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Rivalry, Conflicts and Collaboration Between the Hsiang (Hunan) and Huai (Anhui) Armies 1860s—1880s

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Both the Hsiang (Hunan) and the Huai (Anhui) armies which emerged to dominating military positions after the suppression of the Taiping Revolution in 1864 were *ying-yung* which was a kind of quasi-regular and semi-private forces different from the Manchu Bannermen and the Green Standard Army on the one hand and the local militia on the other.¹ Although the Huai army owed its theory, philosophy and structural pattern from the Hsiang army, it was actually separately organized and commanded, centering on the sole leadership of Li Hung-chang.² On the other hand, the Hsiang army's line of command was much more complicated since it included many factions originating from different, original organizers (such as Tseng Kuo-fan, Hu Lin-i, Wang Chen-tso Tsung-t'ang, etc.) Although later events proved that Tseng won the highest prestige and was supposed the highest commander-in-chief after assimilating many different factions into his own, the Hsiang forces' factions continued to be existing; and either Tseng before 1872 or Tso in the period of 1872-1885 were supposed as highest moral leaders only.³ However, the Hsiang army as a whole was to be counted a well-defined military clique which was still coherently organised and identified. The leadership of the Huai army which centred on Li Hung-chang was always unchallenged until 1895, since Li stressed a narrow spirit of personal loyalty of all the military subordinates to him.

Furthermore, associates of the two armies were not only organized separately, but were also formed cohesively and informally into political groups as some of the military generals and civilian staff were also appointed to civilian positions either in the central government or in the provincial hierarchy. It is natural that the two factions in pursuing and expanding their respective military and political power, undertook incessant maneuvers of collaboration when their interests coincided, but were some-

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¹Kwang-ching Liu 劉廣京, "The Limits of Regional Power in the Late Ch'ing Period: A Reappraisal" 晚清督撫權力問題商榷, *Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies* 清華學報, (Taipei), New Series 10, no. 2 (July, 1974), p. 178; Kwang-ching Liu, "The Ch'ing Restoration", *Cambridge History of China*, vol. 10, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, part I, ed., John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 410, 413-414.

²Fan Wên-lan 范文瀾, *Chung-kuo chin-tai shih* 中國近代史 (Peking, 1962), vol. 1, p. 206; Wang Erh-min 王爾敏, *Hui-chün chih* 淮軍志 (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica 中央研究院近代史研究所, 1967), pp. 373-374.

³Lee En-han 李恩涵, "Concerted Campaigns and Factional Conflicts of the Hunan and Anhui Armies, 1865-1868" 勦捻期間湘、淮軍間的合作與衝突, *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica* 中央研究院近代史研究所集刊, vol. 8 (1979), p. 99.

times clashing when their interests collided. This trend of rivalry, conflicts and collaboration was usually reflected in the personal relationship between Tseng and Li on the one hand before 1872 and between Li and Tso on the other in the period of 1872-1885.

COLLABORATION AND CONFLICTS DURING THE CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE NIEN UPRISINGS

The Nien uprisings became extremely serious when Tseng was appointed supreme commander in charge of suppressing them in the Yellow-Huai rivers basin. Since Tseng's Hsiang army which amounted to 80,000-90,000 strong in 1863-1864, had been largely disbanded except for a remnant force of 10,000 men, he had to rely on the Huai army which was still a large force of 50,000 soldiers, for the military campaigns.⁴ Under tacit arrangement between Tseng, Li and the Peking court, Li was appointed governor-general of Liangkiang replacing Tseng's former position, being responsible for the financial and logistical supply to Tseng's needs. Tseng also brought Li's three brothers, to be governor of Kiangsu and military commanders respectively, helping him facilitate his command of the Huai forces. In addition, a Huai general, Liu Peng-chang who was later appointed to civilian services as governor-general of Szechuan in 1880s, was appointed to be a deputy supreme commander under Tseng.⁵

