

*A History of Modern Tibet, Volume 4: In the Eye of the Storm: 1957–1959.* By Melvyn C. Goldstein. Oakland, CA: University Press of California, 2019. Pp. xxxiv + 571. \$85.00.

The fourth volume of *History of Modern Tibet* is an eventful history of Central Tibet during the period 1957–1959, which begins in January 1957, when the fourteenth Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso (Bstan 'dzin rgya mtsho, b. 1935) returned to Lhasa after a stay in India, and ends in March 1959 with the departure of the Dalai Lama from Tibet and his arrival in India. This volume concludes the historical work undertaken by Melvyn C. Goldstein on the so-called modern period of Tibet, from 1913 to 1959.

A great scholar of Tibetan culture and one of the most important contributors to international scientific knowledge about Tibet, Melvyn C. Goldstein speaks to all audience, and his multidisciplinary skills are admirable. Trained as an anthropologist, he has authored numerous books and articles on a wide range of subjects, including Tibetan-English dictionaries that are a staple on the desks of Tibetologists. In recent years (in the 1990s and early 2000s), since the publication of the first of the four-volume series entitled *History of Modern Tibet* in 1989, he compiled historical data collected from 135 former officials, members of the Tibetan government, and other witnesses to the history of Tibet from 1913 to 1959. Tibetan interviews, memoirs, and autobiographies form the basis of a complex and controversial history. Guidelines from the Chinese Central Committee and interviews with Chinese dignitaries, actors of the years 1957–1959, complete the Tibetan testimonies. Melvyn Goldstein fades behind the statements and writings of the protagonists. The result is prodigious precision.

The author begins by mentioning the events that shook Tibet between 1951 and 1957 and are useful to recall. In 1951, several thousand Chinese soldiers arrived in Lhasa and met passive resistance led by the prime minister of the Tibetan government, Lukhangwa (Klu khang ba, 1895–1966). The Tibetan resistance refused to sell basic necessities and food to the Chinese and the establishment of a People's Party (*mi dmangs tshogs 'du*) composed of civil society members who had both anti-Chinese and anti-Tibetan Ministerial Cabinet feelings. In 1952, the dismissal of Prime Minister Lukhangwa and the restoration of the Tibetan Ministerial Cabinet in its traditional form increased the tensions within the Tibetan Work Committee (TWC). Fan Ming 范明 (1914–2010), from the Northwest Bureau, opposed the gradualist approach advocated by Mao Zedong (1893–1976), President of the Republic of China from 1954 to 1959. Fan preferred an immediate application of the so-called democratic reforms and envisaged dividing Tibet into two autonomous regions, thus strengthening the powers of the tenth Panchen Lama Lobsang Trinley Lhündrub Chökyi Gyaltsen (*Blo bzang phrin las lhun grub chos kyi rgyal mtshan*, 1938–1989). The tenth Panchen Lama was a reincarnated master of the second lineage of

reincarnation of the Gélukpa school (Dge lugs pa), after that of the Dalai Lama. He was head of the monastery of Tashilhunpo (Bkra shis lhun po) in the Tibetan province of Gtsang. In 1953, Mao's gradualist policy was reaffirmed, and the Dalai Lama remained the sole spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet.

In 1954, the Dalai Lama travelled to China and stayed there for almost a year. There were then two routes connecting Central China with Lhasa. In 1955, Tibet continued to maintain its own army and currency. Concurrently, the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region (PCTAR) was created while the land reforms were implemented by force in Khams. Fear emerged in Lhasa that the same would soon happen there. In 1956, the Dalai Lama travelled to India where he met Prime Minister Nehru (1889–1964, Prime Minister of India from 1947 until his death). Nehru told him that India would not support him. Instead, an emigrant Tibetan resistance organization was created in India. One of its leaders was the elder brother of the Dalai Lama, Gyalo Thondup (Rgya lo don grub, b. 1928). At the same time, more and more armed and angry Khambas began to flee from the forced land reforms, and to arrive in Lhasa. At the end of his visit to India, the Dalai Lama returned to Tibet.

After this introduction, the author develops the history of the period in three axes: the Tibetan resistance movement and its relations with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government; the Chinese administration in Tibet; and the flight of the Dalai Lama from Tibet.

The first axis concerns the Tibetan resistance movement, the aid it received from the CIA and the position of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government towards it. The Tibetan resistance movement, called The Khams Four Rivers, Six Ranges, Tibetan Defenders of the Faith Volunteer Army (*mdo stod chu bshi sgang drug bod kyi bstan srung dang blangs dmag*), was officially founded on 20 May 1957. Its numerous achievements included disorder and turmoil sufficient to destabilize the Chinese. Its members numbered in the thousands. CIA assistance in October 1958 and February 1959 provided substantial benefit, in particular the training that its members received and the donations of arms and ammunition (in October 1958 and February 1959) from which they benefited.

