

香港中文大學 天主教研究中心

Centre for Catholic Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong

天主教研究學報

Hong Kong Journal of Catholic Studies

第六期 2015年

No. 6 2015

個人、社群、教會和國家

The Individual, Community, Church and State



香港中文大學天主教研究中心

《天主教研究學報》

〈個人、社群、教會和國家〉

目 錄

- 4 作者簡介
- 6 主編的話
- 19 馬樹人〈西學東漸、絲綢之路、與國民教育〉
- 31 陸鴻基〈公教社會訓導與香港的國民教育〉
- 55 馮苑菁〈從香港教會的社會訓導中看公民身份與實踐原則〉
- 74 林榮鈞〈公民教育中的國際公民和愛國公民之間不能化解的張力——盧梭的角度〉
- 111 吳達明〈香港人身份的法律基礎〉
- 148 朱偉志〈佔領運動的價值衝突對基督徒帶來的啟示和挑戰〉
- 173 黎恩灝〈建立地上的天國：天主教會與巴西和南韓的深化民主〉

Table of Contents

- 4 Contributors
- 6 Editor's Word
- 19 MA Shu Yun "Dissemination of Western Knowledge to the East, Silk Road, and National Education"
- 31 Bernard Hung-Kay LUK "Catholic Social Teachings and National Education in Hong Kong"
- 55 FUNG Yuen Ching Catherine "Citizenship and its Practice in Social Teaching of the Hong Kong Catholic Church"
- 74 Wing Kwan Anselm LAM "Irresolvable Tension between Cosmopolitan Citizenship and Patriotic Citizenship in Civic Education"
- 111 Simon T M NG "The Legal Foundation of Hongkonger Identity"
- 148 CHU Wai Chi Rodney "The Implications and Challenges of the Value Conflicts of the Occupy Movement for Christians"
- 173 Yan Ho LAI "Building Heavenly Kingdom on Earth: The Roman Catholic Church and Deepening Democracy in Brazil and South Korea"

作者簡介

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| MA Shu Yun
馬樹人 | Professor,
Department of Government and Public
Administration,
Chinese University of Hong Kong
香港中文大學政治與行政學系教授 |
| Bernard Hung-Kay LUK
陸鴻基 | Associate Professor,
History Department,
York University, Toronto, Canada
加拿大約克大學歷史系副教授 |
| FUNG Yuen Ching
Catherine
馮菀菁 | Panel Head of Religious Studies, St. Mary
Canossian School
嘉諾撒聖瑪利學校宗教科主任 |
| Anselm Wing Kwan LAM
林榮鈞 | Associate Professor,
School of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Hang Seng Management College
恆生管理學院人文及社會科學學院副教授 |
| Simon T. M. NG
吳達明 | Associate Professor,
College of Humanities and Law,
HKU School of Professional and Continuing
Education
香港大學持續進修學院
人文及法律學院副教授 |
| CHU Wai Chi Rodney
朱偉志 | Assistant Professor,
Department of Applied Social Sciences,
Hong Kong Polytechnic University
香港理工大學應用社會科學系助理教授 |

LAI Yan Ho Eric

黎恩灝

Master of Science,

London School of Economics

倫敦政治經濟學院(政治社會學)科學碩士

主編的話

自六十年代起，天主教會對教會與世界的關係有新的理解，這尤其見於梵蒂岡第二次大公會議(1962-65)。自梵二以來，教會不單只專注於個人的得救，亦強調教會自身與世界的密切關係，世界所關心的亦是教會所關心的。對人格尊嚴、人類社會生活及人類活動的深湛意義的理解，都構成教會和世界所有關係及交談的基礎。梵二文件〈教會在現代世界牧職憲章〉指出，教會同整個人類共同前進，並和世界共同體驗著塵世的命運；教會猶如人類社會的酵母與靈魂，志在基督內革新人類社會，並將這社會變作天主的家庭。¹ 教會強調，信德應深入信友整個生活，包括普通生活。信德應推動信友實行正義仁愛，尤其對貧者。²

這種對教會與世界的關係的新認知，為教會與政治團體或政府的關係亦有影響。雖說教會深知政府與教會是各自獨立自主的機構，但它肯定，透過宣揚福音真理，並通過其教義及其信友所立的榜樣，它在國家內及國際間能在愛德及正義方面作出貢獻，故教會尊重並促進國民的政治自由和政治責任。³ 教會亦肯定信友應意識到自己對國家所負有的特殊使命。他們應以身作則，表現對社會的責任感和大眾公益的服務精神。而且，國民的政治及公民教育尤其重要，特別是為青年，務使每位公民能在政治生活中負起自己份內的責任。⁴

在香港，天主教會在六、七十年代亦積極投入各種職務和服務，例如教育、社會服務、社會正義職務等。隨著九七主權移交，

¹ 梵蒂岡第二次大公會議，《教會在現代世界牧職憲章》，第 40 號。

² 同上，第 21 號。

³ 同上，第 76 號。

⁴ 同上，第 75 號。

教會亦就香港的政治社會發展表達關注，以求達至大眾公益和正義和平的目標。

近年，中港矛盾加劇。隨著愈來愈多人感到北京政府介入香港本地事務和「一國兩制」受破壞，中港兩地的緊張氣氛不斷上升。香港人和北京政府對國民身份和愛國有著不同的理解。香港人常被視為太西化，缺乏愛國感，又被指為文化「混雜」、「處於夾縫中」，⁵ 與中央政府有著矛盾的關係。因此，不管對內地人士或北京政府，不少示威抗議行動繼而產生，二零一二的反國民教育運動及二零一四年的雨傘運動更是抗議行動的高峰。

面對以上處境，進一步探討教會與社會、基督徒與作為教會成員和香港公民以至中國公民等身份之間的關係有其重要性。本期期刊的主題是「個人、社群、教會和國家」，作者從不同角度就此作探討和反省。作者當中，有些探討香港人作為本地和中國人的身份認同問題、公民和公民教育的意思，以及抗爭行動背後的意義等。此外，由於探求天主教會在這些討論的角色有其迫切性，因此，一些作者從天主教的社會思想傳統中尋找靈感，希望對以上的討論作出疏理和貢獻，並期望能為達至大眾公益的理想找到方向。一些作者亦探討這些討論對天主教學校的意義，因為天主教學校對培養學生的價值觀和態度扮演著重要角色。

在首篇文章〈西學東漸、絲綢之路、與國民教育〉，馬樹人從歷史和較宏觀的角度就著香港人的身份和國民教育作反省。根據幾個歷史中東、西方相遇的重要轉捩點，包括於公元前一世紀左右西方文化沿著絲綢之路傳入中國、十六世紀利瑪竇等傳教士來華傳教帶來西方文化，以至近年藉敦煌故事和絲綢之路的復興宣揚愛國精神和香港在當中的角色等，作者勾畫出一個數世紀長的大故事。作者提出，把這個故事說得越長越遠，香港便越像被

⁵ 筆者借用文化學者 Homi Bhabha 的後殖民概念形容香港的處境。參閱 Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 107-110.

淹沒在一條它掌握不了的歷史長河里。而當這個巨大的故事成為國民教育一部份，它將給香港的身份認同帶來重大挑戰。

另外，兩篇文章探討公民概念和國民教育與天主教社會訓導的關係。在〈公教社會訓導與香港的國民教育〉一文中，陸鴻基介紹了幾個他認為對公民教育的討論很重要的社會訓導主要命題。作者澄清了「國家」這個詞語的多重意義，對國民身份、公民身份和國民教育的理解，以及指出了天主教社會訓導如何與國民教育結連。作者認為社會訓導的主題如重視人的尊嚴、優先幫助貧苦的人、為自己的權利發聲、保護生態環境等等，是上好的公民教育議程和素材，可以幫助培養「公民」而非「順民」，也可以培養雙向歸屬感，即中國人和香港人，但不是「中國國民」。作者亦主張，社會訓導宜配合時事，深入討論公民教育課題。討論過程中，學生對社會的認識和參與自然增長，亦可澄清自己的公義理念，這樣可以培養學生的獨立思考和判斷能力。

另一篇有關天主教社會訓導的文章〈從香港教會的社會訓導中看公民身份與實踐原則〉，馮菀菁探討了基督宗教信仰在香港社會中的脈絡，特別是社會訓導中有關公民身份與實踐的信仰向度的內涵。透過分析香港教會的社會訓導文件，作者指出在普世教會中所能體現的公民實踐原則，在本地教會同樣能展現出來。作者發現，在香港教會的社會訓導中，存在著本地身份及社會處境或文化狀況等元素。而且，在一家一體的關係上展現「先知」與「僕人」的角色。作者認為，這些思想使人類社會能更明白宗教信仰可給予社會問題的思考及可能的答案，亦可以主動回應社會上不公義或有違信仰精神的事情，以信仰精神注入社會各關係。她強調教會及其信徒是團結共融的標記，這身份表明了基督信徒在社會上的影響，在於連結各種關係，以天主教訓導的精神，活現在社會生活當中。作者亦指出，社會訓導應與天主教學校的宗教及道德教育課程連結起來。課程不應只涉及民生及社會的議題，而忽略了政治方面的議題，以及應關注如何在社會中充當基督宗教信仰中的先知角色。

接著的三篇文章分別從哲學、法律和社會學角度探討公民和身份認同問題，以及對香港的啟迪。採用盧梭的理論，林榮鈞在〈公民教育中的國際公民和愛國公民之間的不能化解的張力——盧梭的角度〉一文中分析了「國際公民」和「愛國公民」的內涵。作者指出，根據盧梭，國際公民建基於普世價值如正義、人權和民主；而愛國公民則建基於對個別國家和文化的情感。作者認為，雖然盧梭並沒有解決兩種公民概念放在同一課程內的理論衝突，但盧梭以自由為政治、倫理和教育的目標，以此發展出來的國際公民和愛國公民教育，同時包含理性和情感元素，這對香港國民教育的發展尤具啟發性。此外，借鏡盧梭的理論，作者認為，國民教育不必局限在課程內。在社會公共生活中可以培養公民的一體感和榮譽感，同時配合法治和民主體制，讓公民體驗平等和自由，從而產生愛國情感，這樣對培養愛國感更有效。不過，大前提是國家必須尊重其國民。

吳達明在〈香港人身份的法律基礎〉一文中，從法律角度探討香港人身份，從而幫助我們確認在一國兩制的獨特憲制和歷史處境下，香港人身份在法律和政治方面的多元和複雜性。他指出以法律身份為基礎的「香港人」論述，指出所有香港人都享有憲制賦予的共同權利和自由，這是較具包容性和以權利為本的論述，同時需要一種平等地尊重和關懷每一個人的公共倫理觀予以配合。這種理解對香港天主教會計劃社會牧職上有一定重要性，因為教會作為人性尊嚴的護衛者，以及肩負起先知、教師和僕人角色，是社會的道德力量。

採用社會學角度，朱偉志在〈佔領運動的價值衝突對基督徒帶來的衝擊和挑戰〉一文中，分析了佔領運動後的社會運動中的分歧及其價值衝突，並探討這發展對本地基督信仰，特別是天主教徒的社會參與所帶來的反思和出路。作者分析了回歸後的中、港兩地之政經轉化對人心產生的微妙變化，這使中港關係的緊繃狀況不斷累積；到了佔領運動期間及之後出現的各種政治和社會運動，包括溫和泛民主派與本土基進派之間的衝突，更反映了社

會上對抗爭模式的多元看法。當親建制派認為香港人必須面對現實之時，基進派則認為香港必須把舊抗爭模式作重大轉變。作者認為官方對社會氛圍的主流論述，與民間的理解存在巨大鴻溝，這或會使教會的參與變得被動。然而，掌握新形勢對參與社會運動的天主教徒來說有其價值，除了有助消除其無力感之外，亦提醒參與者一種新角度的自省是不能或缺的。

最後一篇文章的作者黎恩灝，以巴西和南韓的天主教會的經驗為例探討教會、民間社會與政治的關係。在〈建立地上的天國：天主教會與巴西和南韓的深化民主〉一文中，作者討論天主教會在公民社會的發展，特別是加深民主化方面的角色。他指出，作為公民社會的一份子，巴西和南韓的天主教會對深化民主作出貢獻，這是透過有關社會政治參與的教義、動員的資源，以及在國際和本地層面運用政治上的機會的策略。天主教會亦與本地民間和宗教組織合作和組成聯盟，以便在社會政治參與上取得更大影響力。他認為全國性和本地教會之間的關係、宗教之間的關係，以及政府、商界和宗教之間的關係這三個元素起著決定性作用。

阮美賢

Editor's Word

The Catholic Church has a new understanding of the relationship between the Church and the world since the 1960s, explicitly seen in the Second Vatican Council (1962-65). Since then, the Church does not merely focus on the salvation of an individual person, but also emphasizes the close relationship between the Church and the world. The understanding towards the dignity of the human person, the human community and the profound meaning of human activity are the foundations for this relationship. In a Vatican II document *Gaudium et Spes*, it is stated that the Church serves as “a leaven and as a kind of soul for human society as it is to be renewed in Christ and transformed into God’s family.”¹ The Church emphasizes that the faith needs to prove its fruitfulness by penetrating the believer’s entire life, including its worldly dimension, and by activating the faithful towards justice and love, especially in regards to the needy.²

This new understanding of the relationship between the Church and the world also carries implication to the Church’s understanding of the relationship between the Church and political communities or the State. Although the Church recognizes that the Church and the political community in their own fields are autonomous and independent from each other, the Church affirms that it can contribute toward the reign of justice and charity within the borders of a nation and between nations, especially through its social teachings and

¹ The Second Vatican Council, *Gaudium et Spes* (the Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World), no. 40.

² *Ibid.*, no.21.

Christians' witnesses. Thus, the Church respects and fosters the political freedom and responsibility of citizens.³ The Church also affirms that all Christians must be aware of their own specific vocation within the political community. It is for them to give an example by their sense of responsibility and their service of the common good.⁴ Moreover, great care must be taken about civic and political formation, especially for youth, so that all citizens can play their part in the life of the political community.

In the context of Hong Kong, the Catholic Church has been engaged in the development of the society since the 1960s or 70s, through various kinds of ministry, including education, social services, and social justice ministry. With the changeover of sovereignty in 1997, the Church has expressed its concern about the political and social development of the Hong Kong society, with the goal of upholding justice and peace and achieving common good.

In recent years, conflicts between China and Hong Kong have enhanced. Tension between China and Hong Kong has been escalating because many people are suspicious of the intervention of the Beijing government in the local affairs of Hong Kong, thinking that the “high autonomous rule” and “One Country, Two System” policy has vanished. There are different understandings of the notions of national identity and patriotism between Hong Kong people and the Beijing government. Hong Kong has been considered as too western and lacking a sense of patriotism. It is often characterized by hybridity, in-betweenness and has an ambivalent relationship with its sovereign power.⁵ This results in resistance or protest actions again

³ Ibid., no.76.

⁴ Ibid., no. 75.

⁵ I borrowed the postcolonial concepts from cultural critic Homi Bhabha to describe the situation of Hong Kong. See Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 107-110.

mainlanders and the Beijing government, as well as large scale protests on the issue of national education in 2012 and the Umbrella Movement in 2014.

In the face of this situation, it is important to further explore the relationships between the Church and the society, individual Christians as church members and citizens in Hong Kong as well as nationals of China, and the Church and the state.

The authors in this issue reflect on the theme of the relationship among the individual, community, Church and State from various perspectives. They explore the topics of local identity as Hongkonger and national identity, the meanings of citizenship and civic education, and the underlying values behind the resistant actions. Moreover, since it is imperative to examine the role of the Catholic Church in this situation. Some authors in this issue examine the resources in Catholicism that can be retrieved to engage in the discussion on citizenship and national education, and how it contributes in pursuing the common good. They also discuss the implications of this discussion on Catholic schools in Hong Kong that play a prominent role in education and nurturing students' values.

In the first article “Dissemination of Western Knowledge to the East, Silk Road, and National Education,” MA Shu-Yun offers a reflection on Hong Kong's identity and national education from a historical point of view and a wide perspective. Tracing several important turning points in the history of East meets West, including the cultural exchange through the Silk Road in the first century B.C., the arrival of Catholic missionaries in China in the sixteenth century, and the contemporary employment of the story of Dunhuang for promoting patriotism and the role of Hong Kong in it, Ma tries to map out a several-centuries-long mega history. The author suggests that the longer and farther this story is, the more likely Hong Kong

would seem to be drowned in an unmanageably long stream of history. When this mega history is made part of national education, it will bring grave challenges to Hong Kong's identity.

Two articles in this issue examine the concepts of citizenship and national education, and their relationship with Catholic social teachings. In his article “Catholic Social Teachings and National Education in Hong Kong,” LUK Hung Kay highlights some key themes in the papal social teachings in which he thinks are important in discussing topics of civic education. He also clarifies the concepts of the State, national identity, citizenship and national education, and discusses how Catholic social teachings are related to national education. Luk claims that Catholic Social Teachings are excellent resources for civic education as it deals with themes such as human dignity, option for the poor, striving for human rights, environmental protection, and so on. It can help to nurture “citizens” rather than “obedient people.” It can also help to develop double loyalties, both as Chinese, not China’s nationals, and a Hongkonger. Luk suggests that civic education should be based on current affairs. During the process of discussion, students’ knowledge and sense of participation can be enhanced. Students can also clarify their own understanding of justice. This in turn can train their independent thinking and ability of making judgment.

In another article related to Catholic social teachings, namely “Citizenship and its Practice in Social Teaching of the Hong Kong Catholic Church,” FUNG Yuen Ching explores the relationship between Christianity and the Hong Kong society in general, and the religious dimension in the concept of citizenship in the social teaching in particular. Through conducting a textual analysis of the social teaching of the Hong Kong Church, Fung affirms the continuity of the papal social teaching and the teachings of the Hong

Kong local Church, especially the interrelated relationship between human persons, all belong to one family. In the Hong Kong church, Fung finds out that elements such as local identity and social or cultural contexts can be seen in the social teachings. Moreover, the roles of prophet and servant are emphasized at the same time. These social thoughts can shed light on the discussion of social issues in human society and respond to unjust issues which violate the spirit of Catholic social teachings. She emphasizes that the Catholic Church and the believers are sign of communion and solidarity, thus, they can play the role of networking and linking up various parties. Fung argues that the themes of Catholic social teaching should be integrated to the religious and moral education in the Catholic schools. It should not only focus on issues relating to the livelihood of people, but also the political and structural problems, as well as the prophetic role in the society.

Three articles examine the concepts of citizenship and identity from philosophical, legal and sociological perspectives respectively. Employing the ideas of Jean Jacques Rousseau, Anselm LAM Wing Kwan discusses the notions of cosmopolitan citizenship and patriotic citizenship in his article “An Irresolvable Tension between Cosmopolitan Citizenship and Patriotic Citizenship in Civic Education—A Rousseauian Perspective.” Lam points out that the foundational principles of cosmopolitan citizenship approach are based on the universal values like justice, human rights and democracy whereas the patriotic approach instead is based on the sentiment to a particular country and culture. Lam highlights that Rousseau’s education of patriotic citizen and cosmopolitan citizen involves both rationality and sentiment. Freedom is their common goal, even though their paths to freedom are different. The development of a democratic and legal system and the formation of patriotic affection in social life and culture are two hands of the

Legislator and he can establish a society in which citizens are free. This insight can shed light on the discussion of civic and national education in Hong Kong. Thus, the formation of patriotism can be beyond curriculum and the development of democratic system can be the next step to freedom in Hong Kong.

In his article “The Legal Foundation of Hongkonger Identity,” Simon T.M. NG investigates the Hongkonger identity from a legal perspective. This understanding can help us recognize the unique constitutional and historical context of “one country two systems” and the diversity and complexity of the legal and political aspects of the Hongkonger identity. Ng argues that the legal definition of “Hongkongers” is inclusive and rights based, and all Hongkongers share constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedom in common. This embracive legal identity also calls for a public morality requiring equal respect and concern for everyone. This can bring implications to the Catholic Church, which claims itself a defender of human dignity and bearing the roles of prophet, teacher and servant, in planning its social ministry.

Besides, employing a sociological lens, CHU Wai Chi analyzes the various fractions of social activities and their values in the social movements of Hong Kong after the Occupy Movement or Umbrella Movement. He argues that there is a gap between the conventional discourse on the social ethos of Hong Kong against the complicated Hong Kong identity. This varies from the nativist or local group; the leftists who emphasize values of human rights, democracy and employ strategies of peaceful, rational, non-violence, and non-offensive way; the mild democratic group; to the rightist pro-establishment camp. Without offering a concrete answer to the existing situation, Chu proposes some reflections to the Catholic social activists who follow the Catholic Social Teaching based on the

changing social context, and how to rethink their possible role in the future.

Based on the experiences of two Catholic local churches, Brazil and South Korea, LAI Yan Ho, in the last article of this issue, discusses the role of the Catholic Church in the development of civil society, particularly in deepening democracy. In the article “Building Heavenly Kingdom on Earth: The Roman Catholic Church and Deepening Democracy in Brazil and South Korea,” Lai argues that the Catholic churches in Brazil and South Korea as a member of civil society, contribute to deepening democracy by their own doctrine, which frames the justification of their social and political involvement, their resources for mobilizations, and their strategies that utilise political opportunities at both the national and local level. They also cooperate and build coalitions with many local non-governmental organizations and even religious organizations for a greater influence in their social and political engagements. By comparing the behaviours of the Catholic Church in South Korea and Brazil, the author highlights that, apart from the strategies and size of the faithful, three modes of dynamics are essential to continue the field of study, that is, the relationship between the national and local levels of the Catholic Church, the inter-religious relationships and the relationship between state, business and religion.

Mary Yuen

個人、社群、教會和國家

西學東漸、絲綢之路、與國民教育

馬樹人

[摘要] 1582 年，意大利傳教士利瑪竇抵達澳門，把歐洲的宗教、天文、地理等知識，傳入中國，而他後來被稱為「西學東漸第一人」。但是，根據敦煌學的考據，遠於公元前一世紀左右，西方文化已沿著絲綢之路，傳入中國。那為甚麼要待一千六百多年後的利瑪竇等傳教士來華，才被稱作「西學東漸」之始？本文認為，這是因為當時絲綢之路已被歷史遺忘。今天，陸上絲綢之路正和海上絲綢之路一起被重新賦予歷史任務，而香港也被納入其中。本文將嘗試按著與這相關的幾點歷史時空轉捩點，勾畫出一個數世紀長的大故事。我們會發現，把這個故事說得越長越遠，香港便越像被淹沒在一條它掌握不了的歷史長河里。而當這個巨大的故事成為國民教育一部份，它將給香港的身份認同，帶來極大挑戰。

引言

1582 年，意大利耶穌會傳教士利瑪竇，隨葡萄牙商船抵達澳門，把歐洲的宗教、天文、地理、數學等知識，傳入中國。時為明朝神宗年間，比清朝的洋務運動早二百多年，而利瑪竇也就

被稱為「西學東漸第一人」，¹揭開了「西學東漸之序章」，²乃「中西思想文化交流第一人」。³

但是，根據敦煌學的考據，遠於公元前一世紀左右，西方文化已沿著橫跨歐亞大陸的絲綢之路，傳入中國。⁴那為甚麼要待一千六百多年後的利瑪竇等傳教士來華，才被稱作「西學東漸」之始？本文認為，這是因為當時絲綢之路已被歷史遺忘。今天，陸上絲綢之路正和海上絲綢之路一起被重新賦予歷史任務，而香港也被納入其中。以下，我們將嘗試按著與這相關的幾點歷史時空轉捩點，勾畫出一個數世紀長的大故事。我們會發現，把這個故事說得越長越遠，香港便越像被淹沒在一條它掌握不了的歷史長河里。而當這個巨大的故事成為國民教育一部份，它將給香港的身份認同，帶來極大挑戰。

從「西學東漸」到八國聯軍

讓我們把故事從公元十三世紀末開始說起吧。那時，中國已經歷唐、宋兩代，海路興起，逐漸取代絲綢之路在中國對外交通的作用。⁵到了十六世紀中，明朝政府封閉嘉峪關，邊塞居民內遷，敦煌因而被荒棄。⁶差不多與此同時，在日趨繁盛的海路上，迎來了西洋傳教士利瑪竇。這時的中國，正處於甚麼改革都會被傳統勢力消解為「毫無意義」（no significance）的明神宗萬曆年代。⁷相反地，歐洲這時已進入了科學革命時代，科學知識湧現，

¹ 李韋玲，《西學東漸第一人：利瑪竇在中國》（香港：天地圖書，2010）。

² 黃正謙，《西學東漸之序章：明末清初耶穌會史新論》（香港：中華書局，2010）。

³ 劉明強，《西學東漸在肇慶》（廣州：暨南大學出版社，2014），頁 1。

⁴ 陳萬雄，〈敦煌的時空〉，敦煌研究院主編，《敦煌石窟全集一》（香港：商務印書館，2005），頁 24。

⁵ 張倩儀，〈由無知覺到迷上了：敦煌的魅力與啟悟〉，李美賢、紀文鳳編，《立體看敦煌》（香港：商務印書館，2014），頁 176-190。

⁶ 樊錦詩，〈前言：敦煌石窟的百年傳奇〉，敦煌研究院主編，《敦煌石窟全集一》（香港：商務印書館，2005），頁 5。

⁷ Ray Huang, *1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline*, (New

而利瑪竇所屬的耶穌會，正是強調傳教士除了要接受傳統神學訓練外，還需具備一定的自然科學知識⁸。利瑪竇後來之得以晉身大內宮殿，其中一個關鍵，正好是他給神宗獻上自鳴鐘，並懂得修理這個皇上心儀的西洋報時儀器⁹。那就是說，所謂利瑪竇是「西學東漸第一人」的說法，是把「西學」縮窄為沿著海路而來的歐洲宗教和科技文化。至於在歐洲還沒經歷科學革命前，從絲綢之路經敦煌傳入中國的外來文化，則不被算入這「西學」之中。

無論如何，利瑪竇確是開啟了從海路而來的「西學東漸」。那時候，西方傳教士背後的教會組織，在中國並沒有甚麼政治或軍事力量。因此，利瑪竇在華傳播歐洲的科技及宗教時，總是小心翼翼，並需要考慮中國人所能接受的程度。例如他在中國繪制世界地圖時，使用的是歐洲技術，但他卻把歐洲從地圖的中央移到左邊，而把中國放在中央。他這樣做，既讓中國人了解到神州只是世界的一部份而非全部，但也避免冒犯天朝自認是世界中心的權威。¹⁰此外，每當天主教義與崇拜儀式與中國的傳統習俗有衝突時，他大多採取忍讓及妥協的態度，甚至容許華人天主教徒敬孔祭祖，令在華的天主教看來有點不倫不類。這便引來長達近一世紀的「禮儀之爭」，結果教廷於 1704 年禁止利瑪竇那種與中國傳統習俗相調和的傳教方式。而這時正處於康熙、雍正盛世年代的清朝政府，亦以強硬態度回應，全面禁止洋人在華傳教¹¹。那就是說，自始至終，直至十八世紀初之前的「西學東漸」，並沒有觸動中國的權威。

然而，在隨後的一百多年里，中國及西方的國力發生了巨大的此消彼長。到十九世紀中，西方傳教士已不再需要如利瑪竇那般謙恭有禮地來進行「西學東漸」，而是藉著船堅炮利，把中

Haven: The Yale University Press, 1981).