But the relationship between Tseng and those unruly Huai generals was always uneasy. Many of these generals often refused to accept Tseng's orders implicitly or explicitly. Li, although keeping a regular supply of financial and logistical needs to the imperial forces in action, was always not hesitant to intervene in Tseng's command of his Huai army.⁶ Liu, as a liaison officer between the two factional leaders, was frequently reprimanded by Li for his faithful cooperation with Tseng. When Liu supported Tseng's plan of making efforts to strengthen the fortified embankment of the Great Canal so that it could be used as an effective barrier for the rebels' movement, Li threatened to cut off the financial allocation for it.⁷ As part of Li's scheme of controlling his Huai generals in the battlefield, they were informally required to keep constant but private correspondences with him. Any of Tseng's important orders to them was usually needed to get the endorsement of Li beforehand. Also, when the generals applied for a short home leave from their military responsibility in the battlefield, the request was usually presented to Tseng through Li's office, although the latter was positioned in Nanking, several hundred miles far off from the battlefield.⁸ These annoyed Tseng greatly. But there was no real improvement since Li was always making efforts to safeguard his personal control of his Huai army and retained its quasi-regular and semi-private character intact. Tseng was compelled in the ensuing

⁴ Lee En-han, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-103; Kwang-ching Liu, "The Limits of Regional Power in the Late Ch'ing Period: A Reappraisal", pp. 188-189; see also S. Y. Teng, *The Nien Army and Their Guerilla Warfare, 1851-1868* (Paris, Mouton & Co., 1961), p. 200.

⁵ *Li-wên-chung-kung ch'üan-chi* 李文忠公全集, letters, 6:6.

⁶ Nieh Ch'ung-ch'i 聶崇岐, *Nien-chün tzu-liao pieh-chi* 捻軍資料別集 (Shanghai, 1958), p. 339.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Tsêng-wên-chêng-kung ch'üan-chi* 曾文公正全集, letters, 13:40.

months to re-institute some of his Hsiang army, and ordered them joining military actions in the western part of the Yellow-Huai region. The famous T'ing-Chun of 16,000 strong under the gallant and fierceful command of the veteran general Pao Ch'ao, was one of the major reinforcements, although General Pao had been frequently discriminated by Tseng as an heterodox faction among the Hsiang forces in the anti-Taiping campaigns.⁹ However, the major fightings against the Niens were still largely engaged by the Huai Army.

Tseng's strategy was mainly based on a combination of forceful containment, thorough blockade and active pursuit of the rebels. With the establishment of four major bases in the eastern part of the plain by using the fortified embankment of several rivers as the major defensive lines, he ordered his forces attacking the Niens actively.¹⁰ But these orders were often not faithfully and effectively carried out. His physical health also prevented him from supervising his military schemes energetically. Eventually, he was compelled to resign in November 1866, and Li was ordered to succeed him.¹¹ The Peking court re-appointed Tseng to his former position as governor-general of Liangkiang. Thus, the two 'warlords' just exchanged their official positions and responsibilities, and the respective forces of their semi-private armies continued to engage in the fightings with the Niens. But the significance of this exchange of positions was rather consequential. It represented the changing weight of the two military factions, and the superiority of the Huai army as a fighting force over the Hsiang army was then officially recognized.

Li's command proved to be more vigorous. Basing largely on the strategy designed by Tseng, he employed most of his Huai forces in a forceful pursuit of the swiftly-moving Niens in the great plain. The majority of the Hsiang forces which stationed in the western part of the region, was used only for defensive purpose. The strength of the Huai army was therefore increased rapidly from 40,000 strong to 70,000 strong in early 1867, and then to 82,000 men in 1862.¹² But the collaboration and rivalry of Huai and Hsiang armies continued. While Tseng did his best in providing funds and the necessary supplies to Li's command as Li had done so before, his Hsiang army saw eye-to-eye at the battlefield with the Huai forces with animosity, and both their generals and their rank-and-files refused to follow Li's orders faithfully as the Huai army had done before.¹³ The jealousy and rivalry between the two forces were especially true in the western part of the great plain where the two armies met in pursuing the fastly-moving enemy.

The most serious conflict between the two armies occurred in February 1868 in the battle along the Yin-lung River in T'ien-men in the northern Hupeh. The clash was originated from a joint battle agreed upon by the prestigious Huai general Liu Mingchuan and the well-known Hsiang general Pao Ch'ao, to an encirclement of a large

⁹ *T'ing-chün chi-lüeh* 霆軍紀略, chap. 10; see also Kwang-ching Liu, "The Ch'ing Restoration", pp. 434, 436.

¹⁰ As note 3, pp. 104-105.

¹¹ Fan Wen-lan, et al. eds., *Nien-chün* 捻軍 (Shanghai, 1953), vol. 1, p. 50; *Nien-chün tzu-liao pieh-chi*, p. 340.