These contacts could not have existed without the network created in India, which included Andrug Gompo Tashi (A 'brug mgon po bkra shis), leader of the Tibetan resistance fighters, Gyalo Thondup, elder brother of the Dalai Lama and the Jenkhentsisum.<sup>1</sup> One of the important questions raised throughout the book is whether or not the Dalai Lama acknowledged the existence of the Tibetan resistance movement

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<sup>1</sup> The Jenkhentsisum is an acronym formed from the titles of its three leaders: Gyalo Thondup, Tsipön Shakabpa, and Khenjung Lobsang Gyentsen, literally: *jen* (elder brother), *khen* (khenjung), *tsi* (tsipön) and *sum* (the number 3).

and whether he supported his brother. Indeed Goldstein portrayed the Dalai Lama as pursuing two contradictory policies. One was to work with the Chinese to ensure the implementation of the seventeen-point agreement that guaranteed real internal autonomy in Tibet, including the maintenance of the major religious institutions. The other was to support the forces of resistance. According to Melvyn Goldstein, Mao and the Chinese Central Committee had ordered the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to pursue a defensive policy. As such, the PLA did not seek to subdue the resistance fighters, so the Chinese authorities considered that it was up to the Tibetan Ministerial Cabinet to take appropriate action. At the request of the Chinese in Lhasa, the Tibetan Cabinet sent two delegations to the resistance fighters, but without any real conviction. According to Goldstein, the first delegation (which went to Lhoka in June 1958) was neutral, but the second (which joined the resistance forces in Lhoka in 1959) was not. Leaders of the second delegation set up supplies for the resistance fighters. Indeed, Goldstein shows that by appointing Namseling Peljor Jikmé (Rnam sras gling dpal 'byor 'jigs med) as head of the Namseling mission, the ministerial cabinet openly showed its support for the movement. Namseling was a close associate of Gompo Tashi and Tup ten ö den Phala (Thub btan od lden pha lha, 1910–1985), the Lord Chamberlain who supported the resistance movement from its inception. Goldstein insists that the Dalai Lama was regularly informed about the movement by Phala, whose role as intermediary between the members of the resistance in India, the resistance in Tibet, and the Dalai Lama was essential. Finally, the book shows a constant concern for the Dalai Lama's security, an argument that Phala used to justify his action in favour of the Tibetan resistance movement.

The book, therefore, develops two parallel stories: one with the Tibetan resistance movement and the other with the reaction of members of the Tibetan government and the policies pursued by the TWC in Lhasa. The first story forms the first line of thought of the book, making the value of the power of the Tibetan government clear by showing its support or lack of support for the Tibetan resistance movement. There is no doubt that the Dalai Lama, without encouraging the guerrilla movement, was not opposed to it.

The reader may ask, however: What were the forces at work within the Tibetan government? What were the tensions between its members? What about possible factions? The main actors in favour of the Tibetan resistance emerged as ministers: first, Phala, as Lord Chamberlain; and, second, Namseling, Surkhang Wangchen Gelek (Zur khang dbang chen dge legacy, 1910–1977), and Yüthok (G.yu thok). However, it is clear that several levels of responsibilities existed according to the proximity to the Dalai Lama and, above all, with Phala, regarding the actions and decisions to be taken to resist the Chinese presence in Tibet. Despite the list of protagonists given at the beginning of the volume, information was delivered in an incomplete synthetic form without dates, leaving the reader without knowledge of the connections between the

officials (whether lay or religious) in the Tibetan government. This makes it difficult to determine on what basis links were forged, or whether the religious segment was more active than the secular one in its desire for Tibetan independence. All too often, the Cabinet appears to be an abstract entity, without letting the reader learning more about the discussions that might have taken place in meetings. Similarly, the chains of decision-making between the secular branch of government, the religious branch, and the house of the Dalai Lama are not clear. Thus, it seems that each protagonist acts on its own: Phala, the Lord Chamberlain, the Ministerial Cabinet, and the staff of the House of the Dalai Lama, without any administrative hierarchy emerging, just as the Tibetan Ministerial Cabinet does not hesitate to bypass the TWC when it deemed it necessary. Another look at Tibetan civil society would have been extremely interesting to understand how it had lost confidence in its government to the point of reactivating the People's Party. The party was anti-Chinese and anti-Kashag, which was a political innovation in Tibetan society and went beyond the trivial framework of pro- or anti-Chinese. Additionally, the reader finds few, if any, opinions given of great monastic authorities. One last major fact highlighted in the framework of this axis is the Chinese intent not to order a military attack against The Khams Four Rivers, Six Ranges organization. Indeed, according to Goldstein, they considered the Tibetan rebellion an internal movement to be settled by the Tibetan government, in accordance with the seventeen-point agreement, which granted Tibet the administration of its internal affairs.