⁸ 黃正謙，《西學東漸之序章：明末清初耶穌會史新論》，頁 80-81。

⁹ 李韡玲，《西學東漸第一人：利瑪竇在中國》，164-191；張錯，《東西文化比較研究：利瑪竇入華及其他》（香港：香港城市大學出版社，2002），頁 11-12。

¹⁰ 菲利浦·米尼尼，《利瑪竇-鳳凰閣》（王蘇娜譯）（鄭州：大眾出版社，2012），頁 112。

¹¹ 李韡玲，《西學東漸第一人：利瑪竇在中國》，頁 194-197。

國人眼中屬奇風異俗的西洋宗教，強行引入中國。結果，宗教、文化差異演變為暴力衝突。到了 1900 年，外國傳教士更在義和團運動中受到襲擊，最終以八國聯軍入京鎮壓告終。

而也就在這世紀之交的一年，西方探險家在中國西北萬里黃沙中，進入了莫高窟藏經洞。而我們的故事，也就要轉到這時已久被遺忘的敦煌了。

從敦煌文物流失到取得香港主權

1900 年，一名居於敦煌石窟附近的道士，無意中發現了內藏大量古代經卷、典籍等文書的藏經洞。當時的清朝政府，正處內外交困、風雨飄搖之際，無心亦無力去處理那些尚待考證的邊塞文物。另一方面，來自英、俄、德、法、日等國的探險家，一個接一個地把藏經洞的文物運到外國，導致大量國寶散失海外。對中國來說，這與晚清連串的割地賠款，同屬難以承受的國恥。¹²

踏入民國時期，中國仍處外憂內患，列強繼續以不同方式，企圖運走敦煌文物。但是，辛亥革命及五四運動後，經歷了「民族覺醒」而又受過西學洗禮的中國知識份子，逐漸學懂起而抵抗外國在華的文物掠奪。到了二十世紀四十年代，他們更組織隊伍，前赴敦煌，自行發掘、保護及研究藏於那里的國寶。1944 年，抗日戰爭正酣，民國政府只能以極為有限的資源，在莫高窟一座破廟中，成立了敦煌藝術研究所。1949 年，中共立國，新政權隨即接管敦煌文物。¹³

不久，反右運動及文化大革命爆發，敦煌研究成為學術禁區。和當時中國大部份知識份子一樣，敦煌文物的研究人員都被

¹² 劉詩平、孟憲實，《敦煌百年》（廣州：廣東教育出版社，2000），頁 6-101。

¹³ 劉詩平、孟憲實，《敦煌百年》，頁 216-276。

列作「反革命份子」而遭受批鬥。至於莫高窟內的文物，在國務院保護下，得以保存。¹⁴

直至二十世紀八十年代初，中國進入改革開放年代，敦煌研究逐漸恢復。老一輩敦煌學者在沉寂二十多年後相繼復出，新一代接棒者迅速冒起，國內敦煌學趨於蓬勃。1997年11月，一批中國專家學者，在北京大學召開會議，討論有關敦煌文物從海外回歸中國的問題。¹⁵而就在這之前數個月，中國政府剛從英國手上，取得管治香港的主權。巧合的是，在上世紀初首批從藏經洞流散海外的敦煌文物，被運往的正好就是英國。這既是歷史的偶然，卻好像也說明了政治與文化之間一種必然的關係。而我們的故事，到這裡也就要轉到上世紀八十年代，中英就香港前途展開談判那時刻了。

從「北進想像」到「北學南漸」

1982年，英國首相戴卓爾夫人訪華，試圖按英國與清朝政府所簽訂的一系列條約，延續英國對香港的管治，但遭鄧小平拒絕。此後經過兩年多談判，英國最終同意於1997年，把香港的主權交給中國。

儘管這大局已定，但在香港主權正式被移交中國前的過渡期間，中國還正在向全世界學習富國強兵的經驗，而香港則仍處於作為亞洲四小龍之一的黃金時期。在這格局下，香港出現了一股所謂「北進想像」，認為憑著它在政治制度、經濟實力、文化水平等各方面的優勢，香港將會向中國輸出其成功故事。¹⁶那就是說，儘管主權北移，但港人期待著的，卻是「南學北漸」。

然而，2003年圍繞著基本法二十三條立法的爭議，令香港人感到「北進」只是曇花一現的「想像」，事實則是來自北京的

¹⁴ 劉詩平、孟憲實，《敦煌百年》，頁296-307。

¹⁵ 劉詩平、孟憲實，《敦煌百年》，頁339-358。

¹⁶ 陳清僑編，《文化想像與意識形態》（香港：牛津大學出版社，1997）。

政治權力，正開始衝擊香港多年建立起來的成功基石。2004年，約三百名專業人士，聯署《維護香港核心價值宣言》，聲稱香港的成功經驗，是體現在一些核心價值上，「它們包括：自由民主、人權法治、公平公義、和平仁愛、誠信透明、多元包容、尊重個人、恪守專業」。¹⁷

從「北進想像」到核心價值宣言，標致著香港與中國的關係已從「進」轉為「守」了，而這過程的背境，是中國的國勢正急促冒升。對中國領導人來說，經過二十多年的改革開放，中國已進入了「大國崛起」的「復興之路」。這種躊躇滿志的心態，盡顯在2007年兩套以此為名的官方電視紀錄片中。就在那一年，當時的中共總書記胡錦濤訪港，表示香港也需像國內一樣，推行「國民教育」。所謂「國民教育」，在國際間並不多見，¹⁸更沒有統一的定義。香港政府在籌劃國民教育時，則把其定義為「一種圍繞國家及建立國家觀念的教育。透過國民教育，使每一個國民成為能遵守國家法律、能照顧國家利益、能擔負國家命運的人。」¹⁹這種以國家為中心的集體主義，與強調普世及個人（而沒有國家）意義的香港核心價值，可謂南轅北轍。2012年，香港特區政府公佈「德育及國民教育科課程指引」，被批評是推行愛國洗腦教育。在強大的社會反對聲中，整份指引被擱置，香港好像守著了一條防線。²⁰但就在這不久之後，一個帶著比「大國崛起」、「復興之路」更雄心萬丈，以同時打造現代海、陸絲路為

¹⁷ 《蘋果日報》，2004年6月7日。

¹⁸ 國際間較常見的，是強調以客觀、持平態度，及民主視野來處理國家管治問題的「公民教育」(civic education)，而非以國家利益為中心的「國民教育」(national education)。見 Ngai, S. K., Leung, Y. W. and Yuen, W.W., "The Turmoil of Implementing National Education in Hong Kong: An Overview and Analysis," *Social Educator* (2014, vol 32, issue 1): 5-15

¹⁹ 策略發展委員會國民教育專題小組，〈香港推行國民教育的現況、挑戰與前瞻〉，2008，附件乙，頁1。

²⁰ 莊環珉，〈從公民教育到國民教育的爭議〉，Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, *Occasional Paper* 227 (December 2013)。

己任的中國領導人，在北京登上了權力高峰。而我們的故事，也就此要進入另一篇章了。

從「復興之路」到「一帶一路」

上述的中國領導人，便是於 2012 年 11 月接任中共總書記的習近平。剛上任，習便到國家博物館參觀「復興之路」展覽，並提出要「實現中華民族偉大復興的中國夢」。次年 9 月，他更把這個夢的內容，從中國境內擴展到一個橫跨亞、非、歐三洲的「一帶一路」構思中。²¹

所謂「一帶一路」，其中的「一帶」是指由中國內陸出發，經中亞、中東、東南歐而抵達西歐的「絲綢之路經濟帶」。而「一路」則是從中國沿海出發，經東南亞、南亞、北非、中東而抵達南歐的「21 世紀海上絲綢之路」。中國表示，它將主動拓展與「一帶一路」沿線各個國家的經濟合作，並牽頭興建基礎設施。整個藍圖，共覆蓋 26 個國家，約佔全球人口 63%、全球經濟規模 30%。這個超級龐大區域體系，內藏各國的政治、經濟、外交、軍事等利益計算。但對中國來說，卻有特殊重大的意義，因為它提供了一個宏偉的歷史文化框架，來承載「大國崛起」、「民族復興」這中國夢。按照規劃，整個「一帶一路」工程將於 2049 年完成，那將正好是中共建國 100 周年。²²

在「絲綢之路經濟帶」這宏圖下，敦煌又被賦予了新的任務。就在「一帶一路」計劃提出後不久，甘肅酒泉市即宣佈「正在將敦煌打造成絲綢之路經濟帶上的國際文化旅遊名城」。²³一名政協委員則說，敦煌是重振絲綢之路的「一張王牌，無論是舞

²¹ 《香港商報》，2013 年 9 月 26 日及 2015 年 1 月 18 日。

²² 《明報》，2014 年 12 月 23 日。

²³ 《大公報》，2013 年 11 月 25 日。

劇、歌劇，還是話劇、電影，都有很多故事可寫，而故事往往是最打動人的，可作為更好的載體在中亞國家傳播」。²⁴

這名政協委員，是香港演員彭丹。她在娛樂圈外的發言，可能不會被香港人留意，而她所說的把敦煌故事「在中亞國家傳播」，對香港也好像沒有直接意義。但事實也並非完全如此。就在 2014 年 11 月至 2015 年 3 月，一批敦煌文物在港展出，展覽的主題是「敦煌—說不完的故事」。正如彭丹所言，「故事往往是最打動人的」。而只有動人的故事，才能使國民教育生效。

事實上，在中共剛剛建國還不夠一年，敦煌故事已被用作「國民教育」之用了。1950 年 9 月，北京急電敦煌，說「經中央研究決定，配合抗美援朝，進行愛國主義教育，在北京舉辦一個大型敦煌文物展覽會，請速即攜帶全部敦煌壁畫摹本和重要經卷文物來京籌備為要」。²⁵未有證據顯示，2014-15 年敦煌文物來港展出，也是帶有類似的政治任務。但正如上文所述，從敦煌文物於 1900 年被列強掠奪，到香港主權於 1997 年移交中國，正好是一個關於中國從百年屈辱中，重拾尊嚴的民族復興故事。而正因為這敦煌故事有其令人動容之處，它可說是國民教育的「一張王牌」。

那就是說，「一帶」的敦煌效應，可令中國有更大的「軟實力」，來對香港進行「北學南漸」。另一方面，「一路」更可能令香港需要改寫自身的歷史，因為它給香港提出了一個重要問題：香港在被英國「開埠」前，是否只是個小漁村，還是海上絲路上的一個城市？

原來，早於 2002 年，廣州、泉州、寧波等一些中國沿海城市，已開始計劃把海上絲路申報為世界文化遺產項目。2005 年，香港政府曾表示會研究加入這計劃，此後便好像沒有了下文。但另一方面，國內一些沿海城市不但競相加入，更各自爭取成為海上絲路的起點。²⁶到「一帶一路」這宏圖出現後，中國九個沿

²⁴ 《文匯報》，2014 年 1 月 23 日。

²⁵ 劉詩平、孟憲實，《敦煌百年》，頁 208。

²⁶ 《明報》，2015 年 8 月 10 日。

海城市於 2014 年 11 月簽定協議，共同推動「海絲申遺」，而這九個城市（北海、廣州、漳州、泉州、寧波、揚州、蓬萊、福州、南京）中，並沒有香港。²⁷

然而，國內及香港一些歷史學者，均認為香港在割讓給英國時，並非是個小漁村，而是南中國一個「重要港口」。²⁸不知為何歷史如此巧合，2013 年初，就在中國提出「一帶一路」這規劃後不久，香港在沙中線鐵路興建地盤中，發現大量宋代古蹟文物，顯示「在南宋時期九龍城一帶，存在著的並非寥寥數戶的偏遠小村落，而是有繁盛經濟活動、有系統、有間格的社區模態。基於這次的發現，香港的歷史或將有重大改寫，不再是以往位於邊陲的南方未開發之地，在合理的評鑑之下，香港的歷史，更應被置於海上絲路的總平台作考量」。²⁹一時間，保護出土文物之聲，此起彼落。諷刺的是，原本以保護一些港英殖民地標（天星、皇后碼頭）為開始的本地保育運動，就此可能被轉化為中國海上絲路建設工程的一部份，從而為國民教育提供教材。

結語：敦煌的興衰，對香港有何啟示？

以上，我們說了一個時間上跨越數世紀、地域上牽涉東西南北的大故事。這個故事，以絲綢之路的衰落開始，以「一帶一路」構思的出現而結束。在這之間的數個世紀中，其實還有其它無數的興衰故事。中國既是這些故事的其中一個主角，也是其中一個重要的講述者。它曾經因其衰落，而失去講述這些故事的主動權；今天，隨著其國力冒升，它正整合出一個宏偉的「一帶一路」大故事。對香港來說，「一帶」給香港帶來源自敦煌「說不完的故事」，而「一路」則要香港發掘自身在海上絲路上的角色。

²⁷ 《大公報》，2002 年 1 月 14 日、2005 年 8 月 24 日、2008 年 11 月 18 日、2014 年 11 月 29 日。

²⁸ 《大公報》，2014 年 4 月 11 日；《明報》2014 年 5 月 11 日。

²⁹ 《明報》，2014 年 12 月 6 日。

兩者一北一南，為中國對香港的國民教育，提供了一套壓倒性的教材，而其效力亦相信會與日俱增。如此形勢下，香港能如何自處？

一個城市，也許就如世間萬物一樣，興有時、衰有時，沒甚麼大不了。既然敦煌也曾如此，那麼它對香港有何啟示？一名香港文化工作者，在回想曾編輯一套敦煌圖冊時這樣寫道：「繁榮了一千年的敦煌留下世界級的文化遺產，但交通條件改變了，現在它這麼破落與荒涼。那麼將來的香港呢？如果交通改變，香港將來留下甚麼給後人呢？」³⁰

的確，在思考國民教育這問題時，香港除了關心當下的政治忠誠及身份認同外，是否還應想想，有甚麼永恆的東西，可以留給後人？

參考書目

李韡玲。《西學東漸第一人：利瑪竇在中國》。香港：天地圖書，2010。

張倩儀。〈國際大都會 – 敦煌〉，樊錦詩、陳萬雄主編，
《發現敦煌》。香港：商務印書館，2000，頁 1-6。

張倩儀。〈由無知覺到迷上了：敦煌的魅力與啟悟〉，李美賢、紀文鳳編，
《立體看敦煌》。香港：商務印書館，2014，頁 176-190。

張錯。《東西文化比較研究：利瑪竇入華及其他》。香港：香港城市大學出版社，2002。

³⁰ 張倩儀，〈由無知覺到迷上了：敦煌的魅力與啟悟〉，見李美賢、紀文鳳編，
《立體看敦煌》（香港：商務印書館），頁 189。

莊璟珉。〈從公民教育到國民教育的爭議〉，Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, *Occasional Paper 227*, December 2013。

陳清僑編。《文化想像與意識形態》。香港：牛津大學出版社，1997。

陳萬雄。〈敦煌的時空〉，敦煌研究院主編，《敦煌石窟全集一》。香港：商務印書館，2005，頁 22-25。

菲利浦·米尼尼。《利瑪竇－鳳凰閣》（王蘇娜譯）。鄭州：大眾出版社，2012。

黃正謙。《西學東漸之序章：明末清初耶穌會史新論》。香港：中華書局，2010。

策略發展委員會國民教育專題小組。《香港推行國民教育的現況、挑戰與前瞻》，附件乙，2008。

劉明強。《西學東漸在肇慶》。廣州：暨南大學出版社，2014。

劉詩平、孟憲實。《敦煌百年：一個民族的心靈歷程》。廣州：廣東教育出版社，2000。

樊錦詩。〈前言：敦煌石窟的百年傳奇〉，敦煌研究院主編，《敦煌石窟全集一》。香港：商務印書館，2005，頁 5-10。

Huang, Ray. 1981. *1587, A Year of No Significance: the Ming Dynasty in Decline*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Ngai, S. K., Y. W. Leung, and W. W. Yuen. “The Turmoil of Implementing National Education in Hong Kong: An Overview and Analysis.” *Social Educator* (2014, Vol. 32, issue 1): 5-15.

[ABSTRACT] In 1582, the Italian priest Matteo Ricci arrived in Macao, and brought to China European knowledge in religion, astronomy, and geography. Subsequently he was called “The first person to disseminate Western Knowledge to the East”. However, according to Dunhuang studies, as early as around the 1st century B.C., there were disseminations of Western culture to China through the Silk Road. Then why was the arrival of priests like Matteo Ricci to China over 1,600 years later called the beginning of “dissemination of Western Knowledge to the East”? This article will argue that, this is because by that time the Silk Road had already been forgotten by history. Today, the land Silk Road and the maritime Silk Road together are given a new historic mission, and Hong Kong is being absorbed into it. Based on some related historical time-space junctures, this article will attempt to map out a several-centuries-long mega history. We will find that the longer and farther this story is, the more likely Hong Kong would seem to be drowned in an unmanageably long stream of history. When this mega history is made part of national education, it will bring grave challenges to Hong Kong's identity.

公教社會訓導與香港的國民教育

陸鴻基

[摘要] 本文旨在探討香港的公民教育與公教（天主教）社會訓導的關係。全文分為三部份，首先介紹公教社會訓導的主要命題；繼而分析「國民教育」的問題；最後歸納出香港公民教育的取向。第一，社會訓導的主題，如人的尊嚴、人的合群性、優先幫助貧苦的人、發聲的權利、人性的多方面整合，與及保護生態環境等觀念，都是上好的公民教育素材。第二，在香港，2012年推出的「德育及國民教育」科的根本問題是「國家」一詞的含混。多重詞義的「國」和「國家的混用，名為培育學生愛護河山居民，實則掩飾包裝著對統治機器的絕對擁護。百多年港英殖民地教育及香港人對香港本土的感情和歸屬感，形成香港人的「雙重認同」，即既是不折不扣的「中國人」，也是不折不扣的「香港人」；兩者並存。最後，本文指出公民教育必須讓青少年學習成為「公民」。「公民」跟「順民」在態度上不同；後者逆來順受，前者卻堅持用盡合情合理的和平手段，據理力爭。公教社會訓導既提供社會公義的準則，讓青少年養成「雙向歸屬感」提供實踐門徑，因此，適合用作公民教育的素材。設計課程，不能以灌輸教條的方式進行；而是要培養每個人的獨立思考和判斷能力。

本文旨在探討香港的公民教育該以甚麼為重心。以下先介紹「公教社會訓導」；繼而分析「國民教育」的若干問題；最後歸納出香港公民教育的取向。

一． 公教社會訓導：從 1891 年《新事物》通諭到 2015 年《願祢受讚頌：照料共同家園》通諭

十九世紀歐洲各地紛紛經歷了工業革命。生產方式改變了；人們謀生的途徑和工作的安排也隨著起了不少變化；接著，家庭生活和社會生活的許多層面，也不由得蛻變了。從前農業社會的好些觀念和習慣，跟工業社會的情況，往往顯得不咬弦。例如，農業社會最重要的財富是土地，最富裕、最有權勢的人是大地主；可是在工業社會，最重要的財富是金錢，最富裕、最有權勢的是擁有大量金錢，善於投資賺錢的資本家。社會從農業經濟轉向工業經濟，大批農戶被逼離開農村，遷徙到城鎮謀生，成為工廠工人。部份地主也轉成資本家，開設工廠。資本家要節省生產成本，以求增加利潤；盡量壓低工資是常用的手法。個別工人勢孤力薄，要反抗資本家的「剝削」，希望得到一家人足以溫飽的工資，唯有集結起來，組織工會，爭取「集體議價」。在十九世紀新興的「資本主義」國家裡，資本家操控政府，立法禁止組織工會、罷工、示威遊行等反抗資本家的行為。社會上的矛盾，日益嚴重；階級對立的張力，持續增加。各種改革運動、革命運動，乘時而起。

1891 年，教宗良第十三世 (Leo XIII) 頒發《新事物 (Rerum Novarum)》通諭，探討工業經濟引發的許多社會問題，公教會應守的立場和要採取的方針，是為公教會公開表示關注工業經濟所引發社會問題的濫觴。¹ 此後一百二十多年來，宗座先後頒佈了多篇以工業社會的問題為主題的通諭；1960 年代的『梵蒂岡第二屆大公會議』，聚集全球主教共商公教會更新、踏進現代世界的急務，是劃時代的大事；在這方面也多所發揮；² 地方主教，也有針對當地特有的社會經濟狀況，發表相關牧函的；例如：拉丁美洲主教會議 1968 年在哥倫比亞都市美地延議決的共同宣言

¹ 文本見天主教香港教區社會傳播處網頁『社會訓導文獻-天主教香港教區』www.catholic.org.hk/v2/b5/teach/a02_1931.html

² 參閱阮美賢，「香港教會的社會參與及社會訓導」，香港天主教正義和平委員會網頁，<http://www.hkjp.org/social.php?cid=6&topic=32&id=306>.

(Medellin Declaration)，本著『梵二』的原則，強調教會應要「優先考慮貧苦人士的需要 (preferential option for the poor)」；加拿大西部亞爾伯特省產油區的教區主教路加·布薩(Luc Bouchard) 2009 年初揭示「柏油沙」(tar sands)地區石油業損害生態環境和原住民健康的牧函；³等等。教會的這些文告的內容，總稱為「公教社會訓導」，就是過去百多年歷任教會領導，綜合整理二千年來公教思想的社會、經濟和政治議題，應用到當前世界的實況，發展出來的教義。最新的公教社會訓導，是教宗方濟各 2015 年 6 月頒佈的《願祢受讚頌：照料共同家園》通諭 *Laudato Si*。⁴

既然公教社會訓導是針對當前社會、經濟和政治實況的教義，自然跟公民教育有十分密切的關係；下文將仔細討論。

綜合百多年的通諭和牧函，研究公教社會訓導的學者歸納出幾個主要命題。⁵

第一個命題是**人的尊嚴**。公教思想認為人具有靈魂，而人的靈魂是神的肖像；因而凡是人都有其尊嚴。既然人的靈魂是神的肖像，別人當然不可以隨意踐踏他。再者，凡是人都有靈魂，因此每一個人不問貧富、地位、種族、國籍、宗教或性別，都是神的肖像，因此也是平等和共通的。人的靈魂是神的肖像這個觀念，就是在基督宗教傳統裏「人權」(human rights)的基礎。世俗化的「人權」觀念的基礎也是人的尊嚴，只是少了「神的肖像」這方面的詮釋；往往只強調了法理面向的「人權」；就是說，列舉有些事情是法律不容許政府對人民做的，例如政府不可以任意把人監禁，剝奪他的人身自由。從公教的人權思想去看，「人權」的定義更為廣闊，不止於消極地限制政府濫權、更積極地維護「神的肖像」應有的尊嚴。例如：當我們目睹有人遭受老闆無情無義

³ 參閱該牧函的網上版 Luc Bouchard, "A Pastoral Letter on the Integrity of Creation" (2009.01.25)。

⁴ 該通諭英文本見

http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html

⁵ 參閱 John Coleman, SJ, and William Ryan, SJ, eds., *Globalization and Catholic Social Teaching* (Ottawa, Novalis, 2005), 頁 15-20。

的剝削，以至捱饑抵餓、尚且疲於奔命，「被驅不異犬與雞」。我們不能袖手旁觀。公教人權觀既有法律上的人身自由，更擴而充之，包含經濟及倫常生活的面向。

公教社會訓導第二個大命題是強調人的**合群性**，因為根據《聖經》的教導，神創造人，不是要人孤立、孤獨地生活，而是要人與人合群 (relational)——正如神自己是「三位一體」的。而人人都有著本身尊嚴的合群，應要本着彼此尊重的態度。合群的另一個面向，是每人應為大眾帶來利益。雖然在大眾利益之下，人也有私人利益值得尊重的；但人們生存必需的條件，才是首要的；個人舒適的次要利益，總不能凌駕於大眾生存必需的首要利益之上。同時，在大眾利益之下，人也有私人空間及自己珍重的價值觀念；人既合群，社會也還是多元化的。因此，公教社會訓導，一方面要限制資本家無涯的貪慾，但同時也反對革命家以均富為名，對人進行抄家逼害；當權者也不能在各種各式問題上壟斷思想，強求人民的思想統一、言行同一口徑，而是必須尊重每個人的良心和社會的多元。

公教社會訓導第三個大命題是強調社會上各人也有團結互助的責任，更應該優先幫助貧苦的人。在這套思想之下，並沒有假定人人應享有平等待遇，但卻認定人人都有基本的需要（物質方面和精神方面）；這些基本需要應該受到保障及得到合理的滿足。這種「**貧苦者優先**」(preferential option for the poor) 的理念和取向，並非只是社會上眾人各自的責任，也是政府的責任。就是說，倘若政府向富裕者抽取較重的稅收，用以協助社會上的貧苦者——為推動入息再分配的累進所得稅——這種造法不是不公平的。

公教社會訓導要求的不只是人人得到溫飽、有疾病時得到醫治，也要求**每個人都真正享有為自己發聲的權利**，即參與社會的權利。人有權為自己的合理權益而發聲；貧苦者並非只能被動地接受他人或政府的施捨，忍辱吃嗟來之食，他們也有權利向大眾提出自己的需要，參與改善社會，這才符合社會公義。既然如此，公教社會訓導第四個大命題是：社會上的權柄不宜過度集中，因為層級較低、地域較小的單位（例如：分區議會或分區政府）

能讓一般平民有更多和更直接發聲的機會；因此，權力應要下放到政府決策和施政的適當層級(subsidiarity)。**權力要下放**，公眾的利益才得到妥善照顧。就是說，即使公教社會訓導避免在任何具體的政治爭拗中採取偏袒立場；但其基本假設，往往是跟民主政制、公民組合、集體議價等民間結合互保的做法，不謀而合的。

歸納公教社會訓導，還有一個要點，就是**強調人性的多面整合(integral humanism)**。人性是不可被割離的；無可否認，人要吃飯，就是經濟的一員，但人同時也是家庭和社區的一員、政治的一員、文化的一員、宗教的一員。因此，當代資本家奉行的市場基要主義 (market fundamentalism)，只看見人的經濟角色，而不考慮人性其他各方面，這種「人是經濟動物」(homo economicus)的觀念，是不合理和違反「公教社會訓導」的。

綜上所述，在基督宗教傳統裏，「公教社會訓導」跟十九世紀後期以來在基督新教宗派興起的「社會福音」(Social Gospel)運動，有很多不謀而合之處。這些共通之處源於二千年歷史中基督宗教傳統的愛德觀念，也就是近年世界各地教會對「資本主義全球化」作出回應的出發點：批判「市場基要主義」鼓吹物慾和貪婪、偏重個人和私利、壓制社群和公義的意識形態，重新強調愛心、合群、互助、公義和人性的尊嚴與整合。

因此，有人宣揚現代世界祇有資本主義與共產主義對峙，是不符實情的：還有對資本主義和共產主義都進行深層批判的公教社會訓導和基督宗教傳統。

2015年6月，教宗方濟各頒佈《願祢受讚頌：照料共同家園》通諭(以下簡稱為《家園》通諭)。這裡借助梵蒂岡廣播電臺(Radio Vaticana)的新聞稿，撮述其內容：⁶

『教宗方濟各的生態思想在通諭的六個章節中逐一伸展：從今日擁有的傑出科學發現，談聆聽受造界的呼喊（第一章）；

⁶ <http://zht.radiovaticana.va/news/2015/06/18/教宗方濟各《願祢受讚頌》通諭簡介/1152287>；亦參閱 <http://zh.radiovaticana.va/news/2015/06/18/圣座召开记者会，公布及介绍教宗新通谕《愿祢受赞颂》/1152528>

以聖經和猶太教/基督信仰傳統（第二章）為依據，識別出問題的根源在於技術至上及人類過度以自我為準則（第三章）。教宗提出一個「顯然將人及社會幅度容納其內的整體生態觀」（第四章），它與環境問題密不可分。在這前景下，教宗方濟各提議在社會、經濟和政治各層面開展能制定透明決策進程的誠懇對話（第五章），並提醒世人，若不受到一種成熟及負責任的良知的激發，任何計劃都不會奏效（第六章）。教宗建議應在教育、靈修、教會、政治及神學領域增進在這方面的努力。』

保護生態環境，對抗氣候異變等工業經濟引發的當前急切問題，人們一向視作技術和經濟政策的問題。《家園》通諭引伸上文指出神創造人，不是要人孤立地生活，而是要人與人合群；進一步發揚人和天地間一切動、植、礦物都同是神所創造，而相互依存的。通諭也批判唯利是圖、「一用即棄」的心態，以促進消費、擴展經濟為一切依歸，妄顧其他人文和生態視角的資本主義價值觀。這樣《家園》通諭把保護生態環境，對抗氣候異變等議題，賦以豐富的道德和心靈意義，讓人們看見科技問題與心靈的緊密相連，而心靈問題並非囿限於抱殘守缺的教條，從而讓人也窺見自己久已遠離的心靈；也改變了世人對教會的觀感，為教會和「世俗化」知識界，搭建了橋梁，成功扭轉了世界輿論。誠然是教會近二百多年來罕見的成就。也是公教社會訓導的最新推展和引伸；其劃時代意義，比起 1891 年的《新事物》通諭，有過之、無不及。《新事物》把基督宗教「愛你的鄰人」的誠命加以引伸，特別強調資本家對工人的經濟、社會和政治權益方面應有的責任；《新事物》畢竟比較許多改革運動和革命運動，都來得較晚。《家園》通諭則更進一步，直認地球上一切生命，都同是天主所造的兄弟姐妹；人不能任意剝削別的物種以自肥。這是上溯公教中古聖人方濟各·亞西西(1181-1226)的靈修理念，在二十一世紀更強調地球上生命的共通性；在資本主義全球化的氛圍裡，可謂發人所未發，引導潮流。我們只有地球這個家園；任由工業污染破壞環境，導至諸多物種滅絕，到頭來只會傷害我們自己。不同階級、宗教、國籍的人都會受害。無疑富人能夠負擔較多保障和防護；首當其衝的是窮苦的人。但富人早晚也難倖免：

