


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Report for 1997-8 by Sidney Cheung, President

In 1997-98, the Hong Kong Anthropological Society enjoyed at a good variety of regular monthly and special activities for its members. The high point of the year was the fieldtrip to Hakka walled villages in *Shenzhen*, co-organized with the International Association of Hakka Studies. A total of 120 participants visited three gigantic walled villages and experienced a country style Hakka lunch in a local restaurant, all for a very reasonable price. Organizers and participants were most impressed by the hospitality of the Department of History of Shenzhen University and the various local people who helped us in the trip.

As in past years, we had lectures on a variety of topics and geographical areas. The 11th Barbara Ward Memorial Lecture was delivered by Dr. Elizabeth Johnson on "Research at the Margins: Distinctive Occupational Groups in South China" which gave insights into Barbara Ward's field data in Hong Kong. Other speakers during the year were: Andrew Kipnis who contrasted female Christians and male banqueting in North China; Edward Bruner, who told us how to study tourism as a tour guide as well as an ethnographer in Bali; Lui Tai-lok, who discussed Hong Kong's cultural identity from a postwar baby-boomer's perspective; and Manolete Mora, who spoke on the complicated relations among divas, clerics, ethnographers and warlords in the Philippines. The Annual General Meeting was addressed by C. K. Lau who discussed identity and education in contemporary Hong Kong society. The Society also organized a Film Festival and a visit to the synagogue in the Mid-Levels.

Many thanks are due to committee members in the past year: to our Treasurer Andrew Stables, the Vice-chairpersons Chris Hutton and Gordon Mathews, to the Hon. Secretary Marie Wong, to the Editors of the *Hong Kong Anthropologist* Joseph Bosco and Grant Evans. Special thanks to Jane Fong for making the *Shenzhen* trip possible and keeping us on the right track, and to all the co-opted members for their insights and their support of the Society.

Sidney Cheung
Chairperson 1997-98

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with the assistance of Noel Law

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The Barbara Ward Memorial Lecture 1996 Hong Kong's Own Boat People, Vignettes from Life and History

James Hayes



Courtesy, Hong Kong Government.

As a young District Officer in the late 1950s, I was fortunate in being posted to a part of the New Territories in which long-settled rural and boat populations were still following their traditional occupations and the lifestyles that went with them. It was still possible to catch glimpses of the old relationships between the landed inhabitants and the boat people in their everyday lives. However, by that stage in Hong Kong's early postwar history, development and the modernization process were already under way, and before very long they would erode and sweep away the old ways of life for good, on both land and sea.

PART ONE: FACETS OF THE TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIP

Sharing the sea and its resources

One of the fruits of my early

enquiries into local history was that I began to see just how much sharing of the sea and its resources there had been until a few decades ago. Villagers living on or near the coast and indigenous boat people alike gained a livelihood from fishing. On Hong Kong Island in particular, it became clear that, besides tending rice and vegetable fields, fishing by seine net, by stake-net and from small boats had been a major activity in most villages. At Shek O on its southern side in 1966, I enquired about two commercial undertakings listed on the altar table of the Tin Hau Temple in the village. A seventy year-old man (born in 1897) told me about the organization and operation of these two groups of 30 men each who engaged in a flourishing seine fishery that was active into the 1930s. This close involvement with the sea is reflected in a late 19th century Hong Kong census report which, under "occupations", recorded that there were



Courtesy, Hong Kong Government.

875 farmers in the villages and 481 fishermen, out of totals of 886 and 491 for the whole island of Hong Kong.¹

The following is a typical example of how the sea had shaped the local villagers' lifestyles, in this case to Tin Ha Wan in Junk Bay:

When I visited Tin Ha Wan with Sit Ping (and To Man-chi of the Shaukeiwan Kaifong) in November 1973, I learned that the Sits had at first been inshore fishermen, using small boats, and padi farmers and stake net fishermen later. Mr. Sit himself had operated a stake net between 1939 to 1948 and had farmed the family's rice fields before then.²

This was a pattern to be found everywhere in coastal areas of the Hong Kong Region where stake nets in particular were a picturesque and

This is an edited version of James Hayes' talk.

¹ HK Census of 1891, in Sessional Paper 1891.

² My informant, born in 1914 was the fifth generation there, giving a likely settlement time of 1820-40.

prominent feature of the landscape, remarked upon in European accounts of travel in the area.

Putting aside sea fishing by landmen, I found that even on water the Tanka were not the sole group of persons living on boats and gaining their main livelihood from fishing. On the island of Peng Chau near Lantau, besides a sizable Tanka boat population living on trawlers or on smaller craft, there had long been a small group of Hoklo fishermen who lived on their boats, with another group of Hoklo fishermen living on land. There were land-based Cantonese and Hakka boat fishermen into the bargain – all within Peng Chau's small population of hardly more than one thousand. To this varied mix of people, there must be added a blurring of occupations and lifestyles among the four different speech groups.³ Clearly, there is no reason to think that this was a unique situation, in a region with its many small inhabited islands

³ See the account given in my rural Communities, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1983. Chapter 2

and coastal settlements.

More interesting still was the inter-marriage between the Hoklo and Tanka boat people of the island. Whereas, in the prewar period, the land-based Hoklo had only married their own kind, the Hoklo boat people had been inter-marrying with the Tanka boat population at Peng Chau and Cheung Chau over several generations. How long such social interaction had gone on is unknown. In this general connection, it should be mentioned in passing that although the Tanka were generally reckoned to be a people apart, there was always some "passing" of Tanka onto land, with eventual absorption into the local populations.⁴

Relationships in a Shared Anchorage

Where landmen and boat people shared an anchorage, there were opportunities to examine their social and economic relationships. One such place was Po Toi O, an inlet situated near the tip of the Clear Water Bay peninsula to the east of Kowloon, which I first visited in early 1958 during one of my familiarization tours of the district.

The old temple at this anchorage was dedicated to Hung Shing, a popular deity among boat people. Following the norm in the region, his annual birthday was marked by the customary opera performances, and as usual, a small committee was responsible for making all the arrangements. However, instead of comprising only landmen, here it comprised two boat people and one villager. A further departure from the norm was that whereas few or no children from the boat population attended the village schools, here at Po Toi O, the majority of the 20 pupils were reported to come from the floating population.

It so happens that another account of Po Toi O, also from the District Office South and more or less contemporaneous with my own notes, is available. It is part of a complete but

unpublished record of the Southern District, compiled in May-July 1955 by the then district officer, Austin Coates. He noted that there was little fertile land in this rocky place and surmised that at least part of their livelihood came from servicing the boat population. In his words:

The villagers deny that they sell grass and water to the fishermen, but subsequent enquiries revealed that they sell both, and also rent vats for boiling nets. Grass is sold at \$8 per picul, about double its market value, and the village controls the beaches both in the harbour of Po Toi O and over the other side of the low hill separating them from Joss House Bay, in front of the Tai Miu (the Joss House).

As a matter of fact, the beaches were controlled by the principal families, rather than by the village. Utilizing his two years' familiarity with all parts of the Southern District, Coates stigmatized this connection as being "the peculiar relationship of extortion which exists between settled fishing communities and the land people who serve their needs".

Exploitation and Extortion?

In accepting an "exploitive" and "extortionist" view, Coates was following a well-trodden path. From before the Second World War, officials of the colonial government had taken a critical view of the economic relationship between the boat people and the wholesale fish dealers or *laans*. They nourished a similarly poor opinion of vegetable and livestock farmers' connection with the wholesalers in those commodities. Breathing the "benevolent paternalism" of the day, the writers of both prewar and early postwar government reports were always ready to see the black side of what was in most respects a working relationship. The adverse view was encapsulated in a blueprint for postwar action drawn up by a small group of officials and other interested parties during their confinement in the Stanley Internment Camp in the wartime Japanese Occupation of Hong Kong. The outcome was the establishment, soon after war's end, of the government-backed Fish Marketing and Vegetable

Marketing Organizations, which were intended to "free" the primary producers from the coils of the wholesalers. However, we should, in my opinion, take a wider view of such "exploitation" and "extortion", as various pertinent factors need to be taken into account that place them in a broader and more realistic light.

The Boat People's Needs

What were the boat people's principal and regular needs? As we have just seen, the availability of beaches was high on the list. They were essential for a number of purposes. Firstly, it was necessary to carry out regular and periodic breaming of their craft: that is, the process of burning the hulls with dried grass to remove barnacles and other marine growth. The boat people also needed to use the beaches or other flat spaces for drying, mending and dyeing their nets. Among essential commodities was the grass used for breaming, which, like firewood, was also used in their cooking stoves. Another basic commodity was potable water, especially in those anchorages where their larger numbers (sometimes swelled by visiting vessels) made it difficult if not impossible for them to obtain it for themselves.

The only persons able to meet these various requirements were the villagers and the major families who controlled land and the shoreline. These were invariably financial transactions, because they too had to make a living and had to pay the land and other taxes. However, it is worth noting that service was sometimes rendered as part of the deal. For instance, in some places I was told that the rent included the supply and use of the long wooden poles needed to prop up the boats during breaming, an awkward and bulky item that was inconvenient to carry and store on a crowded small boat.

When we turn to the matter of selling dried grass to boat people for breaming, we have to bear in mind that the villagers were supplying an essential commodity to persons who needed it but were either not permitted or were otherwise unwilling to obtain it for themselves. Moreover, considerable

time and effort were needed to bring it to the boat people, or any other buyers. The villagers—usually the women and girls, as this was "women's work"—had to cut it from the hillside plots allocated to their families, carry it down from the hill, and then dry and store it. The fact that dried grass was supplied to the local shipyards where the larger fishing junks were breamed, provides further proof that this was a saleable commodity. One of my earliest memories of Lantau Island is of watching rowing sampans from the villages piled high with bundles of dried grass crossing some quiet bay on their way to the Cheung Chau boatyards. Indeed, the preparation and sale of dried grass represented an important cash crop in the rural economy. Basically, this was supply and demand.

In like manner, villagers (and others) could sell water to boat people in those places where their larger numbers in the local anchorage created a demand. It was a clearly a commercial venture for some people. Evidence in a Court case of 1887 over land in Aberdeen mentioned a reservoir there owned by a man who sold water to the boat people.⁵ I am sure that when I first visited the large coastal anchorages at Cheung Chau, Tai O and Sai Kung, similar arrangements were still being made by landmen there. At Tai O, for example, it was not until a few years into my tenure as District Officer that the Water Supplies Department had provided a public water supply there. They constructed holding dams and small reservoirs in the adjacent hills, and installed public stand-pipes from which boat people and boat squatters could obtain water free of charge.

Another important point to make in regard to the charge of "exploitation" is that it was not only boat people who had to pay for using the shore and coastline. The big landowners who derived their right from legal ownership of large areas of land which sometimes included whole islands, took rent as a matter of course from the operators of the stake-net fishing platforms (or "fishing stations")

⁴ See my *Hong Kong Region*, Anchor, 1977, p.79 and my *Tsuen Wan*, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.152-3, for examples.

⁵ HK Daily Press, 1 December 1887. I am indebted to Rev. Carl Smith for this reference.

as they were generally known), whoever they might happen to be.


Looked at in this broader context, "extortion" and "exploitation" may not be the right words to describe the normal situation. Yet there can be no doubt that the pattern of seeking to take economic advantage of the boat people's needs was very well-established, since there were always persons with or without established rights who were ready to take advantage of them.

Boat People's Exclusion from Local Management but Participation in Temple Repairs

In the Southern District's most important coastal anchorages, the boat people—their large numbers in relation to the land populations of such places notwithstanding—were not represented

concerned. This "divide" was based on functional and occupational rationalization. Unless they came on land and were absorbed into the land population by reason of changing their occupation to that of shopkeeper, fish-collector, fish-dryer, wholesaler or the like—in which case they had ceased to be boat people—there was an institutional barrier to their participation in local management. There might be one or two representatives sitting on the Kaifong, or later the rural committees, but these persons were there for liaison purposes only, being excluded from a say in all matters concerning the township⁶

But despite this "fending-off" from any participation in the management of community affairs, there was (and is) a well-documented traditional cooperation of land and sea people in temple repairs and sharing in local festivals. This was



Demolition of Squatter Boats at Tsuen Wan, 1961. The new housing blocks for the Shek Pik villagers removed from Lantau Island to Tsuen Wan in late 1960 can be seen immediately behind. GISS Ref. 2041/13; By courtesy Hong Kong Government.

on local management bodies like Kaifongs and rural committees, save in a liaison capacity.

The general separation of the two groups was at its clearest and most interesting at Tai O and Cheung Chau. Residence on board a boat anchored in its home port did not make one a "kaifong" or member of the local community. A boatman was a "non-person" so far as land matters were

the only area of business in which there was cooperation of land and sea people at all stages from soliciting subscriptions to the re-opening ceremony and accompanying opera performances, as is made very clear from the contents of

⁶ See my *Hong Kong Region*, Anchor, 1977, p.79 and my *Tsuen Wan*, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1993. pp.152-3, for examples.

surviving commemorative tablets on temple walls⁷.

