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## Emperorship in Eighteenth-Century China\*

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A distinguished American scholar of Chinese history once said of the Chinese emperor: "He was conqueror and patriarch, theocratic ritualist, ethical exemplar, law giver and judge, commander-in-chief and patron of arts and letters, and all the time administrator of the empire."<sup>1</sup> The Chinese emperor was in theory, if not always in reality, omnipotent. He ruled about 60 million people in the first century A.D., over 150 million people in the seventeenth century, and over 400 million people in the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, the study of Chinese emperors should be a valuable key to our understanding of Chinese history in general and of traditional Chinese polity in particular.

Certain kinds of literature on the lives and administrative developments of Chinese emperors are abundant: official records—such as *shih-lu* (veritable records), *ch'i-chü chu* (diaries of activity and repose), various types of imperial edicts, and dynastic histories—and unofficial writings such as fictions and plays are countless. However, critical biographies and objective analytical studies of Chinese emperors are rare. Dr. Harold Kahn's study of the Ch'ien-lung emperor (Hung-li, 1711–1799; r. 1736–1795) is the first book written in English that attempts to objectively describe a major Chinese emperor in composite images.<sup>2</sup>

\* Harold L. Kahn, *Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes: Images and Reality in the Ch'ien-lung Reign* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). Pp. xi, 314. \$10.00.

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<sup>1</sup> John K. Fairbank, "Proleptical Prologomena on the Emperor of China, etc." (Unpublished conference paper, No. 12, Conference on Political Power in Traditional China, Laconia, N. H., Sept. 3–9, 1959), p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> For the reader's convenience, Ch'ien-lung is used throughout this paper, though Hung-li or Kao-tung may be more correct. Although Hung-li technically became the emperor of China when his father died on October 8, 1735, and was enthroned on October 18, 1735, his reign, Ch'ien-lung, did not commence until the beginning of the Chinese New Year on February 12, 1736. See *Ch'ing-shih* [The History of the Ch'ing Dynasty] (8 vols. Taipei: Kuo-fang yen-chiu yuan, 1961 ed.), p. 128; *Ta-Ch'ing Kao-tung Shun (Ch'ien-lung) huang-ti shih-lu* [Veritable Records of the Ch'ien-lung Reign] (Taipei: T'ai-wan hua-wen shu-chü, 1964 reprint), Vol. 1, pp. 150–151. For other biographical studies of Ch'ien-lung see Arthur W. Hummel (ed.), *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644–1912)* (Taipei: Cheng-wen Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 369–373 (written by Fang Chaoying); Goto Sueto, *Kenryū-tei den* [A Biography of the Ch'ien-lung Emperor] (Tokyo, 1942); Simon Harcourt-Smith, "The Emperor Ch'ien Lung, 1735–1799," *History Today*, Vol. 3 (1955), pp. 164–173; Sugimura Yūzō, *Ken-ryū kotei* [The Ch'ien-lung Emperor] (Tokyo, 1961).

The Ch'ien-lung emperor is an ideal subject for such a study. He was one of the longest reigning monarchs in Chinese history as well as one of the most intellectually accomplished and politically powerful. His reign shaped the course of Chinese history at a time when the Western world was entering a new stage of economic, social, and technological change that resulted in a new wave of expansion into China and the rest of East Asia.

Dr. Kahn's book, *Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes: Images and Reality in the Ch'ien-lung Reign*, has thirteen chapters, a prologue, an epilogue, and is in three parts: the first part deals with the Ch'ien-lung emperor's imperial image and its sources; the second with the education of Ch'ien-lung as a prince and the formation of his self-image as a ruler; and the third with the late years of Ch'ien-lung and how the imperial self-image and the realities of court politics differed. The main body of the study is concerned with Ch'ien-lung's self-awareness and his view of the requirements and prerogatives of imperial power; this is also the most outstanding part of the book. The last part focuses on Ch'ien-lung's abdication of the throne in favor of his son, Yung-yen, the Chia-ch'ing emperor (1760–1820; r. 1796–1820), and its consequences. It is the first in-depth analysis of that abdication and makes an admirable contribution to our understanding of that critical event in Ch'ing history.

Kahn contends that there is a series of conflicting images of Ch'ien-lung: the lofty self-image held by the ruler; the idealized image created by historians, novelists, playwrights, and the like; the derogatory views held by outcast religions and secret societies. His approaches are multiple: historical, historiographical, institutional, and to a certain extent psychological and literary. His sources include official and unofficial records and histories, fictions, dramas, individual writings, miscellaneous notes (*pi-chi*), and so forth. Dr. Kahn's study breaks new ground for research on Chinese emperors and provides a fresh interpretation of Ch'ing history. It should be recommended to every serious student of Ch'ing China and of Chinese intellectual history. The purpose of this essay is to expand upon Kahn's examination of the formation and structure of Ch'ien-lung's conception of emperors, and to explain the critical problems behind China's inability to meet the challenges presented by the Western world in the nineteenth century.

When Ch'ien-lung took the throne in 1735, his view of "emperors" had already been formed by his informal and formal education as a prince. His informal education was a result of contact with such people as his mother, his father, and his grandfather. His formal education started when he was eight years old (nine *sui*). The curriculum included the Confucian Classics—the *Shih-ching* (Book of Poetry), *Shu-ching* (Book of History), *I-ching* (Book of Change), *Ch'un-ch'iu* (The Spring and Autumn Annals), *Li-chi* (Book of Rites), *Hsiao-ching* (Book of Filial Piety) and the Four Books (*The Analects of Confucius*, *Mencius*, *The Great Learnings*, and *The Doctrine of the Mean*); Neo-Confucian works on ethics and metaphysics such as the works of Chou Tun-i (1012–1073), Chang Tsai (1021–1077), Ch'eng Hao (1032–1085), Ch'eng I (1033–1107), Chu Hsi (1130–1200), and Chen Te-hsiu (1178–1235), and anthologies of these and similar writings such as the *Hsing-li ching-i* (The Essential Metaphysics and Ethics) compiled by Li Kuang-ti (1642–1718) and others; great Chinese historical works, such as Ssu-ma Ch'ien's (145–86 B.C.) *Shih-chi* (Records of the Historian), Pan Ku's (A.D. 32–92) *Han-shu* (The History of the [Former] Han Dynasty), Ssu-ma Kuang's (1019–1086) *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* (Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government), Chu Hsi's *Tzu-chih T'ung-chien kang-mu* (Outlines and Details Based on the *Comprehensive Mirror*), Wu Ching's (670–749) *Chen-kuan cheng-yao* (Important Deliberations on Government of the Chen-kuan Period), and great Chinese political and literary writings, such as *Ming-ch'ien tsou-i* (A Collection of Memorials by Leading Officials from Ancient Times through the Yuan) compiled by Huang Huai (1367–1449) and Yang Shih-ch'i (1365–1444), and the representative writings of eight

T'ang-Sung great essayists—Han Yü (768–824), Liu Tsung-yuan (773–819), Ou-yang Hsiu (1007–1072), Su Hsün (1009–1066), Su Shih (1036–1101), Su Ch'e (1039–1112), Wang An-shih (1021–1086), and Tseng Kung (1019–1082). Ch'ien-lung's training in the arts was extensive and he also received training in warfare and military theories.<sup>3</sup>

The process of Ch'ien-lung's education was clearly recorded, and the product of that education revealed in his pre-monarchical writings in the *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi* (Complete Selection of Prose and Verse from the Lo-shan Hall), completed before he ascended the throne and printed in the second year of his reign (1737) in forty *chüan* (books). This work consists of historical and philosophical essays, prefaces, short expositions, colophons, letters, notes, and reflections on the Chinese Classics and other readings, "pretended memorials," eulogies, homilies, examination exercises, *fu* (rhymeprose), and *shih* (verse of various styles).<sup>4</sup> An addendum to the *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi* is Ch'ien-lung's *Jih-chih hui-shuo* (Notes of Daily Knowing), compiled in 1736 which is a 4-*chüan* collection of 260 study notes selected from Ch'ien-lung's notes made as a prince.<sup>5</sup> The first *chüan* contains Ch'ien-lung's notes on the essentials of imperial leadership; the second *chüan*, on metaphysics; the third *chüan*, on rites, music, ethics, and related matters; and the fourth, on historical events and personages. The notes appear to be the footnotes of his longer, interpretive essays in the *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*. Together the *Ch'üan-chi* and *Hui-shuo* constitute the "complete works" of the prince, and all of these writings, as indicated by Ch'ien-lung in the prefaces, testify to his understanding of moral values and historical precedents and ideological principles of statecraft—particularly imperial leadership learned from the basic Confucian Classics, Sung Neo-Confucian works, historical literature, and the writings of other great Confucian scholars and ministers of the past.

Ch'ien-lung singled out three works as the canons of "kingly science." The first is the "Wu-i" (Without Idleness and Ease) chapter of the *Book of History*, which Ch'ien-lung praised as a universal guide for kingship—he thought that it should be inscribed on a plaque for every ruler and minister for constant inspiration and guidance.<sup>6</sup> Tradition says that the "Wu-i" was the admonition made by the Duke of Chou (regent 1025–1018 B.C.) to warn the young King

<sup>3</sup> Detailed discussions of these aspects are found in Harold L. Kahn, *Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes*, Chs. 7–8 (pp. 115–167). See also Harold L. Kahn, "The Education of a Prince: The Emperor Learns His Roles," in Albert Feuerwerker, Rhoads Murphey and Mary C. Wright (eds.), *Approaches to Modern Chinese History* (Berkeley, California, 1967), pp. 15–44. For sources not mentioned in Kahn's studies, see Ch'ien-lung's *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi* [A Complete Selection of Prose and Verse from the Lo-shan T'ang], 1737 ed., *hsü* part, pp. 24b, 35b. The *Ming-ch'en tsou-i* is also known as the *Li-tai ming-ch'en tsou-i*, in 350 *chüan*, compiled in 1416. For the *Hsing-li ching-i*, see below, n. 20. Reference to other aspects of Ch'ien-lung's readings will be given later in this article in my discussion of Ch'ien-lung's conception of emperorship.

<sup>4</sup> The *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi* is an expansion of the 14-*chüan* manuscript entitled *Lo-shan T'ang wen-ch'ao* [A Literary Selection from the Lo-shan T'ang], compiled in late autumn of the eighth year of the Yung-cheng reign (1730). See Ch'ien-lung's two prefaces in *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, 1737 ed. (with the 1730 preface following the 1737 preface). The 14-*chüan* version is said to contain only thirty to forty percent of Ch'ien-lung's writings during his seven years of formal learning, from 1724 to 1730. For the contents of the *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, see its Table of Contents in *ts'e* (Volumes) 3 and 4. The *fu* and *shih* constitute *chüan* 15 to 40, and the historical and philosophical essays and the rest are in *chüan* 1 to 14. The first two *ts'e* contain, in addition to Ch'ien-lung's own prefaces mentioned above, twelve prefaces (all written from 1730 to 1733) and six postscripts (all written in 1736) by others, including imperial princes and chief ministers, most of whom served as Ch'ien-lung's tutors.

<sup>5</sup> See *Jih-chih hui-shuo*, 1736 ed., *hsü* part, pp. 2a–2b; Ch'ien-lung, *Yü-chih-wen ch'ü-chi* [Imperially Composed Prose Writings of the Ch'ien-lung Emperor, First Collection], 8 vols., 1764 ed., *chüan* 8, pp. 4b–5b.

<sup>6</sup> *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, *chüan* 10, pp. 7b–9b. *Chüan* in the context of *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi* is abbreviated Ch. hereafter.