¹² Siang-tseh Chiang, *The Nien Rebellion* (Seattle, 1962), p. 121; Stanley Spector, *Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army* (Seattle, 1964), p. 124; Wang Erh-min, *Hui-chün chih*, p. 352.

¹³ As note 3, p. 108.

assembled Nien forces in the region. The former had a force of 10,000 strong, well equipped with modern rifles and some cannons, and the later was mainly composed of 16,000 infantry men. Both were highly moralized, hoping to outmaneuver its opposite party by performing its superiority in fighting capability over its collaborator. They, then, agreed to start the joint offensive at a fixed time on February 19, 1868. Liu was especially adamant to show his vigor and wanted to get an early victory over the Niens before the arrival of the Hsiang army. He therefore ordered his troops to march to the scene earlier than the fixed time. But, with the numerical inferiority of his Huai forces, he was seriously defeated by the overwhelmingly numerous enemy. The situation became so serious that most of the heavy logistics of Liu's troops had been captured by the Niens, and Liu himself and his headquarter's staff were encircled by the enemy. Fortunately, the Hsiang forces came on time to rescue them. Under the joint efforts of the newly participated Hsiang forces and a re-sustained Liu's troops, they defeated the Niens and were able to recover all the booties lost to the enemy. The rebels were forcibly pursued by Pao's forces when they began to flee.¹⁴ In the ensuing few days, the Niens suffered great loss, amounting to several tens of thousand killed or captured.¹⁵ The victor was apparently belonging to the Hsiang while the Huai suffered heavily.

But Liu, being the most prestigious general of the Huai army, was too ashamed to admit his fault in marching to the battlefield at an earlier time than the mutually pre-arranged one with Pao. He was also very ungrateful to Pao's rescue of him in the battle. He instead charged that it was Pao's late coming to the scene which caused to his early defeat. Li, as the supreme commander, submitted his report to the Peking court basing largely on Liu's report. As a result, Pao, as the real victor, had been strongly reprimanded and Liu's defeat was not only pardoned but was even highly praised.¹⁶ This is definitely contrary to the fact and aroused great wrath and hatred from Pao. He therefore refused to fight anymore under Li's command and requested an immediate resignation on the ground that he himself had been wounded in that battle.¹⁷ Since Pao's forces were generally supposed one of the best Hsiang forces and he and many of his subordinate generals were for long discontented with the unjust treatment of them by Li Hung-chang, there was a real possibility for an imminent mutiny. Tseng who was the moral leader of the Hsiang army envisioned an early need to intervene into the affairs. With repeated considerations and negotiations between Tseng, Li and Pao, the request of Pao for resignation was granted, and his forces were to be reorganized: some of the forces were to be re-assigned to the command of Tseng in Nanking while others became independent contingents under Li's command.¹⁸

The successful solution of the conflict helped consolidate Li's supreme com-

¹⁴ This battle was best described by Hsüeh Fu-ch'êng's 薛福成 "Shu T'ing-chün Yin-lung-he chih-yi" 書霆軍尹隆河之役 (See *Yung-an nei-wai-pien* 庸盦內外編, "Hai-wai wen-pien" 海外文編, chap. 4. Also see Liu Sheng-mu 劉聲木, *Ch'ang-ch'u-chai hsü-pi* 長楚齋續筆 (1929), 3:10; *T'ing-chün chi-lüeh*, chap. 12 (see *Nien-chün*, chap. 1, p. 370).

¹⁵ *T'ing-chün chi-lüeh*, chap. 12 (see *Nien-chün*, chap. 1, pp. 253-254, 256-257).

¹⁶ Hsüeh Fu-ch'êng, *op. cit.*

¹⁷ *Li-wên-chung-kung ch'üan-chi*, memorials, 11:14-15.

