, including the United States and Japan, the two largest shareholders of the Bank, eventually led to the formal admission of China to the Bank under its full name "People's Republic of China" in March 1986. At the same time Taiwan was allowed to remain as a member under the name "Taipei, China."<sup>66</sup> As a result the ADB becomes the first IGO to have both China and Taiwan as members, representing a breakthrough in an intergovernmental organisation, due primarily to two reasons. First, China has agreed, at least implicitly, to the application of the Olympic formula to the Bank, despite the fact that the formula was treated as a temporary measure when it was first formulated. This increases significantly the applicability of the formula as a means for handling the "two-China" issue in international organisations. Second, Taiwan has decided to stay in the Bank despite the demeaning name change forced upon it. This represented a fundamental departure from its long-held policy of never coexisting with the PRC at the official intergovernmental level. However, to register its fury, Taiwan deplored the

Bank's decision, refused to accept formally the name change, and decided to take a less active role in the Bank's activities.<sup>67</sup> It did not send any official delegation to attend the last two annual meetings of the Bank held in Manila in 1986 and in Osaka in 1987.

Taiwan is not without benefit by going along with the arrangement, because a precedent can be set at an important IGO, on the basis of which, it can then try to seek entry or re-entry to other IGOs if it so wishes, first to those which are closely associated with the Bank, then to the specialised agencies of the UN, and eventually perhaps to the UN itself. Such a possibility could not be ruled out, according to Huan Xiang, a senior adviser to China's State Council, but he felt that Taiwan was not yet ready for it.<sup>68</sup> A spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry said, however, that Taiwan's remaining in the ADB after changing its designation did not constitute a precedent to any other international organisation.<sup>69</sup> As the Taiwanese authorities are fully aware, such a projected course will be full of obstacles<sup>70</sup> and will certainly take a long time to mature.

#### Implications for Reunification

What are the implications of the foregoing developments in international organisations for China's policy for securing the reunification of Taiwan? Since the official signing of the Hong Kong Agreement, China has repeatedly stressed that it was the successful outcome of the concept of "one country, two systems."<sup>71</sup> This concept, the PRC claims, is also applicable to Taiwan, with more generous terms than those for Hong Kong. In addition to its present

economic and social systems, Taiwan will be allowed to maintain its armed forces and security services.<sup>72</sup> How generous are the terms for Taiwan's control of its external relations have not been clearly spelt out, except the vague promise that China will grant Taiwan "considerable diplomatic powers to handle some external affairs."<sup>73</sup>

The Olympic and the ICSU formulas can be seen as two specific manifestations of the concept under two different sets of circumstances (see Table 1).

TABLE 1: TWO MANIFESTATIONS OF "ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS"

Concept Formula	One Country	Two Systems	Proponent
Olympic	Not applicable	Two committees: Chinese...; Chinese Taipei...	IOC
ICSU	One country	Two adhering bodies: Chinese...Society; ...Society located in Taipei, China	IUB; ICSU

At the heart of the concept is the issue of national sovereignty: the PRC is to be the sole central government and Taiwan a regional one; only the former

is responsible for conducting diplomacy with foreign countries.<sup>74</sup> For Taiwan to accept such terms would mean the surrendering of its present international legal personality. The most flexible position that Taiwan seems to be prepared to consider is a "multi-system nation" concept which, in a nutshell, calls for the recognition of the sovereignty of both China and Taiwan by the international community until reunification is eventually achieved.<sup>75</sup>

Each of the two separate concepts has been rejected by the opposite side, for reasons that have been analysed by scholars interested in this area.<sup>76</sup> Simply put, China rejects a "multi-system nation" and a similar idea of the formation of a "great China confederation" on the ground that they are tantamount to the creation of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan."<sup>77</sup> Taiwan, on the other hand, condemns the "one country, two systems" as a "united front tactic" to confuse the free world by creating an illusion of peaceful coexistence.<sup>78</sup>

Bitter polemics apart, it is clear that both China and Taiwan are working towards some form of "one country, two systems,"<sup>79</sup> but differ in their interpretations of the words "country" and "systems" (see Table 2).