PART TWO: BOAT PEOPLE IN TRANSITION

In the 1960s and 1970s when working in the City District Officers Scheme, I had to deal with the larger traditional anchorages of Hong Kong island, like Aberdeen where the local boat people were being swamped by large numbers of incoming boat squatters from China. With the extinguishing of their former distinctive lifestyle and occupation, most were living in what the Hong Kong Census Commissioner had described for his staff as "un-boats", meaning "a boat which no longer floats or can put to sea".⁸ They had to endure appalling living conditions until, sooner or later, the sites were cleared for development and they were moved on land, to live in one or other of the government's multi-storey public rental housing estates, or in temporary housing areas where they were required to erect small huts to approved standard size and height.

Swamped by Outside Boat People and Removed into Public Housing Estates

By the mid 1960s, more and more boat people from Mainland China were coming to Hong Kong, mostly clandestinely. Many of them were living in squatter boats lying on the foreshore or in the shallows in the major anchorages of Hong Kong and Kowloon; with others, as at Shaukeiwan on Hong Kong Island, occupying stilt huts above the mud flats. They could be found in particularly large numbers at Aberdeen on the south side of the Island where, during these years, there was a good deal of development for public works and for modern high-rise apartment and commercial buildings, many built on

new reclamations. The area was within the boundaries of the Western City District, and its CDO staff was closely involved with development clearances along the foreshore that affected a great many boat squatter families.


These people lived in truly deplorable conditions. The largest and most densely populated assemblage of squatter boats within the urban area had been located at Staunton Creek, the long narrow arm of the sea at Aberdeen that used to extend into Lower Wong Chuk Hang. This had been cleared and filled for development in 1966-67. In 1970, some 2000 more people were involved when the large number of squatter boats moored in front of the century-old Hong Kong and Whampoa Dock had to be removed for a reclamation scheme. I particularly recall going to visit one of the places set aside as a relocation point. It was virgin hillside, located on the middle slopes of the road leading up to the Aberdeen reservoir, opposite two housing estates. The site was steep and the new huts were built among the many pine trees growing there. Living on land was, of course, a completely new experience for most of these people, and in one hut, in lieu of beds, I found the family members using the polished floorboards of their former floating home, brought with them to their new quarters. These people were poor, and beds were expensive as well as unfamiliar to them. Indeed, I had seen the same thing inside boat people's squatter huts in Tai O and Cheung Chau.

Some Coastal Fishing still in Progress

Despite the changing life style imposed on many families, some fishing from boats was still continuing in the area, making the transition more gradual for some. On 3 January 1970 during a Sunday boat outing, when returning to Deepwater Bay from South Lamma by sea, we saw lots of dark patches that were shoals of fish. Three boats, each with two sampans, were fishing with nets off Middle and South Bays (Repulse Bay) as it got dark, about 6 p.m. The nets were very long, and were being put into the water hank by hank from one of the boats. As we got close to another boat whose crew was

⁷ See *The Hong Kong Region* (1977), pp. 98-102 and 223-4.

⁸ *Hong Kong By-Census 1966*, Land and Marine Training Manual (Government Printer), pp. 76, 164.



Courtesy, Hong Kong Government.

hauling in a net, they told us that they had got about 100 catties of fish in that one catch. One of the three, now at Aberdeen, was formerly from the little group of boat families long anchored at Deep Water Bay. And there were still Tanka boats to be seen anchored here and there, especially near Middle Island, between Repulse and Deep Water Bays, where there was an old boat people's temple and, as I knew from scrambling all over the place, a good many of their graves.

The Stakenet Fisheries of the Area

I have stressed the shared use of the sea by villagers and boat people alike. I am therefore including a brief mention of the landmen's activities here in order to round off the picture, and to show how they too had to adjust to changing times.

The Ngs of Lo Tik Wan on North Lamma had never had enough land at their village, and had therefore to seek a livelihood by other means. In their case, they resorted to stakenet fishing at places in the vicinity, going in prewar days to Ma Kong Mei (South Bay), to Stanley and even to Cheung Chau.

This family's experience, which can be paralleled by many others' known to me, makes it clear that the local stakenet and sampan fishing had long helped to provide a livelihood for villagers having to farm marginal or insufficient land at home. Fish had been plentiful up to the War sufficient to bring visiting Hong Kong fish laans or their agents to buy up the catches, I was told though sometimes the operators had to take fish to market for sale.

By the early 1960s, all this had changed, for villagers just as for the boat people. Like most stakenet and sampan operators, my main informant among the Ng families had had to stop fishing only a few years before and find other kinds of employment as his main source of livelihood.

PART THREE: A NEW LIVELIHOOD FROM THE SEA

Marine Fish Culture (Mariculture)

After the foregoing recital of the tribulations of the indigenous boat population in the early postwar decades, it is a relief to be able to recount their

success in finding an alternative occupation: one that would utilize and preserve their connection with and knowledge of the sea, and substitute for and extend their traditional livelihood. Taken up from around 1970 onwards, mariculture, or marine fish culture, became a viable alternative for many members of the non-modernized section of the indigenous boat population. Briefly described, it involved the rearing of fish in cages suspended from floating rafts in suitable sheltered inshore bays across the territory. Knowledgeable about, and well accustomed to, local waters from their infancy, boat people were aware of the numerous then unused small bays or other stretches of sheltered water where mariculture could be started. However, this enterprise was not without its teething problems. Though empty for the time being, not all locations were available for mariculture in the long term. Unwittingly, some local boat people had taken up their new ventures in areas scheduled for development. In such places, as I got to know from my direct involvement with them in the Tsuen Wan District, they had made a false start, creating problems for themselves and the authorities alike.

The Beginnings

The beginnings of what was to become a major industry were small in scale, for this was essentially a family undertaking, replacing the family boat of earlier times as the working unit. It was on the same visit to Tin Ha Wan in Junk Bay in November 1973 (recounted above) that I took note of this new departure:

Three fish floats near the jetty were being used by Tanka fishermen to raise laap tsai, as is being done on a larger scale at Picnic Bay, South Lamma. A chance flight in a small aircraft over the Southern New Territories with a friend a year later, confirmed the existence of the industry in a number of favourable locations.

Mariculture is first mentioned in the section of the Hong Kong Annual Report dealing with the fishing industry for the year 1973. It was then stated that about 460 families were engaged in this activity. In the 1974 Report, this

number had risen to 877 families. A survey of October 1976 listed 983 families and 7.5 hectares of rafts. By 1980 it was mentioned that the 760 tonnes of live marine fish supplied by this activity came from some 60 sites.

Clearly, the mariculture industry had come to stay. In 1974 it was already being reported as steadily growing in importance as the demand for live fish increased. It is especially significant that its growth was initially measured by families, indicating that most of the persons engaging in this activity were former inshore Tanka fishermen. It is also necessary to emphasize that this was an innovation of their own creation, and that being such there were no government rules or regulations on the subject, and they were free to establish themselves wherever it was convenient to do so and local conditions were favourable.

Mariculturists and Development Works

As stated above, this unregulated situation gave rise to problems with mariculturists operating in places scheduled for development. Such operators were unlicensed and since their locations could not be designated for mariculture, no licenses could be issued. Because of this, no compensation was available when they were asked to close down their fish farms. This combination spelt trouble, both for them, and for the officials who had to deal with them. A case of this kind occurred on Tsing Yi when I was Town Manager and District Officer, Tsuen Wan.

The indigenous Tanka fishermen of Tsuen Wan had been affected by the large-scale development of the township in the 1960s. They had moved over to the adjoining island of Tsing Yi, and along with the small group of local boat people were mostly living in fishermen's villages on shore. However, some were still endeavouring to make a living from the sea by engaging in mariculture in Tsing Yi Bay. This was not due for reclamation for some years, but a channel had now to be dredged throughout its length to permit barges to carry "fill" over to Tsuen Wan Bay for

the large new reclamation there. Instructed to move out of their path, the mariculturists had refused to budge unless they were given other locations for their rafts and some compensation. Returning at this point from an overseas leave, I found a crisis on my hands. On the "go ahead" from the District Office, which had assumed that the operators would move at the right time, the contract for the barging work had already been let by the Development Office, but with delays now expected the contractor could put in a claim against the government for every day he was prevented from starting work.

We and the boat people were well and truly "boxed in" by the rules. As I have pointed out above, "no licences, no designated zone" meant no statutory compensation. There was nowhere else in Tsing Yi Bay for them to moor their rafts, and although the operation amounted to a clearance, with the normal provision of ex gratia payment for operators of commercial undertakings, ex gratia payments to mariculturalists were not yet included in the compensation schedules. Where to turn, and what to do? There had been talk of forcing the issue by getting the Marine Department, with support from the Marine Police, to tow away and confiscate the rafts, but their officers were understandably reluctant to act. In any case, this type of "solution" was quite unacceptable to me. Here were boat people being kicked around again: and there had been more than enough of this over the past two decades.

I went over to Tsing Yi, where the operators had assembled in a large single-storey furniture factory near the shore. During discussions with the large body of operators (and I suspect some hangers-on), the desperate situation to which they were being reduced by circumstances beyond their control was stressed repeatedly, and despair and dissatisfaction were writ large on their faces. Believing I could persuade the Finance Branch of the Government Secretariat to create a special category in the existing Ex Gratia Compensation Schedule if I could carry the several concerned departments with me, I agreed to seek compensation for them; though even with successful "lobbying",

some time would elapse before any payments could be made. This worked, and the mariculturists promised to move by a certain date: but I had been greatly aided by the boat people's leaders and other influential parties who had come with me and assured the gathering that they could trust me to do my best for them. The ex gratia payments were later approved and the money was paid soon after. The crisis had been averted. Some operators removed their rafts and families to Ma Wan Island, where permits for huts were also made available, I think.

The point of this tale is that it shows, yet again, how the boat people were usually on "the receiving end" during these decades of Hong Kong's postwar development. As I have stated above, this group of former inshore fishermen, who had not become part of the new, modernized deep sea fishing industry, were not the concern of the specialized departments of government. They had always to fend for themselves, and usually did so, but it was left to the district officers in town and country to assist them in time of need.

Regulation and Growth of the Industry

Let me now revert to the general situation in the late 1970s. The proliferation of sites and the environmental nuisance created by the operations, as well as by the rafts themselves with their lack of basic amenities, obliged the Agriculture and Fisheries Department to take steps to regulate the new industry. In June 1976, the Department established a new section to work towards "licencing and protecting marine fish culturists in designated areas"; and, long in preparation, the necessary legislation "to promote the orderly development of the marine fish culture industry in the limited sea area available", was passed in January 1980.

For a few years thereafter, the industry became the problem child of the Department. Apart from problems on site, with tide and current the mariculturists' operations could easily create environmental degradation of adjoining areas of sea and swimming

beaches. Lynx-eyed, invariably indignant, yachts-men and pleasure craft owners and their wives, out for their week-end relaxation, were ever ready to bring unsatisfactory situations to the attention of officials, and badger them into taking action against offenders. Thus the designation and licensing exercise ushered in a period of wrangling and occasional mini-confrontations between the authorities and the raft operators. They had become the victims of their own success.

Operators did not always find it easy to comply with the new requirements, and the regulatory and licensing process became protracted in some areas. As already indicated above, not all the sites already developed by mariculturists were suitable for designation. In ever more crowded Hong Kong, the sea was fast becoming as precious as the land, and was equally subject to various demands and to competing claims from its actual or would be users.

When I returned to work in the New Territories in 1985, the regularization exercise was well advanced, as evidenced by the number of licenses reported for that year, which was 1,480; though as if to reflect the newly found status of the industry conferred by imposing statutory controls its extent was now being recorded in this way instead of by the number of sites and families engaged.

However, there was still work to do on regularization of problem areas, and there were also extensions and deletions to be taken care of. As was to be expected in any "people" exercise, the District Officers were involved in discussion and resolution of difficult cases. I recall going with District Officer Islands to one of the largest and earliest mariculture sites - at Picnic Bay on South Lamma - to note the extent and detail of contentious matters still under negotiation. But on the whole, there was a smooth progression, as reflected by the figures included in the annual Colony Reports for the rest of the decade. The 1,480 licensees reported in 1985 had increased to 1,854 in 1988. Production levels, too, rose throughout the eighties, up from the 960 tonnes for 1979 to 1,500 tonnes in 1985, jumping

to 2,870 tonnes the following year, and reaching 3,010 tonnes by 1993.

Even in their new occupation, the boat people's livelihood did not cease to be precarious. From the outset, the mariculturists had to be prepared to face various hazards. Early on, contamination caused by a 3,000 ton spillage of oil from a ruptured storage tank at Ap Lei Chau had affected large numbers of fish and made it necessary to suspend operations.⁹

Marine pollution itself was another, ever growing threat, as urban development extended everywhere and population levels soared. In April 1980, 37 tonnes of cultured marine fish had been destroyed by algal blooms which broke out in Tolo Harbour and Mirs Bay in the New Territories. However, by then well aware that the industry could only expand "if water quality can be maintained", the Agricultural and Fisheries Department had begun to carry out research of all kinds, to assess "the impact of pollution, including red tides, on fisheries, particularly mariculture, to minimize production loss".¹⁰

Conclusion

This ends the tale of my involvement with the boat people during my government service in Hong Kong from the 1950s to the 1980s, and through my historical research. I think you will agree that it points to a story that is worth a book-length study of the kind that Barbara Ward would have loved to write herself, and would have done so well.