¹⁸ As note 3, pp. 113-114.

mandership, and made him possible to squash the Eastern Niens by January 1868, relying solely on his Huai forces.¹⁹

In the final phase of suppressing the Western Niens, Tso Tsung-t'ang, then governor-general of Shensi-Kansu in charge of suppressing the Moslem uprisings there, led personally part of his forces in pursuing the Niens from Shensi, through Shansi and Honan, to the southern Chihli. Li Hung-chang's forces in Shantung were also ordered by the imperial decree, concentrating in the Chihli-Shantung border, so that a massive joint campaign could be launched for the extermination of the Niens there. In terms of official status, personal prestige and their respective power in commanding their military forces, Tso was all on a par with Li. Both of them were men of action, being ruthlessness in pursuing their respective military and political goals with great vigor and determination. Furthermore, Tso, representing the Hsiang army and Li, the sole, highest Huai commander, were all power-thirsty people, and they were therefore natural competitors in either military or political affairs. Both of them were very jealous with each other and would like to take every measure to conspire or counter-conspire at the loss of their opposite. Tso was initially appointed to command all forces in Chihli and Li to command all forces in the adjacent Shantung province.²⁰ Later on, as Li's Huai army arrived at the area in greater numbers while Tso's forces had only a total of 19,000 strong (Tso's total forces in Shensi-Kansu were amounted to 80,000-90,000 men which were equivalent to the total forces of Li's Huai army), Li was appointed supreme commander for the campaign.²¹

Li had always been critical of Tso's strategy and tactics and berated Tso's military achievements with derision. He also gave evaluation of the military performance of the Hsiang forces unfairly.²² In comparison of Li's Huai army, the Hsiang army under Tso had never taken any 'resting home leave' from their incessant fightings since their engagement with the Niens; and many of their military merits were not duly counted by Li. As a consequence, most of the Hsiang generals had not accordingly been promoted.²³ Li was also anxious to reduce the strength of Tso forces, and urged the governor of Anhui withdrawing his provincial army from Tso's command.²⁴ Tso was also extremely resentful of Li's leadership. He charged privately that the discipline of the Huai was notoriously bad, and expressed his strong disgust of that army although they were collaborating in fighting with the enemy.²⁵ Tso explained that this lamentable condition was resulted from the fact that the Huai army had accepted into its columns too many ex-Niens who surrendered to them in the process of years' fightings.²⁶

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 115-120.

²⁰ *Tso-wên-hsiang-kung ch'üan-chi* 左文襄公全集, memorials, 29:10; Kuo T'ing-yi 郭廷以, *Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-shih jih-chih* 近代中國史事日誌, pp. 506, 508.

²¹ *Tso-wên-hsiang-kung ch'üan-chi*, letters, 10:10; Kuo T'ing-yi, *op. cit.*, p. 509; Lee En-han, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

²² *Tso-wên-hsiang-kung ch'üan-chi*, letters, 8:14, 45; Fan Wen-lan, *Chung-kuo chin-tai shih*, vol. 1, p. 427.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Li-wên-chung-kung ch'üan-chi*, letters, 8:35.

²⁵ *Tso-wên-hsiang-kung ch'üan-chi*, letters, 8:35.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 8:35, 50; letters to the family, 2:9.

RIVALRY AND COLLABORATION BETWEEN TSO AND LI

After the successful suppression of the Nien Uprisings in August 1868, Tso and his forces returned to the northwestern China, continuing their campaign against the Moslems, and Li's forces remained in the strategic areas along the coast and the Great Canal. As the governor-general of Chihli after August 1870, Li's tactful solution of the Tientsin Massacre made him well recognized afterwards as a diplomatic trouble-shooter. His skillful involvement into the court politics in Peking also facilitated his continued control of his Huai army. The Peking court became increasingly confident on him for the defence of the metropolitan region as well as for the serious negotiations over a series of issues with the foreign countries.²⁷ This was especially so after the death of Tseng Kuo-fan in 1872. In the meantime, Tso was fully occupied with his military assignment in the Northwest. Although he had suffered a few military debacles in the whole process of his campaigns, he was able to bring all the rebellion to an end in the provinces of Shensi and Kansu by October 1873.²⁸ He was then ready to start a military expedition into Sinkiang (Chinese Turkistan) where various rebellious Moslem groups became dominant after the early 1860s.

Since Li, who was more concerned with the coastal defence, wanted to persuade the Peking court investing more money for it, he began an energetic effort to block Tso's military scheme for Sinkiang. The Japanese encroachment on Formosa (Taiwan) in March 1874 was cited by Li as a dangerous signal which showed China's impotence before an aggressive power from the seas. So, Li argued, China should take dynamic measures of purchasing more modern ships from European sources, building her own railroads, strengthening further her existing modern army (his Huai army) and opening her coal and iron mines. Since these programmes required large amount of funds, Li proposed, Tso's scheduled expedition to Sinkiang should be stopped, and the nation's funds should therefore be pooled together for the expenditure of the maritime defence.²⁹ This led to a great policy debate between Li and Tso as well as between their respective associates. In the debate, both sides showed their different calculations of the national security, but they also expressed a strong stink of factional strife.³⁰ It represented an unquestionable head-on clash between the regional and factional interests of the Hsiang and Huai forces.