因為大家始終同坐一條船，總還是生活在同一家園。地球不單是全人類的家園，也是一切動、植、礦物的共同家園；因此，我們對眾生都應要有「民胞物與」的尊重和愛護。

以上就是公教會對當代社會急逼、重大問題的訓導；是教會內外都值得反思的。從事教育工作的公教人士尤應注意。

二．何謂國民教育？

上文討論過公教社會訓導；以下討論「國民教育」。繼而探討兩者的關連。

所謂「國民教育」，是政治教育的一種，其目標為了培育下一代成為符合「國家」要求的「國民」。至於「國家」和「國民」的含義，以下會探討。2012年，香港特區政府要在全港中、小學強制推行「德育及公民教育」必修科，引起極大爭議。

香港的「國民教育」爭議 (2012 年)

2007年6月30日，中國共產黨總書記、中華人民共和國國家主席胡錦濤訪港時，提及「國民教育」，說：「我們要重視對青少年進行國民教育，加強香港和內地青少年的交流，使香港同胞愛國愛港的光榮傳統薪火相傳。」這大概是中共中央對2003年7月1日，香港數十萬市民上街遊行，抗議特區政府施政缺失的一種回應吧。其實，1990年代，香港社會上已出現過香港公民教育，應該側重「民族認同」還是「民主參與」的論爭。而胡錦濤訪港前，親共的『香港教育工作者聯會』（『教聯會』）早已獲得教育統籌局批出資助（未經招標），成立「國民教育中心」（2004年）。

胡錦濤訪港後，2007年至2011年，特首曾蔭權連續五年在他的《施政報告》中提及「國民教育」；終於，2011年5月5日，政府推出《德育及國民教育科課程指引（小一至中六）諮詢稿》，表示擬將此科列為必修科。並且預算在2012財政年度，撥款六億元（即全港每名中、小學生，人均九百餘元）推動「國民教育」。

又資助香港浸會大學當代中國研究所編製《中國模式國情專題教學手冊》，由國民教育服務中心出版；向全香港的小學及中學分派。

該手冊講解中國政治體制；形容中國執政集團「進步、無私與團結」，其官員任用制度「是社會科學所言的理想型」。這樣的描述，跟香港傳媒報導大陸的情況，以至中共領導人在人大、政協等高層會議，多番責備內地官員貪污瀆職的批判，都背道而馳。如此偏頗的、顯然違背常識和事實的《國情教學手冊》由特區政府出資編印，派發到全港學校，難免被香港許多人指責是政治洗腦的教材。它的出現激化了香港「國民教育」的爭議。

「德育及國民教育」列為必修科，在香港社會引起了軒然大波。支持該科的親建制派稱此舉為「國際慣例」，香港人身為中國人，自然有必要加強對中國的認識；而反對的泛民主派則指《香港基本法》以永久性居民定義香港人而非「國民」，批評《課程指引》內容偏頗、注重「情感」觸動、剝奪學校自主強制推行，為「洗腦」教育；因而發起了多次抗爭活動，例如街站、聯署、遊行、集會及絕食等，要求香港政府撤回德育及國民教育科。終於，在立法會選舉（2012年9月9日）前夕，特區政府先放棄了2012年推出必修科的政策；繼而擱置該科的課程指引；但沒有撤消開辦這科目的意念，也沒有放棄開辦這科目的數億元特別款項。「德育及國民教育」科激起的爭議，相信讀者耳熟能詳，在此不贅了。⁷

以下分析該科的一些基本問題。

「國家」一辭的多重含義

「德育及國民教育」科的一個根本問題是「國家」一詞的含混。

⁷ 意念的討論，可參閱學者戚本盛，《國民教育甚麼：演變與爭議》（香港，進一步，2012年）。

學者南雁鳴在《「國家」係乜？》⁸（香港，進一步，2012年）一文指出，「國家」這個詞語，「在現代中文裡最少有三重意義，就是（1）「某個地域的河山和居民的合稱」；（2）「政權」或「統治權柄」——套用共產主義的思維，就是「統治階級的專政工具」；（3）「某個地域的人民的總稱」，即「民族」。這三重意義，在好些西方和東方語文，都有不同的用詞，可供分辨。例如，三種含義，在英文分別是“country”，“state”，和“nation”；這三個英文字，有時也互相替換使用，但需要分辨清楚時，還是有詞可用，可以輕易「避免把『河山居民』、『政權』和『民族』三者混為一談。」然而，現代中文卻決少了這樣的方便。⁹南雁鳴指出：

多重詞義的『國』和『國家』，也許是引導人們的思想和感情進入某些特定軌跡的工具。

他解釋說：

人們使用語言，自覺或不自覺地，總會受到每個詞語的意義的限制和牽引。如果一個人運用的詞語意義模稜兩可，他的思想自然也不會清楚。又如果有人故意利用含糊的詞語，試圖令受眾想不清楚他的訊息，盲從地接納，這就是『宣傳』了。¹⁰

如果說，教育的一大目的，是培養學生的獨立思考能力；那麼，讓學生養成清晰思維的習慣，更是智育的首要目標；而清晰思維是需要以明確地運用詞彙作為基礎的。

回到「國民教育」的論爭，我們自然要問：「國民」到底是具體的「河山居民」的一份子，還是抽象的「民族」的一員呢？

⁸ 南雁鳴，《「國家」係乜？》（香港，進一步，2012年）。

⁹ 南雁鳴，《「國家」係乜？》（香港，進一步，2012年），頁 7-8。

¹⁰ 南雁鳴，《「國家」係乜？》（香港，進一步，2012年），頁 8-9。

還是「專政工具」所要管治的對象呢？而「國民教育」要培養我們下一代的「國民認同」，到底是要他們認同「河山居民」，還是認同「統治機器」、「專政工具」呢？

抑或是兩者混淆，「明修棧道，暗渡陳倉」呢？

「德育及國民教育科」爭議時，曾有不少人指責該科是「洗腦」教育。可是，「洗腦」一詞，缺乏明確定義，是個繪形繪聲的譬喻，大概是有效的動員用語；但對清晰思維，卻不一定有幫助。說該科內容難以服眾、教學參考手冊往往偏頗失實。無從置疑。可是，甚麼是「洗腦」？具體地有甚麼弊端？給學生甚麼不良教育？「洗腦」一言難盡。

「洗腦」一詞，源於冷戰期間的美國。朝鮮戰爭美國戰俘獲釋返美後，部份表示同情「社會主義革命」、敵視美國的「資本主義制度」。美國右翼政客遂指稱這些美軍被俘時，受過精神虐待；他們的頭腦受過洗滌（brainwashed）、染紅了。平心而論，「洗腦」也並非共產黨的專利。凡是以「一言堂」抹殺人的獨立思考和批判能力，藉以灌輸特定思維方向，使人「失其本心」的，大概都可視作「洗腦」；不過，這個生動的譬喻詞，始終未見有嚴謹的定義。

十九、二十世紀世界，流行最廣泛、威力最猛烈的意識型態，大概是「民族主義」；以「國家至上」排拒「人類大同」。其壟斷思維，排除異見的威能，無與倫比。因此，形塑「國家認同」的教育往往具有「洗腦」成份。¹¹

但，如果說「德育及國民教育科」混淆觀念，名為培育學生愛護河山居民，實則掩飾包裝著統治機器；而又不准質疑、不容議論；一味強調情意灌輸和形塑認同。那麼，它不但是偏頗的政治教育，更是搗亂思維的反智育了。

以下姑且借用一份網上資料，分析「國家、民族」觀念混淆的弊端，從而顯示偏頗的「國民教育」的禍害。

¹¹ 參閱 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London, New York, Verso, 2006).

混淆觀念的「國民教育」例子

2008 年春，西藏爆發抗議運動；中國出兵鎮壓，藏人自焚抗議的消息不斷傳出。海外同情者不少。時值『北京奧運』前「聖火」接力傳送之時期。同情藏人抗議者，有攔途阻截「聖火」接力傳送的。遂觸發各地中文互聯網上熱傳原作是英文、譯成中文的一段文字。由於這段文字以斷行排印，彷彿詩句，網上名之為「詩」；然而字裡行間了無詩意、詩味；姑且冠以引號，稱做「詩」可也。有謂該「詩」英文原作發表於美國《華盛頓郵報》；然而遍尋不獲。該詩的原作者不詳。然而，該「詩」尚且每隔兩三年再度出現，彷彿新作；再度流傳，已脫離原來的脈絡。¹²該「詩」的文字和思想水準都相當平庸，不可能視作任何經典，有人把它比擬李小龍電影，也是言過其實。不過，連番在網上流傳，還有點代表意義。網上再三傳揚時，有引言說：

「這位學者表達的是整個中華民族的憤慨....以前國弱受欺凌，好不容易開始崛起又受敵視，中國人做甚麼都似乎不對，你們西方人究竟想我們怎樣生存？這首詩近期在網上熱傳，原因是它反映了華人的心態，抒發了華人長期以來的集體壓抑。是受到雙重標準困擾的海外華人向西方偏見射出的一箭。西方某些人對中國的敵意與偏見，原因複雜，有中國人自己的缺失，也有種族歧視、有色眼鏡、利益衝突、以至害怕中國崛起等因素。...互聯網是中西交往的重要橋樑，在這種情勢之下，如何促進溝通？這首詩實在值得中國人三讀，值得西方人三讀。」¹³

可見把「詩」再三傳揚的用意。這樣，也值得把它分析一下。

先引用該「詩」原文：

¹² 見該「詩」不少網上文本；「引言」出處未詳。

¹³ 最少有 2008、2010、2011、2013、2015 年幾次，令人難免生問。是否果如周大偉所言（見前註），則未見證實；姑且存疑。

給西方的詩《你究竟要我們怎樣生存？》

我們是東亞病夫時，我們被說是黃禍；
我們被預言是下一個超級大國了，我們被指是主要威脅。
那時我們閉關自守，你走私鴉片來強開門戶；
我們擁抱自由貿易了，你責罵我們搶走你的飯碗。
那時我們風雨飄搖，你鐵蹄犯境要求機會均等；
我們要整合破碎的山河，你說我們「入侵」……
叫喊「給西藏自由」。
我們試行馬列救國，你痛恨我們成為共黨分子；
我們擁抱資本主義了，你又恨我們當了資本家。
當我們的人口到達十億，你說我們在摧毀地球；
我們要限制人口了，你說我們踐踏人權。
那時我們一貧如洗，你們看我們賤如狗；
我們有鈔票借給你了，你怨我們令你國債累累。
我們發展工業了，你說我們是污染者；
我們有貨品賣給你了，你說我們是地球暖化的因由。
我們購買石油，你說我們榨取兼滅族；
你們為石油開戰，你說是為了解救生靈。
那時我們動亂無序，你說我們沒有法治；
現在我們要依法平暴，你說我們違反人權
我們靜默無聲時，你說我們欠缺言論自由；
我們不再緘默了，你說我們是被洗了腦的仇外暴民。

為甚麼你這樣憎恨我們？我們想知道。

「不」，你說，「我不恨你們。」

我們也不恨你；只是，你了解我們嗎？

「當然了解」，你說。「我們消息多的是，有 AFP、CNN、還有
BBC……」

其實你究竟要我們怎樣生存？

回答之前，請仔細的想一想……因為你的機會不是無限的。

已經够多了……這個世界容不下更多的偽善了。

我們要的是同一個世界，同一個夢想，靖世太平。

這個寬廣、遼濶的藍地球，容得下你們，容得下我們。

首先，此「詩」指責美國政府在石油利益方面，說一套、做一套，是「雙重標準」。這大概是今天世界各地很多人的共識——即使在美國也有不少人指控其外交政策是虛偽的；前美國總統小布殊托詞攻伐伊拉克，更受到國內外廣泛非議。誠然，美國政府早已喪失其在國際舞臺上的「道德高地」。因此，這「詩」的控訴，並非甚麼驚世駭俗之談。

不過，說一個人是「偽君子」，只是批判他的行為，否定他的作為可以信賴；並不就此可以拋開他所說的價值觀念、不值一顧。（當然，倘若這人的實際行動能夠體現他的信念，他的誠信自然更高。）他言行不一時，我們仍需要分別察其言、觀其行；自己衡量他宣諸於口的價值觀念是否合理、合情，應否成立，是否我們應該認同的。這才是發揮我們的獨立思考能力，做負責任的判斷；不能因人廢言，徒然因為某人行不及言，而棄絕他說的一切。從這角道看，群育（含公民教育）的智育成份實在不能忽略。

其次，西方傳媒往往囿於其受眾的偏見、或甚而只務反映其政府的立場，以至沒有充份發揮獨立傳媒監察政府、啟迪社會的職責。這也是耳熟能詳的問題；該「詩」不曾提出任何新的批判。然而，一個傳媒機構擁有新聞自由與否，畢竟還有重大區別：「自由」傳媒的自我改錯能力較強；對它的社會和政府，間中還可以有點批判作用；「官媒」則難以有任何獨立聲音。至於我們身為受眾，面對傳媒的限制，該怎樣自處？說到底，還是需要養成批判頭腦和獨立思考能力，廣泛地涉獵資訊，多作比較。因此，現代社會的教育，往往也包含「傳媒教育」，培養青少年對傳媒批

判的能力和習慣。像「詩」暗示的，一味否定西方傳媒，不是辦法。

此「詩」列舉百多年來中西交往時，中方含怨受屈的事例，都是耳熟能詳的，然而不無時空倒置或觀念混淆之弊。例如：「東亞病夫」之說，無疑是華人深以為辱的；可是，該話原意是指大清帝國的「國力」，並非窺視中國人的「體力」；在二十世紀中葉後的國際社會上，久已未聞這樣的議論。但在 2008 年『北京奧運』前夕，倒有人在中文傳媒舊調重提，大概達至鼓動不同政見的華人，同心支持這個所謂「百年大夢」的目標吧。

再者，就其本意言，「東亞病夫」和「黃禍」雖然都是十九世紀歐洲外交界的「辱華」意念，但卻是敵對雙方（英帝國、德帝國）的說法。該「詩」把不同觀點、不同理念的想法，都混作同一個「西方」看待，肯定無助於理解西方人對中國的批評、化解其猜疑，或尋求制勝的立足點。

試舉另一個較近期的事例。該「詩」說：『我們擁抱自由貿易了，你責罵我們搶走你的飯碗。』又說：『我們試行馬列救國，你痛恨我們成為共黨分子；我們擁抱資本主義了，你又恨我們當了資本家。』美國資本家利用第三世界的低廉生產成本，實施「離岸生產」(offshoring)，以求提高利潤，導至美國製造業加快式微，工人廣泛失業；是不爭的事實。（這現象是「成熟工業社會」常見的，也不限於美國。香港 1980、90 年代的「經濟轉型」，也是相關發展。¹⁴）當然，美國資本家「離岸生產」的基地，除了中國，還有墨西哥、孟加拉等地；拖累美國工人失業的「罪過」，全都歸咎中國嗎？即使如此，大概也是「世界工廠」「美譽」的部份代價；是否公允，實屬見仁見智。「離岸」工人遭受剝削；「離岸」權貴乘機發大財，「國民所得」節節上昇。無論如何，也是以低工資吸引外來投資的發展策略難免的後果。

埋怨中國工人「搶走飯碗」、「恨我們當了資本家」的是「西方」的失業工人、無產階層；較早前，「痛恨我們成為共黨分子」

¹⁴ 參閱陸鴻基，《心靈何價？資本主義全球化下的教育與心靈：基督宗教與中華傳統的回應》（香港，崇基學院，2009 年），第一章。

的是「西方」的有產階層。雖然同屬「西方」人，但其利益和志趣往往是對立的。即使是同樣的媒體反映的觀點，也應要分辨；不宜混為同一個「西方」，否則只會搞亂自己的思維和對問題的理解。

抱怨中國工業污染「摧毀地球」的「西方」環保人士，往往也責備其本國資本家對生態的傷害，鼓吹「西方人」改變生活方式（例如少用私家車、不要住大屋、等等）；他們跟肆意追求利潤、力保所得不斷上揚的市場基要主義者，更不可以混為一談。

當然，如果目的不是要對問題有透徹的理解，只是要分辨「敵」「我」，那麼，把一切「西方」混為一談，不管其內部分歧和前後差異，總之全盤否定——把「西方」的「民主」、「人權」、「環保」等觀念，跟它的「雙重標準」和「種族歧視」，一起扔掉；才算乾淨利落。

同理，凡是關乎「中方」的，也混為一談，更能分辨「敵」「我」。該「詩」屢屢用「我們」代表一切曾經受過「西方」委屈的「中方」——不管是「河山居民」、「統治權柄」、還是「民族」，也有這個作用；也具見混淆觀念的「國民教育」的威力。

這首佚名所作的「詩」，再三匿名在網上傳揚；其受到不少人輾轉相傳，正好體現了觀念混淆，側重情意培育的群體認同，往往奏效。反對者稱之為「洗腦」，大概沒有誇大。然而，光反對是不足夠的，最少因為人的心有空隙需要填補。那麼，該用甚麼代替呢？

下文繼續分析「國民教育」的問題。隨後，討論香港的公民教育可以教甚麼。

三. 環球生態完整與國家主權——從日本明治時期的「富國強兵」和「殖產興業」到二十一世紀愛護共同家園的世界公民

今天世界的環境問題，無疑是二十世紀中葉後西方各國政府鼓勵民間消費以促進經濟增長的政策，加上燃燒石油、煤碳等作為主要能源，而造成的困局。然而，堅信「人定勝天」，天地一切都是為人存在的迷思，則是源於十九世紀的「科學主義」(scientism) 理念的。跟「科學主義」緊密相連的是傳揚「物競天擇、適者生存」(survival of the fittest) 的「社會達爾文主義」(Social Darwinism)。兩者都是乘著當時西方科學突飛猛進的形勢而興起的學說，其本身卻是殊不「科學」的；兩者也為當時十分熾熱的帝國主義擴張，提供理論支持。而帝國主義擴張，往往是民族主義、主權國家的進一步推展。「明治維新」也是日本從傳統君主國家轉變成為民族國家、主權國家的時代。

十九世紀「西學東漸」，開風氣之先者是明治時代的日本。1868 年後，明治維新政府推行的口號「富國強兵」、「殖產興業」等，是其後數十年日本政府發展策略之鵠的。當時日本朝野大都迷信「科學主義」和「社會達爾文主義」鼓吹的「進步」：「富國強兵」是目標、「殖產興業」是手段。對外，把日本帶上侵凌鄰邦，擴展帝國的歧途；同時造就了大財團（「財閥」）壟斷現代化企業、小民農業則滯滯不前的「雙軌經濟」；與及貧富日益懸殊的社會矛盾。不過，明治日本高速崛興、雄霸亞東、挑戰西方列強的史績，卻教許多人欽羨不已；前車雖失，還是後有來者的。在今天資本主義全球化的氛圍裡，以「殖產興業」，達至「富國強兵」，不管社會和生態代價的崛興，還是亞洲內外不少掌權者津津樂道的成就。

「富國強兵」和「殖產興業」的理念，並非源於明治日本，而是當年西方流行的思想。相信工業經濟可以不斷擴展，帶來財富源源不絕，有百利而無一害的，是「科學主義」輕信「科學萬能」、「人定勝天」的一種體現。一切以擴展「國力」為依歸，

擴展帝國，以求雄霸全球，則是「物競天擇、適者生存」的前提下，「主權國家」必然選擇的路向。日本天皇《教育敕語》主導的「皇民教育」，自然標榜「富國強兵」、「國體本義」的意識型態，直至戰敗「無條件投降」為止。

「主權國家」觀念，源於十七世紀歐洲的『三十年教派戰爭』；意思是，擁有「主權」(sovereignty)的封建統治者之間，地位是平等的；各位統治者在其疆域內都有絕對權力主宰一切。十九世紀西方列強，利用各種「不平等條約」榨取中、日等國的經濟利益。於是，受壓搾者，紛紛以「廢止不平等條約」、「恢復主權完整」作為改革、自強的目標。漸漸，所謂「國家主權」也成了必須堅守的信條，「體現主權」也成了國家行為的指定動作了。國家既然擁有主權，就是對國內人和事，享有絕對權柄，不容人民質疑。這些觀念，是十九世紀至二十世紀前半的政界共識，也成了各國「國民教育」常見的內涵。注意：「主權」是「國家」的，就是統治者的，不是人民的、更不是個別「國民」的。

第二次世界大戰的慘痛經歷，讓許多地方的人汲取了教訓。加上戰後的「非殖化運動」，西方列強大都喪失了帝國，不可能再靠它「稱雄」，也改變了客觀的世界局勢。工業擴展雖然造就了史無前例的民生富足；戰後西方各國相繼推行「福利國家」政策，也造就了較前平均的財富分配。但從1960年代起，工業污染對生態環境的傷害，也逐漸浮現出來了。過去大半個世紀，強調世界一體、互相依存的「地球村」觀念，已日漸取代昔日的「主權國家」、「物競天擇、適者生存」、「科學萬能」、「人定勝天」等信念，成為新的世界共識和各地「公民教育」常見的內涵，以求培育愛護共同家園的世界公民。

不過，向下一代灌輸「富國強兵」等觀念，實有助於維持「主權國家」裡的既得利益，因此還是有人推崇的；是否有益世道人心，當然是另一個問題了。

四. 香港人的群體認同與公民教育

探討香港的「國民教育」問題，還需要看一看香港人的群體認同。有人認為，香港人飽受殖民地教育，對中國全無認識；現在既然「回歸了祖國」，自然需要再教育，弄清楚自己的「身份」。這是對香港的殖民統治史和教育史認識未足的觀念。

鴉片戰爭後，英帝國佔據了香港；從此開啟了百多年殖民統治的歷史。

眾所周知，香港沒有豐富的物產，值得英帝國垂涎的。英帝國佔據香港的目的，不外乎建立穩固的對華貿易基地。因此，港英的教育政策，一向著重培養中、英雙語、雙文化的中介人才。完全同化英語、英文化的「黃皮膚英國人」，不會發揮中介作用；因此並非港式殖民地教育的目標。到了 1920 年代，港英政府經歷了『省港大罷工』的衝擊，港督金文泰推出的治港策略，是聯繫在港的遜清遺老，鼓勵保守的中文和中國文化教育，以建立對抗二十世紀中國民族主義的統一戰線。金文泰統戰策略的基礎，是中國傳統價值和士大夫文化；不是甚麼西方文化或西方價值。當年英國社會大行其道的民主、平等、自由、人權、工人運動，以至社會主義等觀念，正是帝國各地「反殖」思維的出發點；金文泰等人自然不會鼓勵。到了 1950 年代，港英政府沿此思路，籠絡「南來文人」，推行「厚古薄今」的中文、中史課程；直至 2000 年代的「新高中課程」。¹⁵

百多年港英殖民地教育側重培養香港學生認同中國文化，但遠離中國政治。這樣，「厚古薄今」的教育，可說是造就了香港人普遍認同自己是「中國人」，但並不認同自己是「中國國民」。換言之，人們有很濃的中國文化感，但沒有熾熱的「國家民族感」。可說是短小了二十世紀盛行的「民族意識」，但不能說是對中國傳統沒有認識或認同。另一方面，生於斯、長於斯、居於斯；

¹⁵ 參閱陸鴻基，《香港課程裡的中國文化科目：文化傳承與殖民統治》，在莫禮時等合編，《課程、學習與評估：香港的經驗》（香港，公開大學，2003 年），頁 7-31。英文原文在 *Comparative Education Review* 35(4): 650-668。

人們自然也對香港有感情和歸屬感，因此也認同自己是「香港人」。這就是香港人的雙重認同：既是不折不扣的「中國人」，也是不折不扣的「香港人」；兩者並行不悖，兩重認同既互不排斥，也沒有高下之分。如果沒有這份雙重認同，1989年香港市民聲援北京民運的連番大遊行，和以後二十多年連續不絕的『六四』紀念活動，都沒有可能發生：我們關心中國的民主狀況，因為我們是「中國人」；而我們膽敢公開地、集體地表達這份關懷，不用懼怕政府「秋後算帳」，因為我們是「香港人」。¹⁶

香港人的雙重認同和側重文化、忽略政治的群體認同，既有其弊，也有其利。弊處就是跟近代世界的「民族主義」潮流脫節；對他人的「民族認同」往往限於抽象意念的理解，沒法在感性方面代入。如果這個「他者」是「中國人」，更會被他認定是「缺乏民族意識」，甚至被他罵「冷血」，「連自己是甚麼人也不知道，簡直「奴化了頭腦」。因此，中國民族主義者，不少認為香港人是需要接受「國民教育」的。

香港人側重文化、忽略政治的群體認同，也有其利；主要是避過了「國、共兩黨」的相互仇殺和1950至70年代，中國政治的驚濤駭浪。誠然，行政的分隔，是當年中中國頻繁的政治運動鮮有波及香港的原因；然而，倘使沒有認同差異的心理屏障，政治、行政分隔，也不足以抵擋澎湃的「民族」熱潮，讓香港人專注政治以外的發展，創造出驕人成績。

港英政府以「厚古薄今」教育，孕育香港青少年側重文化、忽略政治的中國認同，對它的殖民地統治也不是沒有風險的。一旦有人突破心理上的資訊屏障，革命政治的激情，便可以走著認同文化中國的坦途，長驅而進。這就是「火紅」的1970年的情況。當年港英政權得以維持穩定，一方面由於1967騷動後，港共潰不成軍，而面臨「文革」的中國接管的可能，香港市民大多選擇「保持現狀」。在此形勢下，港英政府也自知脆弱，對民間抗議運動，多作「親民」姿態，讓「公民社會」（「壓力團體」

¹⁶ 參閱陸鴻基，《香港歷與文化》，在冼玉儀編，《香港文化與社會》（香港，香港大學亞洲研究中心，1995年），頁64-79。

的統稱)得以逐漸成長。官民互動,遂發展出 1980 至 90 年代的諮詢政治;讓施政的透明度和問責程度,得以持續增長。民生也得到相當改善。¹⁷

綜上,以往香港並非缺乏了認識和認同中國的教育;短少的,不外是政治內涵和專注香港的課題而已。誠然,1950 年代「楊慕琪計劃」撤銷後,港英政府推動的「公民教育」,沒有政治內涵,完全沒有準備學生參與治理香港的任何主動角色。即使《中英聯合聲明》達成以後,「過渡時期」的「公民教育」課程指引,也還沒有為學生參與治理香港、實踐「港人治港」的準備。到了 1996 年的「公民教育」課程指引,政治內涵才較為顯著。但指引很快捲進了「民主教育」抑「民族教育」的論爭。而當時香港已經歷過 1989 年的歷次民主大遊行,1990 年代的兩次立法局選舉,和圍繞「彭定康政改方案」的風雨;距離政權轉移也只剩有一年了。可以說,戰後數十年,香港的所謂「公民」科和「經公」科,委實是「順民教育」。¹⁸

然而,1970 年代以降,公民社會的發展,相當蓬勃,往往為參與者和他們周遭的人,以至不少旁觀的學生和市民,提供了課堂以外的公民教育。1970 年代,多次發動和平抗爭,向港英政府施壓,要求它改善施政,例如:1970 年的「護士爭取同工同酬」、1971 年的大學生「爭取中文成為法定語文」、1973 年春的「文憑教師爭取薪級」(『香港教育專業人員協會』(『教協會』)於焉成立)、1973 年夏的大學生「反貪污、捉葛柏」(導至港英政府設立『廉政公署』、1974-76 年的教師及坊眾爭取普及初中教育、1978 年『金禧中學』學生長期靜坐,抗議政府封校(是為香港中學生大規模集體行動,和平抗爭的濫觴),等等。這些抗爭

¹⁷ 參閱 Lui Tai-lok and Ray Yep, "Revisiting the Golden Era of MacLehose and the Dynamics of Social Reforms," *China Information*, <http://cin.sagepub.com/> (Oct 29, 2010); 又參閱馬嶽編著,《香港 80 年代民主運動口述歷史》(香港,城市大學出版社,2012 年)。

¹⁸ 參閱黃炳文,「經公科課程炮製出怎樣的『香港公民』」《明報月刊》(1983 年 12 月),頁 56-59。又參閱梁恩榮、劉傑輝合著,《政治教育在香港》(香港,香港基督徒學會,1999)。