Ch'eng (r. 1024–1005 B.C.) of the danger and evils of “pleasure and ease” for a ruler.<sup>7</sup> A succeeding ruler (*ssu-chün*) must always remember the hardship and difficult struggle that his ancestors had in founding the dynasty, he must understand that pleasure and ease displeases Heaven and hence leads to the shift of the Mandate of Heaven to a different dynastic house, he has to be extremely industrious and diligent in his work for the welfare of his subjects and always be kind and good to them, he should execute the law in the fairest manner and with a compassionate heart, and he is responsible for teaching the people the highest moral principles. Failing these, the Duke of Chou says, assures the loss of the divine mandate, the immediate example of which is the defeat of the Shang (ca. 1580–1027 B.C.) and the rise of his own dynasty, the Chou (1027–256 B.C.). The “Wu-i” thus laid down the fundamental ideological framework of emperorship in traditional China: circumspection, hardship, industry, morality, self-reliance, and self-control, all of which constitute the very basis of the so-called Mandate of Heaven.

The second most important reference source for Ch'ien-lung's code of kingship is the three examination papers of Tung Chung-shu (179–104 B.C.) made in 134 B.C. under the emperor Wu-ti (r. 140–87 B.C.) of the Former Han dynasty (202 B.C.–A.D. 9).<sup>8</sup> The three examination papers have been popularly known as Tung Chung-shu's “Hsien-liang san-ts'e,” or Tung Chung-shu's Three Papers in the Examinations for the Virtuous and Good. As a whole, they present the first most articulate formulation of the Confucian idea of statecraft up to that time, on the basis of a synthesis of the views of Confucius (551–479 B.C.), Mencius (371–289 B.C.?), Hsun Tzu (fl. 298–238 B.C.), and the cosmological views of the Yin-Yang School. The great merit of Tung Chung-shu lies in his ingenious way of putting the unclear and sometimes conflicting political ideas of the three great Confucian masters and the Yin-Yang School into one short, precise system of political ideology.

In essence, Tung Chung-shu's system of statecraft<sup>9</sup> maintains that the right to rule is

<sup>7</sup> For the “Wu-i” see *Shang-shu chin-chu chin-i* [The Book of History with Annotations and Translation] edited and annotated by Ch'ü Wan-li (Taipei, 1969), pp. 136–141; Tseng Yun-ch'ien, *Shang-shu cheng-tu* [The Book of History with Annotations] (Peking, 1964), pp. 220–225. For an English translation of the “Wu-i” see Bernhard Karlgren, *The Book of Documents in Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities*, No. 22 (1950), pp. 56–59 (including Chinese text); James Legge, trans., *The Shoo King* (Hong Kong, 1960 reprint), pp. 464–473 (“Against Luxurious Ease,” also including Chinese text). Professor Ch'ü Wan-li also suggests that the “Wu-i” could be written by the Duke of Chou for King Wu (1037–1025 B.C.), not for King Ch'eng. See *Shang-shu chin-chu chin-i*, p. 136, and Ch'ü Wan-li, *Shang-shu shih-i* [The Book of History with Annotations] (Taipei, 1956), p. 106. Chang Hsi-t'ang regards it a work of the fifth century B.C. See Chang Hsi-t'ang, *Shang-shu t'ung-lun* [A General Study of the Book of History] (Shensi, 1958), p. 194. Herrlee G. Creel, who apparently did not see Chang Hsi-t'ang's significant study, maintains that the “Wu-i” was written after 771 B.C. but before the time of Confucius (551–479 B.C.). See Creel, *The Western Chou Empire* (Chicago, 1970), pp. 458–461. I am of the opinion that most of the “Wu-i” indeed dates from the earlier Western Chou (1027–771 B.C.), whereas some parts are later additions made in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

<sup>8</sup> *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, Ch. 10, pp. 12b–14a. For the dating of Tung Chung-shu's three examination papers see Shih Chih-mien, *Han-shih pien-i* [New Studies on Some Controversial Issues in the History of the Western Han Dynasty] (Taipei, 1954), pp. 12–20.

<sup>9</sup> The three examination papers are contained in Pan Ku, *Han-shu* (Peking, 1962 ed.), pp. 2498–2523. Some of the views in the three examination papers were elaborated to a greater extent in Tung Chung-shu's celebrated *Ch'un-ch'iu fan-lu* (Luxuriant Dew from the *Spring and Autumn Annals*), which is a series of essays on the problems of political philosophy and cosmology. See *Ch'un-ch'iu fan-lu* (Chung-kuo *ssu-hsiang ming-chu* ed.; Taipei, 1959). Parts of this book are definitely not by Tung Chung-shu. For a recent study of the controversy on the authenticity of the *Ch'un-ch'iu fan-lu* as Tung Chung-shu's work, see Tai Chün-jen, *Mei-yuan lun-hsüeh chi* [Collected Studies from the Mei-yuan] (Taipei, 1970), pp. 319–334 (the article was originally published in 1968). For this reason, my discussion here is restricted to the *Han-shu* sources. Tung's biographies are in *Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Shih-chi* (Peking, 1959 ed.), pp. 3127–3128, and Pan Ku, *Han-shu*, pp. 2495–2526; the former has been

a divine one, for the king's mandate to rule is received from Heaven. But the Divinity also makes some preconditions and requirements for the receipt and retention of the Mandate: the ruler must be a moral sage; he must assume the responsibility for the education of his subjects; he must preserve his purity by controlling greed and desire; he must always care for the welfare of the people. These responsibilities are interlocked and failing one affects the others. Such failures can lead to disorder, and disorder leads to the revocation of the Mandate of Heaven.

To carry out these responsibilities successfully, which is the essence of kingship, the ruler must recruit men of talent and virtue to assist him. With the assistance of these men, the ruler attempts to educate the people with such high moral principles as *jen* (benevolence), *i* (righteousness), *li* (ritual propriety), *chih* (wisdom), and *hsin* (faithfulness), and then good social mores and customs can be cultivated among the people. Good social mores and customs are the key to a peaceful and well-ordered society. Two institutions must be discouraged: the use of legal punishment, because the people should learn to have a conscience and thereby maintain their self-esteem; and profit-seeking, because it makes man greedy, corrupt, and shameless.

Tung Chung-shu further holds that since Heaven does not endow all men with the same talent and ability, a division of labor is necessary in society and in government. He classifies men into two categories: those who can labor with their minds are *chün-tzu* (superior men) and those who can labor only with their muscles are *shu-jen* (ordinary men).<sup>10</sup> On this basis, a social and professional stratification is formed. The *chün-tzu* serve as the social and political leaders and receive support from the government; the *shu-jen* serve as farmers, artisans, and merchants and support government leaders with their products. The defined status and role of the two groups must never be confused. The *chün-tzu* should never do the *shu-jen*'s work, nor compete with them for profit, and the *shu-jen* should never be allowed to take up the responsibilities of the *chün-tzu*. Otherwise, the social and political order would break down.

As the social and political order is uniform, the world of ideas, Tung Chung-shu says, should be unified into one system. Diverse and different ideas confuse and corrupt the people. The state, Tung Chung-shu then proposes, must officially establish the Six Classics—the *Book of Change*, the *Book of History*, the *Book of Poetry*, the *Book of Rites*, the *Book of Music*, and the *Spring and Autumn Annals*—and the canons of Confucius and his followers must be the sole source of state doctrines. The works and writings of all other philosophical schools, particularly Legalism, must be suppressed. Schools of all levels—colleges and local schools—should be established to teach the Confucian doctrines and prepare the training of *chün-tzu*.

In addition to general principles, what are the practical historical examples of statecraft for a monarch to follow? Tung Chung-shu points to the administration and government of

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translated into English by Burton Watson, *Records of the Grand Historian of China, Ssu-ma Ch'ien* (New York, 1961), Vol. II, pp. 409–411; see also Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, translated by Derk Bodde (Princeton, 1953), Vol. II, pp. 16–19. A comprehensive treatment of Tung Chung-shu's philosophical and political views and Han Confucian thought is given in Chun-shu Chang, *From Rebels to Imperialists: Social Change and Expansion in Early Han China* (forthcoming), Ch. II.

<sup>10</sup> Here Tung Chung-shu clearly follows the view of Mencius: "There are those who use their minds and there are those who use their muscles. The former rule; the latter are ruled. Those who rule are supported by those who are ruled." See D. C. Lau, trans., *Mencius* (Baltimore, 1970), p. 101. For the Chinese text, see *Meng Tzu* (*Ssu-shu tu-pen*; Taipei, 1952 ed.), p. 144.

three sage kings, Yao, Shun, and Yü,<sup>11</sup> and of such virtuous Chou leaders as King Wen (r. ca. 1077–1038 B.C.), King Wu (r. ca. 1037–1025 B.C.), the Duke of Chou, and King Ch'eng. He further contends that the administration and government of these sage kings and virtuous rulers provide the perfect and complete knowledge and practices of kingship, and one need not look beyond these.

The foundation of Tung Chung-shu's statecraft is the Mandate of Heaven, an early Chou ideology. The ruler represents the will of Heaven and should manage the affairs of state accordingly. First, the profound messages of the four seasons should be observed. Spring and summer, for example, are seasons for growth and maturation, and therefore punishment and particularly capital punishment should not be carried out during these seasons. Second, any natural phenomena are construed as messages from Heaven indicating His approval or disapproval of state affairs on Earth. In short, Tung Chung-shu formulated a theory of connection between the cosmic order and the human order and attempted to show that Heaven constantly inspects the conduct of the ruler. This is a further sophistication of the "Wu-i" spirit that was first expounded in the *Book of History*.

Tradition holds that most of Tung Chung-shu's proposals—including the establishment of Confucianism as state doctrine—were put into practice by Han Wu-ti.<sup>12</sup> Tung Chung-shu's theory of statecraft thus molded the Confucian structure of emperorship that was followed in Imperial China. It evidently made a tremendous impression on the Ch'ien-lung emperor during his early education, an impression so profound that he declared that Tung Chung-shu's "Three Examination Papers" contained the complete ways of cultivating sagehood and kingship (*nei-sheng wai-wang*, literally "inner sage and outer king").<sup>13</sup> In fact, Ch'ien-lung's conception of emperorship followed exclusively Tung Chung-shu's views, and he was fond of quoting Tung Chung-shu in his discourses on kingship.

The *Ta-hsüeh yen-i* (Explication of the *Great Learning*) by Chen Te-hsiu of the Sung dynasty (960–1279) is the third special source of Ch'ien-lung's concept of kingship. He considered it the most comprehensive handbook for rulers.<sup>14</sup> It was written in 1229 and presented to the emperor Li-tsung (r. 1225–1264) in 1234.<sup>15</sup> It has forty-three *chüan*, and is

<sup>11</sup> Yao, Shun, and Yü are three legendary sage kings. The succession of the throne during this time was based on moral virtue and talent, not on blood relationship and dynastic legitimacy. Confucius considered the time of the three sage kings as the golden age of Chinese history and political culture. The sagely rule under Yao, Shun, and Yü has been a most important source for the ideology of political culture in traditional China. One modern scholar dates the time of the three sage kings as follows: Yao, 2333–2234 B.C.; Shun, 2233–2184 B.C.; Yü, 2183–2177 B.C. Yü is the founder of the Hsia dynasty, ca. 2183–ca. 1751 B.C. See Tung Tso-pin, *Chung-kuo nien-li tsung-p'u* [Chronological Tables of Chinese History] (Hong Kong, 1960), Vol. I, pp. 255–256.

<sup>12</sup> For the controversy on the problem of the establishment of Confucianism as a state doctrine see Tai Chün-jen, *Mei-yuan lun-hsüeh chi*, pp. 335–344 (the article was originally published in 1968). An old discussion of the problem is given in John K. Shryock, *The Origin and Development of the State Cult of Confucius* (New York, 1932), pp. 33–45.