Tso responded Li's challenge with detailed refutations. He showed clearly that the actual funds allocated to him in the Northwest had never been conformant to the nominal amount which should be assigned by the Peking court. In addition, his soldiers

²⁷ K. C. Liu, "Li Hung-chang in Chihli: The emergence of a policy, 1870-1875", in Albert Feuerwerker *et al.* eds., *Approaches to modern Chinese history* (Berkeley, 1967), pp. 68-104.

²⁸ Kwang-ching Liu, "The military challenge: The Northwest and the coast", *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 11, eds., John K. Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 225-235.

²⁹ *Li-wên-chung-kung ch'üan-chi*, memorials, 24:15-19; Tou Tsung-yi 譚宗一, *Li Hung-chang nien-p'u* 李鴻章年譜 (Hong Kong, 1968), pp. 97-98.

³⁰ Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, "The Great Policy Debate in China, 1874: Maritime Defence vs. Frontier Defence", *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 25 (1965), pp. 212-218; Yao Hsin-an 姚欣安, "Hai-fang yü sai-fang te cheng-lun" 海防與塞防的爭論 in Wu Hsiang-hsiang 吳相湘 *et al.* eds., *Chung-kuo chin-tai shih lun-ts'ung* 中國近代史論叢, 1st series, vol. 5 (Taipei, 1959).

had never been paid fully in the years of the past. In comparison, the Huai army in the same period, had been treated much better. Thus, any financial entrenchment for the frontier defence in the Northwest could not be saved much. Furthermore, even if the frontier defence funds could be dangerously reduced for a re-allocation to the coastal defence, China should absolutely necessary to have a secured and natural boundary in the re-control of Sinkiang beforehand. Without a natural borderline in a Chinese Sinkiang, Tso argued, the border regions of China would always be insecure, and the expenditure for its defence could never be saved. As a secured frontier in the Northwest should at least include the recovery of the northern Sinkiang, further military expedition to Sinkiang was therefore unavoidable. Li's argument which viewed Sinkiang as an economically 'useless barren land' as well as the region could not be defended by the Chinese forces were categorically and strongly refuted by Tso in great detail. He maintained that the recovery of Sinkiang would be a reliable safeguard to the safety of Mongolia, and a secured Mongolia served definitely to a safeguard for the safety of Peking. Thus, with the successful taking back of Sinkiang to Chinese control, the frontier of both northwestern and northern China would be safer, and, therefore, more expenses for that should be deserved.³¹

Tso also raised the point that the maritime defence was actually not so critical as envisioned by Li, and China should use the present golden opportunity to build a strong frontier by recovering Sinkiang for good. He expressed great belief that a recovered Sinkiang could financially be self-sufficient in the near future, contrary to Li's understanding of the issue.³²

In the debate, both Li and Tso attacked his opposite personally and maliciously. Li charged that Tso was concerned too much with the realization of his personal ambition of recovering Sinkiang without paying attention to the national interest.³³ Tso counter-charged that Li's consideration of the issue was too short-sighted. He further condemned that Li's negotiations with foreign powers were mostly self-deceitful, and Li's control of the Huai army was based on the pretext of foreign threat, and thus, exacted a large amount of fund for the army from the Peking court.³⁴

Eventually, Li's proposal was rejected and Tso's military campaign against the Moslem regimes in Sinkiang began. By August 1877, all of the territory in Sinkiang except the Russian-occupied Ili (Kuldja) was restored to Chinese domination. But the feud between the two persons continued. Tso considered Li's management of the Margary affair a 'total appeasement, stressing a temporary solution of the issue only'.³⁵ Li's consistent control of the Huai army and his frequent recitation of the army as 'invincible' were also condemned by Tso as ridiculous.³⁶ This was because, according to Tso, Li did not have a sense of self-confidence on his Huai forces in a future confronta-

³¹ Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy, 1871-1881* (Oxford, 1965), p. 64; *Tso-wên-hsiang-kung ch'üan-chi*, letters, 13:2, 21:19-20; memorials, 46:33-36.

³² *Tso-wên-hsiang-kung ch'üan-chi*, letters, 15:21-22; 58-59.