運動都最少得到部份訴求，促進了香港公民社會的發展，也促進社會大眾的心態從「逆來順受」過渡到「據理力爭」，是最有實效的公民教育。此外，1985年，「過渡時期」伊始，『教協會』舉辦了公民教育夏令營，以模擬區議會選舉的方式，為數百名中學生，提供了民主治理香港、實踐「港人治港」的準備。¹⁹

公民社會的這些行動和活動填補了學校公民教育的部份空隙；最少足證香港公民教育並非一片空白。事實上，倘使香港人全無公民教育，1989年的遊行、以後每年6·4的紀念，2003年的遊行，2012年的抗爭，以至2014年的「雨傘運動」都沒有可能發生。這些遊行和「公民抗命」運動的發生，證明香港不少人已經經歷了從逆來順受到據理力爭的心態演變。他們需要公民教育提供的，大概是協助他們澄清價值觀念和爭取目標的思維鍛練而已。在這方面，公教社會訓導大概可以發揮不少積極作用。不是要灌輸價值觀念或教義，而是提供磨練思想的議程和參考材料。

以下討論公教社會訓導在此能夠提供的貢獻。

五. 二十一世紀的公民教育與公教社會訓導

公民教育的目的，就是要讓社會下一代成員，學習成為「公民」。「公民」跟「順民」的差別，主要是在態度上：面對管治權威侵蝕自己和他人的基本權利，「順民」只會逆來順受，而「公民」卻會堅持用盡合情合理的和平手段，據理力爭。「公民」持此態度，因為他有「雙向的歸屬感」：他歸屬這個社會；他關心社會大眾的事務；他也感覺這個社會他有份擁有，因此，大眾的事務也是他的事務。有甚麼非理性的狀況，他自然不會「事不關己」地袖手或退避。

歸屬感從那裡來呢？來自認識和參與。生長於斯，自然有認識、有感情；生活知識經過書本知識擴潤和加深，更為穩固。對社會的改進，曾經出過力，就是有所參與了。一個人對他的社會

¹⁹ 參閱《教協報》(1984年11月23日)。

有認識、有參與，對這社會就有歸屬；社會接受他的參與和貢獻，他也就感覺這個社會他有份擁有了。「雙向的歸屬感」形成，就是如此。公民教育要培養「雙向的歸屬感」，既要提供知識，更要提供實踐參與改進社會的經歷。

要讓青少年學習成為據理力爭的「公民」，一方面需要在實踐上培養他們「雙向的歸屬感」；同時更需要讓他們想清楚對與錯的準則。所謂「對」和「錯」，不單是人與人之間的私德問題，關乎公共事務的，往往更是「社會公義」的議題。例如，老闆招請僱員，說妥薪金若干，屆時無拖無欠地支薪，就是滿足了「私德」的要求。但如果協定的工資低於市價，又不足讓僱員過活，就是違反「社會公義」了。面臨這樣情況，公教社會訓導要求僱主善待僱員；也要求政府設法保障「打工仔女」的生計；跟社會上商界的「市場基要主義」（所謂「中環價值」）每每是對立的。符合公教社會訓導的公民教育，也就會鼓勵青少年人支持和平爭取「合理工資、工時」等社會運動了。

從這個例子可見，公教社會訓導既提供對與錯的準則，作為社會公義的參考，也提供讓青少年養成「雙向歸屬感」的實踐門徑。無疑是上好的公民教育議程和素材。

前述公教社會訓導的幾個主要命題：人的尊嚴、人的合群性、應該優先幫助貧苦的人、每個人都真正享有為自己發聲的權利、強調人性的多方面整合、保護生態環境、共同家園；尊重和愛護眾生；「民胞物與」；都是十分值得配合時事，深入討論的公民教育課題。討論過程中，自然增進學生對社會的認識和參與；同時幫助學生澄清自己的公義理念。公民教育最重培養每個人的獨立思考和判斷能力，設計課程，尤其不能以「填鴨式」或灌輸教條的方式進行。

餘下的問題，是公民教育最適宜以甚麼地域作為基礎單位呢？跟據「公教社會訓導」的「權力下放」（subsidiarity）原則，行使政府權力的地域單位，最好是小市民也有機會參與製訂和推行決策的—就是說，一個都市或都市內的分區。公民教育既要培養「雙向歸屬感」和實踐和平爭取改善社會，理想的地域，也就相若了。

另一方面，香港的「外向形經濟」，在這個「全球化」的世代，尤其需要培養青少年的世界視野—所謂「思想全球、行動當地」（“Think global, act local”）。教宗方濟各的《家園》通諭也強調全球視野，要求人們注意自己賴以致富的工業經濟，給全世界生態環境造成的損害。因此可以說，我們需要放眼世界，同時立足自己的社會，盡力爭取改善民生、社會制度、和生態環境的狀況。換言之，我們需要先學好做人，然後才是問做甚麼人。

至於「主權國家」，畢竟是現實的一個重要環節，還是不能忽略的，否則「怠慢忘身，禍災乃作」。基於此，也基於香港人「雙重認同」的傳統，香港的公民教育，總還需要有「國家」的成份；只是不能讓它宣揚混淆的觀念，型塑「單向歸屬感」，培養「順民」的心態。該如何籌措，是具體編訂課程者，在弄清楚自己的理念後，需要憑良心，費思量了。

六． 我們需要做的事

綜合以上的討論，倘使香港公教學校的公民教育果真以「公教社會訓導」作為核心，著重培養我們的青少年的「雙向歸屬感」，勇於承擔和平爭取改善社會的公民義務，則遠離明治日本「富國強兵」、「殖產興業」的模式了。面臨「國民教育」的挑戰，要推動這樣的公民教育是不容易的。

「公教社會訓導」宣示了百多年，有評論家尚且認為它是教會「保守得最好的秘密」（“best kept secret”），因為教會中人為怕開罪權貴，把「公教社會訓導」的要旨，往往避而不談，或「點到即止」，以至普通教友，很多根本不知道教會有這樣的教義。²⁰然而，正如教宗方濟各在《家園》通諭指出，地球是人類唯一的家園，我們不好好愛護它，任由污染破壞生態，早晚我們都會家毀人亡。同理，香港是香港人的家園，公民教育是培育家園繼

²⁰ Tony Magliano, “Surprise! Catholic social teaching is the church's best-kept secret,” *National Catholic Reporter*, 16 April, 2012.

承人的，我們能不為下一代爭取不斷改進的社會和教育麼？在香港推展「公教社會訓導」的公民教育，任重而道遠，正是需要共同承擔的。

[ABSTRACT] This essay discusses the direction of civic education in Hong Kong and its relationship with Catholic Social Teaching (CST). It begins with an overview of Catholic Social Teaching, then analyzes the proposed “national education” in Hong Kong, and concludes with a suggestion for Hong Kong’s civic education. First, CST stresses themes such as human dignity; the social nature of human beings, preferential option for the poor, the right to express one’s voice in order to articulate one’s needs, integration of human development, respect and nurture the ecological vitality of Mother Earth. All these are important for civic education. Second, it is pointed out that the root problem of the “Moral and National Education” program introduced in Hong Kong in 2012 was that the term *guojia* has multiple meanings: to expect our pupils to love the land and people of China, in effect becomes packaging to camouflage an inculcation of absolute obedience to the state machinery. The background of British colonial education and a sense of belonging to Hong Kong naturally arising from the young people’s experience of growing up here contribute to the creation of a “dual identity” of most Hongkongers—to be both 100% “Chinese” and 100% “Hongkongers” at the same time. In the final section, it is pointed out that “civic education” must aim to nurture “citizens,” not subjects. Subjects accept injustices in resignation, while citizens would protest them with all peaceful means. CST is an excellent basis for civic education, because it provides not only guidelines on what is right, but also opportunities for nurturing “two-way belonging.” In designing the curriculum, care must be taken to avoid indoctrination. Each pupil’s independent and critical thinking should be nurtured.

從香港教會的社會訓導中 看公民身份與實踐原則¹

馮苑菁

[摘要] 本文旨在探討基督宗教信仰在香港社會中的脈絡；以及公民身份與實踐原則中的信仰向度的內涵；繼而討論信仰向度的內涵與公民教育之間有着怎樣的關係？在分析中看到天主教信仰與公民觀的關係。其次，在探討公民身份與實踐原則中的信仰基礎時，本文發現教會訓導中那豐富的內涵及意義。繼而再探討這些內涵與公民教育之間的關係。筆者發現，要培育基督徒公民，有關的培育是重要及不容忽視的，從中亦給予天主教學校及其它非宗教學校在公民教育上一些啟示。

一．導言

隨着全球政治及社會的急劇變遷，國際關係漸趨頻繁和複雜，人不能獨善其身地活在自己的私有領域當中；人的身份也不再只局限在固有的地域或疆界之上。這變化令我們思考，人活在這空間的身份與責任。其次，近年香港社會日益頻繁的政治爭辯，以及社會運動漸趨普遍和成熟，促使我們思考，今天所呈現的境況是如何形成？亦令我們反思，要塑造怎麼樣的公民，在社會上應扮演著什麼角色和履行什麼責任及義務，才能共同建設一個理想的社會共同體。

¹ 本文改寫自作者的價值教育碩士論文，承蒙香港中文大學教育學院的謝均才教授指導及在改寫期間給予意見。

在西方，當代對公民觀研究的主要理論分別為：自由主義、公民共和主義、社群主義及文化多元主義。每個流派對理想的公民觀都有其獨有的見解與闡釋。

基督宗教信仰雖然不是一種「主義」，但對社會產生一定的影響力。從過去的歷史中，能看出這些思想深深塑造了集體道德和社會文化。其次，這些思想亦深深影響了基督徒，甚或接受這套準則的人。這些人帶着這套理念生活，參與社會中各項活動，面對社會上各種問題，這些信念慢慢影響著社會。「教會把她的影響擴展到社會現實中更深的層面，她啟發了個人和集體的良知，把福音的精神注入社會的風氣之中，因而影響了人們的生活。」²無論在政治、經濟及民生方面，基督宗教信仰對世界起著深遠的影響。因此，其獨有的公民觀，會否給予世界一些啟示及幫助，以達致理想社會之建立？

我希望透過此文探討基督宗教信仰與社會的關係；特別是探討在公民身份與實踐原則中的信仰向度的內涵；再者，探討信仰向度的內涵與公民教育之間有着怎樣的關係？以上給予公民教育什麼啟示？在公民教育的研究領域上，不少學者都曾研究有關課程的內容問題、教學法、不同地域推行公民教育的情況等。但深入思考如何辦公民教育，最重要及首要的問題是：我們希望透過此教育培育一個怎麼樣的人？面對時代的變遷及社會上的多元發展，那些人應具備什麼特質？

二. 天主教信仰的社會脈絡

從歷史的發展去看天主教信仰與社會的關係，我們不難發現宗教與社會之間有極密切的關連。在西方社會中，第三種最重要和最普遍的社群是宗教社群。³在西方社會，宗教與社會思想的主

² Herve Carrier (李燕鵬譯)，《重讀天主教社會訓導》(台北：光啟出版社，1992)，頁 48。

³ 根據 Nisbet，第一種社群是政治社群，第二種社群是經濟社群。參考 Robert Nisbet (徐啓智譯)，《西方社會思想史》(台北：桂冠圖書股份有限公司，1982)。

流都是基督教思想。James Arthur 在他的研究中指出，歐洲社會的公民觀的形成與發展，大部份都是依賴着基督宗教的信仰而衍生的。另外，他亦提出，宗教所承載的價值體系是有助去模塑公民的身份、素質及其行為，對整體公民觀的發展有着深遠的影響。再者，基督宗教信仰有別於一般公民觀的概念。他們相信自己與神的關係，是一種盟約式的關係，所有人都是神的子民，人只是受託在世上管理大地。由此觀念引申，活於此世的人，大家都是同屬一源，不但應以愛相待，還應互相尊重，共同建立一個強調團結、友愛及無分彼此的社會。這種普世性的公民觀，其實始於初期教會便存在。⁴

其次，Arthur 指出宗教信仰不只是一種抽象的概念，而是關心在公共領域中的行動及參與，行為是宗教信仰的先決條件，亦即為基督信仰而言，實踐是十分重要的。宗教信仰本身體現了一套價值、思想和感情，它可能成為一重要、決定性因素，去模塑國家的政治及其信仰會有深遠的影響。⁵

除此以外，為再進一步闡釋宗教與公民觀之間的關係，Arthur 提出了聖奧思定在《上帝之城》中所提出的兩種公民觀。基督徒所歸屬的不是羅馬帝國或任何地上之城，而是上帝之城。地上之城與上帝之城最根本的差別在於，前者人民的共通點在於對自己的愛，後者則是結合於對上帝的愛和因此而生的對彼此的愛。在對比這兩個城從起源到結局的過程中，他對人類的群體生活有深入的討論。⁶聖奧思定所描述的地上之城及上帝之城，當中包含了天國及在世的兩個幅度；兩種不同的幅度卻沒有衝突及相互抵觸。反之身為基督徒應盡本份及義務，好好活現兩個幅度的特質，在現世社會中，既做好的基督徒，亦要做個好公民，從而

⁴ James Arthur, "Christianity, Citizenship and Democracy," in *Education for Citizenship and Democracy*, ed. James Arthur, Ian Davies and Carile Hahn (London: SAGE, 2008), 305-313.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Arthur, "Christianity, Citizenship and Democracy." Also see Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, *The Two Cities of God: The Church's Responsibility for the Earthly City* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub., 1997).

建設一個美好的社會。聖奧思定提出，雖然天主之城是永恆的，而地上之城是短暫的，但身為基督徒仍要好好活在地上之城，因他們有責任將愛天主及愛人這兩條準則在其生活中活現，最好的莫過於將這份愛分別呈現在兩城當中。這兩個幅度正好帶出當中兩者的關係。

在天主教的信仰當中，聖經和傳承（或傳統）同樣重要，而社會訓導是教會傳統不能或缺的部份。如要深入瞭解天主教會在現世社會所扮演的角色，以及其怎樣以宗教的角度去回應當前的社會問題，研讀社會訓導的內容是最佳途徑。天主教社會訓導，不但只涉及倫理道德的訓導，當中還對所身處的社會，所面對的境況作出及時的回應及指引。另外，社會訓導是以福音精神的原則，對有關的情況作出適切的分析。其核心離不開維護人性尊嚴和保障人類社會生活各方面的需要。⁷所以社會訓導是可視為回應當代社會、政治和經濟問題的重要指標。另外，社會訓導為人們提供反省社會問題的原則，使人能依據當中的準則及勸喻回應各項挑戰。已故教宗若望保祿二世亦曾明確闡述道：「教會的社會訓導不是介於自由資本主義與馬克思集權主義之間的第三種途徑，也不是其他較不過份對立的解決辦法以外的另一種替代方案。更確切地說，它自成一格。它不是一種意識形態，而是在社會與國際的秩序中，在信仰及教會傳統的光照下，對人存在的複雜事實進行周詳的反省，再根據反省結果，提出正確的說明。其主要目的就在於解釋這些事實，確定這些事實在對人和人的使命上是否與福音的教導相一致。此種使命一則是屬於世間的，再則也是超越世間的，旨在指導基督信徒的行為。」⁸這些反省原則成

⁷ 天主教社會訓導的主要原則包括：維護人類尊嚴、維護公義與和平、關顧弱小及與他們同行、積極關懷與參與社會事務、公民參與政治生活、公民參與經濟生活等。就上述原則，本文作者於其未發表的論文中作討論，參閱馮苑菁，《從香港教會的社會訓導中看公民身份與實踐原則》（香港中文大學文學碩士論文，2015）。亦請參閱 Milburn J. Thompson, *Justice and Peace: A Christian Primer* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1997); Michael Hornsby-Smith, *An Introduction to Catholic Social Thought*. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

⁸ 若望保祿二世，《社會究事務關懷通諭》，1987。

為一些在現世社會生活的指標，它一方面是恆久不變，但另一方面是常新的，因為它不斷適應歷史情況的改變及人類生活與社會生活不停的演變。教會參與對社會事務的關懷之特殊方式之一就是這些社會訓導。它在實際上怎樣與社會連上關係？從天主教社會訓導中，天主教會是如何理解看公民身份與實踐？而這些理解又是建基於何種的理論及信念的基礎之上？這種公民身份與實踐如何能可以促進一個美好的社會建立？以下透過文本研讀及分析方法，筆者將從香港教會的訓導文件中尋找天主教的信仰角度，探究其公民身份與實踐的內涵。

香港教會的社會訓導文件，主要是由香港教區主教或主教公署頒佈有關社會問題、教會社會使命和鼓勵教友參與社會活動的牧函和文件，亦可視為香港的社會訓導。本研究選取了徐誠斌主教(1969-1973 任教區主教)、胡振中樞機(1975-2002 任教區主教)及陳日君樞機(2000-2009 任教區主教)三位主教在任期間曾發表過的牧函，希望從內容中，尋找本地教會如何結合普世教會訓導的原則和本地的要素去理解公民身份，以及這身份與人及社會的關係。其次，在當中又是怎樣理解公民實踐的原則和內涵。除了本地主教們的牧函外，為了能夠更深入瞭解當中的意思，本文將採用兩本天主教會出版的書籍作為輔助分析。一為《教會社會訓導彙編》(2011)，這本書籍是按已故教宗若望保祿二世的要求撰寫，目的是以概要和更全面的方式去將教會的社會訓導展示出來。⁹這是一部完整的概論，是天主教社會訓導教義內容的基本框架。另一本為香港天主教正義和平委員會出版的《教會的寶藏 -- 天主教社會訓導簡易本》(2014 年修訂版)，這是香港教會為了幫助本地教友更明瞭社會訓導的意義，而重新整理各篇訓導文獻的要點，闡釋當中的核心思想和原則，是信仰生活裡一本充實的指南。¹⁰

⁹ 宗座正義和平委員會，《教會社會訓導彙編》(香港：公教真理學，2011)。

¹⁰ 夏志誠，〈序〉，朱偉志、伍小蓮、黃奕清編，《教會的寶藏 -- 天主教社會訓導簡易本》(香港天主教正義和平委員會，2014)，頁 4。

三．從香港教會的社會訓導中看公民身份與實踐原則

上文初步介紹了公民身份及實踐原則中的信仰向度的概念。接著，以下會探討在基督宗教信仰中，這些內涵所承載的意義又是什麼？下文會集中闡釋在香港教會的意義。

1. 香港教會社會訓導的社會脈絡

香港的社會訓導與普世教會的社會訓導都是為回應當前的社會處境和問題。教會希望以福音的精神為基礎，對社會處境和問題作出的一些反省和建議。香港的社會訓導精神是秉承普世教會的社會訓導的意念，加上配合本地的文化和處境，再發表其具本土特色的訓導，給予本地信眾及人士作相關的參考與實踐。為教會自己，為所服務的大眾，教會認為應該針對這些迫切的問題尋找出答案來。¹¹根據普世教會社會訓導，香港教會再反思本地社會的問題及如何回應和落實。香港社會訓導提出了待人處事原則，例如市民的民主參與和公民責任、政府重視大眾公益和人民福祉、傳媒重視公義公平、大眾的團結和諧共處、各方的互相尊重，以及對話和信任等。在強調香港人的本地身份之餘，也不忘其擁有的多重身份，如基督徒和中國人身份，以及生活在地球村中的世界公民身份。香港的社會訓導的另一特色是實踐取向。¹²

有關本地天主教會在歷史及社會變遷上的角色，在香港開埠的初期，本地教會的使命是傳福音。但因應當時社會環境的需要，關愛及照顧當時社會上貧窮弱小的大眾，成為教會其中一個主要且迫切的任務。自六十年代末，經濟開始發展，當時的人除了注意社會及民生問題外，亦開始積極投入社會和政治事務。而教會在七十年代已意識到，基督徒除了應關注社會現狀外，更重要的是為公義而發聲，並應主動去關心及改善人的生活。在八十年代，香港進入了歷史的新的歷程，就九七年香港回歸事宜，中

¹¹ 胡振中，《公教報》，1970年2月13日。

¹² 阮美賢，〈香港教會的社會參與及社會訓導〉，朱偉志等編，《教會的寶藏——天主教社會訓導簡易本》，頁86。

英雙方簽署並發表了決定香港前途的中英聯合聲明，從此本港進入了過渡期。本地的主教曾公開致信教友及發表聲明，以表達其對相關問題的關注，並鼓勵信眾都應該關心上述問題，積極發表意見，借此以共同為大眾公益而努力；另外還要服務人羣和貢獻社會。在 1989 年北京發生民運期間，本地主教透過不同的信件向呼籲要以和平和符合人道的方式解決緊急危機。正值此時本地教區頒布了邁向光輝的十年牧函，當中一部份是論及社會事務和相關社會問題。尤其關注正義、人權、勞工、醫療、婦女和家庭等社會議題。到了九十年代中的後過渡期，教區頒布了「過度九七之牧民指引」，指引中分別從中國人、香港市民及基督徒的身份提醒信眾應盡的責任，並要在社會中負起天主教會的使命。在 1999 年，人大常委就居留權問題解釋基本法後，當時的主教發表信件，他呼籲香港人，基於對天主的愛和鄰人的愛，要尊重人性的尊嚴。並提出此舉的行動會破壞香港法治、令人質疑一國兩制、高度自治在香港落實的可能。在千禧年，香港教區召開了教區會議：就社會上的問題討論，就社會問題表達意見，並採取適當的方式作回應。¹³

2. 對公民身份的理解

2.1 結合本地因素的公民身份角色

公民身份的得以建立，在上述內容的詮釋是同時擁有一份具屬神元素的天國公民的身份及一份具現世元素的地上公民的身份。但這些身份結合本地因素後，其面貌會是怎樣？身為得救標誌的教會，要將天主的慈愛呈現在人世當中，必定是透過現世的生活去彰顯。當中已故主教胡振中樞機以自身的經驗作闡釋，便帶出三個不同的身份及與人的關係。身為中國人，亦感到驕傲，引以為榮。因中國歷史源遠流長，文化博大精深及其高尚的倫理價值；其次，身為香港市民，理應共苦同甘，守望相助；彼此團結合作，以服務社會，造福人羣；特別愛顧老弱貧病孤苦人士，

¹³ 同上，頁 75-79。

提昇精神生活質素，致力於均衡的全人發展：使香港發展成為更加美好，合乎人道的居住地方。再者，身為天主教徒，信仰基督，敬天愛人。基督乃天人中保，人類救主。他傳教受難，死而復活；建立教會，往訓萬民，佈道四方。天主教徒繼承此一使命，宣揚基督，傳播福音，而力行仁愛，服務人群。¹⁴

2.2 強調「先知」與「僕人」的角色

除了以上的身份外，本地主教亦在本土提出教會一直以來強調先知和僕人的角色，提示大家要均衡將這身份好好呈現在社會中。在《邁向光輝的十年》牧函中，胡振中樞機指出，一方面，教會做「僕人」的角色是要多關心及服務身邊的人，特別是貧苦大眾；同時，亦要把「先知」的角色更明顯地呈現，特別關注正義、人權、勞工等問題。¹⁵公民實踐多元身份的得以建立，能幫助建設香港，使發展成為更加進步，充滿活力，合乎正義，令人自豪的社會。相信真誠的天主教徒，也是真正的好市民。真正活出不同身份的特質，亦是積極關懷與參與社會事務的表現。如在選舉上，主教提醒信眾亦扮演重要的角色。引述教會的訓導：「信友應當感到自身對社會所負的特殊而固有的使命。他們應當以身作則，表現他們對公共福利的責任感與服務精神。」¹⁶「在福音的光照和教會思想的指導下，教友受基督之愛所推動，應當直接而果敢地參與現世事務。」¹⁷胡振中樞機提示眾人應開始以身作則，參與社會事務，及時辦理選民登記，屆時憑良心投票；共謀公益，貢獻力量。這是大家的權利和義務。¹⁸胡主教再次強調真誠的天主子民，該是真正的好市民。身為天主教徒，我們應宣揚基督，傳播福音，也該力行仁愛，共謀公益；以服務人群，造福社會。

¹⁴ 胡振中，《公教報》，1984年8月24日。

¹⁵ 參閱胡振中，《邁向光輝的十年》牧函，1989年。

¹⁶ 《論教會在現代世界牧職憲章》，75節。

¹⁷ 《教友傳教法令》，7節。

¹⁸ 胡振中，《公教報》，1984年9月14日。

3. 公民實踐原則：具本土特色原則中的內涵

3.1 維護人類尊嚴

彼此關係能有效地呈現是透過落實和具體的實踐，那實踐的內涵又是以怎樣方式展現？

在基督宗教信仰上，致力宣講「人性尊嚴」的真理，在這基礎上才能建設一個公義的、恆久的和平。¹⁹陳日君主教(2000-2009 出任教區主教) 在牧函中引用教宗的話說：生命是天主給人的第一個恩典，人最基本的財富。教會宣講生命的福音，並提醒國家的首要任務正是維護生命的基本權利；近年來這基本的人權越來越受到嚴峻的挑戰。尤其是在生命的開始時，人特別脆弱，也更需要國家的保護。

放回一個本土的情境，針對墮胎問題，胡主教在牧函中指：如果我們祇追求自私的享受或為了追求名利而偷生怕死，那末我們雖然活著已等於死了。²⁰又如社會上看到人性尊嚴不被尊重，胡主教勸喻應多加檢討，深思熟慮地考慮如何以個人或社團之一員的身份，參與促進社會正義的工作。提示當目睹自己的手足弟兄尊嚴受創，實不應袖手旁觀，無動於衷。²¹他再次重申，人的生命是天主創造的，所以是神聖不可侵犯的。²²如果看到有人的尊嚴受創時，就不應袖手旁觀，無動於衷。²³

3.2 維護公義與和平

在維護公義方面，胡主教在牧函中提出，除了直接服務個別兄弟姐妹，也應致力改革社會制度，為弱勢社群爭取公道。²⁴其次，胡主教也給予當權執政者有關的提示：提醒身為領導人民的

¹⁹ 陳日君，《聖誕期牧函》，2002年12月。

²⁰ 胡振中，《四旬期牧函》，2005年。

²¹ 胡振中，《公教報》，1970年2月20日。

²² 胡振中，《公教報》，1972年12月22日。

²³ 徐誠斌，《公教報》，1970年2月20日。

²⁴ 陳日君，《四旬期牧函》，2004年。

是人民的僕人。「親民」不該是手段，該是基本心態。首先要親近人民，尊重真正的老百姓，一切政策該從他們的利益出發。²⁵

維護公義與和平是支持「大同博愛」。陳主教曾表示要大家真誠接受並實踐博愛的真理，我們才會有持久的和平。博愛就是愛所有的人，愛每一個人，而且愛他如己。²⁶

其次維護和平的關鍵，在於人類關係的協和。要促成這種協和，人與人之間必須有互信、公義、以及無遠弗屆的愛。我們與天主建立了正確的父子關係後，人與人之間便有手足情誼，便有協和，便有和平。27教會訓導我們，「公民不得忘懷他們具有為促進公共福利，而運用其自由投票的權利和義務。」²⁸此屬人性尊嚴，不容忽視。簡言之，無人可以離群獨居，我行我素。身為市民，我們是這群體的一分子，要使香港成為繁榮、安定、自由、正義的社會，一個更加美好、適合生活的地方。教會又訓導我們，「以慈父的心腸關懷人的天主，立意要求所有的人組成一個家庭，要求人們以弟兄之誼彼此相待」。²⁹人類確是兄弟姊妹，同屬一個精神家庭。身為基督徒，是力求促進全港市民的身心福利，提高大眾的生活質素。³⁰

3.3 關顧弱小及與他們同行

關懷貧苦要求重建一個關懷的文化！關鍵的不是多少，而是誠心樂意去做！胡主教在牧函中經常會著信眾深思一個問題——貧窮與社會正義的問題。他解釋貧窮的其中一個因素是社會不義、財富分配不均。人性尊嚴乃人類天賦的權利；社會存在不公義的現象往往由於人與人之間互不尊重而起。³¹因此關顧弱小，

²⁵ 陳日君，《聖誕牧函》，2004年。

²⁶ 陳日君，《聖誕牧函》，2005年。

²⁷ 徐誠斌，《公教報》，1970年12月25日。

²⁸ 《論教會在現代世界牧職憲章》，75節。

²⁹ 《論教會在現代世界牧職憲章》，24節。

³⁰ 胡振中，《公教報》，1984年9月14日。

³¹ 胡振中，《公教報》，1970年2月20日。

不只是停留在關心他們的所需，而是更進一步去瞭解其成因及積極面對那些問題。

關懷貧苦並非僅僅施惠於人而已。須知施惠就是受惠；克己助人，首先受惠者乃我們自己。我們每日所作的奉獻，能滋潤我們心中的愛德之苗，使它茁壯，我們的品德和超性生命也就愈形豐富。³²