<sup>13</sup> *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, Ch. 10, p. 13a.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch. 9, pp. 10a–12a.

<sup>15</sup> Chen Te-hsiu, *Ta-hsüeh yen-i* in *Chen Wen-chung kung ch'üan-chi* [The Complete Works of Chen Te-hsiu] (20 vols. Taipei, 1968 reprint), pp. 1–1458. For brief biographies of Chen Te-hsiu, see T'o T'o (1313–1355), *Sung-shih* [The History of the Sung] (Taipei, 1955 ed.), pp. 5314–5318; Huang Tsung-hsi (1610–1695), *Sung-Yuan hsüeh-an* [A Survey of Confucian Philosophers of the Sung and Yuan Periods] (34 vols. *Wan-yu wen-k'u* ed.; Taipei, 1964 reprint), Vol. 20, pp. 115–118; and *Hsi-shan Chen Wen-chung kung nien-p'u* [Chronological Biography of Chen Te-hsiu], in *Chen Wen-chung kung ch'üan-chi*, pp. 1505–1524. A summary of the *Ta-hsüeh yen-i* is given in Chi Yun (1724–1805) et al., *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tsung-mu t'i-yao* [An Annotated Catalogue of the Complete Library of the Four Treasuries, Compiled 1773–1872] (4 vols. Shanghai, 1934 ed.; Taipei, 1971 reprint), pp. 1912–1913; but it is a confusing one and misinterpreted some basic parts of the book. My discussion

organized according to the tenets and order of the first six of the eight soritical propositions of the *Great Learning*, which read, in order of progress and extension of concerns, *ke-wu* (investigation of things), *chih-chih* (extension of knowledge), *ch'eng-i* (sincere wills), *cheng-hsin* (rectification of minds), *hsiu-shen* (cultivation of personal life), *ch'i-chia* (regulation of family), *chih-kuo* (government of the State), and *p'ing t'ien-hsia* (ordering of all-under-Heaven).<sup>16</sup> In the *Ta-hsüeh yen-i*, the six propositions are grouped into four sections: *Ke-wu chih-chih*, *cheng-hsin ch'eng-i*, *hsiu-shen*, and *ch'i-chia*.<sup>17</sup> The four are preceded by two sections of more fundamental discourses on kingship. The first section, in one *chüan*, explores the basic concerns of emperorship and the steps of achieving good imperial rule; it contains selections from the Confucian Classics and the works of such Confucian masters as Hsun Tzu, Tung Chung-shu, Yang Hsiung (53 B.C.–A.D. 18), and Chou Tun-i.<sup>18</sup> The second section, in three *chüan*, illustrates with selections the model process of how previous rulers, from Yao, Shun, Yü, to those of Hsia, Shang, Chou and later dynasties to the T'ang (618–907), learned their roles and statecraft; in addition, it expounds the fundamental philosophy and learning of imperial leadership.<sup>19</sup>

The four sections in the main body of the book comprise twelve special topics (in thirty-nine *chüan*) on the fundamental problems of government and imperial leadership. Together they utter the most important philosophical, moral, educational, and political precepts of statecraft—such as the philosophy of the state, the recruitment and use of men of talent, importance of the people, the primacy of education in society, the virtue of circumspection and hardship, the evil of idleness and pleasure-seeking, the urgency of preserving self-esteem, the difference between righteousness and profit-seeking, the danger of false doctrines, the careful administration of justice, the nourishment of high morality in private life in the imperial palace, the prohibition of favoritism, nepotism, and the use of treacherous, slandering, and toadying officials, and so on. All topics are illustrated with selections from classical, philosophical, and historical works and with Chen Te-hsiu's elaborated interpretations of and remarks on these selections. As a whole, the book is an encyclopedia of the virtues, faults, successes, and failures

of the tenets of the *Ta-hsüeh yen-i*, therefore, is based on my direct reading of the book, not on the *Ssu-k'u* summary on which Dr. Kahn based his discussion of the book (*Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes*, pp. 122–123).

<sup>16</sup> For the text of the *Great Learning*, see *Ta-hsüeh* (*Ssu-shu tu-pen* ed.), pp. 1–28. For complete translations of the Chinese text, see James Legge, trans., *The Great Learning in The Four Books* (Tokyo, 1936 reprint), pp. 272–309; Wing-tsit Chan, trans., *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton, 1963), pp. 86–94, including Chu Hsi's (1130–1200) commentary. My translation of the Chinese terms is generally based on Chan's, but with significant revisions.

<sup>17</sup> The last two propositions of the *Great Learning* were omitted by Chen Te-hsiu in the *Ta-hsüeh yen-i*. Ch'iu Chün (1418–1495) of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) wrote in 1487 the *Ta-hsüeh yen-i pu* [A Supplement to the *Ta-hsüeh yen-i*], in 160 *chüan* plus one introductory *chüan*, to complete the coverage of the whole eight propositions. This work includes twelve sections: 1. "Cheng ch'ao-t'ing" [Rectification of the Imperial Court]; 2. "Cheng pai-kuan" [Rectification of the officialdom]; 3. "Ku pang-pen" [Consolidation of the foundation of the state]; 4. "Chih kuo-yung" [Administration of the state finance]; 5. "Ming li-yüeh" [Elucidation of rites and music]; 6. "Chih chi-ssu" [Proper arrangement of sacrifices and offerings]; 7. "Ch'ung chiao-hua" [Exalting education and cultural activities]; 8. "Pei kuei-chih" [Provision of regulations for buildings, clothing, seals, measures, and so on]; 9. "Shen hsing-hsien" [Careful application of laws and punishments]; 10. "Yen wu-pei" [Strong efforts on military preparedness]; 11. "Yü i-ti" (Management of barbarian peoples); and 12. "Ch'eng kung-hua" [Moral perfection of the emperor and of the government]. In terms of time coverage, Ch'iu Chün also included, in addition to the period covered in Chen Te-hsiu's *Ta-hsüeh yen-i*, the events of the first hundred years of the Ming dynasty. See Ch'iu Chün, *Ta-hsüeh yen-i pu*, *Ying-yin Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu chen-pen erh-chi* (Taipei, 1971 ed.). Ch'ien-lung also consulted and admired the *Ta-hsüeh yen-i pu* (*Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, Ch. 8, pp. 8b–9b). A critique of the *Ta-hsüeh yen-i pu* is given in Chi Yun et al., *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tsung-mu t'i-yao*, pp. 1926–1927.

<sup>18</sup> *Ta-hsüeh yen-i*, pp. 89–117.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 119–188.

of the rulers, ministers of all sorts (virtuous, good, evil and bad, loyal, treacherous, upright, petty), imperial relatives, eunuchs, and other officials of past ages and dynasties from the eras of Yao, Shun, Yü to the Sung dynasty. Ch'ien-lung felt that the book was a complete reference on moral cultivation, imperial leadership, and historical judgments, and hence a perfect guide for governmental procedures, legal enforcements, and educational measures. Its over-riding message for an emperor is, as in the "Wu-i" and Tung Chung-shu's essays, the inconsistency of the Mandate of Heaven and the ascendancy of the will of the people. The Mandate of Heaven must be maintained by moral behavior and ethical and political deeds; mere dynastic legitimacy and the inherited right of imperial succession are not good enough for the retention of the Mandate. To preserve the Mandate for the dynastic house, the monarch must care for the people's welfare. Only if the people are satisfied, will Heaven be pleased and the Mandate sustained.

The *Ta-hsüeh yen-i* as a guide for rulers is different from the "Wu-i" of the *Book of History* and the essays of Tung Chung-shu. While the last two furnish only the basic Confucian ideological precepts of rulership, the *Ta-hsüeh yen-i* systematically presents a well organized body of ideologies and historical practices concerning good emperorship. Ch'ien-lung advised rulers to use it as a constant reference for both ideological and practical guidance.<sup>20</sup>

The second group of sources of Ch'ien-lung's conception of emperorship is the so-called "imperial injunctions on moral conduct" (*sheng-yü*), which were proclaimed by emperors and had the force of law. The first such *sheng-yü* in the Ch'ing period was proclaimed by the Shun-chih emperor (r. 1644-1661) in 1652 (implemented in 1659). This has been referred to as Shun-chih's Six Injunctions (*Liu-yü*) and contains the following six maxims:

1. Perform filial duties to your parents.
2. Honor and respect your elders and superiors.
3. Maintain harmonious relationships with your community members.
4. Teach and discipline your sons and grandsons.
5. Attend peacefully to your proper vocation.
6. Do not do what the law forbids.

The Six Maxims are exactly the injunctions issued by the first emperor, T'ai-tsu (r. 1368-1398), of the Ming dynasty in 1398.<sup>21</sup> Shun-chih's successor, the K'ang-hsi emperor (r. 1662-1722),

<sup>20</sup> The *Hsing-li ching-i* should also be included in this group. But it is not a book exclusively for emperorship; it has a broader range of concerns and discusses all metaphysical, ethical, musical, calendrical, and political knowledge, and rules of etiquette that an educated person, be it an official or an emperor, should learn. Only the last two *chüan* deal with imperial leadership and they in general only sum up those philosophical and practical aspects that have been elucidated in the works just discussed. See *Hsing-li ching-i* (3 vols. *Ssu-pu pei-yao* ed.). The last two *chüan* consist of twelve topics, including "The Way of the King" (Chün-tao), "Ministership" (Ch'en-tao), "Employment of the Talented and Virtuous" (Yung-jen), and "Forthright Remonstrance" (Chien-cheng).

<sup>21</sup> For the Ming text see *Chiao-min pang-wen* [Imperial Instructions on Moral Conduct] in *Huang Ming chih-shu* [Collection of the Most Important Legal, Administrative, and Judicial Orders and Regulations of the Ming Dynasty], compiled by Chang Lu (1523-1598) in 1579, reprinted by Koten Kenkyūkai (2 vols. Tokyo, 1966-1967), p. 470. Shun-chih's *Liu-yü* is in *Ch'in-ting Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li* [Collected Statutes and Precedents of the Ch'ing Dynasty], printed in 1899, reprinted by Ch'i-wen ch'u-pan she (Taipei, 1963), *chüan* 397, p. 1. For a study of Ming T'ai-tsu's Six Instructions and their ramifications, see Obata Tatsuo, "Mindai göson no kyōka to saiban" [Public Instructions and Village Elder's Instructions in the Ming Period], *Tōyōshi kenkyū*, xi, No. 5 (September 1952), pp. 423-443; Sogabe Shizuo, "Min Taiso Rokuyu no denshō ni tsuite" [The Tradition of the Six Instructions of Ming T'ai-tsu], *ibid.*, xii, No. 4 (June 1953), pp. 323-332. See also Édouard Chavannes, "Les Saintes Instructions de l'empereur Hong-wu, 1368-1398," *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient*, iii (1903), pp. 549-563; Wada Kiyoshi, "Min no Taiso no Kyōiku chokugo no tsuite" [On the Educational Edict of Ming T'ai-tsu], in *Shiratori Hakushi kanreki kinen Tōyōshi ronsō* [Essays on Oriental History in Honor of Dr. Shiratori on His Sixtieth Birthday] (Tokyo, 1925), pp. 885-904.



restructured and expanded the Six Maxims into sixteen in 1670. The new, expanded version has been known as the *Sheng-yü* of K'ang-hsi, and contains the following maxims:<sup>22</sup>

1. Perform with sincerity filial and fraternal duties to give due importance to fundamental human relations.
2. Respect your clansmen to demonstrate harmony and affection.
3. Cultivate peace and concord in your community.
4. Promote agriculture and sericulture to insure a sufficiency of food and clothing.
5. Conserve your money and goods.
6. Exalt the schools of instruction to make the conduct of scholars correct.
7. Reject false doctrines and honor only orthodox learning.
8. Be familiar with the law to warn yourself as to avoid ignorance and rascality.
9. Manifest propriety and modesty to cultivate good manners and customs.
10. Devote yourself fully to your chosen vocation.
11. Instruct your sons and younger brothers to guard themselves from lawless activities.
12. Stop false accusations.
13. Abstain from hiding fugitives to avoid being involved in their punishment.
14. Pay your taxes fully to ward off tax duns and penalties.
15. Combine in the *pao-chia* system to prevent robbery and thievery.
16. Resolve animosities.