Both agree on one cultural entity and two social entities but disagree on the number of sovereign entities. The present situation is that there are two sovereign entities--a reality that China dismisses. China wants to extend its sovereignty over Taiwan, whereas the latter refuses to surrender its to the former. Short of an all-out military solution<sup>80</sup> (which is unlikely to happen according to the analyses of leading strategists in this field),<sup>81</sup> and barring

TABLE 2: TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF "ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS"

Concept	One Country	Two Systems	Proponent
Actor			
China	One sovereign entity	Two social entities	Deng Xiaoping
Taiwan	One cultural entity	Two sovereign entities	Wei Yung* Shen Junshan**

\* Wei is a political scientist, an academic turned government civil servant. See Chiu and Downen, Multi-system Nations and International Law; and Shaw Yuming (ed.), Guoshi taolunji (Taipei, 1983), pp. 199-211.

\*\* Shen is an academic, a physical scientist by profession, and an adviser to the government. See Jiushi niandai, May 1983, pp. 41-51.

unforeseen fundamental changes in Sino-America-Taiwan relations or in domestic circumstances in China and Taiwan, the present situation will most probably persist in the foreseeable future. Any non-military alternative can hardly avoid addressing the problem of how sovereignty is to be shared on a positive-sum basis with increased benefits to both, along the line suggested by the Olympic and the ICSU formulas, in the interim period leading up to some possible agreement towards full reunification.

Prospects for Reunification

What is needed at present if a sustainable dialogue is to be established between China and Taiwan is something rudimentary, mutually beneficial and based on a proven track record; something that can be built upon step-by-step so that trust and confidence can be fostered; something that both sides can retreat from to their initial positions without suffering too much damage should the attempt fail; and something that carries a certain amount of international check and balance so that both sides would act fairly according to some agreed rules.

At the moment the only measure that comes close to fitting this bill is the Olympic (or the ICSU) formula which is gaining popularity among INGOs. The number of co-memberships between China and Taiwan in these organisations is increasing; available statistics show that it rose from 105 in 1983 to 182 in 1986.<sup>82</sup>

China welcomes Taiwan's compliance of the Olympic formula in seeking membership of international organisations. Taiwan, however, is very cautious. Its stated policy is to limit the applicability of the formula to sporting organisations so that its young people can have the chance to compete in international sports. In practice, however, Taiwan also goes along with the ICSU formula to expand its participation in scientific organisations and with similar methods to maintain or acquire membership of other organisations.

All these activities necessitate Taiwan to adjust its policy of "no contact, no negotiation, no compromise" with China to "no avoidance, no

retreat," and to handle flexibly individual cases according to prevailing circumstances.<sup>83</sup>

Thus, progress made in the area of INGOs has so far brought China and Taiwan closer together, representing an elementary yet positive step in the long process towards a possible reunification. There are avenues that both parties can pursue to consolidate and to expand the existing links to their mutual benefit. Both can increase their participation in INGOs and IGOs by acquiring more memberships. This can easily be done in organisations where the other party is not yet a member. Taiwan can use the name Republic of China or China (Taiwan) or Chinese Taipei or some other suitable title. In organisations where the other is already a member, the Olympic, ICSU or some similar formula can be used.

