

有關中國暴力史的研究方興未艾，本書雖不是該領域的開山之作，卻可能是首本以長時段，就某一地方作深入探究的微觀論著。全書讀來觸目驚心，但又趣味盎然，值得向讀者鄭重推薦。

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China Upside Down: Currency, Society, and Ideologies, 1808–1856. By Man-houng Lin. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006. Pp. xxvi + 362. \$49.95/£32.95.

This important work by Man-houng Lin, who is a Senior Researcher in the Institute of Modern History of Taiwan's Academia Sinica and a Professor of History at National Taiwan Normal University, is likely to appeal to a variety of scholarly audiences. Following an "Explanatory Note" in which the author presents a clear and concise description of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) monetary system, the first three chapters of her book, which she calls "Part One—Global Links: Silver and the World," contain material that will be of great interest to those concerned with China's place in world economic history during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In Chapter One ("A Vulnerable Empire"), Lin examines the role played by foreign silver in the Chinese economy from approximately 1500 to 1850. Among the key points she makes here are the following: (1) because China's domestic supplies of precious metals were inadequate to meet the country's monetary needs, the economies of both the Ming (1368–1643) and Qing (1644–1911) dynasties were dependent on silver imports to sustain monetary growth and promote economic stability; (2) because of the high degree of interregional and of rural-urban economic integration that characterized pre-modern China in general and the late Qing period in particular, by the early years of the nineteenth century the country's use of silver for monetary purposes was much more widespread geographically than is commonly believed; and (3) and because the Qing central government had no control over the amount of bullion being mined abroad and thus over the quantities of silver that would eventually enter the country's money supply, China became increasingly vulnerable to economic and political developments in other parts of the world. That was especially true of developments in Latin America, which, once imports from Japan had declined sharply in the seventeenth century, produced virtually all of the silver used in the Chinese monetary system during the remainder of the Qing period. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, according to Professor Lin, the stage was for a "crisis" in the Chinese monetary system, one that was caused, at least in part, by the protracted struggle for political independence in Latin America, a struggle that periodically "disrupted [Peruvian, Bolivian, and Mexican] silver mining and the global silver supply" (p. 71).

As the preceding paragraph suggests, Professor Lin does not subscribe to the old idea that what eventually became an outflow of silver from China during the first half of the nineteenth century was simply the result of the country's increased imports of opium from India and the Middle East. While acknowledging that those imports were damaging to Chinese society and the Qing economy, in her second chapter ("Opium: The Culprit?") Lin also points to a steep decline in the global demand for Chinese products such as raw silk, silk textiles, and tea as a major factor in the country's economic and monetary problems during those years. For example, although the available statistics on silver outflows and opium imports generally coincide during the period from 1808 to 1856, Lin emphasizes that the same was not true of the decades immediately following 1856. To the contrary, even though large amounts of opium continued to be imported into China throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, silver began to flow back into the country in substantial quantities after the mid-1850s. Her explanation for this important trade reversal is that a significant recovery in Latin American silver production after about 1850 helped to stimulate an increase in the foreign demand for tea, silk, and other Chinese goods. That increase, she believes, more than made up for the cost of opium and other imports and was a crucial factor in the recovery in the Qing economy, a recovery that enabled the dynasty to survive for another half century. To support her arguments on these points, Professor Lin draws on a wide range of Chinese and Western sources to produce an impressive array of tables and graphs on subjects that include statistics on trade balances between China, India, Britain, and the United States, fluctuations in world bullion production, and changes in Chinese and global bimetallic ratios.

In Chapter Three ("Disturbance of the Social Order"), Lin provides an even more detailed discussion of the impact of the "silver" or "silver-copper coin" crisis on the Qing economy during the first half of the nineteenth century. As that "crisis" deepened in the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s, and as the all-important exchange rate between silver and copper coins began to widen, both the domestic and international markets for products such as mulberry leaves, raw silk, raw cotton, silk and cotton textiles, and tea contracted sharply. With their agricultural incomes in steep decline, landlords and tenants in many regions of China found it more and more difficult to acquire the silver they needed to repay loans or to pay taxes and rents. That, in turn, led to serious financial problems for central, provincial, and local governments as well as for manufacturers of handicrafts, merchants, moneylenders, artisans, and even day labourers. The various captions Professor Lin provides for her subsections in Chapter Three will sound familiar to students of the "crisis" that accompanied the fall of the Ming dynasty in the mid-seventeenth century and give some indication of the many economic, social, and political problems that China encountered in the early nineteenth century: (1) Impoverishment of Copper-Coin Earners and Increasing Vagrancy; (2) Landlords' Problems; (3) Commercial Decline and Losses for the Merchants; (4) Diminishing Incomes of Soldiers and Officials; (5) Shortfalls in Tax Payments; (6) Shrinking Government Expenditures; (7) The Worship of Money and Corruption; and (8) The Threat to Qing Dynastic Rule. Lin ends this chapter and thus the first half of her book (pp. 1-143) with the following comment: "Although scholars are still debating the connection between the world supply of silver in the seventeenth century and the fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644, given the late Qianlong period's [c. 1775-1796]

reliance on silver, both the exacerbation of the currency crisis in the early nineteenth century and its eventual easing in the mid-nineteenth century indicate China's close link with the world supply of silver" (pp. 142–43).