其次，社會服務應注意僕人角色與先知角色，並使兩者更均衡發展。在僕人角色方面，要多注意為傷殘、老人、弱能、弱智、難民及一些所謂社會的「邊緣人」而服務。在先知角色方面，我們要認真關注人權、正義、勞工、富裕社會中的貧窮人等問題，找出其背後原因；並對政府的福利、勞工、房屋、醫療等政策，作出負責的研究和具體的回應。³³

3.4 積極關懷與參與社會事務

身為得救標誌的教會，要將天主的慈愛呈現在人世當中，必定是透過現世的生活去彰顯。積極關懷與參與社會事務是一最佳的途徑和方法。但實際在一個社會環境當中，我們可怎樣表達這份積極關懷與參與呢？本地主教曾在牧函中提出以不同身份去積極投入及參與社會。當中已故主教胡振中樞機更以自身的經驗作闡釋可行的方法，透過不同的身份去極極投入社會的各項事務。³⁴建設香港，使發展成為更加進步，充滿活力，合乎正義，令人自豪的社會。相信真誠的天主教徒，也是真正的好市民。真正活出不同身份的特質亦是積極關懷與參與社會事務的表現。如在選舉上，主教提醒信眾亦扮演重要的角色。主教引述教會的訓導：「信友應當感到自身對社會所負的特殊而固有的使命。他們應當以身作則，表現他們對公共福利的責任感與服務精神。」《論教會在現代世界牧職憲章·75》「在福音的光照和教會思想的指導下，教友受基督之愛所推動，應當直接而果敢地參與現世事

³² 胡振中，《公教報》，1971年2月26日

³³ 《邁向光輝的十年》牧函。

³⁴ 胡振中，《公教報》，1984年8月24日。

務。」《教友傳教法令·7》他提示眾人要開始以身作則，參與社會事務。如及時辦理選民登記，屆時憑良心投票；共謀公益，貢獻力量。他重申這是大家的權利和義務。³⁵胡主教再次強調要做一位真誠的天主子民，該是真正的好市民。身為天主教徒，除了要宣揚基督，傳播福音，也該力行仁愛，共謀公益；以服務人群，造福社會。³⁶在牧函中陳主教亦提示信眾要多多認識教會的社會訓導，投入各種愛德工夫去建設一個愛的社會：維護公義，扶助弱小。愛心會使大家在身邊見到那沒有東西吃，沒有衣服穿，孤苦伶仃；患病，傷殘；被欺負受歧視，甚至被以為是社會的包袱而遭排擠的兄弟姊妹。³⁷

3.5 政治與公民的參與

在政治參與方面，承接普世教會在這方面的教導，投身積極參與政治，目的都在於為人的福祉，為大眾的生活更符合人性及尊嚴而努力。本地教會在這方面亦努力勸喻及教導人們積極參與各政治活動，以使人在公平和正義的環境下行使應有權利及履行其義務。如在 1987 年，香港推出代議政制發展綠皮書時，當時胡振中主教呼籲基督徒積極閱讀及作出適當的回應；並提醒他們對世間事務的處理是他們的責任；碰到不同意見時，應當互相尊重。³⁸又在 1991 年，香港首先得以直選立法局議員，胡主教提醒信徒要感到這是他們的使命，應以身作則，表現他們對公共福利的責任感與服務精神。再次重申不單是公民的責任，更是信仰的要求，和天主合作去管理、改造、聖化世界。³⁹

在公民參與政治活動上，當中亦提及作為執政者是人民的僕人。「思人民所思，急人民所急」當然首先要親近人民，尊重真

³⁵ 胡振中，《公教報》，1984 年 9 月 14 日。

³⁶ 胡振中，《公教報》，1984 年 10 月 19 日。

³⁷ 陳日君，《聖週牧函》，2007 年。

³⁸ 胡振中，《公教報》，1987 年 7 月 3 日。

³⁹ 胡振中，《公教報》，1990 年 10 月 19 日。

正的老百姓。一切政策該從他們的利益出發。⁴⁰陳主教亦引用自身的經驗來闡釋基督信仰在政治參與方面的角色：

「有人會說你這個主教頻頻出來吵架還敢宣講和平？其實我感到有些冤枉，我絕不喜歡吵架，但我有責任按福音的真理、教會的訓導維護人的權利。民主就是承認人人有資格關心社會的事並積極參與，不應讓權力祇被握在富者和強者的手中。世貿在全球化的同時也造成了貧富懸殊，我們站在貧窮弱小者的身邊，為他們的生機奮鬥，要求真正的平等。希望在聖誕節這「愛的真理」滲入每人的心。祝賀大家在新的一年內享受自由、平等，人人安居樂業，敬主愛人」。⁴¹

陳日君主教再次重申，基督信仰在政治上是要表現積極，為的是維護人的權利，特別是生活在貧窮無依的一群。透過積極參與政治活動，希望帶來一些改變。

3.6 經濟與公民的參與

在基督宗教信仰中，所有的經濟活動必須為所有人和所有民族服務，著重的除本身經濟活動原則外，亦看重其倫理素質和意義的一面。主教們結合本地因素，積極將這理念傳給信眾們，讓他們明白在發展經濟的同時，亦不忘著重維持人類尊嚴、保障人類福祉為大前提。主教們除提醒他們要慷慨解囊，救濟貧苦外，盡力對症治本亦是重要。貧窮的其中一個因素是社會不義，財富分配不均。這就是何以天主教福利會積極進行助人自助的職業訓練支持社會發展工作的原因。⁴²

胡主教又提出，教會在社會福利制度、稅制、政制、經濟發展等問題，要主動回應，不應迴避，要根據實際社會情況，客觀分析，表明教會立場。⁴³公民積極參與社會上的經濟活動，為的

⁴⁰ 陳日君，《聖誕牧函》，2004年。

⁴¹ 陳日君，《聖誕牧函》，2005年。

⁴² 徐誠斌，《公教報》，1970年2月20日。

⁴³ 胡振中，《邁向光輝的十年牧函》。

是建設一個更合符公平公正則的社會，為生活在當中的人得到保障及相應的尊重。

小結：在一家一體的關係上展現「先知」與「僕人」的角色

在上述的分析中可看到，從基督宗教信仰中，在普世教會中所能體現的公民實踐原則，在本地教會同樣能展現那彼此間從屬一家一體的關係。因著這關係的基礎，基督宗教信仰相信所有人皆為上天所創造，這個天家是全人類所共有、共享的。因此，維護人類尊嚴、維護公義與和平、關顧弱小及與他們同行、積極關懷與參與社會事務等實踐，都體現了人類的關係彼此更趨共融團結。在這個關係網中，人透過不同的實踐原則去將當中的關係更加緊密地連上。而在本地教會中，其關係的特色，往往是加入本地的身份元素及社會處境或文化狀況等。使之更能具體地呈現其身份的臨在。如對於本地社會所產生的獨有的問題，如政治、經濟的變化及狀況，如何以多重的身份，在福音精神及教區領導的訓導下，履行當中的實踐原則及其精神。最重要的是在一家一體的關係上展現「先知」與「僕人」的角色。

四. 反思及建議

4.1 對教育的啟示

進一步思索，有關公民身份與實踐原則如何能有效地在社會中落實？除了靠積極推廣有關的教導內容，在其宗教機構環境中作不同的培育外，還有其它途徑能令它更廣泛及更全面被認識、被深化和被展現嗎？筆者相信透過教育這途徑可以達致以上的效果。以上的分析顯示，在原有的公民身份與實踐的理念上，可以加入基督宗教元素。在地理層面上，在世界之上還有一個更高層次的向度，即從基督宗教的角度，天國的層面，一個屬靈及超聖的向度。其次，在公民身份要素上，可包括基督徒公民身份。而這個身份是與其它相排而論，可以用一個整體、兼容所有的視

角去處理。但要將之有效地落實在現實中，筆者相信教育是最好的媒介，教育可以將它的訊息及精神傳達到每一個人身上。

在現實的教育場景中，可透過課程傳遞這方面的培育。本港天主教會曾嘗試透過宗教及道德教育課程⁴⁴，將有關的基督宗教元素滲進在教授社會問題的課題上。有關的課程文件曾提及以下的課程宗旨，當中與社會訓導及倫理有關的主題包括：培育學生以倫理觀念及基督的愛探究社會問題；培育學生崇尚人類尊嚴及基本權利、誠實、公平、正義、守原則、捨己為人、孝順父母、尊重生命、勤勞、節儉、和諧、和平與包容等價值；培育學生關注及認識弱勢社群的需要，為有需要人士服務的精神；增強學生的環保意識及公民責任感，和四海之內皆兄弟的意識。⁴⁵從中可見，課程除了希望在探討社會問題時提供一個天主教的角度供學生思考外，還希望培養學生成為一個擁有天主教信仰特質的公民。

除此之外，課程的內容亦從「修齊治平」及天主教信仰兩個角度去闡述。學生由幼兒至高中畢業的過程中，課程由修身、齊家〔包括原生家庭、學校家庭及教會家庭〕、關愛社會、關心國家、以至兼善天下的漸進式進行道德教育。課程內的宗教及道德知識和價值都源自《天主教教理》的四大支柱。然而，除了參照《天主教教理》，當討論有關社會倫理時，我們亦可引用天主教社會訓導。

此外，在課程的規劃上，由初小至高中有教授與社會方面相關的議題，但大多只集中在關懷貧窮人、學習在團體中如何服務、以公義/公平/平等的角度分析相關社會經濟問題等。這些都只是涉及民生及社會的議題，似乎忽略了政治方面的議題，以及

⁴⁴ 於二千年三月至二零零一年十二月期間召開的教區會議，在「教育與文化」範疇的其中一項建議，是教區應製訂宗教及倫理教育的課程指引。天主教教育事務處於二零零二年十二月開始搜集公教學校及幼稚園校監、校長及部分宗教倫理科教師對此核心課程的意見，並於二零零四年成立專責小組跟進是項工作。專責小組為了落實上述建議，撰寫天主教學校宗教及道德教育課程的諮詢文件。

⁴⁵ 宗教及道德教育課程文件，2006。

如何在社會中充當基督宗教信仰中的先知角色。在培育具基督信仰的公民，有關的培育亦需加強。

4.2 宗教與公民身份

前文曾提及 James Arthur 的研究所提出的幾個問題：其一是一般的公民觀討論都只集中在公民本身的權利、責任及義務，即大多以俗世普遍的概念來闡釋。但他相信不能只靠那些觀念去理解，因在履行權利、責任及義務時，必然要求忠信、忠誠等特質。他提出當中會否涉及一內在的信仰及靈性方面的動機？公民觀是從何而來？當中宗教信仰又扮演著一個什麼角色？那所有的行動又是否一份宗教信仰所驅使及推動？在本文分析中，給予這些問題一個更清晰及確切的答案。從分析中看到，基督宗教信仰相信公民觀內的公民身份皆來自上天，因著其創造及主宰，上天更賦予每個人在現世有這種公民身份。它與一般公民身份的差異在於，它多了一層靈性、甚或超性的幅度，它的基礎及核心便是信仰。這核心推動擁有這身份的人更能實踐教會教導中的精神和意義。

其次，Arthur 亦提出宗教所盛載的價值體系是有助人去模塑公民的身份、素質及其行為，對整體公民觀的發展有着深遠的影響。他指出宗教信仰不只是一種抽象的概念，而是關心在公共領域上的行動及參與，行為是宗教信仰的先決條件，亦即為基督信仰而言，實踐是十分重要的。宗教信仰本身體現了一套價值、思想和感情，它可能成為一重要和決定性因素去模塑國家的政治。Arthur 沒有在其論點上詳細解釋當中的內涵。那些在公共領域上的行動及參與是什麼？本文引用天主教的社會訓導文件作為豐富其內涵的重要參考文件。從中更能明白基督宗教信仰在社會結構及運作中真正扮演的角色及那實踐行動的具體原則。

基督宗教信仰真正影響社會的，其中以橋樑的角色身份，使人類社會能認識及更明白宗教信仰可給予社會問題的思考及可能的答案，將天主國的信念及精神引薦到人類社會中。其次，以新人道的塑造者的身份，主動回應社會上不公義或有違其信仰精神的事情，以信仰精神注入社會各關係。再者，教會及其信徒是

團結共融的標記，這身份表明了基督信徒在社會上的影響，不在於激烈奮進的進行社會改革，而是在於連結各關係，以天主教訓導的精神，活現在社會生活當中。

除此以外，Arthur 提出在基督宗教傳統中，認為盡責任的公民是一種美德；參與政治的過程是一種道德的責任。但從研究分析中發現，在基督宗教信仰中，盡責任及積極投入參與政治和社會事務不只因為一種道德責任而已，而是如 James Arthur 在其文亦有提出的一份內在推動力，但他沒有在這方面詳加闡釋。內在推動力在本研究分析中，便是那對上天絕對的信仰及那與祂所建立的緊密關係，這份動力不但令信徒自身有所改變，還成為一份強大的力量，推動其參與在世社會的所有事務。

基於以上討論，可見基督宗教信仰能給予公民觀另一個可參考及繼續思考的重要面向。這令基督宗教信仰不再只是基督信徒的專利品。因著其普世性的幅度，使全人類能受惠其中；因著其超越性的幅度，它為人類的思考提供一個超越性的方向，不再只局限在個別的地域、民族及時空。

參考書目

中文部分

陳日君。《平安抵岸全靠祂-陳日君樞機公教報文集》。公教報出版社，2010。

朱偉志、伍小蓮、黃奕清。《教會的寶藏：天主教社會訓導簡易本》。香港天主教正義和平委員會出版，2014。

許紀霖。《公共性與公民觀》。南京：江蘇人民出版社，2006。

Robert Nisbet 著，徐啓智。《西方社會思想史》。台北：桂冠圖書股份有限公司，1982。

Derek Heater 著，郭台輝、余慧元譯。《公民身份：世界史、政治學與教育學中的公民理想》。北京：吉林出版集團有限責任公司，2010。

Herve Carrier 著，李燕鵬譯。《重讀天主教社會訓導》。台北：光啟出版社，1998。

John C. Bennett 著，徐慶譽。《基督徒的公民責任》。基督教輔僑出版社，1957。

梵帝岡宗座正義和平委員會。《教會社會訓導彙編》。香港：公教真理學會，2011。

鄔昆如。《天主教的政治觀》。台北：輔仁大學出版社，1988。

天主教香港教區檔案處。《胡振中樞機牧函集》。天主教香港教區檔案處，2005。

天主教香港教區檔案處。《天主教香港教區牧函集》。天主教香港教區檔案處，2007。

英文部份

Arthur, James. 2008. "Christianity, Citizenship and Democracy." in *Education for Citizenship and Democracy*, Edited by James Arthur, Ian Davies and Carile Hahn. London: SAGE. pp. 305-313.

Braaten, Carl E. and Robert W. Jenson. *The Two Cities of God: The Church's Responsibility for the Earthly City*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub., 1997.

Curran, Charles. 1986. *Official Catholic Social Teaching*. New York: Paulist Press.

Insin, Engin F. 1999. *Citizenship and Identity*. London: Sage.

Kammer, Fred. 2001. *Doing Faithjustice: An Introduction to Catholic Social Thought*. New York: Paulist Press.

McCarthy, David Matzko. 2009. *The Heart of Catholic Social Teaching: Its Origins and Contemporary Significance*. Grand Rapids: Mich.: Brazos Press.

Hornsby-Smith, Michael. 2006. *An Introduction to Catholic Social Thought*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Rousseau, Richard W. 2002. *Human Dignity and the Common Good: The Great Papal Social Encyclicals from Leo XIII to John Paul II*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

Thompson, J. Milburn. 1997. *Justice and Peace: A Christian Primer*. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books.

Westheimer, Joel and Joseph Kahne. 2004. "What Kind of Citizen?" *The Politics of Educating for Democracy American Educational Research Journal*. vol. 41, no. 2, Summer, 237-269.

[ABSTRACT] This article aims at examining the role of Christianity in Hong Kong society. It discusses the religious dimension of citizenship and its practices in the Catholic social teaching, as well as the relationship between the religious dimension of citizenship and civic education. It is found that there is a clear relationship between Catholicism and citizenship and the rich meanings of citizenships in the Catholic social teachings. These meanings are important to civic education. The author argues that it is imperative to foster Christian citizens with religious values and Catholic social teachings. Catholic schools play an important role in it through its religious and moral education.

An Irresolvable Tension between Cosmopolitan Citizenship and Patriotic Citizenship in Civic Education—A Rousseauian Perspective

LAM Wing Kwan Anselm

[ABSTRACT] The debate of the approach to civic education in Hong Kong lies upon the notions of citizenships. The foundational principles of cosmopolitan citizenship approach are based on the universal values like justice, human rights and democracy and the patriotic approach instead is based on the sentiment to a particular country and culture. Would they be mutually exclusive? Can patriotism be reconciled with universal morality? Jean Jacques Rousseau, who is a champion of human dignity and rights, advocates both cosmopolitan and patriotic citizenship in his works. According to Rousseau, patriotism is essential for the freedom of citizens. Rousseau understands that man is born free, and everywhere in society he is in chain. He suggests two ways of maintaining freedom in society as in the state of nature, namely education of man in *Émile* and education of citizen in *The Social Contract and other political writings*. I will first illustrate Rousseau's education of man in *Émile*, in which the formation of cosmopolitan citizen is shown. *Amour propre* is the source of the malady of society but also is the origin of morality. I will then articulate how the malady of alienation of citizen is cured by the submission of his own will to the general will and the significance of patriotism as virtue for citizen. The last part of the paper is to evaluate Rousseau's treatment of these two kinds of

education based upon two notions of citizenship and how it shed lights on the conflict in the civic education in Hong Kong. In sum, Rousseau’s education of patriotic citizen and cosmopolitan citizen involves both rationality and sentiment. Freedom is their common goal, even though their paths to freedom are different. The development of democratic and legal system and the formation of patriotic affection in social life and culture are two hands of the Legislator that he can establish a society in which citizens are free. Thus, the formation of patriotism beyond curriculum and the development of democratic system could be the next step to freedom in Hong Kong.

I Introduction

A The Controversy of the Moral and National Education in 2012

In summer 2012, people in Hong Kong witnessed a grand social movement initiated by a group of secondary school students, Scholarism, aiming to protest against the compulsory implementation of the Moral and National Education (MNE) by Hong Kong Government as a brainwash project. Over 100,000 people, including many parents and teachers, gathering in front of the Legislative Council building urged for the withdrawal of the MNE. The Chief Executive of Hong Kong finally announced to withdraw the implementation of MNE, which is widely regarded as the political mission of national identity building. What are the potential reasons of the controversy? Why did secondary students, parents and teachers come together to reject the national education, which is not uncommon in different countries? What is the main issue of the conflict between Hong Kong people and Chinese government? There are different explanations of the controversy of the MNE in 2012.

Some suggest that there is a conflict between the promotion of national patriotism and local Hong Kong liberal civic values. Some claim that the conflict is due to the opposition of the local Hong Kong identity to the Chinese communist national identity.¹ How did the conflict come out? What is its genesis?

One country, two systems, suggested by Deng Xiao Ping in early 80s, is a great political experiment of China.

“After China resumes the exercise of its sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997, Hong Kong's current social and economic systems will remain unchanged, its legal system will remain basically unchanged, its way of life and its status as a free port and an international trade and financial center will remain unchanged and it can continue to maintain or establish economic relations with other countries and regions.”²

This political experiment intends to maintain the social, economic and legal aspect of Hong Kong unchanged after 97 for 50 years. It, however, put two notions of citizenship of these two systems, cosmopolitan citizenship from Hong Kong and patriotic citizenship from China in conflict. Hong Kong has adopted free market economic systems for many years and the process of democratization has been undertaking rapidly since early 90s. Liberal

¹ Paul Morris and Edward Vickers have done a good literature review of the explanation of the controversy. See Paul Morris and Edward Vickers, “Schooling, Politics and the Construction of Identity in Hong Kong: the 2012 ‘Moral and National Education’ Crisis in Historical Context,” *Comparative Education* (2015, Vol. 51 No. 3), p. 306.

² Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Volume 3* (Beijing, China: Ren Min Publishing Company, 1993), p. 30.

individualistic civic rights and duties clearly shown in the document, *School Education in Hong Kong: A Statement of Aims* issued in 1993 are emphasized in civic education. “Schools should help students to become aware of Hong Kong as a society; to develop a sense of civic duty, responsibility to the family and service to the community, and to exercise tolerance in interacting with others...”³ School leavers are educated as a responsible citizen in Hong Kong, a pluralistic cosmopolitan city. It is worth noting that the orientation of the civic education has been changed after 97. Building national identity became one of the key tasks of civic education. In 2010, “Moral and National Education” (MNE) was introduced as a compulsory school subject. A Curriculum Guide was issued in 2012, in which the building of national identity as a learning objective was clearly mentioned.

The overall learning objective for this domain is to help students enhance their national identity, understand their roles, rights and responsibilities as nationals, foster a sense of affection for the country, actively learn about the national situation and explore the opportunities and challenges of the country’s development such as achievements, difficulties, constraints and directions for improvement. It also helps students enhance national qualities such as the ability to distinguish right from wrong and to think independently. It encourages them to stay closely connected with the motherland, stand together in

³ Education and Manpower Branch, *School Education in Hong Kong: A Statement of Aims* (Hong Kong: Government Secretariat, 1993), p. 19. Emphasis added.

adversity, and contribute to the development and betterment of the country and its people.⁴

Students are expected to learn a kind of Machiavellian extreme patriotism claiming that it is “Our Country, right *or* wrong.” in the curriculum.⁵ Chinese patriotic citizenship based upon the Socialist collective beliefs is acknowledged in the Curriculum Guide. Following the “One Country, Two Systems” principle, how can Chinese government keep the local liberal Hong Kong citizenship unchanged under the sovereignty of China? We see that civic education is closely related to the notion of citizenship, what should the purpose and practice of civic education be? What are the meanings of two notions of citizenship and patriotism?

B Citizenship and Civic Education

Civic education aims to help students to become a responsible citizen by learning the rights and duties of citizen. Its curriculum also consists of teaching “knowledge, skills and attitudes that are required for children to be a virtuous and civically productive member of society”.⁶ Civic education curriculum is designed according to the notion of citizenship of the society, which defines the rights, duties and virtues of the member of the community. The notion of citizenship can be expressed in different forms, namely, legal,

⁴ The Curriculum Development Council, *Moral and National Education, Curriculum Guide, (Primary 1 to Secondary 6)*, April, 2012, p. 31. Emphasis added.

⁵ Primoratz, Igor, “Patriotism”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/patriotism/>>. 2.2.1

⁶ Meira Levinson, “Citizenship and Civic Education,” in *Encyclopedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy*, ed. Denis C. Phillips (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2014), p. 1. URL=< <http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12701475>>

political, social and moral. It first denotes a legal status or a political standing in a community. A citizen entitled by law has rights protected by state and duties to state, for instance, right to vote and duty of paying tax. Moreover, it also can be a normative moral standing that represents a particular ideal of civic virtues. Legal rights and duties and civic virtues vary in different political systems. For instance, freedom of expression is the basic right protected in liberal democratic society but can be sacrificed in communist society. Thus there can be big disagreements of civic education curriculum in different countries according to their diverse notions of citizenship.

We have seen that there are two different notions of citizenship adopted in Hong Kong and China, namely, cosmopolitan citizenship and patriotic citizenship respectively. Cosmopolitan citizenship forming a citizen of the world induces a political and moral commitment to universal human rights rather than the moral values or ideology of a particular country. The citizen of the world, as Stoics claims, gives his/her allegiance "to no mere form of government, no temporal power, but to the moral community made up by the humanity of all human beings."⁷ The civic education of Cosmopolitan citizenship, concerning the universal moral principles for the rest of the world, is rational in nature.

Patriotic citizenship, on the other hand, is sentimental. Patriotism, as Stephen Nathanson defines, is the love of fatherland. It concerns about the affection to one's own country. A patriotic citizen, moreover, identifies oneself with one's own country and thus the well-being of the self and the well-being of the country become one. A patriotic citizen out of the patriotic affection desires for the

⁷ Martha Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitan," in *For Love of Country, Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1996), p. 7.

well-being of the country and even is willing to sacrifice oneself for it.⁸

As civic education is closely related to the notion of citizenship, how can Hong Kong government reconcile two notions of citizenship in one civic education curriculum? Civic education as a kind of political socialization of national identity after 97 becomes a hot potato for local government. Can these two notions of citizenship be reconciled? The moral and political tradition, the main stream of Enlightenment, including Kantianism and some forms of Utilitarianism, asserts the universal, impartial and impersonal moral principle as the moral and political allegiance. Self-interest, emotions and feelings, values and virtues of particular countries have nothing to do with moral judgment or political commitment. Cosmopolitan citizen, alleged to this universal ideal of humanity is indifferent to race, nationality, or religion. He or she does not have any preference to his or her fatherland or compatriots, when there is a conflict between his or her own country and other countries, or his or her compatriots and people of other countries. The ideal of universal humanity precedes the patriotic sentiment of fatherland and compatriots.⁹ However, the love of abstract humanity is criticized as one loves an empty abstract ideal resulting in loving no one in reality.

On the other hand, proponents of patriotic citizenship claim that we learn moral virtues in a community upon which our identity formed and our sense of belonging grown. It is natural to develop affection towards a particular person or community rather than an

⁸ Stephen Nathanson, "In Defense of 'Moderate Patriotism'," *Ethics* (1989), Vol. 99, pp. 535–552. Reprinted in Primoratz (ed.) (2002). It is quoted in "Patriotism" by Igor Primoratz, 2015.

⁹ Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitan," p. 7.

abstract ideal. Thus when a compatriot and a foreigner are in need of your help, it is natural to give a hand to the compatriot.¹⁰ This preferential option for the fatherland and compatriots is criticized, as it becomes a biased and hostile attitude toward foreigners.

Can these two notions of citizenship be reconciled? McIntyre claims that the conflict between them is inevitable, for instance, the conflict arises from scarcity of essential resources and the ways of life among countries.¹¹ Cosmopolitan citizens count each individual person equal weight but patriotic citizens would strive for the interest of his or her country.

Jean Jacques Rousseau, who is a champion of human dignity and rights, advocates both cosmopolitan and patriotic citizenship in his works. It is worth noting that patriotism is essential for the freedom of citizens. Some scholars think that Rousseau intended to show that the tension of these two notions of citizenship could not be resolved as Rousseau mentioned their incompatibility in certain works.¹² The other camp of scholars, on the contrary, claims that although Rousseau has not reconciled these two notions explicitly, they are consistent and coherent in his philosophy.¹³

¹⁰ Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiment*, eds. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (1790; reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 136-137.

¹¹ Alasdair MacIntyre, *Is Patriotism a Virtue?* (Kansas: University of Kansas, 1984), p. 6.

¹² Gourevitch, Gauthier, and Yonah claim that Rousseau acknowledged the resolvable tension between two types of education in *Émile* and *Letters Written from the Mountain*. See David Gauthier, *Rousseau: The Sentiment of Existence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Victor Gourevitch, trans. *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings of Rousseau* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); and Yossi Yonah, " 'Ubi Patria-Ibi Bene': The Scope and Limits of Rousseau's Patriotic Education," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* (1999, Vol. 18), pp. 365-388.

¹³ Dent thinks that Rousseau favored the priority given to the demand of the common

In this article, I will argue that Rousseau did not intend to reconcile these two notions of citizenship into one coherent theory of education. The education of man forming cosmopolitan citizen and education of citizen forming patriotic citizen are kept separately. The essential concern of Rousseau is not so much of education as freedom. Rousseau understands that man is born free, and everywhere in society he is in chain.¹⁴ He suggests two ways of maintaining freedom in society as in the state of nature, namely education of man in *Émile* and education of citizen in *The Social Contract* and other political writings. I will first illustrate Rousseau's education of man in *Émile*, in which the formation of cosmopolitan citizen is shown. *Amour propre* is the source of the malady of society but also is the origin of morality. I will then articulate how the malady of alienation of citizen is cured by the submission of his own will to the general will and the significance of patriotism as virtue for citizen. In turn, the education of citizen will be examined. The last part of the paper is to evaluate Rousseau's treatment of these two kinds of education based upon two notions of citizenship and how it sheds lights on the conflict in the civic education in Hong Kong.

good when the common good is in conflict with natural inclination. See N. J. H. Dent, *Rousseau: An Introduction to his Psychological, Social and Political Theory* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1988), pp.164-5. Besides, Neuhouser argues that *Émile* is not made to remain always solitary but to live with others. *Emile* has learned the art for a man and a citizen for living with his fellows. See Frederic Neuhouser, "Rousseau and The Conflict Between The Educations Of 'Man' And 'Citizen'," in *Institutions of Education: then and today* (Boston, Brill, 2010), pp. 41.