## NOTES

1. Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary, 3rd ed. (Santa Barbara, California, and Oxford, England: ABC-CLIO, 1982), p. 325.
2. A good indication can be found in the bibliography of a volume edited by Samuel S. Kim entitled China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-Mao Era (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984). The bibliography, according to the editor, is an outgrowth of the contributors' "teaching and research experience in Chinese foreign policy" and serves as "a reference point of departure for serious research." (p. 335) Of a total of 179 books and journal articles listed, only one half of one article is on INGOs!
3. For a full list of these organisations see UNESCO Executive Board 119th session document 119 EX/INF.5 (Paris, 11 May 1984), Annex 2, pp. 1-11.
4. A search through successive issues of the Yearbook of International Organisations (YIO) edited by the Union of International Associations, Brussels, is of little help, because this source does not indicate the years in which a particular country became members of the various bodies. Writing to all the organisations concerned to ask for details would not, however, be likely to generate the required information.
5. Chiu Hungdah (ed.) Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Volume 5(1985) (Taipei: The Chinese Society of International Law - Chinese (Taiwan) Branch of the International Law Association, 1986). The count of IGOs and INGOs of this Taiwanese source is different from that of YIO shown in Figures 1 and 2.
6. For the dates on which other specialised agencies recognised the PRC, see Samuel S. Kim, China, the United Nations, and World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 347.
7. UNESCO Executive Board 94th session document 94 EX/33, (Paris, 20 February 1974), p. 1.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 94 EX/33 Add. (Paris, 30 April 1974), p. 1.
10. Ibid., 95 EX/19 (Paris, 1 October 1974), p. 3.

11. Ibid.
12. These figures are culled from documents of the UNESCO Executive Board over the years under consideration.
13. Ibid., 113 EX/19 (Paris, 29 September 1981), pp. 2-3.
14. Statement by the deputy for Yang Bozhen, a Chinese member of the UNESCO Executive Board, in the 116th session document 116 EX/39 (Paris, 11 August 1983), annex.
15. Ibid., 100 EX/26 (Paris, 29 October 1976), p. 2.
16. Ibid., 105 EX/32 Draft (Paris, 16 October 1978), p. 2.
17. Ibid., 110 EX/23 (Paris, 11 September 1980), p. 2.
18. Ibid., 113 EX/19 (Paris, 29 September 1981), p. 4.
19. Copy of the letter was enclosed in the letter ref. LAD/ARC of 19 September 1985 from Claude Chopelet of the UNESCO Archives.
20. Ibid.
21. UNESCO 119 EX/21 (Paris, 21 June 1984), p. 4.
22. For a detailed study of the origin and development of this formula, see Gerald Chan, "The 'Two - Chinas' Problem and the Olympic Formula," in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Fall 1985), pp. 473-90.
23. Olympic Review, No. 145 (November 1979), p. 626.
24. Ibid., No. 162 (April 1981), p. 221 (emphasis added).
25. Pp.41-7.
26. They were track and field, rowing, basketball, canoeing, fencing, gymnastics, ice hockey, wrestling, skating, volleyball, and weightlifting. See Zhongguo baike nianjian (China's Encyclopaedic Yearbook) 1980 (Beijing, Shanghai: Zhongguo da baike quanshe chubanshe, 1980), p. 595.
27. They were swimming, soccer, shooting, cycling, boxing, hockey, judo, handball, archery, skiing, yachting, equestrian, pentathlon, luge, and bobsleighting. See Amateur Sports in the Republic of China (Taipei: Republic of China Olympic Committee, 1978), p. 4. In 1978 Taiwan was expelled from the gymnastic and the track and field federations when China

- was admitted.
28. Quoted in E.C. Slater and W.J. Whelan, "China to Rejoin the IUB," in Trends in Biochemical Sciences (February 1980), p. III.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. IV.
31. Ibid., p. V.
32. Letter ref. 821/MW/ES/84 of 5 November 1984 from Dr. M. Williams, Executive Secretary of the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, enclosing copies of the two agreements and a presidential ruling.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.; and minutes of the 1979 IUPAC Council meeting, p. 5.
35. No. 1, 1980, p. 28.
36. Letter ref. GSM/85/2090/ev/Z of 3 May 1985 from Dr. Richard M. West, General Secretary of the International Astronomical Union, enclosing copies of correspondence exchanged between Professor Y.C. Chang, President of the Chinese Astronomical Society and Professor A. Blaauw, President of the IAU, on 22 August 1979.
37. Letter ref. FWGB/6.10 of 2 January 1985 from F.W.G. Baker, Executive Secretary of the ICSU.
38. A.G. Cock, "Chauvinism and Internationalism in Science: The International Research Council, 1919-1926," in Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 37, No. 2 (March 1983), p. 282.
39. Year Book of the International Council of Scientific Unions (Paris: ICSU, 1985), p. 25.
40. Ibid., 1985, p. VI.
41. Ibid., 1979, p. 11.
42. The ICSU is included. See ibid., 1980, p. 13; 1981, p. 13; 1982, p. 13; and 1984, p. 17. The data are updated by correspondence with some unions in 1985.
43. Letter ref. P-18-193 of 30 October 1985 from G. Bottcher, Secretary of the

International Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing.