Axis two concerns the position of the Chinese government, which maintained its desire for a gradualist policy despite strong opposition from Fan Ming and the role of the TWC in its implementation. It focused on the fact that China's intended reforms in Tibet would not be implemented until 1965 (directive of September 1956). Goldstein insists that this was Mao's deliberate will and in no way a consequence of the weakness of the Chinese position in Tibet. In reality, Goldstein reports that the number of Chinese soldiers had fallen from about 50,000 to 18,000 by 1957 and only a few thousand were still stationed in the Tibetan capital. He also recalls that at the time of the reiteration of this decision, two roads and an airport linked Central China to Lhasa that allowed for the rapid transport of troops and weapons in case of need. Moreover, Goldstein presents the dissensions that existed within the Chinese army and administration in Lhasa and in their relations with Beijing. As with the Tibetan administrative framework mentioned above, it is difficult to determine the extent of networks, support, and rivalries between the various Chinese cadres. In Central Tibet, it is clear that Fan Ming, the leading cadre from the Northwest bureau (First Field Army), was the sole protagonist in favour of an immediate implementation of reforms and of granting some power to the Panchen Lama. In this way, he went against the position of Mao and the Central Committee and knew the risk involved. What was at stake? Was it a struggle within the TWC? Probably, since the leadership of the

TWC had already revealed the rivalry among cadres, notably between Fan Ming and Zhang Guohua 張國華 (1914–1972), head of the Southwest Bureau (Commander of Chengdu Military Region and of the Eighteenth Army Corps of the Second Field Army). Given that Zhang Guohua (lieutenant general of the PLA and Communist Party of China) and Zhang Jingwu 張經武 (1906–1971, Committee Secretary of Tibet Autonomous Region from March 1952 to September 1965) were Mao's followers and opposed Fan Ming, little was said about discussions within the TWC and exchanges with the Tibetan government. Only Fan Ming's actions and ideas are developed in the book, probably because they highlight Mao's willingness to pursue a gradualist policy, rather than follow the opinion of a border official, as Zhang Guohua was. Moreover, the importance given to Mao and the Central Committee should also be explained. The reader might like to know who Mao's advisers were. Li Weihai 李維漢 (1896–1984) is noted but no other data about him is given. Additionally, no mention was made of the forces in the Central Committee regarding Tibetan policy. In the same vein, Fan Ming was eliminated during the Anti-Rightist campaign in Tibet (April 1958), bringing the TWC changes into alignment with those of 1952. However, the reader is not informed of the new organizational chart. Did that mean that with Fan Ming removed, no rivalry remained within the TWC? Were all its members inclined to follow Beijing's policy? And what about the soldiers who made up Fan Ming's army? What about their opinions and their reactions? We know that the Chinese military did not hesitate to express their dissatisfaction on occasion. Thus, by focusing on and remaining at the level of the leading cadres, a social history is lost. What about the relations of Chinese cadres in Central Tibet with those who had had to deal with Khams and Amdo resistance fighters as early as 1958? If there had been any correspondence, it would have passed through Beijing before being read by the Chinese cadres in Tibet and perhaps Fan Ming would then have understood Mao's position which actually took advantage of the PLA's experiences in Khams and Amdo. Would the PLA military pushes in these Tibetan provinces have encouraged Tan Guansan 譚冠三 (1905–1985), member of the PCTAR and Deputy Secretary of the TWC, to take the initiative in attacking the crowd gathering in front of Norbulingkha in March 1959? These are questions that *In the Eye of the Storm* invite the reader to ask.

The third axis focuses on the circumstances of the Dalai Lama's departure from Tibet (March 1959). The departure was prepared well in advance, as early as November 1958. According to the author, through his contacts, Phala had then ordered the Tibetan resistance fighters to guard and secure the road that was to lead the Dalai Lama to Lhüntsé (Lhun rtse) via Lhoka (Lho kha) and then to India. The origin of the Dalai Lama's flight is indicative of a channel of communication at the highest level: between Tan Guansan and Gadrang (dga' brang), the highest monk official within the Tibetan government (*spyi khyab mkhan po*). The author does not