¹⁴ Rousseau, "On Social Contract" in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 41..

II Formation of Cosmopolitan Citizenship

A *Natural Freedom in the State of Nature*

The essential concern of Rousseau's philosophy is freedom. Man was free in the state of nature according to Rousseau illustrated in the *Second Discourse*. Although the natural man is solitary and his faculty of perfectibility is dormant, he is self-sufficient and free.¹⁵ His primary concern, out of self-love, *amour de soi*, is self-preservation. Since he can satisfy his desires, which do not exceed his physical needs, on his own, natural man is independent. He does not need the help of other human beings. In other words, his self-love comes from the sentiment of his existence and he obeys only his own will. The natural freedom consists in his independence and self-sufficiency. However, his faculty of perfectibility develops and *amour propre* burgeons, when he is inevitably living and working with other human beings due to the need of corporation for self-preservation. Natural man then yearns for regards from others.¹⁶ Public esteem instead of self-existence becomes the source of the sweet sentiment of existence. The natural *amour-de-soi* develops into an unnatural or artificial *amour propre* that engenders jealousy, vanity, ambition, shame and pride. How can man living in society be free as in the state of nature? Rousseau thus proposed a remedy in his great work of education, *Émile*.

¹⁵ Rousseau, "Second Discourse," in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 141-142.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 175.

B Education of Man in Émile

Formation of a citizen enjoying the natural freedom as the natural man is the main task of Rousseau in his masterpiece of education. At the beginning of the Book *Émile*, Rousseau clearly distinguished two kinds of education, namely, education from nature and education from man. The former is for the education of man and the latter is for citizen. Based upon the foundation of natural goodness, the education from nature aims to let the child to be self-sufficient and not to follow the opinions of others in society. It endeavors to form the child to be a natural man who is entirely for himself. Natural man is numerical unity, the absolute whole, which is relative only to itself or its kind.¹⁷ On the other hand, the education from man aims to form citizen in society by denaturing. Citizen is only a fractional unity dependent on the denominator, his value is determined by his relation to the whole, which is the social body.¹⁸ The education from nature, avoiding from being denatured by public education, is only implemented at home as domestic and private class. This is only for few special children, who can be taught by an enlightened tutor, like Rousseau. Rousseau here did not say that education from man is inferior to the education from nature. He just brought out their differences and stated that the goal of education is to let the child either to be a man or to be a citizen.

As stated in the *Second Discourse, amour de soi*, the self-love of natural man was burgeoned from the sentiment of existence. Keeping connected with this sentiment, *Émile*, the pupil, is taught how to live out of necessity and becomes independent from others. To live is not only to breathe but also to act. He learns how to make

¹⁷ Rousseau, *Émile, or On Education*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), pp. 39.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

use of his organs, senses, faculties of all the parts of himself to give him the sentiment of existence to the most.¹⁹ Thus he can have a felt life.

Child is kept in balance of his needs and his capabilities. He can satisfy his needs by himself without seeking help from others. Although he asks for food and care from others, he does not recognize his parents as other wills. He manipulates his parents by his will because of his weakness. Child, learning the difference between the self and the outside world, is not capable of making the distinction between things and wills of other people. Everything is regarded as things instead of other wills for the child.²⁰

Imagination, the stimulant of *amour propre*, is kept dormant by preventing *Émile* from reading books.²¹ Despite that, man is not made to live alone. It is inevitable for *Émile* to have relationship with others. He becomes extreme sensitive and perceptive to other people's attention. He projects his will outside himself and becomes aware of other people gazing at him. *Amour propre* and sexual love emerge. *Amour propre* consists of two elements. First, it involves comparison with other people. Second, one expects other people showing same preference as you show to yourself. It amounts to say one yearns for other's recognition of one's superiority. It is the essence of love that involves comparison with others and craves for the love of another person to you in preference to others. *Amour propre* and love is the most important subject of education.²²

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 42.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 64-66.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 183-4.

²² Ibid., pp. 220.

Rousseau keeps the *amour propre* in control by compassion. How to make sure that one's comparison with others resulting in compassion instead of other sentiments? Émile is instructed to read history, in which men from afar are shown to him. Learning history of one's own country is essential for citizen forming a social self.²³ However, there is a flip side that while one identifies himself with the historical heroes, he is discouraged by his real self. Thus Émile is instructed to read history in a new way. He identifies himself with these heroes as an ordinary person with weaknesses and imperfections. He emulates their examples but also feels sorry for their weakness as well. Since Émile sees both the excellences and weaknesses of the heroes, he will not hate nor envy them but take pity on them. Émile thinks himself in the same way as he is neither a genius nor a dull but an ordinary man.²⁴ Rousseau was successive in keeping Émile's *amour propre* from becoming pride or contempt. Nonetheless, although he reads the history of his country, this way of reading history does not foster his love of fatherland. Émile is not proud of the heroes of his country in history.

The final stage of the education of man is to learn keeping promise in marriage agreement and the social contract with the state. Émile is introduced to Sophie, with whom he falls in love. He then learns keeping commitment in marriage as a husband and a father. Love is a sweet sentiment, which makes one strongly attach to the beloved. The strong attachment of feeling on Sophie will induce fear of losing her. "The fear of losing everything will prevent you from possessing anything. As a result of having wanted to follow only your passions, you will never be able to satisfy them...You will be

²³ Ibid., pp. 236-7.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 245.

miserable, and you will become wicked."²⁵ Natural freedom consists in self-sufficiency and independence. Thus, detachment from persons or things is a critical step to freedom. He, therefore, is asked to leave Sophie as if she is dead.

Moreover, Émile has to know the status and duties of husband and father, government, law, fatherland and the price of being permitted to live in the civil society before getting married.²⁶ "But, before marrying, you must know what kind of man you want to be, what you want to spend your life doing, and what measures you want to take to assure yourself and your family of bread."²⁷ He travels around in Europe to learn the duty of a citizen before taking a place in the civil order. Émile loves Sophie but not the country where he was born and grew up. He learns the duty of a citizen but with no affection to the country.

The final goal of the education from nature is forming a man. Émile finally becomes free from dependence on man by returning to dependence on nature. When he returns to his tutor, he said, "Rich or poor, I shall be free. I shall not be free in this or that land, in this or that region; I shall be free everywhere on earth...for *I am a man*."²⁸ "What difference does it make to me where I am? It makes a difference to you that you are where you can fulfill all your duties, and one of those duties is an attachment to the place of your birth. Your compatriots protected you as a child, you ought to love them as *a man*."²⁹ As a cosmopolitan citizen, Émile is free everywhere. "Freedom is found in no form of government; it is in the heart of free

²⁵ Ibid., pp.444.

²⁶ Ibid., pp.448.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 456.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 472. Emphasis added.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 473-4. Emphasis added.

man. He takes it with him everywhere.”³⁰ The education of man makes *Émile* good rather than virtuous. In order to make oneself free, one has to do nothing. It suffices to keep one from being yielded to dependence on others but necessity. The education of citizen rather is different from the education of *Émile*. The main task of *The Social Contract*, like the book *Émile*, is freedom. Citizens are made virtuous rather than good to be free and patriotism is the significant virtue for citizens. The freedom of citizen is different from the natural freedom. Below I will discuss how Rousseau delineates the path to freedom for citizen in *The Social Contract* and his major political writings.

II The Education of Citizen

A *Virtue: the strength to fulfill duty*

The education of man founded on nature aims to educate *Émile*, being independent from others' opinion, following the natural voice of heart, to be a man for himself. On the other hand, the education of citizen founded on denatured human effort, aims to educate citizen, striving against passions, following the general will, to be a man for others. Natural man is free because he lives for himself disregarding others' opinion on him. He is not alienated from himself that his appearance has no difference from his being. However, civil man, living with others and for others, is no longer a unity whole himself. “Civil man is only a fractional unity dependent on the denominator; his value is determined by his relation to the whole, which is the social body.”³¹ Although he knows of his duty to his fellow citizens

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 39-40.

and the state, compassion is not strong enough to stop him from manipulating others for his own interest.

In spite of the rule of the love of men, it is not easy to choose between his interests and the interests of his fellows. Other than the conflict of interests among individuals, it is clear that moral goodness, e.g., duty, can be in conflict with natural goodness, e.g., self-preservation. Rousseau summarized it well in the *Letter to Beaumont*,

“When all the agitated particular interests finally collide, when love of self put into fermentation changes into amour-propre, when opinion making the whole universe necessary to each man, *makes them all each other’s born enemies and determines that none finds his own good except in someone else’s ill*, then conscience, weaker than the excited passions, is stifled by them, and is no longer in men’s mouth except as a word made to deceive each other.”³²

Rousseau brought out the essence of relationship in the modern commercial society, i.e., one cannot be good to oneself without being at the expense of others. In order to preserve justice and the moral relationship among men, men have to compromise his self-interests with the common interests and the duty of the member of the community. Rousseau observed that man living in the society inevitably faces the conflicts of interests among men. “For in the

³² Rousseau, “Letter to Beaumont” in *Letter to Beaumont, Letters Written From the Mountain, and Related Writings*, trans. Christopher Kelly and Judith R. Bush, ed. Christopher Kelly and Eve Grace (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 2001), pp. 29. Emphasis added.

social state the good of one necessarily constitutes the harm of another.”³³ It is impossible to benefit oneself without doing harm to others. But since each man’s force and freedom are his primary instruments of self-preservation, how can he commit them without harming himself, and without neglecting the cares he owes himself? Fulfilling civic duty to other fellows and the state is against his natural inclination. How can a virtuous citizen be free? Since it is so difficult to conquer our passions and opt for duty, are all men capable of acting virtuously? Why should citizen be virtuous? Why should citizen be just? What is the foundation of moral obligation for Rousseau?

In *Social Contract*, Rousseau endeavored “to find a form of association that will defend and protect the person and goods of each associate with the full common force, and by means of which each, unifying with all, nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as before.”³⁴ He proposed to establish a body politic, as a moral being that has a will, and this general will, contrary to the individual will, always tending to preserve the common good for the whole and each parts, is the source of the law.³⁵ Thus in order to be in unity with the whole and all other parts, Rousseau asserted that “each of us puts his person and his full power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.”³⁶ This forms a common self in

³³ Rousseau, *Émile*, pp. 104, note.

³⁴ Rousseau, “Social Contract,” in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 49-50.

³⁵ Rousseau, “Political Economy,” in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 6.

³⁶ Rousseau, “Social Contract,” pp. 50.

unity with the others under the general will. General will concerns the common good of the whole in which each civil man is a fraction of whole. The general will is enacted through the law. Natural man is free as he obeys no law from outside but his natural inner voice. In civil society, man obeys the law from outside and is kept as free as before. The freedom a citizen enjoys is different from the natural freedom, which consists in self-sufficiency and independence. The moral freedom of citizen rather consists in self-legislation. "But when the whole people enacts statutes for the whole people it considers only itself, and if a relation is then formed, it is between the entire object from one point of view and the entire object from another point of view, with no division of the whole."³⁷ Civil man submitting his own will to the general will, observing the law without regarding his own interests, obeying only himself, is as free as the natural man in the state of nature.

Citizen is asked by law to replace his private self with the social or public self. While citizen as a moral being facing conflicts between self-interests and duty, he will endeavor to overcome the passion of self-interest for duty. He tries to put aside his own needs and passions and cares only about his duty and the common good. In addition, civil man's struggle is a battle between the true source of strength, virtue and its pertinacious enemy, passion. Thus, virtue is the strength that man needs to conquer his passions for the sake of fulfilling his duty. "This word virtue signifies 'strength'. There is no virtue at all without struggle; there is none without victory. Virtue does not consist merely in being just, but in being so by triumphing

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 67.

over one's passions, by ruling over one's own heart."³⁸ Virtue conquers passions for duty in the struggle.

Rousseau claimed that "A person who knows how to govern his own heart, keep all his passions under control, over whom personal interest and sensual desires have no power, and who both in public and in private with no witness does only what is just and honest on every occasion, without regard for the secret wishes of his heart, he alone is a virtuous man."³⁹

How can a civil man who is concerned much about his self-interest sacrifice himself for the common good of the country? Rousseau proposed a legal foundation for moral obligation in the *Social Contract*, "Indeed, each individual can, as a man, have a private will contrary to or differing from the general will he has as a Citizen. His private interest can speak to him quite differently from the common interest...that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body; which means only that he will be forced to be free."⁴⁰ The law dictates citizens to be virtuous. However, since man is preoccupied by his own interests, the law cannot guarantee that man does not perform injustice acts covertly. Glaucon's challenge to moral obligation in Plato's *Republic* is not yet solved. Glaucon claimed that an unjust man, while doing the greatest injustice, will feign the greatest reputation for justice. The appearance of justice shields him from legal sanctions. He endeavors to deceive other people to believe that he is just without

³⁸ Rousseau, "Letter to Franquières" in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 267.

³⁹ Rousseau, "Judge of Jean-Jacques," *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, Vol 1, tran. Judith R. Bush, Christopher Kelly, and Roger D. Masters, ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly, (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1990), pp. 158.

⁴⁰ Rousseau, "Social Contract," pp. 141.

being just.⁴¹ Rousseau agreed that "the worst of all abuses is to obey the laws in appearance only to break them safely in fact."⁴² Legal sanction is not sufficient to ensure moral obligation. Education of citizenship is not only about idea of justice or fear of punishment but love of duty and his fatherland. Rousseau turned the focus of the formation of virtuous citizen from the establishment of republican legal system to patriotic sentiment. Government, other than providing education and examples, should create a patriotic culture in society. "Love of fatherland is the most effective...every man is virtuous when his particular will conforms in all things to the general will, and we readily want [or will] what the people we love want [or will]."⁴³ Education of virtuous citizenship consists in reason, making citizen to know the civic duties, compassion, helping him being repugnant to seeing his compatriots suffering, and love of fatherland. Patriotic virtue is a transformed amour-propre, which drives a citizen to yearn for the public honor.⁴⁴ Although compassion, or say the natural sentiment of humanity, is the source of justice by which we go out from ourselves, it is not strong enough to withhold the natural inclination to self-interest. "Pity is obscure and lively in savage man, developed but weak in civil man."⁴⁵ As a civil man, who is able to distinguish himself and others, at the sight of a suffering man will think that it is you who suffer, I am safe. It will be weakened as it spreads further to other societies. Nonetheless, this can be complemented by the love towards spouse or family members.

⁴¹ Plato, *Republic*, tran. G.M.A. Grube, revised by C.D.C. Reeve, Hackett, 1992, 361a.

⁴² Rousseau, "Political Economy," in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 14.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 15.

⁴⁴ Judith Shklar, *Men and Citizen, A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 66.

⁴⁵ Rousseau, "Second Discourse," pp. 153.

Therefore this sentiment of pity to others is useful only to those who are living with us.⁴⁶ The civic virtue, a transformed *amour propre*, burgeons the strong love towards the compatriots who are united together by common interest and the fatherland which protects them from dangers and results in enhancing the strength to fulfill duty. “It is patriotism that produced the many immortal actions.”⁴⁷

Rousseau said that his commitment to be virtuous in the inspiration on the road to Vincennes was out of the noblest pride.⁴⁸ Like the Spartan woman mentioned in *Émile*, she asked for news not about her sons but whether they won the war. The death of his son for Sparta is an honor of his family. His mother is proud of the sacrifice of his son for his fatherland. Rousseau said, “This is the female citizen.”⁴⁹ A citizen faces the choice of either following his inclinations or fulfilling his duties in society. He, however, cannot keep lingering between them. Although the choice for duty is painful, it is made possible with the driven force of national pride.

In addition, citizen has to get to know the general will in order to conform his individual act to it. How to make sure that the will a citizen knows is the general will? There are only few people in society like a philosopher who is able to reason abstract idea of good and justice. Therefore, it is difficult for ordinary citizen to get to know the general will by abstract reasoning. Civil men take the risk of error of understanding of general will and the judgment of individual act. They may confuse their inclinations with general will.

⁴⁶ Rousseau, “Political Economy,” pp. 15.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.16.

⁴⁸ Rousseau, “The Confessions and Correspondence, Including the Letters to Malesherbes,” *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, Vol 5, tran. Christopher Kelly, ed. Christopher Kelly, Roger D. Masters and Peter G. Stillman, (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1995), pp. 350.

⁴⁹ Rousseau, *Émile*, pp. 40.

How to avoid this danger and keep citizen on track to follow the general will? According to Rousseau, man does not start to learn justice from the principles of universal humanity and the social actions of all people. On the contrary, “we conceive of the general society in terms of our particular societies, the establishment of small Republics leads us to think of the large one, and *we do not properly begin to become men until after having been Citizens.*”⁵⁰

B The Patriotic Education of Citizen

Patriotism is the essential part of the education of citizenship. Patriotic virtue strengthens the national unity by subjecting particular will to general will and makes citizens willing to defend their fatherland against foreigners. Patriotic love is much more important for making citizen and building nation. “Loving their fatherland, they will serve it out of zeal and with all their heart. With this sentiment alone, legislation, even if it were bad, would make good Citizens; and only good Citizens ever make for the force and prosperity of the State.”⁵¹ How to foster the patriotic virtues while people are corrupted by vanity and pride? At the end of the *First Discourse*, Rousseau exclaimed, “O Virtue! Sublime science of simple souls, are so many efforts and so much equipment really required to know you? Are not your principles engraved in all hearts, and is it not enough in order to learn your Laws to return into oneself and to listen to the voice of one’s conscience in the silence of the

⁵⁰ Rousseau, “Geneva Manuscript,” in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 158. Emphasis added. McIntyre also makes a similar claim.

⁵¹ Rousseau, “Considerations on the Government of Poland,” in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 184.

passions? That is genuine Philosophy,...”⁵² Rousseau stated that virtue education has little to do with intellectual understanding of concept. The truth which is the goal of philosophy is found not in vigorous study but in seeing, feeling, experiencing nature and simple ways not hindered by complications. As stated above, if patriotic education can be learned only through abstract concepts, only few people are capable of learning it.

Thus State endeavors to form patriotic citizen by national education. National public education is the important mission of the government for nation building. It aims to ignite the fire of love of fatherland, love of the law and of freedom in the heart of citizens. It is worth noting that Rousseau’s patriotic education is different from the Machiavellian extreme patriotism. Rousseau’s patriotism is grounded on the state model founded on the general will. Thus love of fatherland is closely united with the love of the law and of freedom. National education directs the tastes and opinions of citizen by inclination, passion, and necessity. Unlike the education of man in *Émile*, education of citizen makes use of the desire for emulation of national heroes and the pride of national achievements by reading geography and history of his own country, the great deeds and life of the illustrious national heroes. The love of fatherland will “makes up his whole existence, he sees only his fatherland, he lives only for it; when he is alone, he is nothing; when he no longer has a fatherland, he no longer is, and if he is not dead, he is worse than dead.”⁵³ In *The Considerations on the Government of Poland*, Rousseau asserted that in order to nurture the patriotic spirit and culture, the Polish

⁵² Rousseau, “First Discourse,” in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 28.

⁵³ Rousseau, “Considerations on the Government of Poland,” in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 189.

government should embrace some principles. A foreigner, who does not possess the patriotic spirit, teaches national history and illustrious national heroes with no enthusiasm and heart. Thus no foreigners nor priest but Poles only can be teachers of national education. Besides, that left some children behind and lose the opportunity of study would sprout the social inequalities, which can be the source of social faction and unrest. Educational equality should be maintained. Children play together in public may help them aspire for the common goal. In addition, playing game in public accustoms them from early on to rule, to equality, to fraternity, to competitions, to living under the eyes of their fellow-citizens and to seeking public approbation.⁵⁴ In sum, learning the history of the country where he was born, maintaining educational equality, and the participation of communal life foster the patriotic spirit and national pride.

It is clear for Rousseau, patriotic citizenship is essential for the existence and the development of state. On the contrary, education of man weakens the unity of the state. The universal love of humanity encouraged by cosmopolitan citizenship will weaken the love of fatherland and the unity of the country. According to Rousseau, Christian, a typical example of cosmopolitan citizen, cannot be a patriotic citizen. Christians yearn for perfection in the eternal city in heaven rather than the city on earth. They do not have any passion for the country they are living. The temporal law of the state is a necessary evil for salvation, which they obey passively out of fear. The Christian spirit is contrary to the patriotic spirit. "How can you fail to see that only great passions do great things, and that whoever has no other passion than that for his Salvation will never do anything great in the temporal realm?"⁵⁵ Rousseau replied to Usteri.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 189-193.

⁵⁵ Rousseau, "Letters to Usteri," in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political*

Christians claim that they strive for the universal fraternal love of neighbor according to the Gospel. However, Rousseau regarded it as an excuse of loving no one if you do not love your compatriot in front of you. Cosmopolites would have no preference to anyone in need, even their family members or compatriots. It would result in loving no one.⁵⁶

Furthermore, due to the promotion of happiness of people as the main task of government, Rousseau preferred Cato, the citizen, to Socrates, the philosopher. “The virtue of Socrates would make for his own happiness, the virtue of Cato would seek his happiness in that of all...for no one has ever made a people of wise men, but it is not impossible to make a people happy.”⁵⁷

In sum, Citizens are forced to be free as before because he is an autonomous person in society. He conforms his individual will to the general will, which regards him as a part of the whole. That he obeys the law set according to general will is obeying his own will. This self-legislation becomes possible not only by the establishment of law but also by the transformed *amour propre*, patriotic virtue. What do we learn from Rousseau’s proposals of education for the controversy of civic education in Hong Kong?

Writings, trans. Victor Gourevitch, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 265.

⁵⁶ Rousseau, “Geneva Manuscript,” pp. 158; *Émile*, pp. 39.

⁵⁷ Rousseau, “Political Economy,” pp.16.

III Patriotic Education Beyond Curriculum: Rousseauian Insights

Rousseau delineated two different models of education overcoming the shortcomings of *amour propre* and leading to freedom. Can educators adopt these two models at the same time in one curriculum? Are they compatible? Rousseau clearly mentioned that they are incompatible. Educators can only choose one. "Forced to combat nature or the social institutions, one must choose between making a man or a citizen, for one cannot make both at the same time."⁵⁸ The consequence of the ambitious educator who wants both would get nothing.

"He who in the civil order wants to preserve the primacy of the sentiments of nature does not know what he wants. Always in contradiction with himself, always floating between his inclinations and his duties, he will never be either man or citizen. He will be good neither for himself nor for others. He will be one of these men of our days: a Frenchman, an Englishman, a bourgeois. He will be nothing."⁵⁹

Nonetheless, Rousseau had mentioned that *Émile*, the student, has learned the rights and duties of a citizen as stated in *Social Contract*. Is *Émile* a virtuous citizen and a good man at the same time?⁶⁰ No, he is educated to be a free man like a Christian having no attachment to any country. It is no doubt that *Émile* is taught to

⁵⁸ Rousseau, *Émile*, pp. 39.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 40.

⁶⁰ Frederic Neuhouser, "Rousseau and the Conflict Between the Educations Of 'Man' And 'Citizen'," in *Institutions of Education: then and today* (Boston, Brill, 2010). He argues that the two notions of citizenship are compatible for Rousseau as *Émile* is educated to be a man and citizen.

live tranquilly under a government and the simulacra of laws. He owes the country he lives the morality of his action and the love of virtue. He is able to fulfill all his duties as a virtuous citizen and will be free under the law. It seems that *Émile* is a good man and a virtuous citizen at the same time. However, it is worth noting that Rousseau advised *Émile* to love his compatriots as a *man*.⁶¹ *Émile* would not become friendly only to his compatriots but hostile to foreigners. The foundation of his love is not patriotism but universal sentiment of humanity. He can behave as a virtuous citizen but out of different motivation and principles. He loves his fatherland and compatriots without attaching it with fear of losing them. *Émile* is primarily a citizen of the world or men and a citizen of our country or fatherland secondarily. *Émile* is asked to live in a society to be an example of a free man to other citizens. “Your example will serve them better than all our books, and the good they see you do will touch them more than all our vain speeches.”⁶² *Émile*, a good man living in a society, is useful for the education of citizen. Civil man will learn how to be a virtuous citizen but without forgetting his primary identity as man by *Émile*’s examples.

Rousseau clearly stated that education of man and education of citizen are incompatible in public education.

“Patriotism and humanity... are incompatible virtues in their very thrust, especially so in an entire people. The Lawgiver who strives for them both will achieve neither: such a combination has never been seen; it will never be seen, because it is against

⁶¹ Rousseau, *Émile*, pp. 473.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 474.

nature, and it is impossible to assign two objects to one and the same passion.”⁶³

The education of man is suitable for domestic and the education of citizen is for public. They cannot be put into one education curriculum together as their orientations to the cure of the bondage in society are different. One is keeping the natural goodness and becoming independent from others. The other one is identifying an individual with the common self so as to become self-legislation. It does not imply that these two types of education cannot be implemented in the society together. They can be implemented in different aspects, one for domestic and other for public. Then as mentioned above, the good man is useful for the education of citizen.

If Rousseau agreed to the irresolvable tension between these two notions of citizenship, does it shed light to the conflict in civic education in Hong Kong?

Different scholars have tried to find a middle way out of the conflict. Constitutional patriotism, a concept Habermas made popularized, is an integration of universal morality and patriotism. Citizen is loyal to the values and principles of law and the procedures of liberal democratic constitution but not the pre-political values like race, religion and culture. The patriot loves the values embodied in the constitution of his country and so he would go beyond the love of the fatherland to the universal humanity. It is criticized by Müller that Constitutional Patriotism appears to be an universalist but is patriotic through and through. The origin of this idea came from

⁶³ Rousseau, "Letters Written From The Mountains" in *Letter to Beaumont, Letters Written From the Mountain, and Related Writings*, trans. Christopher Kelly and Judith R. Bush, ed. Christopher Kelly and Eve Grace, (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2001), pp. 149n.

West Germany, a half nation, with a sense of deeply compromised nationality on account of Nazi past. It is not application to other countries. Constitutional patriotism, in short, is a sort of particularism in universalist disguise.⁶⁴ Robert Audi brings out that the conflict looks irresolvable as two notions of citizenship go to extreme. A society can only adopt one notion of citizenship. It becomes an all or none situation. Audi claims that different areas in society that can adopt different notions. For instance, patriotic nationalism applies on area of defense and cosmopolitanism on economic and trade.⁶⁵ This eclectic approach is similar to the civic education curriculum in Hong Kong after 97. Thus far, Cosmopolitan citizenship and Patriotic citizenship as a normative concept cannot come together in one education curriculum. Nonetheless, can they be applied in different arena without conflict? Patriotism is generally regarded as irrational and its formation is sentimental. It is mainly concerned about the attachment to a particular country. Rather Cosmopolitan citizenship is rational, impartial and impersonal. Detachment rather than attachment to a community is valued. This understanding creates an insurmountable obstacle between them. Nevertheless, Rousseau's education of patriotic citizen and cosmopolitan citizen involves both rationality and sentiment. Both of their goals are freedom, even though their characteristics of freedom are different. The integration of rationality and sentiment and freedom as the final goal of human development are the main characteristics of Rousseau's theory of domestic and public education.

⁶⁴ Müller, Jan-Werner, "On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism," *Contemporary Political Theory* (2006, Vol.5), pp. 278–296.

⁶⁵ Robert Audi, "Nationalism, Patriotism, and Cosmopolitanism in an Age of Globalization," *The Journal of Ethics* (2009, Vol. 13 No. 4), pp. 365-381.

Rousseau's patriotism is different from Machiavellian patriotism, which asks patriots to sacrifice themselves for the country for any reason. Rousseau's version is a democratic patriotism. Citizens are able to overcome their self-interest and love their fatherland because they are treated well equally. Each one of them is respected equally as a whole. It is worth reading the long quotation from Rousseau here.

