Campaigns, Bureaucratic Cooperation, and ighted Materials State Performance in China*

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Abstract

Campaigns and bureaucratic institutions are two key modalities of national governance in China. Although previous studies have examined the relationship between campaigns and bureaucracy, how bureaucrats respond to campaigns and the effect bureaucratic cooperation on state performance have not yet been sufficiently explored. This study seeks to develop a typology of bureaucratic responses to campaigns depending on various degrees of incentives and pressure derived from the said campaigns: substantive cooperation, performative cooperation, overzealous implementation, and bureaucratic inertia. Bureaucratic cooperation influences the effectiveness of the deployment of state bureaucracy, which transmutes into state performance. In order to illustrate the four types of bureaucratic cooperation and their respective implications for state performance, this article examines campaigns of land expropriation, poverty alleviation, village merging, and moral education in China. This research suggests that agency factors are Chinese Un important for institution building and state building.

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