⁹ Hong Kong 1974, p.51.

¹⁰ Hong Kong 1981, p.64; Hong Kong 1980, p.196; and Hong Kong 1986, pp.80-1.

香港船民：生活與歷史的剪影

James Hayes

文章摘要

本文作者於五十年代曾從事地方官員的工作，透過其第一身的觀察和經驗，作者道出一直以來陸上人和漁民的社會關係，以及現代化、都市化對漁民傳統生活方式的影響。文章的第一部份描繪出漁民與海洋唇齒相依關係，和漁民如何利用海洋資源來過活。作者指出雖然漁民可以參與寺廟的修葺工作，但他們卻被棄絕於寺廟管理階層之外。作者更藉此討論漁民是否一直處於被剝削的位置。

文章的第二部份，主要是探討漁民的傳統生活方如何隨著香港社會的發展而產生改變。包括遷入政府的公共屋村，以及捕魚業所面對的困難。

最後，作者更回顧香港漁業的源起及發展。

Understanding Hong Kong Tourism from an Anthropological Perspective

Sidney Cheung C.H.

Introduction

The prosperity of Hong Kong is closely related to the active and rapid development of its tourist industry. In 1996, Hong Kong experienced 11.7 million tourist visits, generating 82.4 billion Hong Kong dollars in income, making the tourism industry the second largest generator of foreign currency in Hong Kong. In its advertising, Hong Kong attracts tourists not only with its image as a modern metropolis, but also with its heritage representing traditional Chinese characteristics. But this traditional Chinese side of Hong Kong has not only helped foreigners understand Hong Kong; it also influences local residents who are living in Hong Kong (Cheung 1996; James and Rubie Watson 1997).

In the last decade there have been debates about the impact of international tourism, but not domestic tourism. This is probably because it is easier to recognize the global and economical aspects of tourism: the extensive contact between cultures and the large amount of financial benefits brought by international tourists. Domestic tourists are assumed to have less impact in both aspects. However, in my studies of cultural tourism at the Ping Shan Heritage Trail, a well-known tourist spot that was visited by both international and domestic tourists, it became clear that the situation was more complex. In order to understand the more complicated cultural meanings of tourism among foreigners and locals, this paper seeks to look at the emergence of the first heritage trail in Hong Kong and how it reflects different meanings in the studies of tourism from an anthropological perspective.

Construction of "Culture" in Tourism

Tourism, involving travel and contact between cultures or subcultures, clearly fits into contemporary anthropological concerns (Bruner 1991; Nash 1981; Nash & Smith 1991). Previous anthropological research on the nature

of tourism, in relation to ritual, ceremonial, pilgrimage, play and leisure, and cross-cultural exploration appeared in the 1970s (MacCannell 1973, 1976; Nash 1978; Turner 1974); it provides us with a wide scope for understanding traveling or sightseeing as a social process. Tourism also is viewed by a variety of disciplines, from sociology, symbolic anthropology, and semiotics to cross-cultural studies, as a process of "ritual inversion". This has been used to explain why particular behaviors are suspended, exaggerated, or reversed, and why particular groups follow the particular and limited activities that are said to characterize their tourist behavior (Cohen 1972; Graburn 1983; MacCannell 1976; Moore 1980).

In the study of tourism, a tourist has been defined as a "temporarily leisured person who voluntarily visits a place away from home for the purpose of experiencing a change" (Smith 1989: 1). As such, tourism, through a range of choices, styles, and recreation sites, provides comprehensive insight into social relations, contemporary consumerism, class structure, self construction, cultural symbolism and nationalism (Brannen 1992; Ivy 1995; Knight 1995; MacCannell 1977, 1992; Moeran 1983; Nash 1996; Smith 1989). MacCannell (1976) considers tourism in light of the contemporary first-world invention of the third-world, and points out that, "[t]he deep structure of modernity is a totalizing idea, a modern mentality that sets modern society in opposition both to its own past and to those societies of the present that are premodern or un(der) developed" (MacCannell 1976: 7-8). Although MacCannell's analysis emphasizes tourism in third world countries, considering places such as Hong Kong is also important because it can provide insight into the general trends of most modern societies in how "culture" is constructed within the arena of tourism. Valuable insights into tourism have also come from studies of the meanings of heritage, where we are reminded that selection and preservation of historical representations

can regenerate and revitalize ideas and social values for specific socio-political and national interests (Ashworth and Larkham 1994; Boniface and Fowler 1993; Handler 1986, 1988).

By considering how "culture" is constructed in tourism, we simply underline the fact that the traditional side of Hong Kong still plays an important role in attracting international tourists. The International Dragon Boat Festival, night markets, and theme parks with an emphasis on Chinese culture can all be considered the objectified, dehistoricized, and even "orientalized" part of Hong Kong society (Cohen 1988; Said 1978). The Hong Kong Tourist Association (香港旅遊協會), or HKTA, has been actively promoting the heritage and traditional "culture" of Hong Kong by focusing on pre-colonial monuments with an emphasis upon rural and "unchanged" classic Chinese-style architecture for international tourists who are looking for the real "old China." These include Taoist temples representing folk religion; single-surname villages and ancestral halls in the New Territories representing the classical social system; and festivals and ceremonies highlighting traditional values.

In 1995, with the launch of a HKTA campaign entitled, "Wonders Never Cease" (萬象之都) (see Figure 1), the cultural richness and diversity in Hong Kong was stressed. Hong Kong was promoted as "[o]ne of the wonders of the world -- a uniquely vibrant destination blending Asian mystique and dynamism with Western sophistication to excite the discriminating visitor with an ever-changing feast of experiences," as declared by Bates, the advertising agency of the HKTA.¹ One element in this "Wonders Never Cease" campaign, was the re-construction of Hong Kong's heritage in the New Territories, because this supplements the concepts of East-meets-West and modernity-meets-tradition in the formation of the Hong Kong image, and goes beyond the cosmopolitan reputation the city already has. Just by looking at the HKTA's promotions on the Heritage Tour that first appeared in 1989, we might assume that this heritage is important merely because it provides experiences with pre-colonial, traditional, rural Chinese and "unchanged" old lifestyles for modern foreign visitors. As we can see, heritage construction in Hong Kong in

terms of historic, rural and traditional Chinese buildings by the government might be considered as one of the "wonders"² established for the global as well as international tourists' interest. However, one of the controversy in the consideration of the image of Hong Kong would probably be its interpretations by the HKTA to the rest of the world since local interpretations of their "own" culture could be very much different.

The Case of Ping Shan Heritage Trail (屏山文物徑)

We know heritage is mostly constructed, and that it is contested, but we still lack enough anthropological case studies which illustrate the complexity of the contestation. I will look at the case of Ping Shan Heritage Trail in the New Territories because it illustrates heritage construction in Hong Kong and allows me to provide some theoretical groundwork for the exploration of the construction of "culture" in Hong Kong's international and domestic tourism.

In the last decade, the popularity of Hong Kong's local history has been increasing. In




Figure 1: HKTA campaign poster.

part it is part of Hong Kong's emerging identity and 1997, but it also stems from the promotion of cultural tourism. For example, the Ping Shan Heritage Trail has been one of the most popular destinations for both international and domestic tourists. Because it combines natural landscapes, developing rural areas, and a number of different lineage-oriented monuments, Ping Shan attracts many urban



Figure 2: Tourists in Ping Shan.

tourists.

The construction of so-called heritage from the daily lifeways of the villagers in Ping Shan "freezes" some of those buildings, including the ancestral hall, study halls and temple. Such "freezing" of the past is a kind of objectification or dehistoricisation, in which particular items of the past are selected for the present. The most obvious manifestation of the emergence of a manufactured cultural heritage is the numerous international and domestic tourists brought by the HKTA, overseas and local travel agents, and various regional volunteer associations. The customers of these guided heritage tours include both overseas visitors and local people living in Hong Kong. According to the figures recorded at the Ping Shan Heritage Trail, there were approximately 5,000 visitors guided by different organizations on every Sunday in early 1995. But domestic/local tours are different. Most of them are daily, and are run by associations and organizations. Individual participants made up only a small percentage of the heritage tours. Regional groups, as well as volunteer associations, for the most part, are actively involved in organizing local tours as a social response to public concerns about the

future of Hong Kong after 1997.

Baker (1966: 28) says that the Ping Shan lineage dates back to the 13th century, when a branch hived off from a nearby parent village to take advantage of the good paddy land. Nowadays Ping Shan is no longer famous for paddy fields, but is surrounded by high-rise residential buildings nearby (see Figure 2); and because of the establishment of the heritage trail within its two villages, there is a large flow of tourists moving in and out, especially on Sundays and public holidays. Monuments along the Ping Shan Heritage Trail carry specific geopolitics that epitomize the power and hierarchy of the single-surname village organization in the New Territories. With the ancestral hall as the central icon, temples, towers and study halls line up along the heritage trails, visitors can grasp in one swoop the experience of being in the "unchanged state" of traditional Chinese lineage-oriented villages throughout the past few centuries through a 15-minute walk along the Heritage Trail. Yet, in contrast to what one might imagine, these traditional historic buildings appeal to local urban visitors and to foreign visitors in more or less the same way, because the ancestral-hall-oriented social structure has vanished from most Hong Kong's urban local residents' daily experience (see Figures 3 and 4).

Contested Meanings of Heritage

My objectives for analyzing the heritage tour in Hong Kong are not only to investigate the construction of "culture" in terms of heritage preservation, but also to clarify the contested meaning of heritage regarding the awareness of identity/identities among various kinds of participants, especially local Hong Kong people. In recent years, the desire to know more about Hong Kong has increased. On the one hand, this might be due to nostalgia or the search for "the good old days" which is initiated by the mass media, or psychological depression brought about by uncertainty over the future, especially before 1997. On the other hand, this might also be a result of local researchers' and scholars' efforts to force a rethinking of local history as well as local Hong Kong culture. The Antiquities and Monuments Office has played an especially important role in this.

This constructed history of Hong Kong is explicitly disseminated to the population through the display of a series of archaeological

¹ Quoting the flyer distributed on May 21 1995, one day after the official launching ceremony was held.

² Ping Shan Heritage Trail is mentioned as one of the several wonders in the HKTA campaign "Wonders Never Cease."



Figure 3: Tourists visiting the ancestral hall in Ping Shan.

discoveries and architectural exhibits. This was the result of the involvement of government officials in promoting the preservation of Hong Kong's heritage, and can serve as a means of cultural-awareness at the community level. During the last decade, old houses in the villages of the New Territories




Figure 4: Tourists visiting the walled village in Ping Shan.

have been transformed into cultural heritage, and a large number of these buildings are objectified for presentation by the tourist industry. This process of creating cultural heritage can also be claimed for works of cultural preservation started in mid-1970s, with the shift from rock-carving-oriented monuments to ancestral-worship-oriented monuments, as well as the shift from "dead and hard" records to "live and interactive" experiences. Looking at these forms of so-called Hong Kong heritage, I question whether the sense of belonging or historical identity has been successfully created among people who share the rooted cultural similarities but have diverse origins.

Historical identity, being defined as self-identification with regard to one's origins, is important for local people who aim to construct their own origins in the past, and also for their understanding of how Hong Kong society might cope with current political relations between China and Taiwan. In Hong Kong's case, because of the continuous immigration from mainland China and the similar socio-cultural backgrounds involved, the issues of self-identification and the idea of Chineseness are always controversial, because people are to some extent oriented by different institutions. In studying cultural identity in South China, Siu (1993) points out that economic and political power has been held by different groups, such as those local-born, western-educated young professionals in Hong Kong who consider themselves

Hongkongese, as compared to merchants in the Pearl River delta who shape tradition for economic ends and consider themselves Chinese even though they see themselves as being different from northern mainlanders. In these terms, the variation in self-identification among Hong Kong people varies in relation to the specific cultural distance between China and Hong Kong.

In Hong Kong,

with the recent decline of rural areas and the rapid expansion of urbanization in the New Territories, the contrast between the cultural heritage areas and the new town areas with their modern facilities for many leisure activities, became more marked than ever before. A modern transportation network conveniently served nostalgia in the form of traditions such as ancestral hall and *puhn choi* (盤菜) festival as well as banquet food in New Territories villages on the Ping Shan Heritage Trail. There are differences between international tourists and domestic tourists in the way they use the same heritage trail. Foreigners see the heritage trail as one of the never-ceasing wonders, created for the Hong Kong image. However, locals take it as the central part of the search for local Hong Kong history, as well as the "main dish" of the one-day domestic tours. For this reason, I propose here to raise a broader question by looking at the social consequences of the theme of cultural heritage, through an examination of the domestic tours organized mostly by the voluntary associations. Generally speaking, this kind of one-day trip is a package tour including visits to rural Hong Kong temples and natural settings, tasting vegetarian food prepared in temples or shrines, as well as other foods such as *puhn choi* and roasted goose. These tours are mostly organized by housing estates, social service groups for the aged and the handicapped, and other voluntary associations. I suggest that tourist activities of this sort have served to promote the idea of Hong Kong identity, in contrast to the prevailing, more traditional sense of localized identity. Domestic cultural tourism, in Hong Kong's case, is a social activity for putting individuals together into groups made up through voluntary associations. It serves as a means for enhancing the social commitment shown by members, in conveying the understanding of Hong Kong as their common home.