44. Société Internationale d'Urologie 1983 (Paris, 1983), p. 37; letter of 13 August 1985 from Professor Alain Jardin, Secretary-General of the Society.
45. For example, in the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics, the Chinese Physical Society has four votes whereas the Physical Society located in Taipei, China, has only one vote. See letter ref. LK:cgb of 24 May 1985 from Professor Larkin Kerwin, former Secretary-General of the IUPAP; and General Report, IUPAP, 1985, p. 138.
46. Two exceptions are the International Union of Microbiology Societies, where China and Taiwan are listed as the Chinese Society for Microbiology (Beijing) and the Chinese Society for Microbiology (Taipei) respectively; and the International Union of Pharmacology, where they are listed as Chinese Pharmacological Society (Beijing) and Chinese Pharmacological Society (Taipei). See letter of 29 April 1985 from Professor Stuart W. Glover, Secretary-General of the IUMB; and letter of 29 October 1985 from Dr. A.M. Barrett, Secretary-General of the IUPHAR.
47. Zhao Baoxu, "The Revival of Political Science in China," in PS, American Political Science Association (Fall 1984), p. 752.
48. Beijing Review (hereafter BR), Vol. 26, No. 40 (3 October 1983), p. 9.
49. Jiushi niandai (The Nineties), hereafter JSND, January 1985, p. 67; and 2 May 1985, pp. 42 and 44.
50. YIO 1986/87, Vol. 2, Table 4, sections A-F. But according to a Taiwanese source, Taiwan retained membership of ten IGOs at the end of 1985. See Chiu (ed.), Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Vol. 5 (1985), 1986, p. 255. Moreover, some of the organisations listed in the two sources are different.
51. Lian he bao (United Daily News), hereafter LHB, overseas ed., 6 September 1984, p. 2; 7 September 1984, p. 2.
52. China Daily (hereafter CD), 15 December 1984, p. 1.
53. International Criminal Police Organisation, Constitution and General Regulations, September 1977, p. 16, Article 21.
54. LHB, overseas ed., 6 September 1984, p. 2; 7 September 1984, p. 2; and CD, 8 September 1984, p. 1.
55. BR, Vol. 28, No. 2, 4 January 1985, p. 10.

56. Chiu, Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, 1986, p. 214.
57. Ibid., p. 43.
58. The Free China Journal, Taipei, 26 May 1985, p. 1; Overseas Torchlight Weekly, Taipei, 24 May 1985, p. 1.
59. ADB Quarterly Review, May 1984, p. 3.
60. BR, Vol. 26, No. 19, 9 May 1983, p. 9.
61. LHB, overseas ed., 30 April 1985, p. 1. For a detailed analysis of Taiwan's relations with the ADB from a Taipei perspective, see Ma Anyi in Zhongguo luntan (China Forum) (Semi-monthly), Taipei, Vol. 20, No. 3 (10 May 1985), pp. 41-3.
62. Asiaweek (hereafter AW), 17 May 1985, p. 36.
63. LHB, 3 May 1985, p. 1.
64. Words of Yu Kuo-hwa, Taiwan's Premier, in an interview with two journalists of The Asian Wall Street Journal. See its 23-24 November 1984 issue, p. 8.
65. Winston Yang in Baixing (Common People), hereafter BX, 16 July 1985, p. 20. Professor Yang points out that the name "China (Taiwan)" was proposed by Yu Kuo-hwa in view of the serious situation, and approved by Chiang Ching-kuo!
66. Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 March 1986, p. 12.
67. The Asian Wall Street Journal, 24 March 1986, p. 3; LHB, overseas ed., 9 March 1986, p. 1.
68. Interview with Huan Xiang at Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia, on 12 July 1985.
69. Ta Kung Pao, weekly supplement, Hong Kong, 5-11 December 1985, p. 4.
70. LHB, overseas ed., 23 March 1986, p. 1.
71. For an incisive analysis of the concept, nature, content, difficulties and prospects of "one country, two systems," see Byron S.J. Weng, "'Yiguo liangzhi' chulun" ("A Preliminary Analysis of 'One Country, Two Systems'"), a paper presented at "The Future of Taiwan" Conference at