The Yung-cheng emperor (r. 1723–1735), K'ang-hsi's successor and Ch'ien-lung's father, wrote in 1724 a commentary of about 10,000 words on the Sixteen Maxims. Yung-cheng's commentary, which explained in clear the perceptive details and amplified to a considerable extent K'ang-hsi's *Sheng-yü*, has been known as the *Sheng-yü kuang-hsün* (The Amplified Instructions of the Sacred Maxims of the K'ang-hsi Emperor).<sup>23</sup>

All the maxims and Yung-cheng's *Amplified Instructions* were ordered by imperial decrees to be known in every household of the empire. In the provinces, prefectures, districts, counties, villages, garrison stations, and units of frontier border peoples, lectures on these injunctions were held on the first and fifteenth days of each month and attended by the common people, elders, scholars, and appropriate officials. It was through such an institution that the government indoctrinated the people with moral, social, economic, and legal values.<sup>24</sup>

Now we come to examine the fundamental elements of Ch'ien-lung's emperorship. Like all previous Chinese concepts of kingship, Ch'ien-lung believed that emperors ruled by virtue of their reception of the Mandate of Heaven and that the king's right is divine. But he also

<sup>22</sup> *Ch'in-ting Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, chüan 397*, pp. 2–3. My translations of the Six Instructions of Ming T'ai-tsu and the Sixteen Maxims of K'ang-hsi are new. Compared with translations, among others, by George T. Staunton, *Miscellaneous Notices Relating to China, and Our Commercial Intercourse with that Country, Including a Few Translations from the Chinese Language* (London, 1822–1850), pp. 1–56; James Legge, "Imperial Confucianism," *The China Review*, vi (1877–1878), pp. 147–158, 223–235, 299–310, 363–374; William Milne, trans., *The Sacred Edict, Containing Sixteen Maxims of the Emperor Kang-He, Amplified by His Son, the Emperor Yong-Ching; Together With a Paraphrase on the Whole, by a Mandarin* (London, 1817); *The Sacred Edict*, trans. by F. W. Baller (6th ed., Shanghai, 1924), esp. p. v; Kung-chuan Hsiao, *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century* (Seattle, Washington, 1960; paperback edition, 1967), pp. 186–188.

<sup>23</sup> For the complete text of *Sheng-yü kuang-hsün*, see *Ch'in-ting Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, chüan 397*, pp. 4–32; an English translation is given in William Milne, *op. cit.*

<sup>24</sup> A contemporary scholar suggests "the Sixteen Maxims of the K'ang-hsi Emperor may be a useful source for determining the dominant values" of the early Ch'ing society. See Albert Feuerwerker, "Comments on Liu Kwang-ching, 'Nineteenth-Century China: The Disintegration of the Old Order and the Impact of the West,'" in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (eds.), *China in Crisis*, Vol. 1 (Chicago, 1968), p. 181.

saw history as a cycle of order (*chih*) and disorder (*luan*),<sup>25</sup> and the essence of emperorship to him was to maintain order and prolong the Mandate of Heaven through good government. He believed that in order to do this he must have all the requisite qualities of a model ruler that are set forth in the various guides to emperors described above, as well as be a man of great vision and ability.

A few facets received special emphasis in Ch'ien-lung's analysis of emperorship. The first is to make institutions and laws so that the people can be universally governed, their affairs be regulated, and disorder and poverty eliminated.<sup>26</sup> He did not want to control the people through legal means, but rather to give them moral teachings directed toward impressing them with the value of order in the society. He had the people taught the orthodox rites and ritual proprieties associated with their social stations, a prescribed code of conduct, religious practices (such as offering sacrifices), the etiquette of daily life, and the moral values that he felt both the emperor and the people should follow. In essence, he felt that good imperial rule critically depends on the moral cultivation and advancement of the people. That is, moral order is the basis of political order, to rule is essentially to teach the people the right morals. In this light, the ruler is more a moral and educational preceptor than solely a divine sovereign. "Ruling," said Confucius, "is rectifying," that is, rectifying the moral character of the people.<sup>27</sup>

The second most important concern of imperial leadership for Ch'ien-lung is the material well-being of the people. The government, as the ancient sages believed and Ch'ien-lung re-stated, should promote agriculture and sericulture, should not compete with the people for profit, and never disturb their regular work and increase their burden of taxation. As a result, the people should have no fear of hunger and cold (*chi-han*), but should enjoy a comfortable environment. If they are happy, the realm should be at peace.<sup>28</sup>

In short, the two basic premises of Ch'ien-lung's theory of imperial leadership are the moral and cultural cultivation of the people as well as the emperor, and the material well-being of the people. The emperor alone, Ch'ien-lung conceded, cannot achieve this, even though he is blessed with unusual wisdom, abilities, and talents by Heaven. Ch'ien-lung said, emphatically and repeatedly, that the success or failure of imperial rule depends on the discovery, employment, and appreciation of men of talent and virtue.<sup>29</sup> The virtuous and talented are the great treasures of the state (*kuo chih ta-pao*).<sup>30</sup>

Ch'ien-lung defined the ideal statesman as one possessing broad, in-depth knowledge of the Chinese Classics and ancient institutions; a strong sense of responsibility to his society; unquestionable dedication to Confucian ideologies; high moral character; and good literary

<sup>25</sup> *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, Ch. 4, p. 8a; Ch. 5, pp. 8a-9a; Ch. 6, pp. 3b-4b, 17b. The cyclical theory of history has, of course, a long history in China. The first clearly stated proposition about this was made by Mencius. It was later refined by Ssu-ma Ch'ien in his *Shih-chi*. See Fung Yu-lan, *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih hsien-pien* [A History of Chinese Philosophy, A New Edition] (Peking, 1964), p. 218; Burton Watson, trans., *Records of the Grand Historian of China*, by Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Vol. 1, pp. 118, 119. For later cyclical theories of history, see Chun-shu Chang, "The Periodization of Chinese History: A Survey of Major Schemes and Hypotheses," *Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica*, Vol. XLV, No. 1 (1973), pp. 158-159.

<sup>26</sup> *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, Ch. 1, p. 18a; Ch. 2, pp. 7b, 13a; Ch. 3, p. 3b, 5a-7b.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch. 2, p. 13a. The quote of Confucius is in *Lun-yü* (*Ssu-shu tu-pen* ed.), p. 208; Arthur Waley translated the sentence as "Ruling is straightening." (*The Analects of Confucius*, Vintage Book ed., p. 167); James Legge translated it as "To govern means to rectify." (*Confucian Analects*, in *The Four Books*, p. 145.)

<sup>28</sup> *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, Ch. 5, p. 19a; Ch. 6, p. 3b; Ch. 10, pp. 7b-9b.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch. 1, pp. 20b-23b; Ch. 2, pp. 7b-9b; Ch. 3, pp. 9a-11b, 18b; Ch. 4, pp. 13b-15a, 15a-16a, 17b; Ch. 5, pp. 9a-11a, 11a-12a; Ch. 10, p. 22a; Ch. 25, p. 4a. See and also compare the excellent analysis of this aspect of Ch'ien-lung's idea of emperorship in Kahn, *Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes*, pp. 172-197.

<sup>30</sup> *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, Ch. 1, pp. 6b, 22a.

abilities. Morality, Ch'ien-lung strongly emphasized, is far more important than intellectual talents.<sup>31</sup> The ultimate purpose of the life of an educated man is "management of the State and promotion of the welfare of the people" (*ching-shih chi-min*). Since, under the imperial rule every intellectual was trained accordingly, they were expected to vie for positions in the government.<sup>32</sup>

Once these men were recruited, the emperor trusted them completely. Ch'ien-lung hoped that spiritual communication would develop between the emperor and his councillors; a harmonious oneness should be established between them, without the councillors forgetting that they are nevertheless inferior to the emperor.<sup>33</sup>

Statesmen should be appointed and rewarded according to their individual merits. The highest and most important positions are those of the ministers, who directly advise the emperor and participate in imperial decision-making. The selection of these ministers should hold the key to the success or failure, life or death of a reign or a dynasty.<sup>34</sup>

Ch'ien-lung singled out four special models of ministers. The first model refers to those ministers who assist a dynastic founder in planning and building the foundations of a new dynasty. They are called "the meritorious ministers of dynastic founding" (*k'ai-kuo kung-ch'en*), and possess unusual farsightedness in planning state affairs based upon masterful classical and historical knowledge and strong ideological orientation in the *Tao* (Confucianism). The second model identifies those ministers who serve a child or very young ruler. These ministers,

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch. 1, pp. 8, 23; Ch. 6, p. 15a; Ch. 10, pp. 14a-15a, 23ab.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch. 3, pp. 10b-11a; Ch. 5, p. 15a.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch. 1, pp. 20b-23b; Ch. 2, pp. 10a-11b; Ch. 4, pp. 14a-15a; Ch. 5, pp. 15a-16b.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch. 1, pp. 21b-22b; Ch. 2, pp. 7b-9b; Ch. 3, p. 18b; Ch. 5, pp. 9a-10a. Clearly the main sources of Ch'ien-lung's conception of ministership are his readings in the Chinese Classics, histories, and philosophical and literary writings. One particularly influential source is the "Ch'en-tao" section in the *Hsing-li ching-i* (*op. cit.*, *chüan* 11, pp. 14b-19b). But as in the case of discourse on model emperorship there were handbooks or tracts on model ministership. The earliest extant (incomplete) such handbook is the *Ch'en-kuei* (A Guide to Ministership), attributed to the Empress Wu (625-705) of the T'ang dynasty, written between 674 and 690. It blends Confucianism, Taoism, and Legalism together in outlining the rules of model ministership. The book has ten chapters: "Oneness with the Ruler" (T'ung-t'i), "Loyalty" (Chih-chung), "Following the *Tao*" (Shou-Tao), "Fairness and Justice" (Kung-cheng), "Court Remonstrances" (T'ing-chien), "Sincerity and Faithfulness" (Ch'eng-hsin), "Carefulness" (Shen-mi), "Integrity and Honesty" (Lien-chieh), "Generalship" (Liang-chiang), and "Promotion of the Well-being of the People" (Li-jen). The second important tract on model ministership is *Ch'en-chien* (Mirror of History for Ministers). It was written by the emperor Hsüan-tsung (1426-1435) of the Ming dynasty. Prefaced in 1429, it has thirty-seven *chüan*. It selected the words and deeds of the famous ministers from the Ch'un-ch'iu period (722-468 B.C.) through the Yuan dynasty (1260-1368) and divided them into two categories: those worthy of emulation and those prohibited and never to be followed. The third and the most comprehensive handbook on model ministership is the *Ch'en-chien lu*, in twenty *chüan*. Compiled by Chiang I (1631-1687), in about 1679-1681, and presented to the K'ang-hsi emperor in about the same time, it included 122 categories of virtues and deeds with seventy-two in the section of worthy virtues and deeds and fifty in the section of prohibited attitudes and activities. Numerous historical examples and classical quotations are given in each of the 122 categories, and a total of 2,660 historical examples and 960 classical quotations, covering the period from ancient times through the Ming dynasty, are contained in the book. This book supercedes all other books of similar nature in coverage of topics and in range of time. While Ch'ien-lung did not indicate his reading of any of the three books during his principedom, the last one or its ideas should have come to his attention at least indirectly through Chiang I's son, Chiang T'ing-hsi, one of the prince's most influential tutors. As a matter of fact, all Ch'ien-lung's ideas about model ministership and their historical exemplars can be found in this book. For the books discussed above, see *Ch'en-kuei*, *Ti-fan Ch'en-kuei* ed., 2 *chüan* (pp. 1a-11a; 1a-9a) and the postscripts by Yang Shou-ching (pp. 1a-1b) and by Lo Chen-yü (pp. 1b-2b); Chiang I, *Ch'en-chien lu*, 10 *ts'e*, reprinted by Chiang Ch'en-hsi (1653-1721), n. p., 1716; *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tsung-mu t'i-yao*, p. 2723; the *Ch'en-chien* is in the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu*.