It might be contended that cultural heritage, on common land with common history, is intimately related to the commonsense notion of belonging to Hong Kong, and that is the way that participants' identities are being shaped through these one-day experiences. But my own observations are that the local tourists did not identify with the monuments through these visits, so much as identifying with each other as Hongkongese, through the experience of touring. In Hong Kong, there is always some tension between



Figure 5: Protest banner.

the idea of being a Hongkongese and the idea of being tied to one's regional community. Of course, there may be more than one pattern for the ways in which the emergence of cultural tourism has influenced the cultural, social and political life in contemporary Hong Kong society.

Conclusion: Culture, Heritage and Identity


Cultural tourism has aroused an awareness of local identity among indigenous villagers in the Tang clan of Ping Shan when their ancestral hall changes from a local worship place to the heritage of Hong Kong. In studying traditional Chinese lineages as a cultural invention, Faure (1989) has pointed out that single-surname village organization in the Pearl River Delta, with lands and rituals centered around ancestral halls, was the product of particular historical junctures in the state-making policy of the Ming and Qing dynasties. The ancestral hall and study hall are parts of the Ping Shan Heritage Trail, near Yuen Long (元朗), in the part of the New Territories occupied by the Tang clan. The Tangs were the first of the Five Great Clans to come to Hong Kong in the 10th century during the Song Dynasty. They originated from Jiangxi (江西) Province and disturbances in the north forced them, and later the other clans, to come further and further south until they settled in Guangdong and then in what is now the New Territories (Baker 1966; Potter 1968). As described by Ping Shan's

villagers, the first village was established in Kam Tin (錦田) on the advice of a geomancer, and they spread far and wide throughout the New Territories in the following centuries. The Ping Shan Heritage Trail was established in December 1992 to cultivate the public interest in local heritage.

However, the idea of heritage is always contestable, especially when it is used for the construction of historical identity and in this case of Ping Shan. In May 1995, the Ping Shan Heritage Trail was closed in an argument between the government and Tang lineage (see Figure 5). This reflects how the ancestral hall and other monuments representing heritage could be used in power bargaining. A key feature of this argument was the 200-year-old graveyard belonging to the Ping Shan's Tang

argument over the removal of the ancestral graveyard from the landfill site and the request to close the police station has not yet been settled. However, the closure of the Ping Shan Heritage Trail by the Tang lineage can be considered a demonstration of the Tang lineage's right to control the property of which they consider to be "their" own heritage (see Figures 6 and 7).

Since Ping Shan Heritage Trail was one of the most popular destinations in domestic cultural tourism, let us look at the relation between the public and the Tang lineage. During my interviews, local Tangs suggested that by closing their monuments, they could get the public's attention about the government's initiative to move their 200-year-old graveyard, and gain support because of their strong



Figures 6 & 7: Notice on the study hall and close-up.

lineage in Nim Wan (稔灣), Tuen Mun (屯門) which is located at the northwestern part of the New Territories. Located next to a deep coastal bay, the cemetery was supposed to be moved because of a large West New Territories landfill project. The protest against the cemetery's removal included the statement based on the Proclamations issued by the Magistrate of the San On District and the Viceroy of Canton Regarding the New Territories signed in Guangzhou on March 27 1899, which states, "The graves in the leased territory are never to be removed." The

opinions on local and traditional (or *fungshui* 風水) matters. This seems accurate, at least as a partial representation of the reality of the social process. Cultural heritage is considered a desirable resource in terms of how local people and the government have been struggling over its control. Through the case of Ping Shan, we are able to see how complicated the meanings of tourism can be. Though often imagined as designed for foreign tourists, the Trail also is tied to the emergence of domestic tourism within the changing socio-political context. With the increasing value of

tourism, indigenous villagers can withhold buildings as a strategy during conflicts with the government. The case of the Ping Shan Heritage Trail shows the differences in the meaning of cultural tourism in Hong Kong.

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從人類學看香港旅遊

Sidney Cheung C. H.

文章摘要

作者在本文以人類學的觀點，分析近年香港旅遊及其相關的社會文化形成，進而強調本地旅遊和地方發展的重要意義。近年有關旅遊的研究，大多著眼於國際旅遊的型像建構和符號意義，而忽視了本地文化網絡成長的歷史背景及其對社會政治問題的理解。本文以新界元朗屏山文物徑為例，來探討香港社會在建構國型像上的心思，及其背後文化身份認同的複雜性。當中更涉及到本地居民、社會上不同團體及新界原居民利益的問題。

Culture, State, and Market in the Shaping of Hong Kong's Chinese Identity

Gordon Mathews

In this paper I take the central concept in anthropological theory, the concept of "culture," and apply it to Hong Kong in the wake of its handover to China. First I discuss two contradictory meanings of culture, as anthropologists use the term today, culture as "the way of life of a people," and culture as "choices from the global cultural supermarket." Then I discuss how state and market are two dominant forces behind these two meanings. The state shapes people to believe that they must protect and cherish their particular nation and culture; the market shapes people to believe that they can buy and do and become anything in the world they want (if only they have the money).

State and market contradict each other, but most people in the world can't see this contradiction, since they live in a world defined by both state and market. Only in Hong Kong is this contradiction fully apparent: a large middle class, believing in the values of the market, is now asked to believe that it belongs to the Chinese state, an identity that some in Hong Kong accede to, but that many resist. Through understanding this contradiction between cultural identity as shaped through state and through market in Hong Kong today, we can come to a deeper understanding not just of Hong Kong but of culture, state, and market in the world at large.

Two Meanings of "Culture"


Anthropologists, throughout the history of the discipline, have argued about what the term "culture" means; but underlying these arguments, a common definition was assumed. Culture was "the way of life of a people": Chinese had their Chinese culture, Mexicans had their Mexican culture, Mbuti Pygmies had their Mbuti culture, and so on. Each different group had its own particular culture, one per

group.

But this idea of culture is now called into question. As Ulf Hannerz has written, "Humankind has..bid farewell to that world which could with some credibility be seen as a cultural mosaic, of separate pieces with hard, well-defined edges. Cultural connections increasingly reach across the world" (1992: 218). We live in a world of global flows and interactions, where discrete cultures are far more difficult to locate.

It is still true today that if you stand on a street corner in Tokyo and watch how people interact, you will see patterns of behavior that are recognizably Japanese, just as if you stand on a street corner in Beijing you will see patterns of behavior that are recognizably Chinese, or in Boston that are American, or in Paris that are French. But when we look more closely, this cultural unity becomes questionable. What values do the Japanese college professor, laborer, housewife, feminist, and punk rocker all share, as opposed to all of their French or Chinese counterparts? What behaviors do the American fundamentalist Christian, lesbian separatist, inner-city drug dealer, yuppie stockbroker, and Hasidic Jew all share, as opposed to all Japanese or Chinese? Might it not be that the Tokyo rock musician has more, culturally, in common with his counterpart in Seattle than with his own grandparents? That two New York and Shanghai executives linked together through their internet connections share more of a common culture than either has with the janitors that clean her office?

Questions such as these lead some anthropologists to seek out a new definition of culture, culture as what might be termed "choices from the global cultural supermarket." Mass media show us goods and ideas from the world over from which we can pick and choose aspects of our cultural identities: from our tastes in food and home decor and music to our



In a globalized world, what does it mean to say Hong Kong's is Chinese?

political ideologies and religious beliefs. To take just one example of this choice from the cultural supermarket, a Hong Kong newspaper article discusses a motorcycle gang in China whose members are obsessed by Harley Davidsons and the American dream of freedom. When the reporter asks why, he is told, "Cultures...are like the dishes on a table. You just pick up what you like" (Forrester 1994). To a degree, anyway, we can indeed pick and choose who culturally we are, as shown by our diverse choices of lifestyle in today's world.

However, if culture as "the way of life of a people" is not fully accurate in describing how people live today, culture as "choices from the global cultural supermarket" is also inaccurate, in that we don't just freely make ourselves up: we are profoundly shaped by the social worlds in which we were born and in which we live. Both these conceptions of culture have some truth to them, but neither is of itself sufficient. In fact, these two concepts of culture to some extent contradict each other. You can't have both culture as "the way of life of a people," meaning that Japanese, Chinese, Americans, French each have their own particular way of way of life in common, and culture as "choices from the global cultural supermarket," meaning that each Japanese, Chinese, American, or French person chooses her own lifestyle as she sees fit. Underlying this contradiction is the conflict of two huge forces shaping cultural identity today, the forces of state and of market.

State and Market

Throughout most of anthropology's history, anthropologists studied tribes and their "way of life." But today few people live in a tribe; almost everyone in the world lives in a state. If tribes' "ways of life" arise through the mostly imperceptible weavings of tradition generation after generation, states, emerging only over the last two centuries, purposefully construct cultural tradition in order to justify their existence. Through education and propaganda, states shape their citizens to value their cultural traditions, and to be willing

to die for the state. That these cultural traditions may be wholly invented is beside the point -- states everywhere use culture as "the way of life of a people" to mold their citizens to believe in the "naturalness" of the state. "The idea of a man without a nation seems to impose a strain on the modern imagination," writes Ernest Gellner (1983: 6). "A man must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears."

The state's power in molding its citizens is enormous. Why, despite the fact that I am an anthropologist and should see through such things, does the American national anthem still move me? It is because the state grabbed me as a child, making me patriotic despite myself. That 77 percent of Americans in a recent poll (Shapiro 1992: 43) said they would be willing to fight in a war for their country indicates that I am far from the only American to be so shaped; and of course members of other nations throughout the world are shaped as well. "What if they gave a war and nobody came?" was a wishful 1960s slogan and no more: mostly when states go to war, their citizens line up, eager enough to kill and be killed.

However, states' molding of their citizens into a common "way of life" is under challenge today by the market.¹ People throughout the

¹ I view the cultural supermarket as the partial reflection in the realm of culture of the economic market; but their relation is highly complex,



Since most people in Hong Kong eat hamburgers, should hamburgers now be considered Chinese?

affluent world are at least as molded by the market as by the state: but this is a manipulation more of seduction than coercion, of the persuasions of advertising rather than the force of law and police, as well as schooling. Throughout the world, the state is being eroded by the market. Iran, with its spiritual police in search of satellite dishes, sets itself in clear opposition to the market's attempted erosions, but those erosions continue. China, with its "capitalism with Chinese characteristics," attempts to defend itself from the market with its "spiritual civilization" campaigns, but finds that its citizens ignore the state's posters of warning before the allure of the shop windows. Japan has become so overrun with foreign -- Western -- cultural forms that conservative commentators write darkly of how Japanese have forgotten their "Japaneseness," but Japanese consumers don't seem to care. The United States, in its promise that every citizen has "certain inalienable Rights," among them "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness," seems a model for consumer choice, but the conflict of state and market is apparent in areas such as religion -- is America a Christian nation, or a nation of a plurality of religious truths, in accordance with consumer choice? There is

requiring more space to explicate than I have in this paper. I should also note that I am leaving aside issues of ethnicity and ethnic identity, which form another potent force challenging the state.

not a society in the world that escapes the conflict of state and market in the molding of citizens' "way of life."

However, most people don't recognize this conflict. People in the world's affluent societies have been shaped both in terms of state and market: the propositions that "one should stand up for one's country and protect its cultural tradition" and that "one should be free to shape one's life as one chooses" both are taken-for-granted, despite the fact that they are contradictory. But this is not the case in Hong Kong. Hong Kong, as one of the world's last

remaining colonies until recently, has had no cultural identity of belonging to a state (few Hong Kong Chinese ever thought they were British); with Hong Kong's immense wealth in recent decades, surpassing that of its colonial master, Hong Kong's middle class has had an acute consciousness of cultural identity as shaped through the market. Hong Kong middle-class people have not had a "way of life of a people" as defined by the state; instead, they have had a cultural identity in terms of "choices from the cultural supermarket" (Mathews 1996). This, however, changed on July 1, 1997, when Hong Kong people acquired the national cultural identity -- the identity of belonging to China -- that for 150 years had been lacking.

Hong Kong's Chinese Cultural Identity²

Is Hong Kong Chinese? Hong Kong is "a very Chinese city," writes Chan (1993: 483); "Hong Kong is not a Chinese city, although more than ninety-seven percent of its population are ethnic Chinese," writes Kwok (1994: 111). These different interpretations of

² This section uses brief excerpts from extended interviews conducted over the past three years with some forty middle-class Hong Kong informants discussing cultural identity. Fuller accounts of these interviews appear in Mathews 1996, 1997.

