

to students of Chinese literature. The translation is well done, and I have noted only a very small number of minor slips in the main text and the notes. The expertise and care of all involved in this production speak from every page of this book. This is indeed an extremely welcome addition to the available body of renditions of truly popular literature. Its vivid contents will not only surprise many Western readers but also many of our Chinese students.

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The Making of Song Dynasty History: Sources and Narratives, 960–1279.
By Charles Hartman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. xiv + 377. \$120.00.

I feel unworthy to review a book that is so masterfully written and researched that it seems sheer impertinence to offer my opinion of it. Charles Hartman, a scholar who has been a master for so long that it seems a fact of nature, rather than the achievement of decades of practice, has written a sophisticated, nuanced, and deeply researched study of history writing during the Song dynasty. Specifically, he carefully sifts through the sands and shoals of the historiographic process whereby Song historians, officially and privately, composed histories of the Song dynasty in a highly politically charged environment. Not only were the documentary records of earlier emperors repeatedly culled, edited, and reconstituted as different factions gained control over the official institutions of history writing, but the political implications for historians in their own time were critical for themselves, other officials, and the emperors. Song historians struggled to be true to their work as historians, however that was understood, to portray the past accurately, while understanding the difficulties of their sources and the effects their work had on their present. It was in many respects this struggle that made the Song, as Chen Yinke 陳寅恪 said (cited by Hartman), the peak of Chinese historiography.

It should be said at the outset that this is a Chinese historian's book, written about Chinese historians and historical writing, for other Chinese historians to read. More specifically, it is a book for Song-dynasty historians. Professor Hartman assumes that the audience he is addressing knows the major figures, the major events, the source materials, and the histories he is discussing. I imagine that even a Chinese historian working on another period would be hard-pressed to make much sense of this book. Some would surely know who Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019–1086) or Ouyang Xiu 歐陽脩 (1007–1072) were, but perhaps be less aware of Hartman's hero in this tale, the historian Li Tao 李燾 (1115–1184), who produced the *Continued Long Draft of the Comprehensive Mirror for Aide in Governing* 續資治通鑑長編.

As is always the case, the perspective of subsequent historians is entirely reliant upon the sources left to them, and in the case of the history of the Song dynasty, particularly the Northern Song dynasty, many of those sources were written by Song historians. Thus, even historians writing in the twenty-first century are still receiving and being influenced by the decisions made about Song history by Song historians. This might have been well-understood by scholars in the field, but Hartman is able to demonstrate in exquisite detail how the narrative of the Song dynasty was created and why. It is not that the received account is necessarily wrong or misleading, but that we need to be aware of the limitations of the sources and the political and intellectual pressures the historians were working under.

Hartman begins with the important point that the idealized system of official history-writing that we all know of took some time to be implemented in the Song, and that it did not always function as it should have. The system inherited from the Tang was fully mature only in the eleventh century. It entailed three general stages, “transcription, transmission, and transformation” (p. 4). The first stage was the transcription, or recording, of the emperor's actions and what was said in his presence, along with the chief councilors' summaries of their discussions with the emperor, the activities of certain government agencies, and the biographies of recently deceased, high-ranking officials. All of these materials were then transmitted by being compiled into a single, daily record of events surrounding the emperor and his court. When an emperor died, the daily records were then transformed into a “veritable record (*shilu* 實錄)” of that emperor's reign. At some future point, the veritable

records of several reigns would undergo still another process of editing, this time producing a “state history (*guoshi* 國史).” The state history was presented in the standard format of annals, monographs, and biographies, which the dynastic history composed after a dynasty fell would also follow.

This kind of history-writing was unabashedly focused on the emperor and his court, encapsulating much of what made imperial Chinese governments function the way they did. It was inherently political and hierarchical, with a fundamental expectation that what the emperor did, and what happened at court, was, in fact, the point of history-writing. Emperors did or did not do things, producing good or bad effects in the empire. Good and bad officials tried to influence the emperor, or to carry out policies, and the higher-ranking ones were more important in the outcomes than lower-ranking ones. Government itself was the proper and correct focus of history-writing, since it was government that controlled the fate of the empire and its people.