referred to as “the pillars and beams of the State” (*kuo chih chu-shih tung-liang*), are blessed with unusual administrative talents and extraordinary wisdom and courage and represents a strong force and influence of stability and trust at a time of possible crisis as a result of the monarch’s youth and inability to reign. The third model covers those ministers who live in a middle stage, a peaceful and prosperous time. Their special strengths are to offer their advice, to safeguard the ruler against bad influences and irregular conduct, to carry on the established policies and administrative practices of the dynasty, and to prevent any change in these policies and practices. By so doing, they deserve the title “the great ministers of a generation” (*i-tai ming-ch'en*). The fourth type refers to the end-of-dynasty loyal ministers (*chung-ch'en*). They are men of righteousness of the highest order; they hold the utmost loyalty to their dynasty and are absolutely selfless, without any interest in their own success or failure, benefit or suffering; they completely commit themselves to the good and preservation of their dynasty, even with full realization of the impending downfall of their dynasty (*chih ch'i pu-k'o erh wai-chih*); and they will eventually die for their dynasty after all hopes of saving it disappear, never to serve or live under another dynasty under any circumstances.<sup>35</sup> Ch'ien-lung had the highest admiration and praise for the last type and named Wen T'ien-hsiang (1236–1282) of the Southern Sung (1127–1279) as the embodiment of all the virtues thus described.<sup>36</sup>

In addition to the civil ministers, Ch'ien-lung also conceived the model military general, as personified by the Sung hero Yüeh Fei (1103–1141). For Ch'ien-lung, a truly great military general must be good at both cultural refinements and martial arts; must possess great courage, wisdom, and human-heartedness; must have absolute loyalty to his dynasty and emperor; must care about only his devotion to his sovereign, not about his own personal concerns; and must obey whatever the order his emperor gives to him, without any consideration of his own life.<sup>37</sup>

One of the essential virtues, and perhaps the most critical, of a minister, Ch'ien-lung strongly expressed, is the courage and willingness to make forthright and fearless remonstrance

<sup>35</sup> *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, Ch. 6, pp. 7a–8a, 14a–16a, 18b–20a. The spirit of *chih ch'i pu-k'o erh wei-chih* (“Give your best try even if you know it is hopeless”) as a cardinal virtue has a long history in China. It was first used to describe the spirit of Confucius. See *Lun-yü* (*Ssu-shu tu-pen* ed.), p. 259; *Kung-yang chuan* [The Kung-yang Commentary on the *Spring and Autumn Annals*] (Taipei, 1963 ed.), *chüan* 15, p. 5b.

<sup>36</sup> Wen T'ien-hsiang has been a symbol of dynastic loyalty and a paragon of the national hero in China, because he fought against the Mongols at the end of the Southern Sung and was eventually executed by the Mongols at his own request. For his biography and his heroic struggle, see *Sung-shih* [The History of the Sung Dynasty] (K'ai-ming shu-tien *Erh-shih-wu shih* or Twenty-five Dynastic Histories ed.), p. 5560; Pi Yuan (1730–1797), *Hsü Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* [Supplement to the Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government] (4 vols. Peking, 1958 ed.), pp. 4983–5028; Feng Ch'i (fl. 1590–1610), *Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo* [Sung History in Narratives of Events], ed. with additions by Ch'en Pang-chan (fl. 1590–1621) (*Kuo-hsüeh chi-pen ts'ung-shu* or Basic Sinological Series ed.), pp. 919–930.

<sup>37</sup> *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, Ch. 6, pp. 13b–14b. Yüeh Fei has been a deified symbol of loyalty and military heroism in China since his times. His personality and historical status have both been mythologized in historical records and popular literary works such as fictions and dramas. His official biography is in *Sung-shih* (Taipei, 1955 ed.), pp. 4540–4551. Modern studies of the myth of Yüeh Fei are numerous. See Hellmut Wilhelm, “From Myth to Myth: The Case of Yüeh Fei’s Biography,” in Arthur F. Wright and D. C. Twitchett (eds.), *Confucian Personalities* (Stanford, 1962), pp. 146–161; James T. C. Liu, “Yüeh Fei (1103–1141) and China’s Heritage of Loyalty,” *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Feb. 1972), pp. 291–297; Teng Kuang-ming, *Yüeh Fei chuan* [A Biography of Yüeh Fei] (Peking, 1955), esp. pp. 257–286; Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “Yüeh Fei,” *Chung-kuo hsüeh-jen*, No. 2 (September 1970), pp. 43–58 (this is the full Chinese version of Liu’s article in the *Journal of Asian Studies*); Li An, “Yüeh Fei tsai Nan-Sung tang-shih te sheng-yü ho li-shih ti-wei” [Yüeh Fei’s Reputation and Historical Status in Southern Sung Times], *Sung-shih yen-chiu chi* [Studies on Sung History], Vol. 6 (Taipei, 1971), pp. 117–125.

to protect the ruler from misconduct and immorality. The success or failure of an emperor's reign critically depends on whether or not he is constantly responsive to such remonstrance. This is a very obvious fact in theory, but it is a feat most difficult to achieve in practice. Even for a good broad-minded ruler, it is sometimes very hard to accept with grace opinions opposing his own. In fact, history told, as Ch'ien-lung related, that forthright and fearless remonstrators more often than not died, directly or indirectly, in the hands of bad, merciless rulers to whom they offered their advice.

Tradition says that Pi Kan of the twelfth century B.C. was disemboweled before the last Shang king, Chou (r. ca. 1060–1027 B.C.), as a result of his forthright remonstrance against the ruler's excesses and immoral conduct. In the T'ang dynasty (618–907), Ch'u Sui-liang (596–658) strenuously opposed, in 655, the Emperor Kao-tsung's (r. 650–683) elevation of Empress Wu (625–705). Ch'u Sui-liang was banished for his opposition. Later Empress Wu usurped the T'ang throne and established her own dynasty, the Chou (690–705). To this fundamental predicament of ministership, Ch'ien-lung offered a very interesting solution, typically from the viewpoint of a monarch. He reasoned that eventual historical vindication of the minister's merits and instant satisfaction of his conscience by giving his candid opinion should serve as the highest rewards for the minister's sufferings or death. A tyrannical ruler could kill a minister, but he would go down in historical records as an evil tyrant, whereas his victim would be awarded immortality by history and enjoy eternal respect and worship by later generations. For this reason, the righteous ministers, Ch'ien-lung exhorted, should always offer their forthright and fearless remonstrance without consideration of their own lives, and the vicious rulers should always remember the punishment of historical judgment before committing any injustice.<sup>38</sup>

In a broader sense, the men of talent and virtue cover not only those whose abilities can benefit the governing of the people but also all those who can contribute to the stability of the society at large. The latter include the righteous and loyal commoners, the filial sons in a family, the chaste women (*chieh-fu*), and the like. Their conduct should provide a critical foundation for social stability which, in turn, would result in the continuity of a dynasty or a reign. Therefore, Ch'ien-lung contended that their deeds deserved to be recorded in history and they be given the honor of immortality, so their exemplary conduct might be emulated by later generations.<sup>39</sup>

In addition to the talented and virtuous who make positive and critical contributions to good imperial leadership, certain political and social elements and activities figure as critical determinants in Ch'ien-lung's paradigm of emperorship, but in a negative sense. Prime offenders are a group of people referred to as petty man (*hsiao-jen*). They are the deceitful and sycophantic officials and imperial favorites, some eunuchs, the powerful and licentious ministers and military generals, and the power-hunger and greedy imperial in-laws. Throughout history they almost all followed the same pattern of rising to power. First they showed some talent and pretended virtue to win the initial trust and favor of the emperor; then they began to monopolize the political power and to form their factions both in and out of the court; next they achieved the complete isolation of the emperor from his loyal and righteous ministers and the people; they purged all those who opposed them; and finally they completely controlled the emperor, the court, and the government. Some of these people eventually usurped the throne. The wise rulers, Ch'ien-lung warned, must be aware of this historical pattern.

<sup>38</sup> *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, Ch. 2, pp. 7b–9b; Ch. 5, pp. 9a–11a.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch. 6, pp. 16a–18a.

He specifically mentioned certain notorious figures, such as Liang Chi (d. 159) and Ts'ao Ts'ao (155–220) of the Eastern Han (25–220), Ssu-ma I (178–251) of the Wei (220–265), Kao Huan (496–547) of the Northern Wei (386–535), and Wei Chung-hsien (1568–1627) of the Ming, as frightening examples.<sup>40</sup>

Ch'ien-lung warned that rulers should also take note of two other disastrous institutions in history which often caused the downfall of a reign or dynasty. One is sexual licentiousness and the other is the unwise ascendancy to power of empresses and empress-dowagers. All these had been commonly seen in history and all had disastrous effects. Empress Lü (241–180 B.C.) of the Former Han, and Empress Wu and Lady Yang (Yang Kuei-fei, d. 756) of the T'ang, were, according to Ch'ien-lung, good examples of this historical pattern. They either usurped the throne or brought down the reign of their emperors from whom they received their powers.<sup>41</sup> The positive remedy for this historical syndrome, suggested Ch'ien-lung, was the careful selection of a talented and virtuous empress in the palace. Empress Wen-te (née Chang-sun), for example, was a graceful and compassionate advisor to the T'ang emperor T'ai-tsung (r. 627–649), and Empress Hsüan-jen (Grand Empress Dowager Kao, r. 1085–1093) served as a brilliant regent after the death of the Sung emperor Shen-tsung (r. 1068–1085). Ch'ien-lung valued the wise selection of empress.<sup>42</sup>

Factions (*p'eng-tang*) and factional strife were another political cancer. As Ch'ien-lung viewed it, political factions were often formed for the purpose of personal gain in the name of public interest, and for the revenge of personal grudges by using the influence and power of public offices. Therefore, they had no benefit for the state and the monarch. The baneful effects of the factional strife in the latter part of the Eastern Han, under the reign of the T'ang emperor Wu-tsung (r. 841–846), and during and following Wang An-shih's reforms (1069–1076) in the Sung dynasty were good lessons to remember.<sup>43</sup> Here Ch'ien-lung seemed to have

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch. 4, pp. 11a, 11b–13b, 19a–21a; Ch. 5, pp. 18a–19a; Ch. 6, pp. 5b–6a; Ch. 10, pp. 15b–17a; see also the *tsung-lun* essays on various dynasties.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch. 4, p. 6b; Ch. 5, pp. 8a, 9, 19b–21a.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch. 5, pp. 3a–4b; Ch. 6, pp. 4b–6a. See also the biography of Empress Chang-sun in Liu Hsü (887–946) *et al.*, *Chiu T'ang-shu* [The Old T'ang History] (Taipei, 1955 ed.), pp. 1036–1038; and Ou-yang Hsiu and Sung Ch'i (998–1061), *Hsing T'ang-shu* [The New T'ang History] (Taipei, 1955 ed.), pp. 1140–1141. The biography of Empress Hsüan-jen in *Sung-shih* (Taipei, 1955 ed.), pp. 3210–3212. Empress Hsüan-jen was so admired that she was called the female Yao or Shun (p. 3212; *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, Ch. 6, p. 5a). For a systematic discussion of the institution of female rulers in Chinese history, see Lien-sheng Yang, *Excursion in Sinology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 27–41.