Hong Kong's Chineseness seem rooted in different conceptions of what Chineseness means. Most of Hong Kong's people, as refugees or descendants of refugees from China, adhere to Chineseness as "the way of life of a people," in terms of such cultural characteristics as language, cuisine, and values such as filial piety: in this sense, Hong Kong is clearly Chinese. However, the Chinese and Hong Kong governments seek to make Hong Kong's Chineseness synonymous with the Chinese state, and in this sense, Hong Kong at present is not Chinese. Deng Xiaoping said in 1984, "All Chinese...have a sense of pride in the Chinese nation...The Chinese residents in Hong Kong have this sense of national pride too" (Lau 1997: 2); Tung Chee-hwa said recently, "We in Hong Kong take tremendous pride in our Chinese identity" (Gargan 1997). But many people in Hong Kong, distrustful of what they see as the state's appropriation of Chineseness, don't feel such pride. In one survey conducted just after the handover, 88 percent of Beijing respondents and 82 percent of Guangzhou respondents felt that Hong Kong people were "Chinese," but just 43 percent of Hong Kong respondents felt any inclination toward a "Chinese" identity (Zhu et al. 1997). An October 1997 survey showed that 60 percent of respondents had no sense of feeling "proud of being Chinese after the handover" (No 1997).

I have found from my interviews with Hong Kong middle-class people that this lack of inclination to be identified as Chinese is complex. Partly it seems due to Hong Kong's affluence as opposed to China's perceived lack of affluence ("We're not like people in China! We're from the first world!" I've been told by several of the people I've interviewed.). Partly it seems due to the legacy of the Chinese state's political repression, and particularly to the memory of Tiananmen Square. Perhaps even more, however, this disinclination to be identified as Chinese comes from Hong Kong people being completely unaccustomed to belonging to any state.


In early October 1997, there was much controversy in Hong Kong over the proposed playing of the Chinese national anthem before movie showings: "Films are for enjoying leisure, not for listening to the national anthem," read a headline in *Apple Daily* (Cheng 1997); several of those I interviewed claimed that they would be spending time in

the restroom at the start of movies to avoid having to listen to the national anthem.³ When I told my Hong Kong students that the American national anthem is played before sporting events, some were shocked: "In America, you do that? You're just like the Chinese!" While a few people I interviewed said they felt patriotic when they heard the Chinese national anthem, others expressed only puzzlement: "When I hear it, I don't feel anything. I can't really imagine what I'm supposed to feel." As a newspaper columnist wrote, "I once was at an event where everyone stood at reverence before the rising national flag. I was so embarrassed. It was like being at church...when everyone else is praying" (Lee 1997).


Hong Kong middle-class people may resist what they feel to be "state propaganda," but they have been very much molded by "market propaganda": the moldings of advertising and the allure of money. Hong Kong's money-mindedness may be a cliché, but it also bears a degree of truth. As one person I interviewed said, echoing many more, "The best thing about Hong Kong is we can make lots of money. Money is important in that it gives you choices as to how to live: with money you can do anything you want." In another person's words, "I don't feel I'm Chinese; I'm a citizen of the world. I'll emigrate if I can find good opportunities; it doesn't matter where I go, as long as I can make a good life for myself and my family." Belonging to a state, for people such as these, seems an irrelevancy; participating in the worldwide market what is important. Views such as these arouse the alarm and scorn of advocates of Chineseness in Hong Kong: "Under colonial rule, our education into nationalism was deprived. With the [Hong Kong] mass media's one-sided reporting, Hong Kong people... misunderstand China. Their nationalistic emotion is thus shallow....Patriotic education can strengthen young people's identity as Chinese" (Wong 1997).

This situation is deeply ironic, in that at the same time that national consciousness seeks to overcome market consciousness in Hong Kong, the opposite is happening in China: the government's slogans and exhortations seem

³ The initial reporting on this policy was ambiguous, but it was shortly made clear that only films from the mainland playing in Hong Kong would be showing a video of the Chinese national anthem at their start.



Is Hong Kong Chinese because it belongs to the Chinese state or is Chineseness more a clever marketing device?



Teaching children to be "Chinese".

increasingly ignored, as citizens cluster around store windows and movie screens instead. This may be happening to a degree throughout the world. The East Asian

financial crisis shows how feeble the power of the state is before that of the global economic market, and the same may be true of the cultural supermarket. Only in Hong Kong is this process moving in a different direction, as perhaps the most market-oriented people on earth are exhorted to adapt a state identity.

What this may mean for Hong Kong people -- whether a generation or two of patriotic education will cause Hong Kong people to feel the sense of belonging to the Chinese state that the majority now lack, or whether Hong Kong's market consciousness will serve to further erode the power of the Chinese state, in Hong Kong and in China as well -- remains to be seen. From a detached,

anthropological viewpoint, in any case, this process is extraordinary. I have discussed in this paper two contradictory conceptions of culture in anthropology, culture as "the way of

life of a people" and culture as "choices from the global cultural supermarket"; and I have discussed how the dominant colliding forces shaping these two conceptions of culture are those of state and of market. In most places in the world, this collision is largely invisible, since we are molded by both state and market and cannot see the contradiction of these forces clearly. In Hong Kong, however, because of the present's unique historical juncture, we can indeed see these colliding forces clearly, and can, in the decades to come, study the outcome of this collision. This is why the example of Hong Kong has so much to teach anthropologists, not just about Hong Kong and China, but about the meanings of state and market in shaping cultural identity throughout the world today.

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香港的中國身份建構：文化、國家與市場的形塑力

Gordon Mathews

文章摘要

本文作者從兩個不同角度去討論人類學中一個重要的概念--「文化」。有論者視「文化」為人類的生活方式；亦有論者視「文化」為人們在「世界超級市場」中對自己文化身份所作的抉擇。作者在文中嘗試以國家及市場兩個概念來解釋論者對「文化」所持的不同觀點。他認為國家重視保存和愛惜國家的「文化」；但市場機制卻使人們相信，金錢可以滿足他們對世界上不同生活方式和商品的消費。處於愛國主義和世界主義夾縫中的香港社會，正處處表現出這兩種論點間的矛盾和張力。

田野影像的民族誌——宗族「復興」中的

歷史重構

張小軍

1993 至 1996 年，我在閩東地區多次進行田野研究，中間拍攝了一些照片，其中有一部分與八十年代以來的宗族「復興」有關。宗族是一種歷史現象，後毛時期的宗族「復興」，亦是對歷史的再現。不過，這一復興不是簡單的歷史重現，而是歷史的再創造，是一種歷史的重構 (Siu: 1988)。


本文嘗試以田野影像之民族誌，簡要討論一些宗族「復興」中重構歷史的片斷。從方法論的角度來看，田野影像是人類學者對所見所聞的一次創造和詮釋，一方面，它可以從視覺的角度加深人們對事實的理解；另一方面，可能因為這樣的視覺創造而將歷史的重構簡單化。下面這張

照片 (圖一)，拍攝於 1995 年 12 月陽村彭氏金公總祠落成典禮并祭祖儀式，一輛參加典禮的桑塔納小轎車上「彭氏總祠落成典禮專車」的字樣和一個插有中國和美國國旗的裝飾座，形成了一幅有趣的空間組合。這多少是我的刻意捕捉和創造：中、美兩國的國旗與一個偏僻山村的宗祠落成典禮合了起來。實際上，在人們的觀念中，兩者沒有直接關係。它其實是兩件事情的結合：先，在 1995 年的中國大陸，小轎車上的中國裝飾，是一大時髦，一般較常見的組合是共產黨的黨旗和中國國旗，後來也有國旗和香港特別行政區的區旗。一些報章曾經批評這種將黨旗、國旗庸俗化的不嚴肅現象。不過，這一時髦之流行，顯然與這一象徵中隱喻的權力和地位有關。黨旗和國旗中隱喻的權力地位自不待言，美國在一般公眾中亦是富有大國和力量象徵，少見也有英國等國家的國旗，但是日本的國旗則完全沒有。另外，小轎車參加祭祖、喪葬等儀式，是八十年代以來鄉村中的時

髦，因為擁有轎車，在一般的觀念中也是地位的象徵。1995 年 11 月到 12 月間，陽村的余、李、彭三姓先后以不同名稱舉行祭祖典禮，都有數輛小轎車參加。陽村一共只有兩輛桑塔納小轎車，一輛是鎮政府的公車，自然不便參加祭祖；另一輛是一間李氏兄弟私營企業的，只參加了李氏祭祖。彭氏的這輛小轎車是陽村祖籍的彭副縣長來參加祭祖的專車，在約兩百米的祭祖隊伍中，桑塔納的位置緊隨儀仗隊之後，十分顯眼。

權力和地位的表達，是宗族象徵的主要內容之一。1996 年二月，福清縣李村的李氏宗祠舉行落成典禮，還未上漆的大門上，

圖一



有如下圖的「門神」(圖二)，左邊為「文秦」，右邊為「武尉」：

文秦：	太子太師李	今月今日封
	六省衡文李	今月今日封
	務院總理李	今月今日封
	青田縣正堂李	今月今日封

武尉：浙江省常山市委書記李
 龍岩地區宣傳部長李
 福州市耀隆工資總公司書記李
 江西省鷹潭市商業局副局長李

今日封
 今日封
 今日封
 今日封

性的格式，封官者並不想凌駕這些為官者特
 別是總理之上，而是借這些人的權力地位來
 表達宗族。如果望文生義，以為宗族想壓這
 些官人頭，則誤解了鄉民的本意。門神是非
 一種歷史的習俗，被加以如此的創新，是非
 常實際的，因為這些當官的族人對現在的

圖二




文秦和武尉是護佑之神，如今任各地方黨、
 政幹部的族人變成了武尉門神，而文秦門神
 包括了歷史上的官和當時的國務院總理，李
 總理是當時李姓在中國最高職務的領導人，
 雖然他並不是福清祖籍。

落款的「今日今日封」，封官者是誰呢？
 自然是宗祠和宗族了。這其實只是一個象徵

族有更多實際的貢獻。

歷史的重構是現實的反映，人們常常用
 現實證明和定義著歷史。1996年，在興化
 的港里村，我訪問了彭氏大宗祠。宗祠董事
 長新會老人是我在陽村 1995年彭氏祭祖大
 典上認識的。臨去之前，新會老人跟我說：
 「對你們今天去有個要求，到那邊給他們鼓

圖三



勵一下。他們是農村人，你從香港來。那邊
 宗祠沒人管，我退休後住在城關。老人懂得
 祠堂，但是沒有錢，年輕人有錢，不懂，不

圖四



掏出來。祖先，哎，這事不要提了。我們籌
 13萬建祠不容易啊！……我這裏做牌匾，
 一個兩千元，做一個工本六百元，一個賺1400
 元，我是這樣子收錢啊。」

彭氏大宗祠與我在其他地方所見不同，
 基本的色調是黑白（圖三）：天花板是白的，
 房梁是黑的，嵌有白底的花鳥畫；立柱是黑
 色的，中段的柱聯是白底黑字；匾都是白底
 黑框；樑上懸掛兩塊布，左邊是青藍色，右
 邊是白色。我問新會這是為什麼，他說：「這
 是表示『清白』，不能用紅色，否則子孫不
 清白。這是歷史上傳下來的。陳村有陳家兩
 兄弟，現在在臺灣，八十年代初回來建祠堂，
 做錯了，裏面全部漆成了紅色，結果那一年
 兄弟倆都死了。漆紅色表示老祖宗不清白，
 因為流血是紅的。」我問他：那陽村的彭氏
 金公總祠可是漆的紅色。他說：「那不是紅
 色，是豬肝色，可以的。」我的推測是：興
 化是南宋重鎮，因此宋末元初慘遭屠城，《莆
 田縣志》記載：「德佑二年（1276）十二月元
 陷興化軍，景炎二年（1277）十月元屠興化
 軍。」元兵屠城之時，想必是血流成河，紅
 色成為不祥之兆。黑白的色調，至今仍給人

一種肅穆和靈堂的色彩。祖先的血流成
 河，用大紅的色彩祭顯。祖不敬之嫌。祖代
 先供奉在祠堂，有如供奉在靈堂，可以世
 代傳之。我的推測也許，實確出

。雖然歷史的創造，實確出
 離不開彭氏大宗祠
 前，那薄了頭下創有人造時的

的歷史，吸引的歷
 史，記憶的陽村工藝
 中畫像，法也為
 嫁娶和節慶當宗祠重
 時，他成了不可多得

的人材，幾乎各姓的
 宗祠重修他都參與。大
 小到檐飾，給予他一個
 造力的空間。

1995年彭氏金公總祠重修，正廳祭台
 祖像后面，有一幅七、八
 自陽秦之手（圖四），這
 色彩鮮艷，華美奪目，
 味著吉祥如意，百合代
 事會開會，說只有「百」
 又加了松樹，取其「千
 「千百」意味著長久和
 地久天長。

我問陽秦，這幅畫是怎樣創作的？他
 說：構思來自電視，看
 有趣的是，他畫的「百
 葉，大花瓣的粉紅色花
 合是草本植物，開白色
 人並不關心其中的隱
 蘭的「錯置」。