"Do we want peoples to be virtuous? Let us then begin by making them love their fatherland: but how will they love it if the fatherland is nothing more to them than it is to foreigners, and grants them only what it cannot refuse to anyone? *It would be much worse if they did not even enjoy civil security in it, and their goods, their life or their freedom were at the discretion of powerful men, without their being able or permitted to dare invoke the laws.* Then, subject to the duties of the civil state without enjoying even the rights of the state of nature and without being able to use their force to defend themselves, they would therefore be in the worst condition in which free men can find themselves, and *the word fatherland could only have odious or a ridiculous meaning for them.*"⁶⁶

Being treated well equally is very important for the formation of patriotic affection. No one would think that they are superior or inferior to others. The inequality among citizens would create negative emotions, which harm the unity and hinder the formation of love of fatherland. Other than the conceptual conflict between two notions of citizenship, the failure of the civic education in 2012 is

⁶⁶ Rousseau, "Political Economy," pp. 17.

also due to a skeptic attitude of many Hong Kong people towards Chinese government. A study in 2003 shows that many teachers think that the patriotic education inclines towards totalitarian nationalism, which is common in the PRC. Government tended to adopt teaching strategies, which would suppress critical reflection of students. This kind of national education, usually accompanying intense commitment to particular beliefs and practice probably would be intolerant of other beliefs and lead to indoctrination.⁶⁷ Although the study was done in 2003, this skeptic attitude still prevails today. Many Hong Kong people feel that they are not treated well equally. The value of Hong Kong people, in the eyes of China and Hong Kong government, depends upon their contribution to the development of China. Hong Kong people since 97 have been asked to sacrifice for the country but their return is not in proportion. Thus they are not proud of the achievement of the fatherland, China. Unlike some mainlanders who benefit from the economic and national development of China, Hong Kong people do not have a sense of honor to be a Chinese. For Rousseau, the will to sacrifice for the fatherland comes from the sense of honor that citizens acquire from society and the independence and freedom citizens enjoy.⁶⁸ In order to foster patriotic affection, HK government has to adjust her orientation of social policy from the position of one of the cities in China to maintain the autonomy of HK. In other words, as many communitarian scholars claim, the formation of national identity and love of fatherland and universal moral values starts from the local

⁶⁷ Bottery, M. 2003, The end of citizenship? The nation state, threats to its legitimacy and citizenship education in the twenty-first century. *Cambridge Journal of Education*, 33(1), 101–122. Quoted in Yan-wing Leung, Timothy Wai-wa Yuen, School Civic Education Since 1980s: A Brief Review of the Literature in Hong Kong, *Educational Research Journal* 《教育研究學報》, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2009, pp.273.

⁶⁸ Rousseau, “Discourse on the Sciences and Arts and Polemics,” *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, Vol. 2, trans. Christopher Kelly, Judith R. Bush, and Roger D. Masters, ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly, (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1992), pp. 154.

community in which one grew up and lives.

Besides, Rousseau's formation of patriotic virtue is a republican paradox, in which the good law and institution and the virtuous citizens are inter-dependent. Each one assumes the existence of other and they cannot come to existence at the same time. People and the state are in need of a Legislator who knows the general will.⁶⁹ He can use neither force nor reasoning but have recourse to an authority of a different order, which might be able to rally without violence and to persuade without convincing.⁷⁰ Legislator, on the one hand, establishes a democratic system through which citizens can conform to the general will and become autonomous. He, on the other hand, cultivates a social and cultural patriotic affection through daily social life. Citizen develops a will to sacrifice to the country out of pride in the culture. But this social spirit is thin and easily becomes a blind patriotism. It is important for Rousseau that Legislator has to establish a participatory democratic system that citizen they are the autonomous and are respected equally. The totalitarian political system in China is the main issue of the controversy of national education. Other than the imposition of totalitarian nationalism into the civic education curriculum, HK government, with reference to Rousseau's Legislator, has an urgent need to implement universal suffrage for the election of Chief Executive and the Legislative Council members.

In sum, freedom is the main concern of Rousseau. How can man become free in society in which *amour propre* is dominant? As an opponent to Enlightenment, Rousseau's education of patriotic citizen and cosmopolitan citizen involves both rationality and sentiment. The common goal of these types of education is freedom,

⁶⁹ Rousseau, "Social Contract," pp.68-69

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 71.

even though their paths to freedom are different. The development of democratic and legal system and the formation of patriotic affection in social life and culture are two hands of the Legislator that he can establish a society in which citizen can be free. The formation of patriotism beyond curriculum and the development of democratic system in Rousseau's political theory could be the next step to freedom in Hong Kong. The domestic education of man in *Émile* may not be applicable in Hong Kong. However, it shows that cosmopolitan citizen is another example of freedom, which would help patriotic citizen go beyond their fatherland.

Although Rousseau did not solve the tension between the cosmopolitan citizenship and the patriotic citizenship, his thought of education of man and education of virtuous citizen shed lights on the controversy of civic education curriculum in Hong Kong.

References

Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Terrence Irwin, 2nd edition. Hackett Publishing Company, 1999.

Audi, Robert. "Nationalism, Patriotism, and Cosmopolitanism in an Age of Globalization," *The Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 13 No. 4 Patriotism, 2009. pp. 365-381.

Bottery, M. "The End of Citizenship? The Nation State, Threats to its Legitimacy and Citizenship Education in the Twenty-first Century." *Cambridge Journal of Education*, Vol. 33 Issue 1, 2003. pp. 101-122.

Cavallar, Georg. "Sources of Kant's Cosmopolitanism: Basedow, Rousseau, and Cosmopolitan Education," *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 2014, Vol.33 Issue 4. pp.369-389.

Curriculum Development Council. *Moral and National Education, Curriculum Guide (Primary 1 to Secondary 6)*, April, 2012. pp. 31.

Deng, Xiaoping. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Vol. 3. Beijing, China: Ren Min Publishing Company, 1993.

Dent, N. J. H. *Rousseau: An Introduction to his Psychological, Social and Political Theory*. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1988.

Education and Manpower Branch, *School Education in Hong Kong: A Statement of Aims*, Education & Manpower Branch, Government Secretariat, Hong Kong, 1993.

Gauthier, David. *Rousseau: The Sentiment of Existence*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Leung, Yan-wing and Timothy Wai-wa Yuen. "School Civic Education Since 1980s: A Brief Review of the Literature in Hong Kong," *Educational Research Journal*, 2009, Vol. 24 No. 2 Winter.

Levinson, Meira. "Citizenship and Civic Education," in *Encyclopedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy*, edited by Denis C. Phillips, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2014. pp. 1. URL=<<http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12701475>>

MacIntyre, Alasdair. *Is Patriotism a Virtue?* Kansas: University of Kansas, 1984.

Morris, Paul and Edward Vickers. "Schooling, politics and the construction of identity in Hong Kong: the 2012 'Moral and National Education' crisis in historical context." *Comparative Education*, 2015, Vol. 51 No. 3.

Müller, Jan-Werner. "On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism," *Contemporary Political Theory*, 2006, Vol. 5. pp. 278–296.

Nathanson, Stephen. "In Defense of 'Moderate Patriotism'," *Ethics* 1989, Vol. 99, pp. 535–552. Reprinted in *Patriotism: Philosophical and Political Perspectives*, edited by Igor

Primoratz and Aleksandar Paavkovic. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007.

Neuhouser, Frederic. "Rousseau And The Conflict Between The Educations Of 'Man' And 'Citizen'," in *Institutions of Education: then and today*. Boston, Brill, 2010. pp.29-52.

Nussbaum, Martha. "Patriotism and Cosmopolitan," in *For Love of Country, Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, ed. Joshua Cohen. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1996.

Plato. *Republic*, tran. G.M.A. Grube, revised by C.D.C. Reeve, Hackett Publishing Company, 1992.

Primoratz, Igor and Aleksandar Paavkovic, eds. *Patriotism: Philosophical and Political Perspectives*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007.

Primoratz, Igor, "Patriotism." *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring 2015 Edition, edited by Edward N. Zalta. URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/patriotism/>>.

2.2.1

_____. "Introduction." *The Journal of Ethics*, 2009, Vol. 13 No. 4 Patriotism, pp. 293-299.

Rousseau. *Émile, or On Education*, trans. Allan Bloom. New York Basic Books, 1979.

_____. "Judge of Jean-Jacques," in *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, Vol 1, tran. Judith R. Bush, Christopher Kelly, and Roger D. Masters, ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly, Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1990.

_____. "Discourse on the Sciences and Arts and Polemics," in *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, Vol. 2, trans. Christopher Kelly, Judith R. Bush, and Roger D. Masters, ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly, Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1992.

_____. “The Confessions and Correspondence, Including the Letters to Malesherbes,” in *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, Vol 5, tran. Christopher Kelly, ed. Christopher Kelly, Roger D. Masters and Peter G. Stillman, Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1995.

_____. “Letter to Voltaire,” in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

_____. “Letter to Beaumont,” in *Letters Written From the Mountain, and Related Writings*, trans. Christopher Kelly and Judith R. Bush, edited by Christopher Kelly and Eve Grace. Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 2001.

_____. *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Shklar, Judith. *Men and Citizen, A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

Smith, Adam. *The Theory of Moral Sentiment*, edited by D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie 1790; reprint. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Yonah, Yossi. “‘Ubi Patria-Ibi Bene’: The Scope and Limits of Rousseau’s Patriotic Education,” *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 1999, Vol. 18. pp. 365-388.

[摘要] 2012 年的國民教育爭議在於兩個不同的公民概念。國際公民建基於如公義、人權和民主等普世價值上，而愛國公民則在於對個別國家及文化的感情。然則兩者是否必然互相排斥？愛國公民是否可以和國際公民相容？盧梭是人性尊嚴和人權的倡導者，他在不同著作中均有論及兩種公民概念。為盧梭，愛國主義是公民自由所必須的元素。他明白到人生而自由，但他在社會

到處被束縛。盧梭提出兩條途徑讓人在社會中重拾自由。他在〈愛彌兒〉提出人的教育；在〈社會契約論〉和一些政治著作則論及公民教育。在這論文，我首先會藉著愛彌兒的人的教育闡釋國際公民的培養。*Amour propre* 是人失去自由的根源，但也是道德的源頭。接著我會闡述公民教育，盧梭如何讓城市人將個人意志與普遍意志相一致，以獲得倫理自由；以及愛國主義作為公民德行的重要性。最後，會評論盧梭對這兩公民概念的理解，以及他對香港國民教育爭議的啟發。雖然盧梭並沒有兩種公民概念在同一課程體制內的理論衝突，但盧梭以自由為政治、倫理和教育的目標，以此發展國際公民和愛國公民教育，尤具啟發性。兩者同時包含理性和情感教育，免除對立。此外，課程外的愛國教育更具啟發性。社會公共生活培養公民一體感和榮譽感，同時配合法治和民主體制，讓公民體驗平等和自我立法的自由，從而衍生愛國情感。這可能是香港國民教育的進一步。

The Legal Foundation of Hongkonger Identity

Simon T M NG

[ABSTRACT] The individual exists in a context, bounded by history and all sorts of political, legal and social institutions. The individual's identity, rights, freedoms and duties are largely defined and shaped by these secular institutions. Discussion on the Hongkonger identity has been keen recently. The legal aspect of it, however, is usually overlooked. How does the law define the identity of the people of Hong Kong? This paper argues that residency law in Hong Kong provides the fundamental framework in defining who belong to Hong Kong and it gives the foundation on which a civic identity of Hongkongers may be constructed. “Hongkongers” in this sense is inclusive and rights based, and all Hongkongers share constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedom in common. This embracive legal identity also calls for a public morality requiring equal respect and concern for everyone. Such identity is preferred to other narratives, such as one based solely on restrictive linguo-cultural distinction (Cantonese and Cantopop culture for example). Calling for the morality of equal respect and concern is always challenged in the face of narrow, ethnocentric localism discourses. Upholding of such morality requires courage and clear voices. The Catholic Church, as defender of human dignity and bearing the roles of prophet, teacher and servant, has an important role to play here.

Introduction

Identity tells who we are and where do we belong. Yet, it is a complicated, multi-faceted and protean construct. And one can, at the same time, have different identities: personal identity (what I say I am); social identity (what we say we are); legal identity (what the law says I am or we are) and so forth. How does the law define us as members of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region? This is critical in defining our rights and freedoms and in constructing our relationship with our fellow Hongkongers, compatriots in the same State, the wider community and beyond.

This article intends to give an account on the law defining our legal identity: how has Hong Kong Permanent Resident developed out of the unique historical and constitutional context of Hong Kong? How does the law define it? How does it relate to the wider legal category of Chinese nationality? And how the understanding of the law is relevant to the discourse and narratives on the Hongkonger's identity? It argues that residency law in Hong Kong provides the fundamental framework in defining who belong to Hong Kong and it gives the foundation on which a civic identity of Hongkongers may be constructed. "Hongkongers" in this sense is inclusive and rights based, and all Hongkongers share constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedom in common. This embrative legal identity also calls for a public morality requiring equal respect and concern for everyone. Such identity is preferred to other narratives, such as one based solely on restrictive linguo-cultural distinction (Cantonese and Cantopop culture for example). Calling for the morality of equal respect and concern is always challenged in the face of narrow, ethnocentric localism discourses. Upholding of such morality requires courage and clear voices. The Catholic Church has a role to play here.

A Local Belonging Identity in Law

The establishment of an effective territorial border

Before 1971, there was no legal definition for the Hong Kong believer or citizen. In the first 100 years of Hong Kong’s colonial history, before the end of the Second World War/ Japanese Occupation, the British policy was primarily to make Hong Kong a free port to facilitate trade and business with China, instead of making it a colonial settlement. People came from different places of the world. Free entry and leaving by Chinese migrants from the Mainland were essential as it promoted economic activities and business growth. Chinese who came to Hong Kong mostly left their families behind in the Mainland and came for economic opportunities. People born in Hong Kong were British subjects but there is no law granting them an identity based on their ties with the Colony of Hong Kong. A free, servicing port and free flow of people, goods and businesses were in the best interest of the British and colonial Hong Kong. There was no imminent necessity to define who belonged to Hong Kong and stipulate a distinct legal identity for the people. The conditions were not there. Yet, Hong Kong grew and prospered out of the migratory and transient nature of its population, the laissez-faire economy and English common law.

The end of Second World War and the resumption of the British rule after the Japanese Occupation did not, however, bring back lax border regulations that Hong Kong used to have. The rapid increase in population in Hong Kong in the wake of China’s civil war and concerns over Hong Kong’s capacity and the need to maintain good order prompted the colonial government to impose tighter restrictions on cross-border migration. An Immigrants Control Ordinance (Cap. 243) “to control the entry into, exit from and movement within the Colony of persons not born therein” and a

Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177) to provide for the registration of every person being in the Colony the issue of identity cards, were enacted in 1949. Failure to obtain permission from the Immigration Officer to enter Hong Kong was made a criminal offence and upon conviction would lead to expulsion from Hong Kong. Failure to register under the Registration of Persons Ordinance was also made criminal.

The establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 brought an influx of people from the Mainland to Hong Kong. The imposition of the quota system by the Hong Kong Colonial Government and the exit control over Chinese nationals by the Chinese Government formally ended the century-old freedom of movement across the border. Despite the imposition of tighter bureaucratic control, the border was in fact not effectively guarded. This allowed sporadic migration otherwise through formal channels and large waves of refugee influxes at times and especially during times of turmoil such the Korean War in the early 1950s, starvation caused by the failure of the Great Leap Forward in early 1960s and the political and social unrests due to the Cultural Revolution from the mid-1960s to the 1970s.

Tolerance and acceptance of the society and leniency of the Hong Kong Government policy lasted till 1980, when the "reached-base" policy¹ was formally terminated. Since then, all

¹ The problem of influxes continued without a sign to stop. In 1973 alone, there were some 56,000 illegal migrants came. The Colonial Government decided to implement a "reached-base" policy to address the ever growing number of refugee influx. Under the policy, an illegal immigrant arrested during his attempt to enter into Hong Kong's border area and territorial water would be immediately repatriated. If an illegal immigrant managed to evade capture, enter the urban areas and subsequently reach a home with relatives or proper accommodation (the base), he would be allowed to stay in Hong Kong.

illegal migrants from the Mainland would be repatriated immediately. The development signified the formal end of the decades-long lenient policy towards Mainland illegal migrants and the end of a relatively free migration across the Hong Kong-Mainland border. The problem of “refugees” became one of “illegal immigrants”. With the end of the “reached-base” policy, an effectively guarded territorial Hong Kong-China border was formed. The physical and legal distinctions between “we” and “they” became clearer.

Hongkong Belonger and the right to land

A local belonging legal identity was introduced in the early 1970s, against a background of the change of United Kingdom immigration and citizenship laws in the late 1960s, much attributed to the infamous East African Asians case² and post-war decolonization movement. It was also a time when Hong Kong was baffled by the “problem of people”³ which ultimately led to the termination of the lenient and tolerant policy and approach to Chinese illegal migrants. The development went in parallel with

² *East African Asians v United Kingdom* (1973) 3 EHRR 76. In that case, the European Court of Human Rights held that the United Kingdom acted in contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 3 Racial Discrimination, Degrading Treatment) by denying entry immigration control citizens of United Kingdom and Colonies of East Africa who were of Asian origins.

³ To paraphrase the title of the paper “A Problem of People” published by the Hong Kong Government in 1956. It gave a brief review of the history of Chinese migration from the Mainland to Hong Kong while raising concerns about the Colony’s capacity. Over-crowding, homelessness, squatter areas, hygiene issues and social order were some salient problems that Hong Kong was facing at the time. Migrants, which traditionally gave life to the Colony and one of the most important driving forces for Hong Kong’s growth, were now seen a problem. Tighter immigration control and more extensive social policies were called for to address the problem.

Hong Kong's economic take-off and growth of wealth, and the emergence of the Hongkonger self-consciousness.⁴

The Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115) passed in 1971 gave for the first time a clear definition of Hong Kong's own "belongers", sort of an equivalent to nationals or citizens in the context of a state. The concept of Hongkong Belonger was the foundation and precursor to the later category of Hong Kong permanent residents constitutionally defined as the membership to the Hong Kong SAR in the Basic Law. When the Ordinance was first introduced in 1971, it stipulated three categories of people who enjoyed, in varying degrees, the right to land in Hong Kong. These categories were: (a) Hong Kong Belongers; (b) Chinese Residents; and (c) Resident United Kingdom Belongers. Hong Kong Belongers referred to the people who were born in Hong Kong and declared themselves as British at the time of birth. All of them were taken as British subjects and they formed the vast majority of the residents of Hong Kong. Chinese Residents were those who were wholly or partly of Chinese race and who had been ordinarily resident in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years, excluding any period of time when their stay in Hong Kong was illegal. Resident United Kingdom Belongers included the British expatriates in Hong Kong and the United Kingdom and Colonies Citizens who had been ordinarily resident in Hong Kong for a continuous period of seven years.

A concept of the right to land was also introduced. All the three categories of residents had the right to land in Hong Kong. Chinese Residents and Resident United Kingdom Belongers were subject to

⁴ See discussion below.

deportation under certain conditions, with those restricting the former stricter than those for the latter.

Albert Chen noted the significance of these provisions and categorization.⁵ First, the right to land and the limitations on deportation against the holder of such rights laid the foundation for the future right of abode. Second, the immigration authorities' unfettered discretion about granting or not granting permission to enter Hong Kong was now taken away with respect to the holders of the right to land in Hong Kong. By holding such a right, the holder is immune from the imposition of any conditions of stay or order of deportation. This right is a trump.

Agnes Ku saw the sociological significance of such legal change. Seeing that the social and the legal processes of identity formation were intermingled, she succinctly concluded, based on her discursive analysis, that

“... the local people soon transmuted the notion of ‘Hong Kong belonger’, introduced as a formal immigration category, into a direct, everyday term: ‘Hong Kong people’...Thus, an official category, though perhaps not directly forming an identity, could provide a basis for the public to crystallize or forge their negotiated talk of identity. More specifically, as the idea of ‘settled residence’ was contested, it became a claim to belonging and to rights.”⁶

⁵ Albert Chen, “The Development of Immigration Law and Policy: The Hong Kong Experience,” *McGill Law Journal* (1988, Vol. 33 Issue 4), 631, 636.

⁶ Agnes S. Ku, “Immigration Policies, Discourses and the Politics of Local Belonging in Hong Kong (1950-1980),” *Modern China* (2004, Vol. 30 Issue 3), 326, 347.

Local-belonging consciousness

The change in policy towards Mainland illegal immigrants, the establishment of a formal territorial border and the immigration law reform were coupled with a social and discursive process of emerging local belonging, identity and consciousness among local Hong Kong Chinese. They now saw migrants from the Mainland in a more negative light: backward, uncivilized, and ignorant.⁷ At the social level, the previous attitudes of tolerance and acceptance of their cousins from the Mainland were gone. Mainlanders, especially illegal immigrants, were seen as a threat to the economic and social stability of Hong Kong. Mainland migrants were seen more as a burden to the Hong Kong society and threat to its peace and order, in comparison to the attitudes previously held by the public which had treated Mainland migrants in a friendly and accommodating way. The riots in 1967 seemed to be a booster for this change.

Steve Tsang, a historian, saw the social unrests and disorder caused by the riots in 1967 under the aegis of the Chinese communists as a spill-over of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution taking place in the Mainland at the time marked a turning point in the history of Hong Kong, boosting the rise of the identity of Hongkongers.⁸ A cultural commentator, Matthew Turner, observed that the rhetoric of ‘citizenship’, ‘community’ and ‘belonging’ was deployed on a large scale as anti-Communist counter-propaganda during and after the riot.⁹ Together with the economic take-off and

⁷ Ibid., 352.

⁸ Steve Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006), 180-196. Tsang had a chapter-long account of the rise of the Hongkongers and the emergence of a local identity.

⁹ Matthew Turner, “60’s/ 90’s: Dissolving the People,” in *Hong Kong Sixties: Designing Identity*, eds. Matthew Turner and Irene Ngan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Arts Centre, 1995), 15.

growth of wealth in the 1970s which brought a sense of superiority and pride, local Hong Kong Chinese began to see themselves as a distinct group of people, generally referred to “Hongkongers”, “Hongkongese” or Hongkong people, who were constructed as more civilized, modernized, advanced, knowledgeable and richer in contrast to the people in the Mainland or newly immigrated to Hong Kong, who were generally portrayed as backward, unhygienic, ignorant and miserable “mainlander boy”, “green stamp alien”, “Canton Boy”, “Ah Chan” etc, all derogatory daily vocabularies used to address Chinese immigrants who came to Hong Kong in the late 1970s and early 1980s.¹⁰

Tsang captured what it was like being a Hongkonger in the early 1980s:

“... A Hong Kong person of the early 1980s would identify with Hong Kong and, at the same time, feel at ease both with his Chinese heritage and, for those who claimed British nationality, with travelling on a British passport issued by the Hong Kong government. However, he was not British or western (merely westernized) and at the same time not Chinese in the same way that citizens of the People’s Republic of China were Chinese. He belonged to Hong Kong and was intensely proud of it.”¹¹

¹⁰ Helen F. Siu, “Immigrants and Social Ethos: Hong Kong in the Nineteen-eighties,” *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1986, Vol. 26), 1-16.

¹¹ Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong*, 195.

Hong Kong Permanent Residency

The Sino-British Joint Declaration

China has never recognized the treaties that ceded Hong Kong and Kowloon and leased the New Territories. These treaties, seen as made under duress in the face of imperialism and colonialism, have always been unequal.¹² As such, the basic stance of China is that Hong Kong has always been an inalienable part of China and its people are always compatriots and Chinese by nationality. According to the PRC Nationality Law, which is based on the principle of *jus sanguinis* (blood tie), dual nationality is prohibited.

The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the question of Hong Kong was signed in 1984. By virtue of the Joint Declaration, both the governments of the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China agreed that the PRC would resume sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997 and that Hong Kong would become a special administrative region by virtue of Article 31 of the PRC Constitution. A Basic Law would be enacted to stipulate that Hong Kong's capitalist system and life style should remain unchanged for 50 years.

As to the question of nationality of the residents in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Joint Declaration provides that both Chinese and non-Chinese nationals can be residents. It also introduces the concept of right of abode, which has an origin in the English common law and nationality law. Annex I Part XIV of the Joint Declaration provides two broad categories of people who could have the right of abode in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: (a) Chinese nationals; and (b) non-Chinese

¹² Julia Lovell, *The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China* (London: Picador, 2011), 9.

nationals. Chinese nationals are those “who were born or who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for a continuous period of 7 years or more, and persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of such Chinese nationals.” This sets the foundation of residency/ identity provisions in the Basic Law. A distinct legal identity is thus created within the framework of the Chinese nationality law, policies and Hong Kong’s own law which originates in the English Common Law.

By virtue of the Joint Declaration, all previous Hong Kong Belongers, who were of Chinese origin and Chinese Residents under the Immigration Ordinance 1971, are Chinese nationals under the new categorization and shall enjoy the right of abode in Hong Kong. If they are Chinese by blood and descent in Hong Kong, they are all Chinese nationals.¹³

In fact, the text of the Joint Declaration uses a more general term of “local inhabitants” to refer to the Hong Kong people.¹⁴ It was not until the amendment of the Immigration Ordinance in 1987 that the category of Hong Kong Permanent Residents and the right of abode were formally introduced into Hong Kong law.

Amendments to the Immigration Ordinance and the enactment of the HKSAR Basic Law

The legal category of Hong Kong Permanent Resident (HKPR) formally replaced Hong Kong Belonger, Chinese Residents and Resident United Kingdom Belongers in 1987. Section 2A of the

¹³ *Sino-British Joint Declaration*, Chinese Memorandum.

¹⁴ *Sino-British Joint Declaration*, Part XIV of Annex I.

Ordinance read “Hong Kong Permanent Resident enjoys a right of abode in Hong Kong.” The right of abode is defined as the right-

(a) to land in Hong Kong;

(b) not to have imposed upon him any condition of stay in Hong Kong, and any condition of stay imposed shall have no effect;

(c) not to have a deportation order made against him; and

(d) not to have a removal order made against him.

Residency and the right of abode are provided in Article 24 of the Basic Law, the “mini-constitution” for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region which was formally enacted in April 1990. Six categories of permanent residents are defined in Article 24(2) as:

(1) Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the HKSAR;

(2) Chinese citizens who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years before or after the establishment of the HKSAR;

(3) Persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of those residents listed in categories (1) and (2);

(4) Persons not of Chinese nationality who have entered Hong Kong with valid travel documents, have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years and have taken

Hong Kong as their place of permanent residence before or after the establishment of the HKSAR;

(5) Persons under 21 years of age born in Hong Kong of those residents listed in category (4) before or after the establishment of the HKSAR; and

(6) Persons other than those residents listed in categories (1) to (5), who, before the establishment of the HKSAR, had the right of abode in Hong Kong only.

Article 24(3) provides that the permanent residents shall have the right of abode in Hong Kong. The Court of Final Appeal, in *Ng Ka Ling and Others* case (1999), described that the right of abode as a “core right” that “without it and the right to enter which is an essential element, the rights and freedoms guaranteed [by the Basic Law] can hardly be enjoyed, including in particular the right to vote and to stand for election.”¹⁵

Article 24(4) provides a category called non-permanent residents, who do not have the right of abode in Hong Kong but are qualified to obtain identity cards in accordance with the law.¹⁶

¹⁵ *Ng Ka Ling and Others v Director of Immigration* (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4, 34F-G (per Li, CJ)

¹⁶ According to the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177), a person who is allowed by the Director of Immigration to stay in Hong Kong for 180 days or longer shall be registered as a non-permanent resident. People who fall under this category include expatriates working in Hong Kong and Chinese nationals who came to Hong Kong through the One-Way Permit Quota System for settlement.

The universalistic, rights-based and inclusive Hong Kong residency

There are two distinct characteristics of the Hong Kong residency in Hong Kong SAR: its being rights-based and inclusive.

The permanent residency, or the basic “membership”, so to speak, in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, as prescribed by Article 24(2) of the Basic Law, is grounded on the right of abode; and this right is stipulated in details under the Immigration Ordinance. Holder of the right of abode shall have the rights to land and freedom from being deported, removed and imposed any conditions of stay. Such freedoms and rights are essential to the individual’s movement and autonomy. In other words, these freedoms and rights are not to be subject to arbitrary control. The right of abode shall override any undue bureaucratic control and measures over the freedom of movement of the HKPRs.

Non-permanent residents’ stay is conditional, as they do not enjoy the right of abode. They are free to move and travel so long as their permission to remain in Hong Kong has not expired.¹⁷

The Basic Law further provides that all residents are equal before law, regardless of nationality and the type of residency they are holding, permanent or non-permanent¹⁸. All Hong Kong residents enjoy a wide range of civil and social rights as protected by Chapter III of the Basic Law, including those protected under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

¹⁷ *Gurung Bahadur v Director of Immigration* (2002) 5 HKCFAR 480. See also Johannes Chan and C. L. Lim, eds., *Law of the Hong Kong Constitution* (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell, 2012), 163, para. 5.054.