<sup>43</sup> *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, Ch. 4, pp. 12b–13a; Ch. 5, p. 18b; Ch. 6, pp. 5b–6a. It is significant to note that here Ch'ien-lung did not exaggerate the deleterious consequences of factional strife in these cases, but rather spoke about real historical issues. For recent examinations of these factional struggles, see Chin Fa-ken, "Tung-Han tang-ku jen-wu te fen-hsi" [Personal Factors and Issues in the Factional Strife of the Eastern Han Dynasty], in *Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica*, Vol. 34 (December 1963), pp. 505–558; Liu Po-chi, *T'ang-tai cheng-chiao shih* [Studies in T'ang Society, Education, and Culture] (Taipei, 1968), pp. 29–30, 32–33; Feng Ch'eng-chi, "Niu-Li tang-cheng shih-yin chih-i" [On the Factional Strife between Niu Seng-ju and Li Te-yü], *Wen-shih-che hsüeh-pao*, Vol. 9 (1958), pp. 135–146; Ch'en Yin-k'o, *Ch'en Yin-k'o hsien-sheng lun-chi* [Collected Studies by Ch'en Yin-k'o] (Taipei, 1971), pp. 316–341 (the article was originally published in 1935); Ch'i Hsia, *Wang An-shih pien-fa* [The Reforms of Wang An-shih] (Shanghai, 1961), pp. 223–236; John Meskill (ed.), *Wang An-shih: Practical Reformer?* (Boston, 1963), pp. 19–27. Lei Fei-lung, "Chia-shih ti-yü yü Han, T'ang, Sung, Ming te p'eng-tang" [Family and Geographical Backgrounds and the Factions in the Han, T'ang, Sung, and Ming Dynasties], *Kuo-li cheng-chih ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao*, No. 14 (1966), pp. 95–115. Also note that although Wang An-shih retired in 1076, his reforms continued until the death of Emperor Shen-tsung in 1085.

echoed his father Yung-cheng's attack on detrimental parties and factions in his celebrated "P'eng-tang lun" (Discourse on Factions), issued in 1724.<sup>44</sup>

Moving from the personal components of Ch'ien-lung's paradigm of emperorship to key institutional concerns, four critical issues concern Ch'ien-lung. They are false doctrines, change of the fundamental policies and institutions established by a dynasty's founders, careless and excessive use of legal punishments to keep peace and order, and military adventure and expansionism. Allowed unchecked by state policy, each, Ch'ien-lung contended, could easily disrupt the peaceful and prosperous course and drastically shorten the life of a dynasty. It is the most pressing duty of the sovereign to see all of these condemned or effectively checked.

Following the views of Tung Chung-shu, Han Yü, and the main stream of orthodox Confucianism, Ch'ien-lung held rigorously that all doctrines that he deemed false—Mohism, Legalism, Sophism, Buddhism, Taoism, witchcrafts, superstitions, the popular cult of immortality, and the like—be officially condemned, for he believed they served only to corrupt and confuse the masses and hence cause social disturbances.<sup>45</sup>

The durability and stability of a dynasty, in Ch'ien-lung's view, rests, in large measure, on the preservation and continuity of the good, well-grounded and effective dynastic policies and institutions that the founder and his councillors engineered at its beginning phase. Any change in these policies and institutions in the name of reform (*pien-fa*) by succeeding emperors would surely destroy the foundations of a dynasty. Such a reform would also disrupt the established order and rhythm of the daily life of the people and cause personnel change and bitterness in government. All these then would lead to the downfall of the dynasty. The historical examples of this destructive process were many and familiar. Almost all major dynasties went down through this process. The most obvious ones were the T'ang, the Northern Sung (960–1126), and, to a lesser extent, the Chou. The T'ang dynasty declined and eventually fell because its militia (*fu-ping* or prefecture-soldiers) institution and taxation system known as *tsu-yung-tiao* (taxation in form of unhusked grain, corvée labor, and clothing material such as hemp cloth or silk) were all changed and replaced in later reigns. The Northern Sung fell because Wang An-shih's reforms changed the early Sung fundamental policies and institutions which were planned and commenced by Emperor T'ai-tsu (r. 960–976) and his councillors and were further developed by Emperor T'ai-tsung (r. 976–997). The Chou could not be restored to its old glory after the debacle in 771 B.C. because King P'ing (r. 771–720 B.C.) changed the very foundation of the dynasty by removing its capital from Hao (near modern Sian of Shensi) to Lo-i (modern Loyang of Honan) in 770 B.C. Reform in any form, then, should never be allowed to take place under any circumstances, for the sake of the preservation of a dynasty.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup> For Yung-cheng's "P'eng-tang lun," which was decreed on September 3, 1724 (the day *ting-ssu* of the seventh moon of Yung-cheng's second year), see *Ta-Ch'ing Shih-tsung Hsien (Yung-cheng) Huang-ti Shih-lu* [Veritable Records of the Yung-cheng Reign] (Taipei, 1964 reprint), *chüan* 22, pp. 232–346. The dating of the essay in the *Shih-lu* is more reliable in this case. Other sources are confused about the dating. A short, lucid discussion of the meaning, indications, and historical context of Yung-cheng's "P'eng-tang lun" is given by David S. Nivison, "Ho-shen and His Accusers: Ideology and Political Behavior in the Eighteenth Century," in David S. Nivison and Arthur F. Wright (eds.), *Confucianism in Action* (Stanford, 1959), pp. 224–228; but Nivison's dating of the essay is questionable. See also *Ta-Ch'ing shih-ch'ao sheng-hsün* [Sacred Instructions of the Ten Reigns of the Ch'ing Dynasty] (100 vols., n. p., n. d.): *Shih-tsung Hsien-huang-ti sheng-hsün* [The Sacred Instructions of Emperor Yung-cheng], Ch. 19, pp. 2b–3a.

<sup>45</sup> *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, Ch. 4, p. 10b; Ch. 10, pp. 12b–13b; 20b; Ch. 25, pp. 1a–2b, 19a–20a.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch. 3, pp. 13a–14b; Ch. 6, pp. 5a–6a, 11a, 11b–12a; Ch. 9, pp. 17b–19a; Ch. 36, p. 18b; Ch. 10, pp. 5b–7b; and *tsung-lun* essays on various dynasties. Ch'ien-lung's interpretation of the fall of the three dynasties and Wang An-shih's reforms are, of course, far from realities. For recent examinations of the fall of the Chou, see Hsu Cho-yun, *Ancient China in Transition* (Stanford, 1965); Chun-shu Chang, "Review of Cho-yun

Legal punishments should be reduced to a minimum, and be administered with utmost care and justice. This is the sacred teaching of the "Lü hsing" (Prince Lü upon Punishments) chapter of the *Book of History*. For people should be influenced and molded by moral virtues, not by excessive and careless retributive legal punishments, and, above all, the life of the people is far more important than the mere enforcement of law. Ch'ien-lung strongly believed in this principle of the "Lü hsing," and argued further that legal punishments often assumed the distrust of man's own Heavenly endowed ability to correct his mistakes and faults and in the end destroyed his self-esteem, without which man was no different from animals and therefore government in any form became an impossibility. Ch'ien-lung, therefore, concluded that the end results of using law and legal punishments to maintain peace and order were more deleterious than beneficial to the fate of a dynasty; that the ruler should be extremely careful and fair with legal administration; and that legal punishments should be reduced to a minimum and never applied if there is the slightest doubt of their justification.<sup>47</sup>

In his essay on the evaluation of the Han emperor Wu-ti, Ch'ien-lung criticized him for his indulgence in military expansion and for that Wu-ti was as bad as the Ch'in emperor Shih-huang-ti (r. 246–210 B.C.), a traditional symbol of the tyrant. He showed the same distaste for military adventure in his evaluation of the Sung emperor Li-tsung. Even T'ang T'ai-tsung, the greatest emperor in Imperial China in Ch'ien-lung's eyes, was criticized by the prince for his Korean expedition in 644–645. This is because Ch'ien-lung believed that any military adventure, domestic or foreign, posed a potential factor of self-destruction. The enlightened rulers should rule the world by moral influence, not by force, and only those who ruled with moral strength could survive. Ch'ien-lung felt that military adventures drained the national resources and manpower, and always initiated the decline of a dynasty by exhausting the current and potential resources. A truly wise ruler, in Ch'ien-lung view, should not engage in any military adventures, nor even talk about military adventures.<sup>48</sup>

Hsu, *Ancient China in Transition*, *Journal of Asian History*, Vol. v, No. 1 (1971), p. 67; Li Ya-nung, *Hsi-Chou yü Tung-Chou* [Western Chou and Eastern Chou] (Shanghai, 1956); Li Tsung-t'ung, *Feng-chien te chieh-t'i* [The Disintegration of Feudalism in Ancient China] (Taipei, 1966). For recent analyses of the merits and shortcomings of the T'ang military institution and taxation system, see D. C. Twitchett, *Financial Administration under the T'ang* (Cambridge, England, 1963), pp. 1–48; Ku Chi-kuang, *Fu-ping chih-tu k'ao-shih* [An Inquiry into the Prefecture-soldiers System] (Shanghai, 1962), pp. 128–245. For recent studies of Wang An-shih's reforms, see John Meskill (ed.), *Wang An-shih: Practical Reformer?*, pp. vii–xiv, 35–90; James T. C. Liu, *Reform in Sung China: Wang An-shih (1021–1086) and His New Policies* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959); Ch'i Hsia, *op. cit.*; Higashi Ichio, *O Anseki shimpō no kenkyū* [A Study of Wang An-shih's New Policies] (Tokyo, 1970), esp. Pts. I–II.

<sup>47</sup> *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, Ch. 3, p. 21b; Ch. 4, pp. 1a, 2b, 18b; Ch. 6, p. 18a; Ch. 9, p. 13a; Ch. 10, pp. 9b–10b. For the text of the "Lü hsing," see Tseng Yun-ch'ien, *Shang-shu cheng-tu*, pp. 276–290; for its English translations see Bernhard Karlgren, *The Book of Documents*, pp. 74–78; James Legge, *The Shoo King*, pp. 588–612. The philosophy of law in the "Lü hsing" is discussed in Derk Bodde, "Basic Concepts of Chinese Law: The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Thought in Traditional China," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. cvii, No. 5 (October 1963), pp. 380, 397–398; see also Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, *Law in Imperial China* (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 13–14, 495–496.