陽秦最精彩的设计，是
 朝聘紀念堂。林朝聘作
 為抗英的民族英雄，

應該是什麼樣？現在的人已經無法知道。這就給了陽秦創作的空間。在林氏家廟的一進大廳，圖四是林朝聘紀念堂，陽秦設計正中是林朝聘坐像，塑像是陽秦的伯父建的，他說樣子也是按照電影和連環畫，包括頂戴花翎、松鶴官袍和豹頭座椅。官服正中為鶴，清時是文官的服飾，像背后的壁畫中，卻是一隻象徵武將的花甲麒麟。正堂兩邊各有三個大紅金字虎頭木牌，東面是「肅靜」、「定海司馬」和「欽命五品」，西面是「回避」、「奉政大臣」和「餘姚正堂」，上方的掛匾書有「公正廉明」，整個的感覺是一個縣衙門的再現。我問陽秦這些設計來自何處？他說都是根據電影和連環畫。

電影和連環畫是一種記憶的文本，特別有趣的是這樣的「記憶政治 (memory politics)」。Smith (1994) 曾經分析吉爾干人 (Georgian) 如何在蘇維埃國家之下，通過儀式、口頭文學、詩歌、歷史小說和電影等保存著蘇聯國家之前的記憶 (Smith 1985)。好像中國在四十年的社會主義國編家之下，傳統的記憶仍能通過電影和連環畫等形式保留下來，使陽秦這樣未曾歷過傳統社會的人知道了「傳統」。

對於傳統，常常有創新的理解，圖五是寧德縣虎壩鄉一個彭氏宗祠拍攝的。除神主面向右邊兩個是舊有的之外，左面三個都是近年新做的神主牌。最左面的一個模仿了當地傳統龍頭神主的形式，中間兩個則以人頭代之。如此擬人化的神主，脫離了當地龍頭神主的傳統。龍頭神主牌在陽村和閩東一帶十分流行，無論漢人畬人都一樣。這種龍頭木主上部有鏤空雕刻的龍頭，周圍盤以龍身，整體呈方形，龍爪最多為四個 (圖六，圖七)，當地鄉民告訴我：龍是皇帝的象征，只有皇帝的族人才能有五爪。陽村只有李氏有唐後裔，可以有五爪。木主的底座，通常是雕有麒麟圖案，而這些都是典型的畬族風格。畬民的《高皇歌》中，有「頭是龍來身是人」、「唐朝人龍走過來」等，與陽村木主的風格相吻合 (凌 1947)。在傳統的漢人文化化中，龍是皇帝的化身，不能隨便使用，更何況用龍頭木主。畬人原來是犬圖騰，一種觀點認為畬人在與漢人的交往中，可能羞于犬在漢文化中的低賤性，而逐漸強調龍圖騰，例如祭祖時用龍頭祖杖。犬圖騰向龍圖騰的轉變，是一個畬文化向漢文化認同和涵化的過程，所以反而在漢文化區，少見龍頭木主。「畬」的稱呼始自南宋，為文人墨客的語言，後來才成為國家認可的語言。「畬」的稱呼和龍頭木主的身份強調，是國家政治整合和族群排斥與認同的產物。

本文從田野影像展開了一些民族志的片斷，進一步的分析可見筆者的博士論文。八十年代以來，歷史的傳統作為文化的手段，為現實秩序之建構提供了豐富的資源；華南地區的宗族「復興」，亦為理解後毛時期的

鄉村社會提供了一個有趣的視角。



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
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圖五



圖六



圖七

Ethnography of Fieldwork Images: Lineage 'Revival' as History Building

Zhang Xiaojun

This article uses photographs from the author's fieldwork on the 'revival' of lineages in northern Fujian to show way lineage revival is tied to local history and meaning. Many revived customs violate traditional rules but can be understood as meaningful in the context of post-Mao society.

Tokyo's Pantry:

Everyday Life at the Tsukiji Seafood Market

Theodore C. Bestor

Only a few sea gulls float above the mouth of the Sumida River where it enters Tokyo Bay below the Tsukiji seafood market; long experience has taught them the market's thrifty wholesalers throw few scraps away. Tsukiji is the world's largest marketplace for fresh, frozen, and processed seafood, a market where over 60,000 people come each day to buy and sell fish that will feed many of the Tokyo region's 22 million residents. Tsukiji is singular, at first glance both mundane and esoteric; it is a market for fresh fish in a nation renowned for sushi; it is a market that supplies highly perishable products for finicky Japanese consumers; it is a local market for the catches of a global fishing industry; it is a market of personalized face-to-face transactions conducted against a backdrop of jet transport, international faxes, and cellular


telephones; it is a market where small family businesses, some claiming to be in their twentieth generation, conduct trade with massive modern transnational corporations.

Nowadays central Tokyo faces landward, focused on train lines, subways, and superhighways, away from the rivers and canals that made Edo (as Tokyo was known before 1868) a "city of water" which early European visitors compared with Venice. Most of the old canals and rivers have been filled in, covered with roads, or abandoned. The few remaining stretches of open, working waterfront are largely out of sight, and for most residents of the city places like the Tsukiji marketplace are out of mind as well. For much of Tokyo's ordinary working day, the marketplace is quiet. It comes to life about the time the nearby Ginza bars close down, and when the market's day is done and Tsukiji traders drain cold beers to wash down their sushi, it is barely noon.

But six days a week between four and ten a.m., Tsukiji is a maelstrom of frenetic motion and industrial-strength noise, high-tech electronics and nearly preindustrial manual labor. Each morning, at dozens of separate auctions for hundreds of distinct varieties of seafood, crowds of traders bid fiercely against one another in arcane hand gestures and venerable semi-secret codes. As the auctions end, gigantic tuna carcasses and crates of dried sardines, tubs of sea bream and trays of octopus are hauled by gaff or hand cart across the wet cobblestones to the long, dimly lit sheds that house the market's 1,677 stalls, each presided over by a counting house little larger than a telephone booth, where cashiers use abacuses, calculators, and laptop computers to keep abreast of shouted orders. By the end of the morning, on an average day, roughly \$20 million worth of seafood (in a year time almost \$6 billion worth) changes hands in Tsukiji before being carted out the market's gates. Seafood of every description cascades from sparkling white styrofoam boxes and across well-worn cutting boards of the tiny stalls that line the market's aisles. Retail fishmongers and supermarket buyers, sushi chefs and box lunch makers, hotel caterers and even a few ordinary consumers thread their way




Japanese buyer hoisting Bluefin tuna off a boat in Gloucester, Massachusetts.



From "Maguro ga Tonda" (The Tuna Flew), a children's book published by Tsukiji wholesalers.

through the crowded market to pick out their day's fare from the enormous selection on display. Over the course of a year, perhaps two thousand varieties of seafood are sold at Tsukiji, and in any given season several hundred are available, although no single stall stocks more than a few dozen at a time. Eels wriggle in plastic buckets; flotilla of sea bass stare blankly from their tanks; live shrimp and crabs kick tiny showers of sawdust into the crowded aisles; smooth cross-sections of dark red tuna and creamy swordfish glisten in lighted refrigerator cases. The selection is global: slabs of Canadian and Chilean salmon; trays of Thai shrimp; Okhotsk crab; fresh bluefin tuna air-freighted from New York or Istanbul; boiled West African octopi; eels from Hamamatsu; Shikoku sea bream; and sea urchin roe from Maine repackaged in Hokkaido.

Tsukiji stands at the center of a technologically sophisticated, multi-billion dollar international fishing industry, and every day the market's auctions match international supply with the traditional demands of Japanese cuisine, made more elaborate over the past generation by Japan's prosperity and the gentrification of culinary tastes. Boosters encourage the homey view that Tsukiji is Tokyo's kitchen or pantry—but it is a pantry where about 2.8 million kilograms of fish is sold every



Weighing a tuna on the dock at Gloucester.

day. Despite the enormous scale of the marketplace, the bulk of Tsukiji's daily trade flows through tiny family firms, licensed to buy at Tsukiji's morning auctions and resell their purchases in the market's stalls. These businesses are embedded not just in a complex economic institution but also in a rich and distinctive social world.

Their ranks are largely stable—roughly 1,000 firms control the 1,677 stalls of the marketplace—and when firms change hands they often do so among family members. Over the generations, many a trade dynasty has been established through judicious matchmaking, and many a bitter rivalry has started with a falling out among brothers. The tiny stalls, some not much larger than a parking space, employ the labor of husbands and wives, fathers and sons, aunts and nephews, adopted children and married-in apprentices. Their businesses are hemmed in by deeply-rooted sets of personal ties, obligations, feuds, and patterns of patronage that are renewed—and hence subtly renegotiated—daily, against a backdrop of decades if not generations of similar calculations. This complicated social world constrains them to cooperate even as they compete and provides a rich lode of opportunities to pursue advantage in ways noticeable—or even imaginable—only to initiates.

Tsukiji is set off from Tokyo's ordinary life by many things: the complexity of social life within the marketplace, the slang and argot of the seafood business, even by the clock itself. Of course, the business of the Tsukiji marketplace is a 24-hour-a-day operation, and when day begins or ends depends on your point of view. Outsiders find the topsy-turvy time-clock of Tsukiji, where restaurants open at midnight and close by two in the



Frozen Tuna lined up for auction at Tsukiji market, Tokyo.


afternoon and where heavy traffic flows at three a.m., endlessly fascinating. But Tsukiji regulars, of course, know that their 'merchant's time' and the rhythms of the marketplace are delicately governed by the logic of the human stomach, culturally interpreted and transmitted through the daily shopping behavior of millions of cooks. Many Japanese homemakers shop every day for fresh food—deciding on the spot what they will serve for dinner that night—and their peak shopping hours are between noon and six p.m. Those in the restaurant trade make their decisions earlier, in time for the lunch-time rush. The business of the marketplace is simple: to get fresh food into stores and restaurants before noon. So trucks from provincial harbors start arriving at ten or eleven p.m., auctioneers and their assistants start arranging seafood around two a.m., from three or four a.m. buyers start inspecting merchandise, the opening bells for the morning auctions start ringing shortly after five a.m., and by eleven a.m. at the latest, Tsukiji's stallkeepers start winding up their day's business.

Reflecting on the ebb and flow of the marketplace, one old trader commented to me, "Tsukiji is not some big machine stamping out products clunk, clunk, clunk. It's an *arabesque* (arabesque)." His delicate imagery evokes the precise and intricate footwork of Tsukiji traders as they negotiate what the anthropologist Clifford Geertz calls the Brooved channel of the marketplace that lead them again and again past familiar scenes to accustomed trade partners following a well-understood, if complex rhythm.

As an urban marketplace, Tsukiji is a central historical and cultural symbol of the city life. It is not simply a mechanical device, a logistical cog that serves the nutritional needs of the population and

draws on equally mechanical systems of transportation, communication, sewage disposal, or financial settlement. The long and complex histories of Tsukiji and its forebear, the Nihonbashi fish market, nostalgically intertwine with the traditions of Edo's plebeian culture. The denizens of the marketplace style themselves heirs to the mercantile traditions of Tokyo's old shitamachi regions. In the golden glow of memory, shitamachi life stereotypically revolved around a happy-go-lucky attitude toward work, play, and money; open emotional bonds that linked bosses, workers, family members, friends, and customers; and small family firms in which household and workshop were almost inseparable, where women as much as men negotiated the intricate social and economic equilibrium of kinship and production. Tsukiji draws its identity from the lifestyles, cultural pursuits, and commercial customs of the old merchant quarters, and from the late twentieth century re-invention of Tokyo's shitamachi region as repository of 'authentic' urban culture. If the emotional landscape of old Tokyo has a heartland, Tsukiji's partisans lay claim to a substantial chunk of it.

The Tsukiji marketplace traces its history to the late 16th century, when Tokugawa Ieyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa Shogunate, took possession of Edo (as Tokyo was known until 1868) and brought with his retinue a small band of fishers from a village near Osaka. These fishers, widely regarded as waterborne spies for the Shogun, were granted a monopoly over fishing in the nearby waters of Edo Bay, and, in the early 17th century, were allowed to establish a market at Nihonbashi, the "Japan Bridge" at the center of Edo just outside the castle gates. The market continued in this location until 1923, when the Nihonbashi district



Tuna buyers bidding at auctions, Tsukiji.

was destroyed in the Kanto earthquake, and the market was moved to Tsukiji, about two and half kilometers to the south on the banks of the Sumida River.

For centuries the Sumida has been a busy urban thoroughfare, where barge traffic supplying the city's wharves slightly upstream mingled with pleasure craft and fishing vessels that harvested the waters of Edo Bay within easy hailing distance of where the marketplace stands today. When the present market was built here after the 1923 earthquake, convenience for the fishing fleet was still an important consideration, but in past three quarters of a century most of the bay's nearby fishing grounds have been abandoned and filled in to create islands for housing and industry. Fish arrive today by truck.