Far more problematic were the failures at every stage that marked significant periods in the Song. The compilation of the daily calendar only began in 988, stopped in 1007, resumed in 1043, stopped again in 1054, and then resumed in 1067. The officials responsible for recording what was said and done in the emperor’s presence were usually too far away from him to hear what was said, and departments that were supposed to submit their reports on policies often failed to do so. While the system was complete, the actual execution was frequently, even usually, lacking. The materials left to later historians were, thus, hardly systematic or consistent, and often relied upon partial and uneven bureaucratic accounts to create the most basic level of documentation. It was then necessary for historians to draw upon unofficial, or private, materials, and official documents that might have been retained (and preserved) by officials.

Song officials and emperors were extremely sensitive to history as a practice and as a political tool. Consequently, the intense political factionalism, as opposed to simple personal struggles for power, of the Song drove all of the aspects of the “transcription, transmission, and transformation” of Song history. In particular, the formation and development of *daoxue* 道學 thought starting in the eleventh century, and its connection to a self-identified political faction (though they would never have characterized themselves as a “faction”), provided a clear moral framework for the narrative of Song history as it reached its final form in the thirteenth century. That *daoxue* framework and its

resulting selection and characterization of events and sources have been passed down to the present. Particularly because the process of forming that history also selected the sources that have been transmitted, it is extremely difficult to develop a different view of Song history.

Hartman argues that Song historiography adopted “increasingly well defined [*sic*] and rigid” moral categories as the dynasty progressed due to the growth of *daoxue*. “As the reformulation of moral absolutes that began with the eleventh-century rise of the literati intensified into the twelfth-century *daoxue* movement, a drive also intensified for cleaner, thus more increasingly allegorized, interpretations of history” (p. 242). For Hartman, this process was incipient in Sima Guang’s *Comprehensive Mirror for Aide in Governing* 資治通鑑, where the reader was presented with long quotes from earlier histories and memorials and left to draw his own moral lessons. Sima Guang, of course, carefully selected which documents to include in order to steer the reader to certain conclusions. Herein lay the roots of *daoxue* history. While *daoxue* historians were explicit in their moral lessons, choosing not to leave it to the reader to reach the correct conclusions, Sima Guang was no less certain in his own mind what moral lessons should be learned. Southern Song scholars saw Sima Guang as a *daoxue* progenitor, though modern scholars have tended to emphasize an intellectual separation between his and later, *daoxue*, historians. Of course, the reformulation of the *Comprehensive Mirror* into the more explicitly didactic recension, the *Zizhi tongjian gangmu* 資治通鑑綱目, at Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (1130–1200) direction highlights the difference between Sima Guang and *daoxue* practitioners. And, like the *daoxue*-influenced history of the Song more generally, it was the *Zizhi tongjian gangmu*, rather than the less morally clear *Comprehensive Mirror*, that was influential for the rest of imperial history.

For Hartman, the *daoxue* history of the Song is a coherent metanarrative or grand allegory fully instantiated by the Yuan-dynasty compilers of the *Songshi* 宋史. The course of Song history became the story of progress (along with setbacks) toward the political success of the *daoxue* movement in 1241. Hartman identifies three “thematic clusters” in the formulation of this history. First, the post–Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021–1086) New Policies view that Emperor Renzong’s 仁宗 (r. 1022–1063) Qingli 慶曆 (1041–1048) and Jiayou 嘉祐 (1056–1063) reigns were a golden age of governance. This view was further reinforced by the re-establishment of those policies during Emperor Huizong’s 徽宗 (r. 1100–1126) reign, leading up to the fall of northern China to the

Jurchen. The thorough discrediting of Wang Anshi's policies, and elevation of those opposed to his policies, was written into Li Tao's *Continued Long Draft*, making the post-Renzong shift to the New Policies in 1067 the major inflection point in Song history.