³³ Wen-Djang Chu, *The Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China, 1862-1878: A Study of Government Minority Policy* (The Hague, 1966), pp. 170-171; *Li-wên-chung-kung ch'üan-chi*, letters, 16:8, 18:15, 19:33.

³⁴ *Tso-wên-hsiang-kung ch'üan-chi*, letters, 15:58-59.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

tion with foreign powers, and his **Huai** forces were only used as tools for squandering a large amount of fund from the nation's coffers.³⁷ **Li**, on the other hand, bid to destroy Tso's financial scheme of borrowing a loan from British sources for his Sinkiang campaign.³⁸ When Tso's reclamation of Sinkiang was to be realized, he belittled this brilliant achievement as resulting from Tso's **good** luck since that region was not supposed economically profitable by other nearby countries.³⁹ **Li** also continued to oppose Tso's plan of changing this region into a regular Chinese province. He considered that a newly-instituted province of Sinkiang would be a wasteful scheme and China had not enough administrative talents implementing this scheme effectively.⁴⁰ Facts in the ensuing years, however, proved **Li's** allegations groundless.

CONTROVERSY BETWEEN TSO AND LI OVER THE ILI ISSUE

Another fierce controversy between Tso and **Li** was relating to the Ili crisis which was resulted by Chung-hou's ill-fated conclusion of the treaty of Livadia in 1878, in which most of the Ili territory was ceded to Russia together with a series of political and commercial privileges conceded to them in the Chinese northern and northwestern borderlands. The diplomatic calamity aroused bitter opposition in Peking. The Tsungli Yamen which was in charge of Chinese foreign affairs flatly rejected these terms. Since Russia took a strong attitude towards any revision of the treaty by sending a large fleet to the East for an exhibition of military forces, there was a possibility of war between the two countries.⁴¹

Tso was adamant in urging the central government to refuse ratification of the treaty. He proposed a re-negotiation of the issue for a new treaty so that the whole territory of Ili could be recovered to China.⁴² Tso's concentration of his 60,000 well-trained troops along the Sinkiang border, his personal prestige as the victor in the newly-restored Sinkiang and his firm determination for an eventual showdown with the Russians, were all the decisive factors which made the Russians agreeing to a re-negotiation of the issue.⁴³

Li was apprehensive of a probable war with Russians. Realizing the weakness of Chinese coastal defence, he was most concerned with a Russian possible attack on China from seas. This is why he came out advocating an imperial ratification of the treaty with minor revisions.⁴⁴ **Li's** attitude towards the issue was condemned by Tso as

³⁷ *Ibid.*, letters, 15:21-22.

³⁸ See *Tso-wên-hsiang-kung ch'üan-chi*, letters, 21:19-20; *Li-wên-chung-kung ch'üan-chi*, letters, 18:7; 25:67-68; memorials, 48:41.

³⁹ *Li-wên-chung-kung ch'üan-chi*, letters, 20:26, 17; 22:9.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy, 1871-1881* (Oxford, 1965), pp. 189-196; Lee En-han, *Tsêng Chi-tsê tê wai-chiao* 曾紀澤的外交 (Taipei, 1966), pp. 66-67, 71-73, 105-106.

⁴² Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *op. cit.*, p. 62; Lee En-han, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

⁴³ Lee En-han, *op. cit.*, pp. 78, 80; Luo Chêng-chün 羅正鈞, *Tso-wên-hsiang-kung nien-p'u* 左文襄公年譜 chap. 10, p. 16.

⁴⁴ Lee En-han, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.

'vacillating' and 'being fearful in his heart'! Also, all of Li's programmes of coastal defense were charged by Tso as unreliable.⁴⁵

The Sino-Russian dispute was later solved by Tseng Chi-tse, the eldest son of Tseng Kuo-fan, by signing another treaty in St. Petersburg in February 1881. More favorable terms had been won for China, substituting the original Chung-hou's treaty.⁴⁶ In the process of their mutual debate and harangues, both Tso and Li were apparently engrained with their factional interest in mind, although they were in the name of national interests, too.