From around nine-thirty or ten p.m. the bridges across the Sumida and the wide avenues that cut through central Tokyo rumble with the first of the thousands of trucks that will visit the marketplace during the course of a day's business. Some of the late evening trucks are long-distance refrigerated rigs that come from almost every fishing port and regional marketing center in the country. Others arrive from Tokyo's international airport at Narita, where shipments of fresh fish from

around the world arrive by cargo jet. (A stale riddle at Tsukiji asks "What's Japan leading fishing port? -- the answer is Narita Airport.") Many trucks display the distinctive red-black-and-white swirl of calligraphy that most people can recognize rather than actually read as "Uogashi" ("fish quay"), an old-fashioned, colloquial term for the market. The most spectacular trucks are painted with wild murals of regional festivals, gods, or fish; many trumpet the bravado of long distance truckers, emblazoned with pink and purple running lights, meter upon meter of burnished chrome scroll work, fanciful superstructures built over the cabs, and illuminated slogans like "Riding the morning wind, seeking the love of a fair maiden."

Although they are less flamboyant than the long distance truck drivers, Tsukiji traders also revel in the rich identity and symbolism that the market's four centuries of history provide. Stall proprietors not only derive a professional identity but also a more widely recognized social identity from their claims to be direct heirs of the ancient marketplace. Some can point to their firms' standing in the fish business for four, seven, even fifteen generations. Whether "Established in 1650" or "Established in 1892," such lineages carry considerable cachet. More broadly, these traders represent themselves as heirs to the mercantile traditions of Japanese business centered on small-scale family-run firms as opposed to large-scale bureaucratic, modern corporations, a contrast that has become increasingly sharp as supermarkets replace tiny grocery stores and retail fishmongers across Tokyo. And finally, as purveyors of fine seafoods, Tsukiji's traders regard themselves as stewards of Japan's culinary heritage.

Earning its self-bestowed title as Tokyo's pantry, Tsukiji every day provides the seafood that millions of cooks--professional chefs and homemakers alike--will prepare. Dealing in foodstuffs, Tsukiji tethers the hidebound masculine worlds of fishing and markets to the delicate domains of cooking and feminine domesticity. But Tsukiji's seafood is not just any foodstuff; fish are central elements of Japanese cuisine--both haute and low--and thus occupy a particularly prominent and consequential niche at the center of Japanese conceptions of their culinary culture. Seafood--with rice, the most "Japanese" of foods--is imbued with all the symbolism of tradition and identity that Japanese so often lavish on their cultural heritage. And Tsukiji's economic life is fundamentally shaped by the perceptions, preferences, and ideologies that surround food, its preparation, and its consumption in contemporary Japanese culinary culture; the marketplace delicately calibrates its movements to the cultural significance of the

foodstuffs it purveys.

Tsukiji traders must stay attuned to many aspects of Japanese culinary logic. An enormous concern with freshness is a simple and obvious example, given the prominent role of raw seafood in Japanese cuisine. Equally, wholesalers must pay careful attention to selecting unblemished and properly proportioned seafood to meet the sometimes exquisite demands of culinary visual aesthetics. The cultural rhythms of consumption also occupy their attention. Consumption rises and falls according to the secular calendar of paydays and national holidays, as well as the complicated ritual almanacs that define symbolically appropriate dishes for specific events held according to the traditional calendar. The almanac determines, for example, one or two days each summer when consumers will clamor for grilled eel, following the custom that eel fortifies one against the hottest days of the year.

Much of the folklore of the market sounds casual--fodder for endless chatter between sushi chefs and inquisitive foreigners. Why are sea bream so highly prized? Because their Japanese name (tai) is a homophone for congratulations, and so they are served at weddings and other auspicious events. Eels served in Tokyo are slit along the back, those served in Osaka are slit along the belly. Why? Because Tokyo was a samurai town and slitting the belly was too reminiscent of ritual suicide. Why are lobster claws not served at weddings? Because they resemble scissors and it is bad luck at a wedding to mention things that cut or divide. Why do so few women sell fish in the market and why are there no female sushi chefs? Because--Tsukiji traders sometimes maintain--women's hands are warmer than men's and hence adversely affect the flavor of raw seafood.

Although the market's food lore is at times playful or pure fancy, it can be serious business for people whose livelihoods depend on selling what consumers want. Merchants' decisions to buy and sell are based in the hard realities of supply and demand, but demand can be created by many things, custom, lore, luck, and ritual not least among them.

Off at one corner of the market stands a small Shinto shrine, the Namiyoke Shrine, built alongside the old Tsukiji canal. The shrine buildings are dotted with votive signs, banners, and lanterns emblazoned with the trade names and shop symbols of Tsukiji businesses. In the early morning hours one can often spot traders--wearing their characteristic tall rubber boots--pausing to enter the shrine to offer a quick prayer at the main shrine building. Some, even more hurried, simply bow deeply at the shrine gate before striding off to the



Preparing tuna for sale in a wholesaler's stall, Tsukiji.

inner marketplace across a small bridge just in front of the shrine.

If one pauses to explore the courtyard of the Namiyoke Shrine, one will find a row of stone monuments that stand in tribute to seafood--one for shrimp, another for clams, and still another for monkfish, as well as monuments for more general categories including sushidane (sushi toppings, that is, the assorted and often exotic varieties of seafood that are a top-flight sushi shop's stock in trade) and live fish. Tsukiji traders generally do not regard their trade as a moral issue. After all, a Tsukiji fishmonger or chef with qualms about gutting a fish would not last long. Nevertheless, the Namiyoke Shrine takes ritual note of what goes on at Tsukiji. These monuments--erected by groups of traders from the market -- stand in silent gratitude to the fish that gave their lives for sushi.

東京食品室：築地海鮮市場的日常生活

Theodore C. Bestor

文章摘要

在東京築地的魚市場，每日的海鮮交易量達二百八十萬公斤及二千萬美元。市場內共有一六百七十七個攤檔，大部份是世代相傳及以小規模方式經營。但高科技的運作模式，卻確保不同種類的魚產能從世界各地飛運過來，因而使這個國際性的魚市場獨具其社會特色。

Situating Heung Gong Yahn: Dilemmas of Identity in Australia

Maria Tam Siumi

Australia has been one of the three major destinations of Hong Kong immigrants (after Canada and the U.S.) since 1990. This new exodus of people from Hong Kong includes a relatively high percentage of people with means, who have received higher education, or are professionals by occupation. To some researchers the decision to emigrate was based on economic rationality, largely an outcome of a well-calculated family survival strategy. Others thought it was a political choice that directly or indirectly resulted from the June Fourth Incident at Tiananmen Square. Between 1996 and 1998, through interviews, questionnaires and participant observation, I collected information on the life of Hong Kong immigrants in Sydney, Australia as they lived it, to understand more about the complexities of this modern diaspora. As with other waves of immigrants throughout history, Hong Kong immigrants in Australia, whether they be sojourners or settlers, had been seeking to situate themselves in the host country, making sense of what their home country meant to them in a new environment. I documented immigration as real life processes which ranged from the happily assimilating to the regretful and distressed. But one common theme stood out in the field data—for many of those human beings who took part willingly or unwillingly in *yih mahn*¹ (immigration), whether as sojourners or settlers, it was an experience dominated by uncertainty and insecurity. This essay is a brief discussion of some observations from my field work.

The right side of the escalator: identity crisis

“On which side of the escalator do you stand?” I was caught off guard when Ronald Lee², one of my interviewees, asked me

this question before I even started the tape recorder. Frankly I never seriously asked myself which side of the escalator to stand on. Don't we just know? But culture shock comes from the mundane. It attacks from the most unlikely angle, in everyday life, when we are most vulnerable. One of the genuine shocks that new immigrants from Hong Kong got in Australia was how daily life was lived differently in the host country. Things that were taken for granted and things that looked commonplace in the home country all of a sudden became puzzling, inexplicable, and even mysterious. Take the etiquette of riding on an escalator. Does one stand on the left side or the right side of the escalator? The escalators in Sydney look exactly the same as those in Hong Kong; they even have the same brands. Obviously they serve the same function, i.e., transporting people from one floor to another, and they occasionally act as entertainment for teenagers who prefer to run down the ascending stairs. But, “Do I stand on the *right* side?” Ronald asked again, rhetorically. He was obviously concerned with the *proper* side as defined by mainstream Australian society, whether it meant the left or the right.

Ronald was a man in his mid forties, had been a high school teacher in Hong Kong, and came from a rather well off family in the New Territories. He migrated to Sydney with his wife and children a couple of years ago. He seemed to be a happy-go-lucky guy, but his trademark statement was *juen teui sat geui*—literally “forward backward lack reference”—meaning “I don't know whether to go forward or backward. I have no reference”. It was a perfect analogy for those Hong Kong immigrants who gave up a career in Hong Kong, hoping to find a haven in Australia that at least would justify the financial loss. But after two years' residence and having acquired Australian citizenship, they began to ponder whether they should return to Hong Kong to restart a career from scratch. The phrase embodied a dissatisfaction with the present

¹ All Chinese transcriptions in this paper are based on conventional Cantonese.

² Pseudonyms are used throughout this paper to ensure anonymity.

situation, cast doubt on the decision to immigrate, and sadly, pointed to the helplessness that many immigrants experienced. Ronald went on to explain, "In Hong Kong I stood on the right side. *Jó háhng yauh kéih* ("walk on the left and stand on the right", an MTR slogan). But here, I'm at a loss. It seems to be the opposite here".

Ronald was so concerned with getting it right that he brought this issue up again at a dinner party a few days later. The party consisted of six friends, all immigrants from Hong Kong, one of whom was Peter Wong. Peter, also a former teacher in Hong Kong, said authoritatively, "What proper side? There isn't a proper side. You do what you like here. It's a free society. The Australians themselves stand on whichever side they want to. I've seen people standing on the left, people standing on the right, people standing in the middle. There's no rule. How do you follow a rule when there's no rule?" Ronald was unhappy with this answer. He protested, "But there must be a social norm!"

At that point I felt tempted to give a lecture on the transient nature of social norms and the importance of mutual respect among peoples of different cultures, etc. But of course there was no need because Ronald and Peter were tackling a different question: Where should I situate myself? Who am I (as *hèung góng yàhn*) here (in Australia)? To Ronald, everyday life situations had become something that could not be taken for granted because they challenged his basic understanding of acceptable social behavior, and they threw him off the ground so much that he did not know how to conduct himself. He was a member of a large lineage in the New Territories and for over forty years he had been sure who he was in his village and knew exactly where he should stand in ancestral rites. He was a successful teacher in Hong Kong (measured by the number of his Form Five students receiving credits in public examinations) but here, in a "foreign devil's land" (*guài lóu deih fong*) he did not have an answer for such a simple matter. He would like to follow the rules and be assimilated into the "mainstream" (though he never defined what this was but understood as an Anglo-based set of customs). At the same time, like many *hèung góng yàhn* he was too proud of himself and his Hong Kong identity to submit to an "Aussie culture" perceived as less rational and less sophisticated.

Underlying the query of the self was a sense of insecurity that accompanied any

immigrant's life. One interviewee summed it up, "It always feels like you're not at home. You don't belong". Another interviewee commented that "in the eyes of the [white] Australians, all Asians are newcomers. Always, no matter how long you stay. Once an immigrant, always an immigrant". A first-generation immigrant always felt uncertain of how to conduct oneself, even in the routines of daily life; indeed, *especially* in the routines of daily life. The feeling of being marginalized was obvious. Whether to Ronald who would not hide his sense of insecurity, or Peter who seemed to be confident in himself, the one thing that was certain was the we-they divide between whites and non-whites. And to many of those who gave up what was a life-time's work in Hong Kong, to be up-rooted and transplanted in a lower rung of career and social hierarchy—for little or no perceived reward—was an excruciating experience.

Coming back to Ronald's question about escalator etiquette, it was a move to both literally and metaphorically situate himself in Australian life. He found that he, as a *hèung góng yàhn*, together with the frame of reference that he had acquired in Hong Kong was no longer relevant. His solution to this sense of uncertainty was a cultural retreat. He decided to re-establish an identity for himself by clinging onto a "Chinese culture" which was seen to be superior. He worked at an institute owned by a Hong Kong immigrant that organized activities from Chinese painting exhibitions to Tai Chi and Chinese knots classes. Ronald found comfort in writing short articles for a weekly Chinese magazine that was distributed free in suburbs where immigrants of Chinese descent congregated. He became a member of a Chinese writers club, spent hours writing couplets and riddles in traditional Chinese language and poetry, and was invited to be adjudicator in Chinese poetry reading competitions. He had re-situated himself in the certainty of China's Dynastic Culture.

Moon cakes and god the father: patriarchal familism

Retreating to a familiar resource to compensate for a sense of loss was a common strategy among immigrants. Hong Kong women in Sydney also administered their own dose of traditional Chinese culture to maintain a healthy sense of self. I was invited to a Protestant women's fellowship meeting in August of 1997. All the women were from

Hong Kong and Cantonese was the lingua franca. They met in a member's home. The meeting started with a "sister", Pinky, giving a moving account of how *fu h sah'n* (literally "father-god", or God the Father) had helped her through the very difficult times of being an immigrant, a mother with two very young children, and a wife whose husband lived in Hong Kong to carry on his business as a solicitor. Like other "astronauts"³, Pinky lived a roller-coaster life that transversed between the downs of home-making and raising children, and the ups of having the husband coming for a short stay. She had no friends or relatives in Australia, and was devastated when her Filipino maid returned to Hong Kong after helping her settle into the new home. She was introduced to the Cantonese church in a nearby suburb by the mother of her daughter's schoolmate. Church members provided her with help in grocery shopping, in cooking when she was ill, and in her children's education by exchanging the latest school news. Pinky had found the biggest support in church during the two years of required residence, but it was hard to distinguish the social support from the spiritual. At the end of her recount, she concluded by thanking *fu h sah'n* for the opportunity to immigrate, but she was more grateful that he now let her return to Hong Kong.