specify the importance of this channel, nor its customary character. However, why did Tan Guansan not go through the Tibetan Ministerial Cabinet? Was it because the invitation was a private one and considered a leisurely matter? Was it a trap as the Tibetan ministers suspected? It is, indeed, surprising that the Dalai Lama immediately accepted the Chinese general's invitation without referring first to his government. According to Goldstein, the Dalai Lama's acceptance of an invitation to attend a performance of a new dance and song troupe of the PLA in the Chinese military camp "was one of the turning points in modern Tibetan history" (p. 340). Although it is always difficult to predict what might have happened, the author insists that if the Dalai Lama had declined the invitation, "there would have been no 10 March demonstration, no Lhasa uprising" (p. 340). Indeed, the officials, mostly Phala, spread the news among the civil society and invited the population to come to Norbulingkha to prevent the Dalai Lama from going to the show. According to Goldstein, the Ministerial Cabinet then appealed to the People's Party by inviting its members to participate in an emergency Tibetan Government Assembly meeting. And "[t]his was the first time in Tibetan history that the [People's Party was] asked to select their own representatives and participate in an official National Assembly meeting" (p. 375), which concluded with the creation of a "Command Center" (p. 380). Then, according to the author, the Tibetan ministers took great precautions to evacuate the Dalai Lama from his Norbulingkha palace. Chinese Communist Party documents reveal that the Chinese decided to let him go, i.e. not to detain him, because, according to Goldstein, the Chinese feared killing the Dalai Lama and being blamed for it by the Tibetan population would ultimately cause an even larger revolt movement than the one initiated by the resistance one. The Dalai Lama's departure from Lhasa to Lhoka, where he arrived on 18 or 19 March, went smoothly. However, the Tibetan people were not warned of this and they remained in front of the Norbulingkha to protect the Dalai Lama. Chinese soldiers, under the authority of Tan Guansan and before receiving orders from Beijing, fired into the crowd on 20 March. An hour later, Tan Guansan received a telegram from Beijing ordering him not to attack the Tibetan population. On 28 March, the Tibetan government was replaced by the PCTAR, which had been founded in 1956, and the Panchen Lama replaced the Dalai Lama as its head. Although the Dalai Lama had proclaimed the creation of a new government and a new capital at Lhüntsé, when the fighting in Lhasa was announced it was decided that he would go into exile in India where he arrived on 31 March.

Tibetans were also seeking international assistance. American (CIA) support is mentioned throughout the narrative in terms of the training of a few Khampas whose main mission was to resist the Chinese presence and also to gather information about its forces. Taiwan intellectually supported the appeals received twice from the Khampas but did not contribute any material aid. India and Nehru, its Prime Minister, in particular, advised the Dalai Lama as early as 1956 to cooperate with the Chinese



in order to consolidate Tibet's autonomy. In 1958, India reiterated its position not to support Tibet either militarily or politically. It, nevertheless, welcomed the Dalai Lama in 1959.

Volume Four of *A History of Modern Tibet, In the Eye of the Storm, 1957–1959*, is a sum of scholarship and historical events, which concentrates, in 502 pages, on three years that were decisive for the future of the Tibetan identity and nationhood. Beyond the facts, it shows the complexity of relations within the Tibetan administration, between the latter and the Chinese administration in Lhasa, and within the Chinese intelligentsia in Tibet itself. From Beijing, Mao remained faithful to his political line, which, according to the author, was to pursue a gradualist and gentle policy in order to bring Central Tibet and its government to spontaneously adhere to the policy of the so-called motherland. By collecting the disparate memories of witnesses and actors of the events of the years 1957–1959 at key moments in their lives (the 1990s and early 2000s)—that is to say, when everyone took a step back, led their own lives, and became aware of the stakes inherent in transmission—Melvyn Goldstein became an “entrepreneur of memory.” He converted the disparate memories from each member of their common past into more homogeneous memories and allowed them to acquire a historical visibility unequalled until today.

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***Negotiating Inseparability in China: The Xinjiang Class and the Dynamics of Uyghur Identity.*** By Timothy Grose. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2019. Pp. xii + 146. \$45.00.

The work under review, *Negotiating Inseparability in China: The Xinjiang Class and the Dynamics of the Uyghur Identity*, by Timothy Grose, examines recent educational policies toward Uyghurs, a Turkic-speaking Muslim ethnic group with ties to Central Asia living in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of northwestern China. It focuses on the Xinjiang Class, a programme of boarding schools that supports four-year courses in senior high schools in developed cities in eastern and central China (*neidi* 内地 [inland China]), where Han Chinese constitute the majority. In these boarding schools, students from Xinjiang, mainly Uyghurs, are taught in Chinese and are prepared for the final school examination, with the aim that they will then become part of the educated elite who will develop Xinjiang. The project has educational and political purposes: to offer minority students better standards of education, improve