The second thematic cluster was the elevation of the first emperor, Taizu 太祖 (r. 960–976), to virtual sage status. This process began in the 1030s and 1040s, and is in some sense a natural sort of development for a dynasty once it had proven fairly stable. By the 1030s, it was clear that Taizu had founded a lasting political structure. The impetus for elevating Taizu even further was enhanced in the Southern Song when the imperial line switched back to Taizu's, rather than, as it had been through Emperor Gaozong 高宗 (r. 1127–1162), Taizong's 太宗 (r. 976–997) descendants. Li Tao had considerable difficulties in recreating Taizu's reign from the documents left to him in the Southern Song. I would add that, consistent with Hartman's arguments, the 1030s and 1040s elevation of Taizu was part of a political project that grew out of intensified factionalism in the early eleventh century. Political struggles ramified into the historical account of the Song founding that elevated Taizu and blamed Taizong for the Song failure to "recover" the Sixteen Prefectures from the Liao dynasty. Both Sima Guang and Ouyang Xiu framed the Tang and Five Dynasties periods in that light. By the twelfth century, *daoxue* followers transformed Taizu into a perfect ruler.

The third thematic cluster was the narrative that Song history starting from Wang Anshi was plagued by a series of "nefarious ministers" (*jianchen* 奸臣). This was partly produced by the *daoxue* reaction to the post-1208 domination of the government by Shi Miyuan 史彌遠 (1164–1233) and his nephew Shi Songzhi 史嵩之 (1189–1257), and retrospectively imposed upon earlier periods. The Song grand allegory, thus, became a struggle between good and evil in the form of officials who were either gentlemen or petty men. The worst of those petty men were autocratic prime ministers like Wang Anshi. For Hartman, the driving force in the creation of this narrative was political opposition. Renzong's limited reform by gentlemen in the Qingli period was quickly overturned and, in Emperor Shenzong's 神宗 (r. 1067–1085) reign, overtaken by Wang Anshi's government of petty men.

These themes developed independently and at different times before being formed into a complete metanarrative in the thirteenth century. Hartman's scholarship is exquisite in its fine nuance, showing how each strand of the

narrative came into being through the efforts of individual historians working within their own political context, and in response to earlier historical formulations. He does not see these historians as dishonest, in the sense of manufacturing events whole cloth, but they sometimes struggled to fit the documents available to them into their views of Song history. Song historians also wrote with the knowledge that their political opponents might well read and object to their characterizations of history. Because any current political position was so closely connected to previous political events, the past was never irrelevant to the present. To make matters even more personal, many high officials had been preceded by fathers, grandfathers, and other male relatives in government. One could hardly expect someone to calmly accept a history that characterized their family members as nefarious ministers.

Perhaps the most telling description of the history of the Song that the *daoxue* advocates produced was written by Zhen Dexiu 真德秀 (1178–1235) in his 1229 preface for Chen Jun's 陳均 (1174–1244) *Chronologically Arranged Complete Essentials in Outline and Details of the August Court* 皇朝編年綱目備要. For Zhen, the period from Emperors Taizu through Renzong before 1067 was prosperous and stable because of four of Taizu's policies. The first was that the Song government followed the policy of "benevolence," which was changed to the pursuit of advantage after 1067. The second was basing the Song government on Ruism (Confucianism), which Wang Anshi undermined by introducing Legalist and Buddhist elements into government policies. These first two original policies provided for a firm and unified moral basis for government. The third policy was an incremental and deliberate approach to governing that understood the limitations of policies and government to change things. After 1067, officials tried to effect large-scale changes in very short time frames. The fourth and final policy of Taizu's was the selection of morally sound officials. Officials were morally deficient and "clever" after 1067 (p. 246).