<sup>48</sup> *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, Ch. 3, p. 14b; Ch. 4, pp. 1, 9b, 12a, 21b; Ch. 5, p. 2a; Ch. 6, p. 12b; Ch. 8, p. 18a; Ch. 9, pp. 17b–19a. Here Ch'ien-lung's grave concern about military expansion as a cause of dynastic decline and fall is quite historically real. Military expansions indeed caused disastrous effects resulting in either immediate fall or initial decline of a reign or dynasty. In either case, the drain on the national economy was always enormous. No dynasty in Chinese history remained unchanged in its basic structure after military expansions. Take the case of Han Wu-ti's expansion as an example. The expenses on military expansions totaled 100,000,000,000 cash and the course of the Former Han dynasty was completely changed as a result of his military adventures. For detailed analyses of the military expansions and their effects under Han Wu-ti, see Chun-shu Chang, "Military Aspects of Han Wu-ti's Northern and Northwestern Campaigns," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 26 (1966), pp. 148–173, and *Idem*, *From Rebels to Imperialists*, Ch. 4.



We have now mentioned all the major components of Ch'ien-lung's ideal emperorship. Next we turn to the most fundamental goal of that emperorship—the stability and preservation of the dynasty.

To Ch'ien-lung, or to any ruler in Imperial China, the state meant the specific dynasty of which he was the sovereign. In practical terms, the dynasty was the ruler on the throne. Therefore, when Ch'ien-lung spoke of *kuo-chia* (the State), or *t'ien-hsia* (all-under-Heaven), he really meant the Ch'ing dynasty. In this sense, all discourses on the peace and prosperity of the *kuo-chia* are really aimed for one goal—the stability and preservation of a dynasty—in Ch'ien-lung's case, the Ch'ing. Thus, in the final analysis, good emperorship is for one primary purpose: the retention of the Mandate of Heaven in the current ruling house, or the continuity of the current dynasty.

To sum up our previous discussion, Ch'ien-lung contended that the durability and stability of a dynasty depends on seven basic factors: (a) the good, well-grounded, and effective dynastic policies and institutions that a founder and his councillors had established based upon high moral principles; (b) the preservation and continuity of those policies and institutions by succeeding emperors; (c) the purity and Confucian orthodoxy of the intellectual climate; (d) wise recruitment and effectual employment of men of talent and virtue and prevention of greedy men in power; (e) good, universal moral education of the masses; (f) non-disturbance of the people by extra financial, labor, and military burden; and (g) absolute loyalty of the subjects, particularly the educated and the officials, toward the dynasty. Without the working of all these factors, no dynasty, Ch'ien-lung was convinced, could continue its mandate to rule.<sup>49</sup>

Unhappily, by the end of his long reign, Ch'ien-lung failed most of the fundamental ideals of good emperorship that he had postulated as a prince, and, as a result, his dynasty had passed its glory and begun its long, dreadful process of decline. Traditional China as a whole had also passed its height under the Ch'ing. A basic question that has long been asked by historians is why the Ch'ien-lung emperor, who had aspired and planned so well to preserve and glorify his dynasty and who more than any other emperor in Chinese history had identified himself with the institutions he commanded, was the monarch under whose reign the seeds of the decline of his dynasty rooted and started to grow. Was it due to Ch'ien-lung's lack of determination, abilities, or talents to follow through his ideals? The answer seems to be in the negative. Ch'ien-lung was unquestionably one of the most talented, learned, and able rulers in Chinese history.

It appears that after the first fifteen years of his reign, Ch'ien-lung embarked upon four major areas of damaging undertakings—the Southern Tours, the Ten Perfect Military Campaigns, the compilation of the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* (The Complete Library of the Four Treasuries), and the trust of the corrupted Ho-shen (1750–1799)—all of which had irrevocable devastating effects on the economic, military, intellectual, and political conditions of the dynasty.<sup>50</sup> Although Ch'ien-lung's premonarchical writings evidenced wisdom, his subsequent

<sup>49</sup> In addition to relevant previous discussions and footnotes, see also *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi, tsung-lun* essays on different dynasties and essays on the evaluation of rulers and ministers. See particularly Ch. 3, pp. 20b, 22a; Ch. 4, pp. 2a, 8b, 10b; Ch. 5, pp. 19a, 21a; Ch. 6, pp. 11a–12b, 14a–16a, 17b, 18a, 19a; Ch. 7, p. 8a; Ch. 9, pp. 7b–10a, 17b, 18b–19a.

<sup>50</sup> Ch'ien-lung's Southern Tours were made in 1751, 1757, 1762, 1765, 1780, and 1784. The Ten Perfect Military Campaigns were two against the Dzungars in 1755, 1756–1757; one against the Moslems of Turkestan in 1758–1759; two against the Chin-Ch'uan rebels in 1747–1749, 1771–1776; one against the Lin Shuang-wen and Chuang Ta-t'ien rebellion in Taiwan in 1787–1788; the Burmese Campaign in 1766–1770; the Annamese Campaign in 1788–1789; and the two campaigns against the Gurkas in 1790–1792. For Ch'ien-lung's Southern Tours, see Kao Chin (1707–1779) (comp.), *Nan-hsün sheng-tien* [Record of Four Imperial Southern Tours]

judgments about certain policies and people were not always correct. Perhaps his gravest error was to trust Ho-shen, a corrupt and self-serving minister. The dynasty unquestionably began its process of disintegration during the period that Ho-shen was in power.<sup>51</sup>

The grave consequences of the compilation of the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* between 1773 and 1782 exemplified a crucial shortcoming of Ch'ien-lung's ideals of emperorship.<sup>52</sup> This work represented the most ambitious project in the history of book-collecting, reviewing, and republishing in China. It attempted to bring together all the works known at the time which the compilers considered *worthy* of preservation. The aims of this project were multitude. But in the final analysis, the project was conceived by the Ch'ien-lung emperor as the most effective way to purify the mind of the educated and the people and to rid them of the undesirable influences of heterodoxy under various labels—un-Confucian, anti-Manchu, immoral, and other improper ideas. Ch'ien-lung, quoting the Sung Confucian philosopher Chang Tsai, said specifically that compilation of the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* was for the sole purpose of manifesting the mind of Heaven and Earth, establishing the *Tao* for the people, continuing the sacred learning of the great sages, and bringing about great peace for myriad generations.<sup>53</sup>

(Chien-lung's preface dated 1771; Taipei, Wen-hai ch'u-pan she, 1971 reprint; *Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-k'an*, No. 641); Huang Hung-shou, *Ch'ing-shih chi-shih pen-mo* [Ch'ing History in Narratives of Events] (Taipei, 1959), pp. 242–246. For the Ten Perfect Military Campaigns, see Chao I (1727–1854), *Huang-ch'ao wu-kung chi-sheng* [Glorious Record of the Imperial Dynasty's Military Accomplishments, 1792] (Taipei: Wen-hai ch'u-pan she, 1967 reprint; *Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-k'an*, No. 133), pp. 64–170; Wei Yuan (1794–1856), *Sheng-wu chi* [Record of Imperial Campaigns, 1842] (Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chü, 1962), pp. 100–123, 158–163, 176–191, 212–215, 234–238; Chang Ch'ien (1853–1926), *Shih-i ch'ao sheng-wu chi* [Record of the Military Campaigns of Eleven Reigns] (Shanghai, 1903), *chüan* 8, 9, 10, 11 in *ts'e* 3–4. The total cost of the Southern Tours and the Ten Perfect Military Campaigns was close to 200,000,000 taels of silver while the total annual revenue was about 43,590,000 taels of silver. See also the historiographical comments on the works of Chao I and Wei Yuan in Harold L. Kahn, *Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes*, pp. 48–49. The *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* and the case of Ho-shen will be discussed below.

<sup>51</sup> *Shih-erh ch'ao Tung-hua lu* [Tung-hua Records of Twelve Reigns] (Taipei: Wen-hai ch'u-pan she, 1963 reprint), Vol. 12, pp. 36b–37a; *Ta-Ch'ing Jen-tsung Jui* (*Chia-ch'ing*) *huang-ti shih-lu* [Veritable Records of the Chia-ch'ing Reign] (Taipei: Hua-wen shu-chü, 1964 reprint), pp. 378–390; *Ch'ing-shih* (Taipei: Kuo-fang yen-chiu yüan, 1961 ed.), pp. 4243–4245; Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng (1838–1894), *Yung-an pi-chi* [Desultory Notes of Yung-an], in *Pi-chi hsiao-shuo ta-kuan* [A Collectanea of Books of Desultory Notes and Writings] (Taipei: Hsin-hsing shu-chü, 1973 reprint), pp. 3223–3225; Hsiao I-shan, *Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih* [A Comprehensive History of the Ch'ing Dynasty] (Taipei, 1963), Vol. II, pp. 258–267; Inaba Kunzan, *Shinchō zenshi* [A Complete History of the Ch'ing Dynasty]; Chinese translation under the title *Ch'ing-ch'ao ch'üan-shih* by Tan T'ao (Taipei, 1970 reprint), *chüan* 49, pp. 22–27; Yin Luan-chang, *Ch'ing-chien* [The Mirror of the Ch'ing] (Taipei, 1959 reprint), pp. 425–427; Chao-lien (1780–1833), *Hsiao-t'ing tsa-lu* [Miscellaneous Notes from the Hsiao-t'ing], *Pi-chi hsiao-shuo ta-kuan hsü-pien* (2nd Series) ed. (Taipei, 1962 reprint), pp. 5947, 5951; Huang Hung-shou, *Ch'ing-shih chi-shih pen-mo*, pp. 237–240; Arthur W. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, pp. 369–373, 288–290; David S. Nivison, "Ho-shen and His Accusers: Ideology and Political Behavior in the Eighteenth Century," pp. 209–243; Harold L. Kahn, *Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes*, pp. 248–262.

<sup>52</sup> For discussions of the compilation of the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu*, see Kuo Po-kung, *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tsuan-hsiu k'ao* [A Study of the Compilation of the Complete Library of the Four Treasuries] (Taipei, 1967 reprint), pp. 104–110; Cheng Ho-sheng, *Chung-kuo wen-hsien hsüeh kai-yao* [An Introduction to the Collection and Bibliographical Listing of Chinese Literary Works] (Taipei, 1965 reprint), pp. 1–14, 60–70, 188–190; Ssu-yü Teng and Knight Biggerstaff, *An Annotated Bibliography of Selected Chinese Reference Works* (3rd ed.; Cambridge, Mass., 1971), pp. 19–20. In my listing of works copied into the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu*, I have followed Kuo Po-kung. Cheng Ho-sheng's figure is 3,457; Ssu-yü Teng and Knight Biggerstaff's is 3,460. Kuo's is correct.

<sup>53</sup> Kuo Po-kung, *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tsuan-hsiu k'ao*, p. 1. For a systematic discussion of the various motives of compiling the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* from different perspectives, see Kuo, *op. cit.*, pp. 2–5; Cheng Ho-sheng, *Chung-kuo wen-hsien hsüeh kai-yao*, pp. 190–192; Luther Carrington Goodrich, *The Literary Inquisition of Ch'ien-lung* (Baltimore, 1935), pp. 44–53. For the origin of Ch'ien-lung's statement in his premonarchical writings, see *Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*, Ch. 3, pp. 5a–7b.

Therefore, the pages of 2,054 volumes that were collected by the provincial centers and sent to Peking had been arbitrarily changed or deleted, and, worst of all, more than 4,000 titles were completely or partially destroyed as a result of the Ch'ien-lung inquisition.<sup>54</sup> The damage that such a grand-scale literary inquisition and its attendant terror did is beyond thinking; it is an effort of thought-control to which perhaps only the Book Burning by Ch'in Shih-huang-ti in 213 B.C. can be compared. And it came at a critical time, when China needed more diversified and freer intellectual pursuits to prepare herself for the coming challenge from the West.


The most detrimental ideology in Ch'ien-lung's paradigm of emperorship may have been anti-reformism. Ch'ien-lung placed an overwhelming emphasis on the evil and devastating effects of the succeeding emperors' reform or change of policies and institutions established by the founding emperors; he saw reform as a major cause of dynastic decline and disintegration and unfortunately this contributed to the Manchu Court's persistent resistance to reform in the late nineteenth century, when reform became necessary to deal with the Western challenge.