COLLABORATION AND CONFLICTS IN THE SINO-FRENCH WAR, 1883-1885

The Huai and Hsiang armies and their civilian cliques clashed even more fierce during the Sino-French War period, although they engaged in joint fightings with the French. The Peking court took a vacillating stand between the two extremes of military confrontation and total withdrawal towards French encroachment on north Vietnam. As a result, the nation was fluctuating between a policy for war and a policy for peace intermittently.⁴⁷ Li, who remained to be the governor-general of Chihli in charge of various diplomatic negotiations with the French, championed a peaceful evacuation of all Chinese forces from north Vietnam from the very beginning of the dispute. This was because, as seen by Li, the Vietnamese themselves had never shown a real determination in resisting the French aggression. The Chinese mercenaries of Liu Jung-fu's Black Flags were not supposed a reliable and efficient troop. He maintained, however, a minimum and nominal honour in the realm of traditional suzerain-vassal relationship, should be conceded by the French for China.⁴⁸

Tso who was then the governor-general of Liangkiang in 1883-1884, took again a strong stand, different from Li's. He considered that Chinese confrontation with France in north Vietnam served actually a part of an over-all Chinese efforts for safeguarding the nation's whole tributary system. If the French could be effectively halted of their aggression in Vietnam, other tributary states of China such as Korea and Burma would be saved from similar challenge. Tso therefore advocated a strong support of Liu Jung-fu's forces in Tongking.⁴⁹ His attitude towards the issue was apparently influenced by Tseng Chi-tse who was then Chinese minister to France and Britain. Basing his on-field judgement on the domestic politics of his host country, Tseng urged the Peking court to uphold Chinese suzerainty in north Vietnam with strong measures. He also proposed to send more Chinese troops into the region, and took strenuous efforts in preventing French occupation of the Red River region in Tongking. In addition, all the bilateral treaties signed between France and Vietnam should be supposed unvalidated.⁵⁰ Tseng's

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 78, 80; *Tso-wên-hsiang-kung nien-p'u*, chap. 10, p. 16.

⁴⁶ Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-196; Lee En-han, *op. cit.*, pp. 111, 120-141.

⁴⁷ Lloyd E. Eastman, *Throne and Mandarin: China's search for a policy during the Sino-French controversy, 1880-1885* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), chapters 4, 5; Lee En-han, *op. cit.*, chap. 4.

⁴⁸ Lee En-han, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-202, 211-212.

⁴⁹ *Tso-wên-hsiang-kung ch'üan-chi*, letters, 26:44; 26:12.

⁵⁰ Lee En-han, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-167, 171-176, 197-200.

suggestions were largely but belatedly accepted by the Peking government. But the Chinese expeditionary troops in Tongking which was under the commandership of a Huai general, suffered a major defeat in March 1884.⁵¹ The debacle made the will of the Peking court to implement a strong policy collapsing.

On the various arenas of military front along the China coast, both the Huai and Hsiang armies, together with their civilian leaders, were assigned leadership roles during the war. Chang Shu-sheng, a Huai general-turn-to-civilian official, was appointed governor-general of Liangkuang in Canton, while P'eng Yu-lin, a veteran Hsiang admiral of the Yangtze River Fleet, was an imperial commissioner stationing in the same city. Since both of them were conscientious-minded and straight-forward people, their cooperation in the defence of the region was well proceeded, although certain personal clashes originating from their different personalities did happen.⁵²

The battle-front along the Vietnam-Kwangsi border was commanded in 1883-1884 by P'an Ting-hsin, a Huai general who was then governor of Kwangsi province. But there was also Hsiang army under Wang Teh-pang despatched to fight in the region. In the battle of Longson in January 1885, a total of 25,000 Chinese expeditionary forces were thoroughly defeated by the French, and P'an and Wang blamed each other fiercely for the defeat.⁵³ As a consequence, the Peking court dismissed both of them and appointed a new, neutral commander to the region.

The fiercest conflict between the Huai and Hsiang forces occurred on Taiwan in 1884-1885. The well-known Huai general, Liu Ming-chuan, was then governor of Taiwan, responsible for the defence of north Taiwan against the naval offensive of the French. But, in Taiwanfu (Tainan) of south Taiwan, the garrison was headed by a veteran Hsiang general Liu Ao, who then took a civilian position of taotai there. The latter Liu had actually commanded a larger military forces and kept stronger financial resources than the former Liu who was his superior in Taipei; but Liu Ao refused to lend much assistance to Liu Ming-chuan under the French onslaught.⁵⁴ Serious clashes between them happened with mutual remonstrances to each other presented to the Peking government directly or through their factional sponsors. Tso who was then imperial commissioner in the near-by Foochow being the supreme commander of Chinese forces in the Fukien and Taiwan regions, intervened into the conflict. Since Liu Ao had been his subordinate for more than two decades as well as a fellow Hunanese, he threw his weight on supporting him.⁵⁵ This made the controversy becoming more complicated since Li also became involved in favoring his Huai general, Liu Ming-chuan. The feud of the two Lius, however, came to a showdown as soon as the Sino-French hostility came to an end. Liu Ao of the Hsiang was charged by Liu Ming-chuan of the