On the day of my visit, the main purpose of the meeting was to learn to make moon cakes as a speciality food for the Mid Autumn Festival that was coming up in September. More than thirty women attended but only half were members of the fellowship. There was a minor scramble when the teacher started to distribute the recipe because it was an unexpected crowd. I asked the organizer, Sally, how she knew making moon cakes would be so popular. Sally had a soft-spoken, shy demeanour, but she explained in a matter-of-fact way that most members of the fellowship were learning to be good wives after immigrating to Australia, and the fellowship was providing ways to help. She added that

³ "Astronauts" (*taai hung yàhn*) originally referred to the husbands who, like astronauts flying between the home base and space station, often flew between two households of the family, one set up in the host country where the wife and children lived, and the other in Hong Kong where he continued to work. Among the Hong Kong immigrants in Australia, the term had increasingly diffused to mean also the wives of these "astronaut families" as they were extremely (*taai*) empty (*hung*).

most of the women had been working in Hong Kong and hiring domestic help, but now in Australia they had to do the household chores themselves, to learn to look after the children and to please their husbands. At that point I started to wonder if that was also the reason why the membership list looked almost like Japanese—since all the names were written in four characters (generally Hong Kong style Chinese names are consisted of three characters), with their husbands' surname on top of their own. Sally explained further that learning to make traditional Chinese food was a good way to better one's cookery skills, that family members would appreciate the mothers for the speciality delicacies, and therefore would help to consolidate the family based on Chinese virtues. The group had previously learned to make *jung* (glutinous rice wrapped in leaves) for Tuen Ng Festival and that was popular too.

I initially found incongruities between this return to the Chinese patriarchal family and the claim by many immigrant women that Australia provided a freer environment. But on second thoughts I realized that they fitted together well. The women felt guilty because they believed that they had had a career in Hong Kong at the expense of their duties as wives and mothers. Now that they had immigrated, had no job, and had all the time in world, they saw it a call of duty to compensate for what had been deprived from their husbands and children. Indeed, a large percentage of female questionnaire respondents indicated that they immigrated mainly because their spouse wanted to, or because they wanted their children to receive a better education. The "ideal-traditional" Chinese woman of course would be expected to follow her husband's wish and place her children in top priority. In this fellowship the ideal woman was pushed to an extreme. Wives were seen as subordinate to their husbands, and had little intelligence or the use for it except in cooking and doing housework. This was justified to a large extent by the patriarchal teachings in their religion and by Chinese concepts of gender relations. These were reinforced by an Australian society which was essentially a patriarchy that systematically discriminated against women by privileging single-salaried households through the tax system, encouraging large families through welfare policies, taking away childcare subsidies, and discouraging women from employment by normalizing vertical and horizontal gender inequity in the workplace.

Indeed, in the eyes of most informants, women in Australia were first and foremost mothers and wives, never themselves. They were expected to sacrifice individual interests to uphold so-called Christian and traditional values. In such a cultural milieu, Hong Kong women as first-generation immigrants who were eager to be accepted by mainstream society were particularly susceptible. Whether they were willingly submitting to this practice, they had to realize the fact that they had become financially dependent on their husbands who now earned only a third of what they used to in Hong Kong. Thus in addition to making ends meet, they believed that they must support the husband who had to suffer a psychological blow for a career demotion as well as discrimination in the workplace by [white] Australians. Relegating the female to second class status in the family was a recurrent way to boost the male ego, which the women found easily justified with Protestant requirements and traditional Chinese values.

Multi/monoculturalism and Hongkong identity

When asked whether she considered herself Australian, *hèung góng yàhn*, or Chinese, Alice Chan Lee was adamant: "Of course I am Australian. My nationality is Australian. My passport is Australian". In addition she was very critical of those immigrants who milked the welfare system, saying that people should not do this to their own country, her country. Alice was a core member of the Protestant fellowship discussed in the above section. She was a nurse in Hong Kong but found it unfeasible to work in Sydney because employment would clash with her duties as a mother of two. Her husband was a doctor in Hong Kong and Alice lived an "astronaut" life. She idolized her husband and her two daughters, and at the same time was very grateful for *fuh sàhn* for her family and the opportunity to emigrate. She thought everyone in Australia was nice and it was the fault of immigrants themselves if they could not adapt to the host country that upheld multiculturalism. She did volunteer work in the community as a way of paying back the system that was so kind to her.

Alice's answer to my question was an exception. Most other interviewees insisted they were primarily *hèung góng yàhn* no matter how long they had lived in Australia, and were unequivocally proud of their Hong Kong

identity. According to Jim Lo, "This *hèung góng yàhn* identity—you can't wash it off". There are two sides to this statement. First, many immigrants perceived an unwillingness on the part of the "mainstream" society to accept non-whites as equals. Their "evidence" was the ways aborigines were treated by the government and the often negative image of Asian Australians projected by the mass media. Recently a distrust for the government to sincerely uphold multiculturalism came from the surge of what was coined the Pauline Hanson phenomenon since September 1996.


The line between opponents and supporters of Hanson, the independent Member of Parliament, was very clear cut, though of course many were unsure which side the Prime Minister was really on. To her supporters, she "talked sense", "had a lot of guts" and had even come to symbolize the Australian battler—a single mother bringing up two children while running a fish-and-chips shop. To her opponents, her ignorance ("Please explain"), naivety of economics (offer farmers loans at 2% interest), populist political propositions (relax gun laws and abolish aboriginal land rights), outdated xenophobic sentiments (the Yellow Peril) and white supremacist racism (aborigines are cannibals) were seen to be a mixture of potential danger, especially when these found a ready resonance among the rural populace.

The uproar, or sensation, depending which angle you look at it, that she had caused in the year and a half since her maiden speech in parliament was amazing. The organized propaganda effort behind all this was highly successful. She had been glorified in secular terms (photographed wrapped in an Australian flag) as well as in religious symbolism (in a painting as a crucified Joan of Arc). At the same time, her support was counteracted by name-calling such as "horrible Hanson", "fishmonger flag-wrapper", "the peril of Pauline", "fascist" and "nazist"; there were also newspaper articles by historians and anthropologists that reminded Hanson that her ancestors were also cannibals. The book "Pauline Hanson—the Truth", the official statement of the One Nation Party which she founded, was published in high profile, and predictably caused another round of debate between the for and the against.

The MP was treated more as a celebrity than a politician in her own right. She was, for instance, recently voted the 100th sexiest person in Australia in a survey by a local magazine.

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■ Pauline Hanson's notoriety has a lot in common with that of a heavy metal band. JANE FREEMAN reports.

Why celebrity gossip is the very glue of our society

Her rapidly acquired fame was likened to that of a heavy metal band that channelled anger and caused envy (Marshall 1997). The celebrity factor in the furor was unmistakable. Pauline Hanson was groomed almost like a movie star. She could be seen on TV news in flashy evening dresses at supporters' rallies, smiling girlishly and rushed onto the stage by several bodyguards. Even her trademark anxious-sounding mezzo-soprano voice was considered to be part of image management along with the bright-coloured suits that she wore in parliament. She was constantly bombarded by more experienced politicians who ridiculed her political naivety, but interestingly this helped to accomplish her identity as simultaneously the underdog and the new idol. Like would-be stars, she was the media's pet. Media coverage was so indiscriminate that she would be asked about issues that were at most remotely related to her political platform. The political party that she founded, One Nation Party, was seldom mentioned as a party on its own right. It was always prefixed with its leader's name: "Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party", or "Pauline Hanson's Party", and in the Chinese

media it was *hòhn jàn dóng*, or "Hanson Party". But the National Party was never John Howard's National Party, nor the ALP ever Kim Beazley's Labour Party. The One Nation Party was sculpted with Pauline Hanson on the pedestal and relied largely on her appearance in the media for its development. It was indeed a star in the making—by the media, supporters and opponents alike.

Like watching TV drama series, the audience that watched Hansonism develop were fed with doses of gossip and occasional quibbles like sacking of advisers and their vengeful tales and so on, and in the process their reaction helped to shape the twists and turns of the plot. Recently a mini-climax culminated in the One Nation Party's success in the state elections of Queensland, which the Chinese community watched with anxiety and uneasiness. The audience could also directly participate—a petition to major political parties to put One Nation candidates last on the ballot in the upcoming federal elections was held among the Chinese in Sydney. There were stalls set up in Chinatown where passers-by were asked to sign their names. In institutes

such as the Chinese Cultural Centre, visitors were also encouraged to sign on printed forms. Interestingly, many who signed did not know exactly what the petition aimed at, but only knowing it was "against Hanson" (*fāan deui hòhn jàn*) was enough to make them put down their names. Specifically among Hong Kong immigrants, dislike, distrust and fear for the MP was obvious. All interviewees expressed negative sentiments towards Hanson, citing reasons from her anti-Asian platform, her racist attitudes, to her ignorance of and disrespect for other cultures. And among Cantonese speakers Hanson had acquired a homonym *hòhn sām* ("heart chilling") and her eyes were described as *muhk louh hùng gwòng* (fierce and threatening). One woman called Pauline Chow jokingly said that she was thinking about changing her name to anything but Pauline.

There is a second side to the claim of *hèung góng yàhn* identity among Hong Kong immigrants. When asked to rank the identities of Australian, *hèung góng yàhn*, and Chinese, most of them put *hèung góng yàhn* first. The identity of *hèung góng yàhn* involved not only a positive image of Hong Kong but also a less preferred image of China or Australia. Many argued that because they were born and raised in Hong Kong and so it was primarily their homeland (*hèung hah*), but they were quick to add that they were proud of Hong Kong's achievements in economic and civic development, in the people's hardworking and efficient work ethics, in sum, the ability to "make miracles", though they also noted its shortcomings such as materialism and over-For some interviewees, a Chinese identity was stated as second to their *hèung góng yàhn* identity because they believed they were Chinese by blood. There was one interviewee who put the Chinese label second to the Hong Kong identity because she admired Chinese culture, in particular its "traditional virtues". But more Hong Kong interviewees chose not to call themselves Chinese because of "the politics in China" or "the situation in China". Many of them thought that the Chinese government was corrupt, the Chinese populace was of low calibre, and a large part of the country remained "undeveloped". They also disliked being identified as Chinese in Australia because they would not want to be confused with mainland Chinese who to them, though extremely hardworking and family-loving, yet carried a stigma of being greedy, impolite, unable to speak English, and ignorant in modern ways of management. Part of this

dislike also found roots in the weakening economy of Hong Kong since the takeover in July 1997 and many blamed the Chinese's inability to make "Hong Kong even better tomorrow" (*hèung góng mihng tìn wú gang hóu*). In a sense, then, the *hèung góng yàhn* identity was partly constructed from a combination of primordial sentiment towards the birthplace Hong Kong, and the frustration of the present Chinese government to elevate itself as a source of pride for Hong Kong people.

Identity then is better understood as existing in the plural, and identities are obviously more than intrinsic. They are contingent in the politico-economic realities, preferred and de-preferred as they move along a socio-cultural ranking of various labels. In studying Hong Kong immigrants in Sydney, I was intrigued by the fact that on one hand they were extremely proud of their identity as *hèung góng yàhn*, but at the same time many manifested a sense of insecurity that seemed to be incongruent with the confidence that came from their metropolitan worldview, a financial sophistication, and the ease with which they took part in a westernized lifestyle. Specifically this became conspicuous in the recent debate of multiculturalism vs. monoculturalism (though the former did not preclude white supremacy), but undoubtedly mixed feelings about the future of Hong Kong and its relations with China will affect how *hèung góng yàhn* gauge their value as a collective community in the long run.

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找尋香港人：澳洲新移民的身份認同兩難

Siumi Maria Tam

文章摘要

這篇文章是要探討在澳洲的新移民的身份認同問題。文中指出，當一向習以為常的社會規條不再實用時，人們便會產生迷失的感覺。在這種情況下，女性傾向放棄工作而扮演「主內」的角色，並學習烹調傳統的中國菜式以取悅丈夫和孩子們。透過描述這些過程，作者表現了父權家庭主義是如何被建構出來的。

而在訪問中，大部份受訪者都會自稱「香港人」。她／他們在很多方面感到與澳洲的白人社群格格不入，但，對於「中國」，她／他們也會有同樣的感覺。Pauline Hanson 成爲了一個媒介現象，但香港來的移民卻不喜歡她。另一方面，移民中的兒童卻會認同自己是澳洲人。很明顯，身份認同總是多面向以及條件性的。

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