We have discussed the traditional Chinese paradigm of emperorship, represented by Ch'ien-lung. The singular idea of the system is that it focuses the whole political structure on the wisdom and willingness of the emperor. But, as in the case of Ch'ien-lung, the innate goodness of human nature and sense of historical judgment is not always dependable. Perhaps, however, Ch'ien-lung's failure is not so much a personal failure, as it is the failure of a static and inflexible traditional system that prohibited intellectual freedom, reform, and the dynamic responses necessary to deal with the introduction of the ways of the modern Western world when that world introduced itself to China.

<sup>54</sup> Kuo Po-kung, *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tsuan-hsiu k'ao*, pp. 38-55; Wu Che-fu, *Ch'ing-tai chin-hui shu-mu yen-chiu* [A Comprehensive Study of Indexes of Works Destroyed or Expurgated in Ch'ing Times] (Taipei, 1969), pp. 98-112, esp. p. 109; Chuang Chi-fa, "Ch'ing Kao-tsung fen-hui Ch'ien Ch'ien-i chu-shu k'ao" [A Study of the Ch'ien-lung Emperor's Proscription of Ch'ien Ch'ien-i's Works], *Ta-lu tsa-chih*, Vol. 47, No. 5 (November 15, 1973), p. 29; Ch'en Teng-yüan, *Ku-chin tien-chi chü-san k'ao* [A Study of the Collecting and Dispersing of Chinese Books Throughout Chinese History] (Shanghai, 1936; Taipei, 1968 reprint, under the title *Chung-kuo li-tai tien-chi k'ao*), pp. 97-131; Luther Carrington Goodrich, *The Literary Inquisition of Ch'ien-lung*, pp. 60-68. The figure 4,000 is a new estimate by modern scholars. Goodrich and other old sources gave the figure of about 2,665.

## Glossary

- Chang-sun 長孫  
 Chang Tsai 張載  
*Chen-kuan cheng-yao* 貞觀政要  
 Chen Te-hsiu 真德秀  
*cheng-hsin* 正心  
 Ch'eng 成  
 Ch'eng Hao 程顥  
 Ch'eng I 程頤  
*ch'eng-i* 誠意  
*chi-han* 饑寒  
*ch'i-chia* 齊家  
*ch'i-chū chu* 起居注  
 Chia-ch'ing 嘉慶  
*chieh-fu* 節婦  
 Ch'ien-lung 乾隆  
*chih* 治  
*chih* 智  
*chih ch'i pu-k'o erh wei chih*  
 知其不可而爲之  
*chih-chih* 致知  
*chih-kuo* 治國  
 Ch'in 秦  
 Ch'ing 清  
*ching-shih chi-min* 經世濟民  
 Chou 周  
 Chou 紂  
 Chou Tun-i 周敦頤  
 Chu Hsi 朱熹  
 Ch'u Sui-liang 褚遂良  
*chūan* 卷  
*chūn-tzu* 君子  
*Ch'un-ch'iu* 春秋  
*chung-ch'en* 忠臣  
*fu* 賦  
*fu-ping* 府兵  
 Han 漢  
*Han-shu* 漢書  
 Han Wu-ti 漢武帝  
 Han Yü 韓愈  
 Hao 鎬  
 Ho-shen 和珅  
 Hsia 夏  
*Hsiao-ching* 孝經  
*hsiao-jen* 小人  
 Hsien-liang san-ts'e 賢良三策  
*hsin* 信  
*Hsing-li ching-i* 性理精義  
*hsiu-shen* 修身  
 Hsüan-jen 宣仁  
 Huang Huai 黃淮  
 Hung-li 弘曆  
*i* 義  
*I-ching* 易經  
*i-tai ming-ch'en* 一代名臣  
*jen* 仁  
*Jih-chih hui-shuo* 日知薈說  
*k'ai-kuo kung-ch'en* 開國功臣  
 K'ang-hsi 康熙  
*kang-mu* 綱目  
 Kao 高  
 Kao Huan 高歡  
*ke-wu* 格物  
*kuo-chia* 國家  
*kuo chih chu-shih tung-liang*  
 國之柱石棟梁  
*kuo chih ta-pao* 國之大寶  
*li* 禮  
*Li-chi* 禮記  
 Liang Chi 梁冀  
 Liu Tsung-yuan 柳宗元  
*Liu-yü* 六諭  
 Lo-i 雒邑  
*Lo-shan T'ang ch'üan-chi*  
 樂善堂全集  
 Lü 呂  
 Lü hsing 呂刑  
*luan* 亂  
 Ming 明  
*Ming-ch'en tsou-i* 名臣奏議  
 Ming T'ai-tsu 明太祖  
*nei-sheng wai-wang* 內聖外王  
 Ou-yang Hsiu 歐陽修  
 Pan Ku 班固  
*p'eng-tang* 朋黨  
*P'eng-tang lun* 朋黨論  
*pi-chi* 筆記  
*pien-fa* 變法  
 P'ing 平  
*p'ing t'ien-hsia* 平天下  
 Shang 商  
*Sheng-yü* 聖諭  
*Sheng-yü kuang-hsün* 聖諭廣訓  
*shih* 詩  
*Shih-chi* 史記  
*Shih-ching* 詩經  
 Shih huang-ti 始皇帝  
*shih-lu* 實錄  
*Shu-ching* 書經  
*shu-jen* 庶人  
 Shun 舜  
 Shun-chih 順治  
*ssu-chün* 嗣君  
*Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* 四庫全書  
 Ssu-ma Ch'ien 司馬遷  
 Ssu-ma I 司馬懿  
 Ssu-ma Kuang 司馬光  
 Su Ch'e 蘇轍  
 Su Hsün 蘇洵  
 Su Shih 蘇軾  
*sui* 歲  
 Sung 宋  
 Sung Li-tsung 宋理宗  
 Sung Shen-tsong 宋神宗  
 Sung T'ai-tsu 宋太祖  
 Sung T'ai-tsong 宋太宗  
*Ta-hsüeh yen-i* 大學衍義  
 T'ang 唐  
 T'ang Kao-tsung 唐高宗  
 T'ang T'ai-tsong 唐太宗  
 T'ang Wu-tsung 唐武宗  
*Tao* 道  
*t'ien-hsia* 天下  
 Ts'ao Ts'ao 曹操  
 Tseng Kung 曾鞏  
*tsu-yung-tiao* 租庸調  
*Tzu-chih t'ung-chien*  
 資治通鑑  
 Tung Chung-shu 董仲舒  
 Wang An-shih 王安石  
 Wei 魏  
 Wei Chung-hsien 魏忠賢  
 Wen 文  
 Wen-te 文德  
 Wen T'ien-hsiang 文天祥  
 Wu 武  
 Wu Ching 吳兢  
 Wu-i 無逸  
 Yang Hsiung 揚雄  
 Yang Kuei-fei 楊貴妃  
 Yang Shih-ch'i 楊士奇  
 Yao 堯  
*Yin-Yang* 陰陽  
 Yü 禹  
 Yuan 元  
 Yüeh Fei 岳飛  
 Yung-cheng 雍正  
 Yung-yen 顛朕




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# 清乾隆帝之帝王論


(中文摘要)

張 春 樹




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本文之目的為(一)評介 Harold L. Kahn 之書, *Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes: Images and Reality in the Ch'ien-lung Reign*; (二)分析清乾隆帝之帝王論與其所關涉之問題。而全文之重心是在後者,因 Kahn氏全書對乾隆帝之帝王論之分析甚為草畧,然此一問題卻關涉乾隆一朝與有清一代之發展甚切。另外,研究乾隆之帝王論也有其特別意義,因他的帝王修身、治國、治民之道與相關之理論在他登基之前已完全形成,因此史家可比較其即位前之理論與即位後之行政措施以察其符應與差離之點,藉明傳統中國時代帝王立論、為政之根本問題與弱點所在。



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本文研究乾隆之帝王論本之其所著《樂善堂全集》(四十卷)與《日知薈說》(四卷)。二書雖刊印於乾隆元年與二年,但其中文字卻皆為乾隆登位前之作,而備錄其為帝前對帝王修身、齊家、治國、平天下之全部理論,此二書實為中國歷史上現存之研究一位帝王即位前的帝王觀之特別珍貴材料。



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本文之主要部分首先研討乾隆之帝王論所根據之主要資料,這包括他所接受的他祖父(康熙帝)與父(雍正帝)母(孝聖皇后)之教導與他在受正式教育中所讀的書文:《四書》、《五經》、《孝經》、《史記》、《漢書》、《資治通鑑》、《資治通鑑綱目》、《貞觀政要》、《名臣奏議》、唐宋八大家之古文、《性理精義》與其他宋代著名理學家著作之選文等等。另外,他也頗受順治帝之「六諭」(即原明太祖之「六諭」)、康熙帝之「十六諭」、與雍正帝之《聖諭廣訓》之影響。而在他所讀的經書哲籍中對他的帝王論有特別影響者為《尚書》之《無逸》篇,董仲舒之《賢良三策》,與真德秀之《大學衍義》。

乾隆之帝王論甚有系統而複雜，但主要之論點可簡述如下：（一）王者上承天命，下臨萬邦，凡天下之眾無一不在涵覆之內；（二）天命不常，歷代興亡與治亂循環為歷史之必然途徑，故帝王必朝夕警惕兢業以赴；（三）德教學術為治天下之本，故治國必先尊儒崇道而黜異端以使萬民有所定守而歸善；（四）人君必用賢納諫、戒用「小人」，反是必亡國；（五）主治必戒「朋黨」，為朋黨者皆因公以報私、挾勢以復怨，因之以亂朝廷；（六）治國必慎刑、省賦斂、不事游豫征伐，反是則疲民弊國；（七）人君開國承家創業垂統必有通經明道規模宏大之臣，為之立法垂猷，使子孫有所鑒，成憲而持永久，而繼世之君絕不可改變祖宗之法，變法乃資亂階以為亡國之肇端。

乾隆在位六十年而傳位其子顛琰（嘉慶帝），為太上皇帝，至嘉慶四年正月卒。其御極雖六十年，而治國實為六十三年多，為中國歷史上帝國時代治國最久之君主，如能實行其帝王論中所立之各觀念與方策，則其傳位之時清朝必應鼎盛，而其實際上卻為清朝衰弊之肇端。何者？蓋因乾隆登位後其所先立之帝王論多未實行，或有行者，亦貽大害。此可畧舉其治國期間之數事以說明之。所謂六次「南巡」與「十全武功」皆自毀其即位前帝王論中之基本信念（見上），殫財擾民至甚；修《四庫全書》中之禁燬書籍雖可藉「崇儒」與「罷黜異端」之名，然其所為害，從中國長久之學術與思想史量之實不下於秦之焚書；而乾隆最大之失，厥為在其治國之後二十年中之任和坤之顯橫，自壞其「用賢納諫，戒用小人」之明見，致使官吏將領貪黷枉法，而其末年政事遂敗壞不可收拾，民變亦蔓延數省，寢釀大亂，清之衰弊由此步始。

乾隆之帝王論大致言之立論甚佳，而為集自古以來帝王聖王論之大成，及其御極，其中根本之點卻多不實行，而所為者復多為其反；此固乾隆個人之失與過咎，然亦正反映傳統中國帝王專制制度之最大缺點——即一人專制，政在一人，一切由君主之好惡意取而定，修身、齊家、治國、平天下之完備理論雖在，但此一人廢而不行，亦無可如何！