⁵¹ Lloyd E. Eastman, *op. cit.*, chap. 4; Shao Hsün-cheng 邵循正 *et al.* eds., *Chung-fa chan-cheng* 中法戰爭, vol. 3, pp. 355, 117.

⁵² Lee En-han, "Conflicts and Cooperation Between the Hunan and Anhui Armies 1870-1885" 同治、光緒年間 (1870-1885) 湘、淮間的衝突與合作, *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, vol. 9 (1980), pp. 337-338.

⁵³ *Chung-fa chan-cheng*, vol. 3, p. 77.

⁵⁴ William M. Speidel, "Liu Ming-chuan in Taiwan, 1884-1885" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1967); Liu Ming-ch'uan 劉銘傳, *Liu-chuang-su-kung tsou-yi* 劉壯肅公奏議, chap. 3 (see *Chung-fa chan-cheng*, vol. 3, p. 142).

⁵⁵ *Tso-wên-hsiang-kung ch'üan-chi*, memorials, 63:39-40; William Speidel, *op. cit.*, p. 83.


Huai to be corrupt in the recruitment of his reinforced Hunanese forces as well as disclosing confidential military intelligence to the enemy during the war. The case was openly investigated and judged by two specially-appointed imperial commissioners who were sent to the field by the Peking court; and, as a result, Liu Ao was to be convicted and was sent to exile in northern Manchuria.⁵⁶ This was much a serious blow to Tso who was then an old man on his sickbed unable to provide any effective assistance to his faithful subordinate, Liu Ao.⁵⁷ Tso died in Foochow in August 1885.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In conclusion, we can see that the rivalry and conflicts between the Huai and Hsiang armies in 1860s-1880s were in two forms: first, their clashes usually happened between their leaders and their rank-and-files either originating from their different personalities or from their different personal interests. This was also directly resulted from their assumption of leadership to the separate organizations either as a military group or a civilian faction. Secondly, their conflicts originated from different policy considerations on the part of their respective leaders, and, in certain cases, the basic interests of these respective military and civilian factions were also involved. However, both of the factions still showed their strong allegiance to the Peking court as seen in the facts that they were competing vigorously for winning the imperial favors. Apparently, their rivalry and competition had been effectively manipulated by the Empress Dowager and her high-ranking grand councillors in order to keep a balanced power structure between the two military factions so that those unruly generals of these two forces could be effectively controlled by the Manchu court in Peking.

⁵⁶ Liu-chuang-su-kung tsou-yi, chap. 3, pp. 328-331, 423-432; Kuo T'ing-yi, *Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-shih jih-chih*, p. 783; Tou Tsung-yi, *Li Hung-chang nien-p'u*, p. 182.

⁵⁷ Kuo T'ing-yi, *op. cit.*, p. 785.



湘、淮軍間的合作與衝突

(一八六〇年代至一八八〇年代)

(中文摘要)

李恩涵

湘軍與淮軍均為滿清政權戡平太平天國過程中崛起的「團練」(半官半私的軍隊)，淮附於湘，而在組織制度上大致仿效於湘，惟在此後之攻剿黃、淮廣大平原地區的捻軍期間(一八六五~六八)，淮軍已在軍力上超過湘軍，此後一直至甲午戰爭初期，此一形勢不變。這兩支「軍隊」，不只在軍力與後勤支援上，各有其完整的系統，而且由於原軍職人員的轉化改任，或原軍中幕僚人員的升遷依附，兩軍也各形成一批文官的「政系」集團。所以，以兩軍的總統帥為中心，(湘軍系統較繁，初以曾國藩、胡林翼為中心，惟胡早死；後則以左宗棠為中心；再後以劉坤一為中心；淮軍則始終以李鴻章一人為中心。)不只有軍系的不同，亦隱然形成不同的「政系」，互為傾軋，但亦互為合作與支援。本文係就一八六〇年代至一八八〇年代期間，湘、淮兩軍之間的合作與衝突，作一全面性的探討。