While Professor Lin provides a wealth of new information on the Qing economy and monetary system, her insistence that there was a "close link" between global supplies of silver and China's economic and political health during the nineteenth century also is likely to generate some scholarly debate. There is no question that, as had been the case during the last few years of the Ming dynasty (c. 1630–1644), a decline in world and especially Latin American silver production contributed to a sharp drop in China's bullion imports, which caused serious difficulties for those sectors of the Qing economy and those regions of the country that were most deeply involved in international and interregional trade. Nor can it be doubted that, as also was true during the late Ming and early Qing periods, a widening in the silver–copper coin exchange rate, some of which was also caused by increased hoarding of precious metals as their value increased, affected virtually every member of Chinese society who earned copper coins and/or had to exchange those coins for silver in order to repay loans or to pay rents and taxes. However, as also had been true of the mid-seventeenth century, a monetary or silver "crisis" was just one of many interrelated economic difficulties with which the people of China had to contend during the first half of the nineteenth century. For example, the substantial growth in world population that began in the sixteenth century, stagnated in the seventeenth century, and picked up speed again during the eighteenth, eventually put a significant strain on global agriculture including that of China. By the 1770s if not before, the cultivation of increasingly marginal lands and sharp fluctuations in temperature and precipitation were leading to crop failures, food shortages, famine, and outbreaks of epidemic disease in virtually every society for which we have reliable information. Not surprisingly, by the turn of the nineteenth century the above problems were contributing to widespread food riots, peasant rebellions, mass migrations, military uprisings, and, in some cases, even revolutionary activity. In China, the White Lotus Rebellion, which broke out in 1796 and took the Qing government eight years to put down, occurred well before silver imports into the country began to falter. However, the rebellion erupted precisely when crop failures, poverty, hunger, and disease not only were leading to political unrest in western and north-central China but also in countries and societies ranging from Latin America and the Caribbean to Europe, Russia, Africa, the Middle East, India, and other parts of Asia. Similarly, many of the worst years China encountered between the mid-1820s and mid-1850s, years when C. K. Yang 楊慶堃 argues there was a sharp increase in "Incidents of Mass Action" against the Qing government, not only coincided with the deepening of the country's "silver crisis" but also with terrible climatic conditions, severe food shortages, and political upheavals on a global scale. Among the countries that were adversely affected during those decades were China's close neighbours Japan and Korea. As Lin points out, both of those countries had essentially isolated themselves from the global economy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and thus were protected from any serious problems caused by fluctuations in world bullion production and/or the international flow of silver. Therefore, while Professor Lin is to be commended for placing China's silver imports and the Qing monetary system in a global context, it can be argued

that she sometimes understates the importance of some other key economic variables in the nineteenth-century world, a world that was still primarily agrarian in nature.

Parts Two (“Cultural Resources for Economic Debates”) and Three (“The Competition among Intellectual Models”) draw heavily on the rich material contained in the first half of Professor Lin’s work, but they are likely to appeal to a rather different scholarly audience. The five chapters that make up this half (pp. 147–284) of the book focus on the responses of Qing officials and scholars to the problems caused by the monetary problems Lin had discussed earlier. In Chapter Four (“Monetary Debates and Policies”), she begins by examining proposals on monetary policy that were put forward by a number of prominent Chinese scholars and officials during the first half of the nineteenth century. Many of the differences in those proposals turned on the following points: (1) the proper role of government in economic affairs; and (2) whether the Qing central government should issue paper currency to augment or replace the silver, copper coins, and privately-issued paper notes that were already in circulation. Some scholars, such as Wang Liu 王澐, who wrote a widely-read and hotly-debated book on the subject, believed that the central government should intervene forcefully in the economy by “issuing paper notes and exchanging them for all the silver circulating in China, thereby solving the problems caused by the use of silver” (p. 149). Others, such as Bao Shichen 包世臣, agreed that the government should issue paper notes but thought it also would be necessary for silver to remain in circulation in order to prevent more of it from leaving the country to pay for opium and other products. Still others argued that, as has been the case in the early Ming and early Qing periods, popular confidence in the government and its officials was so low that it would be impossible to persuade the public, and especially the all-important merchant community, to accept and use official notes. As Lin points out, the arguments of this last group proved correct when, under great financial and political stress created by the outbreak and rapid expansion of the Taiping and other rebellions in the 1850s, the government tried and failed to implement a new paper currency system.