While historians have always been aware of the fact that there are important biases in Song historical sources, as is the case with all historical sources, the particular nature of these Song biases, and how deeply they have been built into the narratives of the *Songshi* and the *Continued Long Draft* has previously been less clear. The *daoxue* movement retrospectively imposed its views on Song history at a time and place that made those views the "accepted" narrative of the Song. It is less surprising that this was the case for the Yuan-dynasty compilers

of the *Songshi*, than that this was also the case for Li Tao in the *Continued Long Draft*. Particularly for Northern Song historians, the *Continued Long Draft* combined with the *Song huiyao* 宋會要 have formed the bedrock of the political history of the Song. Li Tao provides so much more information than the *Songshi* that he appears to present a more balanced account. Yet, as Hartman has shown, Li Tao was as subject to, or inclined to, push the same *daoxue* construction of Song history as the compilers of the *Songshi*.

Li Tao is, nonetheless, in Hartman's view, a truly great historian who stayed true to his craft, even while supporting *daoxue* history. As someone who is seldom physically or mentally far from the *Continued Long Draft*, this is reassuring, and seems to be correct. But this also highlights how influential that reading of Song history remains. *Daoxue* culture heroes, like Sima Guang or Ouyang Xiu, still come off as the good guys, and men like Wang Anshi or Shi Miyuan as the bad guys in modern histories of the Song. The connection between political and cultural history means that the *daoxue* view extends well beyond the factional struggles at court. Hartman's careful tracing of the threads ultimately woven together to form the *daoxue* narrative shows us why it is so hard, if not impossible, to try to read against the *Continued Long Draft's* narrative of heroes and villains. Li Tao's account grew out of the organic development of positions on the past that already existed; he did not simply impose a new structure onto that past. Consequently, at least some earlier documents and accounts fit into the *Continued Long Draft's* narrative. And Li Tao was too good a historian to propose obviously outlandish explanations for events. It would always be easy to make Song Taizu a hero, and then a sage, because he successfully founded a long-lasting dynasty. Similarly, it was possible to argue that the pre-1067 Song dynasty was a golden age, given the increasingly difficult factional politics that followed and the fall of the north in 1127.

Of course, not every anecdote collected in the eleventh century fits so perfectly into the *daoxue* narrative. Sima Guang's *Sushui jiwén* 涑水記聞, among other collections, contains some less than sagely stories about Song Taizu. Li Tao did include alternative stories and allow for a messier narrative of history than an ideal *daoxue* reading might prefer. But the overall structure, Hartman's coherent metanarrative, holds true and structures our view of the Song around the rise to dominance of the *daoxue* movement. Even for those not focusing on developments in thought during the Song, the *daoxue* movement has left its

mark, because even as one reads other sources against Li Tao's *Continued Long Draft* and the *Songshi*, that metanarrative is the orthodoxy being challenged.

In much the same way as Li Li 李立 and then Deng Xiaonan 鄧小南 have challenged, problematized, and highlighted the construction of the "Ancestral Laws" (*zuzong zhi fa* 祖宗之法), a connection Hartman explicitly makes, Hartman has reconfigured our view of Song history. He has, to my mind, convincingly explained why virtually all of the culture heroes of the Northern Song belonged to the same political faction. Granted, men like Su Shi 蘇軾 (1037–1101) were renowned in their own time and afterward for the quality of their artistic production, and Su Shi was a political enemy of Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107), but that was within the Old Party led by Sima Guang in opposition to Wang Anshi. Wang Anshi himself also did not fit fully with the idea of good guys and bad guys, having close personal ties with the Old Party, a deep friendship with Sima Guang, and, later, reconciling with Su Shi. The fact remains, however, that we have very little in the way of extant cultural production outside of the men the *daoxue* adherents found acceptable.

Professor Hartman's book provides a foundational knowledge of Song historiography that every Song historian will have to read. In a very real sense, he has shown that Song history is *daoxue* history, and that any subsequent historical analysis based upon the "standard" reading of Song history has been inescapably influenced by the *daoxue* movement. While all of these larger contributions to our understanding of Song history are critically important, they should not overshadow the incredible finely detailed scholarship contained in this book. This book is so dense with information that it bears reading and rereading. The field of Song history owes a great debt of gratitude to Professor Hartman for writing this fine book.

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