Xiamen University, China, in August 1985, and published in JSND, December 1985, pp. 30-40. See also his latest essay on the subject in Mingbao Monthly, November 1987, pp. 27-38.

72. That Taiwan could maintain its security services or intelligence network was announced by Li Xiannian during his visit to Burma in March 1985, but was apparently refuted by Deng Xiaoping in the following May. See AW, 12 July 1985, p. 24.
73. Yan Jiaqi, "Concept Points Way to Reunification," in BR Vol. 28, No. 14 (8 April 1985), p. 23.
74. Ibid., pp. 22-3.
75. For a detailed exposition of this concept see Wei Yung, "The Unification and Division of Multi-system Nations: A Comparative Analysis of Basic Concepts, Issues and Approaches," in Chiu Hungdah and Robert Downen (eds.), Multi-system Nations and International Law: The International Status of Germany, Korea and China (Baltimore, Maryland: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1981), pp. 59-74.
76. See Shaw Yuming, "Taiwan: A View from Taipei," and Huan Guocang, "Taiwan: A View from Beijing," in Foreign Affairs, Summer 1985, pp. 1050-63 and 1064-80; Byron S.J. Weng, "'Yiguo lianzhi' chulun" and his "Taiwan's International Status Today," in China Quarterly, No. 99 (September 1984), pp. 462-80; Chiu Hungdah, "Prospects for the Unification of China: An Analysis of the Views of the Republic of China on Taiwan," in Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 10 (October 1983), pp. 1081-94, and "The 1984 Sino-British Agreement on Hong Kong and Its Implications on China's Unification," in Issues & Studies (hereafter IS), Vol. 21, No. 4 (April 1985), pp. 13-22; and numerous recent articles in Hong Kong journals such as JSND, BX, and Mingbao Monthly.
77. Liu Fengming, Xiandai guojifa gangyao (Essentials of Contemporary International Law) (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1982), pp. 234-6 editorial of Wen hui bao, Hong Kong, 17 March 1984; CD, 7 February 1985, p. 1; BR, Vol. 28, Nos. 7-8 (18 February 1985), p. 10; Guangdong shehui kexue (Guangdong Social Sciences), No.1 (March 1985), p. 97; and Li Jiaquan, "Formula for China's Reunification," in BR, Vol. 29, No. 5, pp. 18-26.
78. Wu Anjia, "'One Country, Two Systems': A Model for Taiwan?" in IS, Vol. 21, No. 7 (July 1985), pp. 33-59
79. The slogan "one country, two systems" was first coined in Taiwan, only to be dropped when China picked it up. See JSND, May 1985, p. 49; and The

Economist, London, 19 October 1985, p. 25.

80. China has steadfastly and categorically refused to rule out the military option as a last resort to forge a reunification.
81. See Ralph N. Clough, "The Republic of China and the World 1949-1981," in Chiu Hungdah and Leng Shao-chuan (eds.), China, Seventy Years After the 1911 Hsin-Hai Revolution (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1984), pp. 524-57; Shaw, "Taiwan: A View from Taipei"; and Huan, "Taiwan: A View from Beijing."
82. Volume 2 of YIO, 1983 and 1986.
83. Central Daily News, international ed., Taipei, 2 March 1985, p. 1.