In Chapter Five (“Chinese Inspiration and Western Comparison”), Lin steps back from her discussion of the monetary debates to consider the sources on which Wang Liu, Bao Shichen, Wei Yuan 魏源, and others based their arguments. Except for scattered references to the use of different forms of currency in Japan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, all the other evidenced cited by the scholars mentioned above “was drawn from Chinese historical sources or current experience. Unlike later periods, when Western economic concepts had become available, early nineteenth-century China marks the last time that only traditional ideas were available to deal with intangible monetary problems such as the silver–copper coin crisis” (p. 180). Of particular interest here is the richness of those “traditional ideas” and the flexible ways in which they were employed in the economic and political debates of the late Qing period. As was true during periods of “crisis” in earlier dynasties, “statecraft” (*jingshi* 經世) scholars such as Wang, Bao, and Wei drew inspiration from the so-called “Confucian Classics,” the dynastic histories, and especially from the works of noted writers in the “statecraft tradition” from earlier periods. Those writers included Jia Yi 賈誼 from the Han dynasty, Han Yu 韓愈 from the Tang, Zhang Yong 張詠 from the Song, Chen Zilong 陳子龍 from the late Ming, and Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 and Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 from the late Ming and early Qing. Like all of the scholars

mentioned above, the nineteenth-century debaters were comfortable incorporating material on economic and political affairs from “Legalist” as well as more “orthodox” Confucian sources. As Professor Lin notes, echoing Hsiao Kung-ch’üan 蕭公權 and others, it sometimes is overlooked that editions of Legalist texts were both widely available and widely read in late imperial China, even by scholars with impeccable “Confucian” credentials. Professor Lin concludes Chapter Five with a comparison of traditional Chinese ideas on economic and monetary policy with the ideas of prominent western theorists who wrote during the period between the seventeenth and early twentieth centuries including John Locke, Sir John Maynard Keynes, and Friedrich Hayek.

In Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight, Lin continues and expands on her study of “statecraft” ideas by comparing two groups of scholars who differed in their fundamental approaches to economic and political reform. Calling these two groups the “interventionist” and “accommodationist” groups, she focuses on their “perceptions of human nature; concepts of the state; views of state power relative to the power of Heaven, sages, and market forces; attitudes toward commerce, trade, merchants, and consumption; and rationales for private property” (pp. 204–5). Although neither of these two groups constituted a monolithic bloc, in general the “interventionist group” believed that the state was, or ought to be, all powerful and thus should play a major role in managing and regulating economic affairs. The “accommodationists,” on the other hand, thought the power of the state should be limited and that, as much as possible, merchants and market forces should be allowed to work. Before the 1850s, the accommodationists generally had the upper hand in policy making before giving way to the interventionists as the shock of the Taiping and other rebellions caused the Qing court to seek new solutions to its problems. On pages 303–5 Professor Lin provides a useful table outlining the basic differences between the positions of the two groups on a range of economic, social, and political issues.

The material contained in Chapter Seven (“Classical Studies, Writing Styles, and Statecraft Thought”) will be the most difficult in the book for the general reader and even for some China specialists to follow. Here the author analyzes the “interventionist” and “accommodationist” schools in terms of their adherents’ commitment to certain philosophical positions and literary theories. Having done this, however, she finds that there was considerable disagreement over monetary policy by those who supposedly held similar philosophical and literary views. The following passage perhaps provides some of the flavour of these disagreements and of the chapter’s contents: “[O]ne strand of statecraft thought, inspired by New Text Confucianism, called for accommodative change, whereas another strand, inspired by Old Text Confucianism, urged transformative change. Old Text adherents sometimes also called for a *laissez-faire* approach, and New Text proponents sometimes urged intervention. Yet in the discussion surrounding the silver–copper coin crisis, there was a tendency for Old Text scholars to be more interventionist than New Text scholars” (p. 228). Similar complexity can be found in Lin’s discussion of the connection between statecraft ideas, literary theories, and classical writing styles. Thus while the material in Chapter Seven undoubtedly will be of interest to students of Qing intellectual history, it seems somewhat out of place here given the focus of the book’s other chapters. Indeed, that material perhaps should have been reserved for a separate study.

Despite some of the reservations noted above, and despite an index that is difficult to use, Professor Lin has produced an important work that deserves to be read by all students of Chinese and world economic history during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In fact, as the author makes clear, the economic history of China only makes sense in light of developments in other parts of the world during those same centuries.

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