¹⁸ Hong Kong Basic Law, art 25

which remain in force by virtue of Article 39 of the Basic Law. In as sense, Hong Kong residency has a universalistic nature. All residents share rights and freedoms which are universally recognized and, by virtue of the Basic Law, are constitutionally guaranteed and enforceable in courts.

Another difference between permanent and non-permanent residents is concerned with political participation. Hong Kong Permanent Residents, but not Hong Kong Residents, enjoy equal rights to vote and stand for elections.¹⁹ In case of official appointments, posts such the Chief Executive of HKSAR,²⁰ principal officials,²¹ President of the Legislative Council²² and the Chief Justice²³ are restricted only to HKPRs of Chinese nationality.

Hong Kong permanent residency is inclusive in the sense that both Chinese and non-Chinese can acquire the status due to the link and connection with Hong Kong through birth, settlement or descent. However, this inclusiveness should also be qualified by the followings: (a) acquisition threshold for non-Chinese nationals is higher;²⁴ and (b) the status enjoyed by the non-Chinese nationals may lose due to a continuous absence of not less than 36 months after ceasing to have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong.²⁵

¹⁹ Ibid art 26

²⁰ Ibid art 44

²¹ Ibid art 61

²² Ibid art 71

²³ Ibid art 90

²⁴ There is an application procedure for non-Chinese nationals. For Chinese nationals (categories (1) and (3)), acquisition by birth and by descent is natural. For category (2) acquisition, a 7-year ordinary residence is all that is needed, and is a lower threshold than that for category (4) which requires proof of intention to make Hong Kong a permanent home.

²⁵ Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115, sch. 1, para 7(1)

The nationality pre-requisite of the first three categories of HKPRs under Article 24(2) is Chinese nationals; and the permanent residency status may be acquired by birth, settlement (fulfillment of the requirement of 7-year continuous and ordinary residence) or descent (limited to persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong to the categories (1) and (2) HKPRs).²⁶ These three categories of HKPRs form the vast majority of the Hong Kong population.²⁷

For non-Chinese nationals (categories (4) and (5)), they have to fulfill (a) the requirements of seven-year continuous and ordinary residence; and (b) having taken Hong Kong as their permanent place of residence.²⁸ There is an application procedure. In a sense the threshold is high as both conditions (the seven year requirement and the permanence requirement) must be concurrently satisfied at the time of application for the permanent residency status.²⁹ And the second requirement of intention involves a partly objective and partly subject test: the applicant has to furnish evidence to demonstrate that steps have been taken to make Hong Kong his permanent home and that there is a sufficient degree of continuity that could be described as “settled”.³⁰ For their children, only those who are born in Hong Kong and under 21 of age are entitled to Hong Kong permanent residency.³¹

²⁶ Persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong to the category (3) HKPRs, however, are not entitled to the right of abode by virtue of this provision.

²⁷ According to the 2011 Census data, over 94% of the Hong Kong population are ethnic Chinese (self-identification). It may be used as an indicator of the rough proportion of Chinese nationals in the city.

²⁸ Basic Law, art 24(2)(4)

²⁹ *Fateh Muhammad v Commissioner of Registration* (2001) 4 HKCFAR 278; *Prem Singh v Director of Immigration* (2003) 6 HKCFAR 26.

³⁰ Chan and Lim, *Law of the Hong Kong Constitution*, 162, para 5.049.

³¹ Basic Law, art 24(2) category (5). This status, however, will expire as he reaches 21 of age. By then, he will have to apply to the Director of Immigration for the

The right of abode and hence the status of permanent residency may be acquired by the second generation of categories (1), (2) and (4) permanent residents—acquisition by descent. Children of categories (1) and (2) residents who are of Chinese nationality and born outside Hong Kong are guaranteed such right and status; and there is no age limitation.³² However, for children of category (4) residents, they can only acquire the permanent residency by descent if they are less than 21 years of age.³³

The morality of equal respect and concern

Despite the different ways of acquisition, the relatively more stringent conditions set for non-Chinese nationals, and the consequence that non-Chinese national’s permanent residency status may be lost due to long time absence after ceasing to “ordinarily reside” in Hong Kong, the Basic Law grants equal rights (including voting rights) to *all* permanent residents and they are supposed to be equal before law. The equal constitutional status of residents calls for a public moral that all permanent residents, regardless of their nationalities and the way they acquired their permanent residency, be respected and treated equally.³⁴ To read the constitution and its

permanent residency status.

³² Ibid., art 24(2)(3)

³³ Ibid., art 24(2)(5)

³⁴ This is primarily based on Ronald Dworkin’s rights thesis and idea of moral constitution. For rights thesis, read: Ronald Dworkin *Taking Rights Seriously* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1978). For his idea of constitution of principle: Ronald Dworkin *Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom* (New York: Vintage Books 1993) 118-147. For the thesis of moral reading of constitution: Ronald Dworkin *Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996).

rights provisions—including the residency provisions in the context of the Basic Law—in the moral perspective—that is, to treat every member of the society with equal respect and concern—is important to make the Basic Law function as a constitution based on principles, that is, taking the promises of “one county, two systems”, “high degree of autonomy”, “Hong Kong people to rule Hong Kong” as solemn pledges and moral commitments; or otherwise provisions in the constitution would be taken as separate, unconnected and purposeless provisions, susceptible to discretionary interpretation and serving no meaningful purposes.³⁵

Unfortunately, this kind of moral reading of the residency provisions in the Basic Law by the Court of Final Appeal, seemed to have been rejected by the State and the Hong Kong society at large, as shown in the right of abode saga in 1999.

The right of abode cases 1999 and controversies over Article 24(2)(3)

Article 24(2)(3) grants the permanent residency status/ right of abode to all the persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong to HKPRs. However, the differential treatment that those born and living in the Mainland of China should undergo led to legal challenges to the constitutionality of the laws which established such arrangement.

The Immigration Ordinance was amended shortly after the Handover in 1997 to bring it in line with Article 24 of the Basic Law. A Certificate of Entitlement mechanism (CoE) was established. For

³⁵ The distinction between constitution of principle and constitution of detail. See Dworkin's *Life's Dominion*.

those living in the Mainland who were born to HKPRs and hence eligible under Article 24(2)(3), this mechanism operated in conjunction with the conventional One-Way Permit Quota System (OWPQ), which has been administered by the Chinese authorities for decades regulating migration of the Mainlanders to Hong Kong for settlement.³⁶ Application for the Certificate of Entitlement had to be done through the Mainland public security authorities when the applicant applied for the one-way exit permit from them. Without the exit permit, a Mainland resident could not leave the Mainland. And migration out of the Mainland involves also cancelation of the Mainland residency registration. A doubt was cast on whether such an expedient arrangement would mean subjecting the exercise of Hong Kong’s immigration authority to the Mainland authorities, hence constitutionally inappropriate. And the situation at that time was that there had been at least several thousands of right of abode claimants (children of HKPRs) from the Mainland physically present in Hong Kong. Many of them had either come to Hong Kong before July 1997 without passing an immigration checkpoint or come on valid two-way permit but overstayed. If they were proved to be eligible under Article 24(2)(3), their stay in Hong Kong should not be legally questionable because of their status as holder of the right of abode. To remove them, or to ask them to go back to China to undergo the application procedure would therefore be legally untenable as these would jeopardize their right of abode. The CoE-OWPQ mechanism arguably imposed restrictions on the eligible category (3) persons in their exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed right of abode granted to them. In *Ng Ka Ling and Others*,

³⁶ The origin of this system is dated back to the early 1950s after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and when the colonial Hong Kong Government unilaterally applied a quota system to regulate the influx of Mainland migrants. See discussion above.

the Mainland born children attempted to challenge the constitutionality of such arrangement and seek recognition of their constitutional right. The Court of Final Appeal handed down a judgment in favour of them, giving primacy to the right of abode and upholding the integrity of Article 24(2)(3) as a constitutional guarantee in the application to all children of Chinese nationality born to HKPRs outside Hong Kong. The Court adopted a purposive interpretation of Article 24(2)(3), that is reading the provision in the light of Hong Kong's constitutional autonomy in the framework of "one country, two systems". By recognizing it as a constitutionally entrenched right, the Court laid down the right of abode as a foundation of Hong Kong permanent residency—the "core right" thesis.³⁷ This "core right" conception may be compared to what some political philosophers or citizenship scholars as "the right to have rights."³⁸

In the moral sense, the decision fulfilled the requirement of "equal respect and concern" for those eligible, according to Ronald Dworkin's moral reading of constitution.³⁹ Article 24(2)(3) grants equal right to all persons born outside Hong Kong to Hong Kong permanent residents; and persons born in the Mainland should not be subject to more restrictions (the CoE-OWPQ mechanism) than those

³⁷ *Ng Ka Ling and Others*

³⁸ The original idea of the "right to have rights" came from reflections over the plight of statelessness and the importance of political identity by Hannah Arendt. But the use of the concept of "right to have rights" extends to citizenship study and becomes a key concept in defining citizenship. Hannah Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism* (3rd edn) (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd 1967) 296-297.

³⁹ Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*, 272-273. Dworkin takes that the right to be treated as equals by the government must be taken as fundamental under the liberal conception of equality. Government must treat the people it governs with equal concern and respect.

who were born in other places outside Hong Kong, as far as the exercise of the right of abode by descent is concerned.

The judgment was supposed to be final as “one country two systems” and the Basic Law have preserved the common law system, judicial independence and final adjudication in Hong Kong. Unfortunately, the decision was later turned down by the Interpretation of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee⁴⁰, at the request of the HKSAR Government fearing that the decision might trigger large influx of Mainland migrants which create social and welfare burden implications would be beyond Hong Kong’s capacity. In the Government’s campaign to garner support for its move to ask the Central People’s Government’s intervention, the “problem of people” argument was rekindled and relied upon again. Hong Kong people and the society at large saw the claimants as Mainlanders wanting to settle in Hong Kong quick, instead of seeing them as HKPRs (Hongkoners). Constitutional recognition of the claims to the right of abode—a core right constitutive of the local belonging legal identity—and the moral right claim to family reunion were, however, displaced by the prevailing sense of Hong Kong identity—built around the values of “prosperity and stability” and an attitude demeaning the Mainlanders. The outcome was, as Agnes Ku identified, a “hegemonic production of consent through construction of social panic” that lent support to the government’s request to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee’s (NPCSC) Interpretation in June 1999 which effectively overruled the supposedly final decisions of the HKSAR Court of Final Appeal in the right of abode cases, bringing about a series of constitutional controversies.⁴¹ Concerns about the potential social impact on Hong

⁴⁰ Hong Kong Government, “A Problem of People,” 1956.

⁴¹ Agnes S. Ku, “Hegemonic construction, negotiation and displacement,”

Kong may not be unreasonable. But in preventing the occurrence of an imagined scenario of massive influx and unbearable welfare burden, ethical requirements, constitutional principles and rights are compromised.⁴² The Interpretation decreed that Article 22(4)⁴³ of the Basic Law covers Article 24(2) category (3) persons born in the Mainland and therefore they must apply to the relevant Mainland authorities for the exit documents before they can enter the HKSAR, despite that they hold the right of abode in Hong Kong. As a result of the Interpretation, the constitutionality of the dual system of CoE-OWPQ as applied to the category (3) eligible Mainland children to HKPRs is preserved. Category (3) eligible persons under the residency provisions of Article 24(2) were treated as Mainland applicants for settling in Hong Kong instead of Hong Kong permanent residents who deserve equal treatment before the law.⁴⁴

HKPR in the Context of PRC Nationality Law

PRC Nationality Law

International Journal of Cultural Studies (2001, Vol. 4 Issue3), 259-278.

⁴² Raymond Wacks, *Law, Morality and the Private Domain* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), 3-5. Wacks has long been arguing for a rights-based interpretive approach to the Basic Law. He shares with Ronald Dworkin in seeing the legal system as a moral system. He praised the Court of Final Appeal's decision in *Ng Ka Ling and Others* but lamented after the NPCSC Interpretation that the Court had failed to demonstrate "its earlier fidelity to individual rights".

⁴³ Article 22(4) of the Basic Law reads: For entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, people from other parts of China must apply for approval. Among them, the number of persons who enter the Region for the purpose of settlement shall be determined by the competent authorities of the Central People's Government after consulting the government of the Region.

⁴⁴ The effect of the NPCSC Interpretation is that the right of abode the eligible persons entitled is subject to Article 22(4) of the Basic Law which governs the Mainland residents who are to migrate to and settle in Hong Kong.

In strict legal sense, Hong Kong residency is only an approximation of citizenship. In the context of Chinese law, there is only Chinese citizen but no HKSAR citizen. The vast majority of Hong Kong permanent residents—categories (1), (2) and (3) permanent residents— are subject to the PRC Nationality Law. Article 33 of the PRC Constitution provides that “all persons holding the nationality of the People’s Republic of China are citizens of the People’s Republic of China.” It further provides that all PRC citizens shall be equal before law. The Constitution equates nationality with citizenship.

PRC Nationality Law is enacted to define Chinese nationality, its acquisition, renunciation and restoration. The law primarily follows the principle of *jus sanguinis*, supplemented by the principle of *jus soli*.⁴⁵

Jus sanguinis is a legal principle by which nationality or citizenship is determined on the basis of blood tie (descent), ethnicity or culture. In other words, nationality is defined by a person’s belonging to a family, tribe, race or a people. *Jus soli*, on the other hand, is a principle by which nationality is determined on the basis on being born in the territory of a political community (state).⁴⁶

⁴⁵ 張勇、陳玉田，《香港居民的國籍問題》(北京：法律出版社，2001) [Zhang Yong and Chen Yutian, *Issues of Nationality of the Hong Kong Residents* (Beijing: Law Publishing House, 2001), 35-48]. These principles have been fundamental to the nationality laws of China since late Imperial Qing Dynasty.

⁴⁶ In discussing citizenship and modern statehood, Preuß argues the importance of *jus soli* principle in delimiting modern state’s authority, sovereignty and claims to obedience along physical boundaries. *Jus sanguinis*, however, was important in maintaining the symbolic boundaries and coherence of migrating nomadic societies. “Wherever there is no physical locus, the symbolic bonds of common blood, descent, history, fate, culture, religion or language evolve into the primary source of commonness and of communal life.” Ulrich K. Preuß, ‘Two Challenges to European

Article 2 of the Nationality Law stipulates that China is a multi-ethnic unitary state and all people from all ethnic groups shall have Chinese nationality. Since there are some 57 officially recognized ethnic groups in China, Chinese nationality based on the principle of *jus sanguinis* is not purely based on natural blood line or ethnicity but is more like a political/ legal construct. Therefore, under the Chinese law, Tibetans, Uyghurs and Hans are all Chinese nationals, despite their having different blood, cultural and ethnic origins.

Articles 4 and 5 of the Nationality Law blend the two principles. Any person born in China whose parents are both Chinese nationals, or one of whose parents is a Chinese national, shall have Chinese nationality.⁴⁷ A person who is born abroad and whose parents are both Chinese nationals, or one of whose parents is a Chinese national, shall have Chinese nationality. But a person whose parents are both Chinese nationals and have both settled abroad, or one of whose parents is a Chinese national and has settled abroad, and who has acquired foreign nationality at birth shall not have Chinese nationality.⁴⁸

Application of the Nationality Law to Hong Kong

The Nationality Law is one of the few national laws that apply to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. In 1996, the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) issued a

Citizenship' in Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione, eds., *Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 123, 125.

⁴⁷ PRC Nationality Law, art 4

⁴⁸ *ibid.* art 5

set of specific explanations on the application of the Nationality Law to HKSAR.⁴⁹ Clause 1 of that Interpretation stipulates that all Hong Kong residents of Chinese blood line (*jus sanguinis*) who were born in Chinese territory (including Hong Kong) (*jus soli*) possess Chinese nationality and are Chinese citizens, according to the Nationality Law. As such, “Chinese compatriots” (the exact term used in the Interpretation) holding British passports⁵⁰ and those who acquire British nationality through the British Nationality Selection Scheme⁵¹ are still regarded as Chinese nationals.⁵² The provisions regarding the first two categories of HKPR in Article 24(2) of the Basic Law cover these previous Hong Kong British subjects. The NPCSC Explanations 1996 agree with the long term policy stance held by China that Hong Kong has been historically part of Chinese territory and that the local Chinese inhabitants are Chinese compatriots. A change of nationality is only recognized if one has acquired the status by settling in a foreign country and formally renounced his Chinese nationality.⁵³

⁴⁹ Explanations of Some Questions by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Concerning the Implementation of the Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (15 May 1996)

⁵⁰ These refer to the British Dependent Territory Citizen passports which became invalid after 1 July 1997 by the Hong Kong Act (British Nationality) Order 1986. These passports were replaced by the British National (Overseas) passports for the locally born previous British subjects who wished to maintain their British status after the Handover.

⁵¹ The scheme was introduced by virtue of the British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act 1990 to allow 50,000 families to acquire full British citizenship. Gina Clayton, *Textbook on Immigration and Asylum Law*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 79.

⁵² Explanations by NPCSC (15 May 1996), clauses 2 and 3

⁵³ PRC Nationality Law, art. 11.

Chinese nationals, citizens, residents and compatriots

A note has to be made that, apart from “nationals” or “citizens” (中國公民), there are also more rhetorically used categories, for example *renmin* (人民, people) and *tongbao* (同胞, compatriots), in the PRC political and legal discourses. *Renmin* is a very general term referring to the people of the whole nation. Despite that Hong Kong permanent residency is inclusive and embraces both Chinese and non-Chinese nationals, the term *xianggang tongbao* (香港同胞, Hong Kong compatriots) is very often used to address the Hong Kong people by the state leaders and officials. The commonly used English translation—Hong Kong compatriots—does not bring out the full meaning of the Chinese term. *Tongbao* literally means “common or same cell”, referring to a common ancestry or blood tie. Such affectionate term likens the tie of fellow countrymen to fraternity, tie as close as siblings. The term does not only appear in speeches of the state leaders and officials for propaganda and political purposes, but is also used in formal policy and legal documents. Its common and wide usage without a formal legal definition has caused some ambiguity. For example, if an official document is addressed to *xiangong tongbao*, should it be only taken literally as addressing only to the Hong Kong residents with Chinese blood tie? Or, should it be interpreted to include those who are legally Chinese nationals but not ethnically Chinese?⁵⁴ And what about those who are categories (4), (5) or (6) HKPRs and who are not Chinese nationals?

⁵⁴ For example, a foreign national or stateless person may be naturalized to become a Chinese national by virtue of Article 7 of the PRC Nationality Law. Zhang and Chen, *Issues of Nationality of the Hong Kong Residents*, 48.

Same nationality, different residency and rights

Notwithstanding the existence of a territorial border in between Hong Kong and the Mainland, and the need for the Mainland residents to fulfill certain legal requirements to settle in Hong Kong, Chinese nationality is the common legal identity among Hong Kong Chinese permanent residents and the Mainland residents. Categories (1), (2) and (3) HKPRs under Article 24(2) of the Basic Law are all Chinese nationals under the PRC Nationality Law. In strict legal sense, HKPR is but a category of residency, not a state citizenship, and should be understood in the context of Hong Kong as part of China. However, some kind of local-belonging/ civic consciousness has in fact emerged since 1960s (after the riots) and the differences between Hong Kong and Mainland, in terms of institutions, lifestyle, social and institutional values etc. have grown wide. The history of Hong Kong and, paradoxically, “one country, two systems” help sustain a sense of citizenship distinct from the rest of China. The rights-based nature of the Hong Kong residency does give the individual more autonomy and freedom. One distinct practical difference is that Hong Kong Permanent Residents holding a HKSAR passport enjoy visa-free access/ visa-on-arrival from more countries (152) from across the world,⁵⁵ comparing to just 52 countries for ordinary Chinese passport holders. Also, human rights are basically guaranteed by virtue of Chapter III of the Basic Law and the Bill of Rights Ordinance and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which remains effective in HKSAR by virtue of Article 39 of the Basic Law. Rights are judicially enforceable. In this sense, Hong Kong residents’ freedoms and rights

⁵⁵ <http://www.immd.gov.hk/eng/service/travel_document/visa_free_access.html> [01-25-2016]

are better protected institutionally, comparing to their fellow countrymen.

Is Law Relevant in Constructing the Hongkonger's Identity

A moral of equal respect and concern

The legal category of Hong Kong Residency is a product of political and legal negotiations out of the unique history and constitutional context of Hong Kong. It is the key to define Hongkonger's legal identity and everyday life. It defines membership to Hong Kong as a community and the membership it outlines is diverse, inclusive and is a reflection of Hong Kong as an open, international city. Hong Kong residency is also rights-based. All permanent residents, and the non-permanent residents as well, are supposed to enjoy the same constitutional rights, except in the area of elections, and freedoms on equal par due and are equal before the law. Given this legal framework, a diverse citizenry based on equal respect and concern is envisioned. And such a vision calls for a moral of "equal respect and concern" that could guide our reading of the relevant provisions in the Basic Law.

The need for this moral was salient in the right of abode cases (*Ng Ka Ling and others*) in which the Mainland born children to Hong Kong permanent residents demanded for the equal exercise of the constitutional right of abode by descent. However, not everyone would share this moral vision. In that case, the Court of Final Appeal's decision may be seen as an attempt to moral-read the residency provisions: giving primacy to the constitutional right of abode of the Mainland born children to Hong Kong Permanent

Residents and treating them as equals under the same constitutional residency provision. The State (including the HKSAR Government) did not share the vision and rejected the decision; and see the case as a matter of control over Mainlanders’ migration and re-settlement. The society and the people at large concerned more about social stability than the demand of morality and constitutional rights.

Sociologist Agnes Ku suggested that there was a pre-existing cultural framework in operation which contributed to the rejection of the Mainland born children of Hong Kong residents: a Hong Kong identity built on a sense of superiority versus an economically and culturally backward “other” .⁵⁶

Anthropologist Gordon Mathews observed that Hongkongers’ self-identification has three clusters of meaning: (a) “Chineseness plus affluence/ cosmopolitanism/ capitalism; (b) Chineseness plus English/ colonial education/ colonialism; and (c) Chineseness plus democracy/ human rights/ the rule of law.”⁵⁷ Rights and law appeared to be a constitutive aspect of the Hong Kong identity. If this schema can be used to reflect on Hong Kong people’s reaction to the right of abode cases, it was actually affluence/cosmopolitanism/capitalism — not rights and the rule of law—that reigned. The rights/ rule of law aspect, despite many proclaim it as a “core value” Hongkongers hold dear, is an ideal and fragile basis in the Hongkonger’s cultural identity.⁵⁸

The localism discourses

⁵⁶ Ku, “Hegemonic construction, negotiation and displacement,” 265.

⁵⁷ Gordon Mathews, “Heunggongyahn: On the Past, Present and Future of Hong Kong Identity,” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* (1997, Vol. 29 No.3), 3-13.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 11.

Localism is a recent buzzword in the local politics and public discourses which can be seen as a kind of consciousness emphasizing priority to the local, self-governing and a basic stance against interventions from the outside. In the wake of China's growing influences and interventions, the fear for "Mainlandization",⁵⁹ and the worry about the future of Hong Kong in the light of the approaching expiry of the pledge of "one country, two systems", localism consciousness discourses have heightened. Along the spectrum of discourses—one end being "Hong Kong as a part of China" with the other end being "Hong Kong as apart from China",⁶⁰ there are at least three distinct propositions, namely Hong Kong as a polis; Hong Kong as a nation; and Hong Kong reformation.⁶¹ The issue of belonging—who belong to Hong Kong and who count as Hongkongers? – is critical but yet no promising proposition has emerged from these discourses.

What do Hongkongers commonly share that make Hongkongers/ Hongkongese a collective identity? One narrative on the identity of Hongkongese or Hongkongers (香港人, *xianggangren*)⁶² is a Cantonese speaking persons born and/ or

⁵⁹ It describes the process to assimilate Hong Kong into the "one country" and making the city more an integral and homogenous part of China.

⁶⁰ Mathews, "Heunggongyahn: On the Past, Present and Future of Hong Kong Identity," pp. 3-13.

⁶¹ 陳雲,《香港城邦論：一國兩制，城邦自治，是香港生死攸關之事》(香港：天窗出版社，2015) [Chin Wan, *On Hong Kong as Polis: One Country, Two Systems and the Self-government of Polis are Matters of Life and Death for Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Enrich Publishing, 2011)]; 二零一三年度香港大學學生會學苑 編,《香港民族論》(香港：香港大學學生會，2015) [Undergrad H.K.U.S.U. 2013, ed., *On Hong Kong as a Nation (Hong Kong: HKUSU, 2015)*]; 方志恆 編,《香港革新論》(台北：漫遊者文化事業，2015)。[Fong Chi Hang Brian, ed., *On Hong Kong Reformation* (Taipei: Azoth Books, 2015)]

⁶² The Oxford English Dictionary gives the definition of Hongkongese or Hongkonger as "a native or inhabitant of Hong Kong".

brought up in Hong Kong sharing some common experiences and culture, or even values belonging to Hong Kong.⁶³ Law—including both the legal provisions and the judicial opinions—has, on the other hand, offered a framework that may serve as a foundation of Hongkongers. However, this framework does not always come on good terms with the socio-cultural identity that localism discourses has constructed. There is a gap between what the law says (requirement of justice) and what the people says about local belonging and identity. *Ng Ka Ling and Others*,⁶⁴ *Chong Fung Yuen*,⁶⁵ *Vallejos Evangeline Banao*,⁶⁶ and *Kong Yunming*⁶⁷ are

⁶³ 曹曉諾，〈香港人的背後是整個文化體系〉，二零一三年度香港大學學生會學苑編，〈香港民族論〉（香港：香港大學學生會，2015），頁 51-61。 [Cao Xiao Nuo, “There is a whole system of culture behind Hongkongers,” in Undergrad H.K.U.S.U. 2013, ed., *On Hong Kong as a Nation*, 51-61.]

⁶⁴ *Ng Ka Ling and Others v Director of Immigration* (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4

⁶⁵ *The Director of Immigration v Chong Fung Yuen* (2001) 4 HKCFAR 211. The case granted the right of abode to persons of Chinese nationality born in Hong Kong regardless of the parents residency status based on the common law approach interpretation of Article 24(2)(1) of the Basic Law, has been criticized as responsible for the trouble of the influx of Mainland women seeking to give birth in Hong Kong public hospitals. Chong Fung Yuen, who has acquired Hong Kong permanent resident status and been living and educated in Hong Kong, was teased as the origin of the “locust catastrophe”. 〈攻破居港權第一人 引發來港產子潮 莊豐源：我不是蝗蟲〉，〈蘋果日報〉，2011年5月1日 [“First person to break the right of abode and bring flocks to give birth in Hong Kong, Chong Fung Yuen: I am not locust,” *Apple Daily* 1 May 2011] <<http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20110501/15214738>> [2016-01-19]. “Locust” is a derogatory metaphor/ dehumanizing language used by some to describe Mainland visitors to Hong Kong.

⁶⁶ *Vallejos Evangeline Banao v Commissioner of Registration and Another* (2013) 16 HKCFAR 45. It was a case concerning about the application for permanent resident status by a foreign domestic helper from the Philippines who had come to Hong Kong and worked for over 20 years. Her applications to the government were rejected and she filed a lawsuit. The Court of First Instance decided for her, i.e. she should have been given permanent resident status. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeal and the Court of Final Appeal rejected the case.

⁶⁷ *Kong Yunming v The Director of Social Welfare* (2013) 16 HKCFAR 950. In *Kong Yunming*, a judicial review case which declared that the seven-year residency

cases that to some extent illustrate the gap and tension. If Hongkongers were only conceived in a narrow, restrictive sense, the diversity and inclusiveness as to place of birth and nationalities that the residency legal provisions allow would be ignored and the possibility, or even the necessity, to imagine and construct a more embracing and diverse Hong Kong citizenry in a globally connected city would be killed. We need to appreciate the unique nature and history of Hong Kong residency.

Law's role in constructing collective identity

If an inclusive, rights-based citizen's identity is the purpose of the project of constructing Hongkonger's identity, what role can law play?

For one thing, law provides the basic authoritative language (e.g. international conventions, constitutional provisions and statutes), and processes and ways (e.g. the judicial process) to seek for justice and

requirement set for the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) Scheme application unconstitutional, the Court of Final Appeal has taken the literal meaning of the term 'Hong Kong residents' in Article 36 of the Basic Law to include both Hong Kong Permanent Residents and (non-permanent) Hong Kong Residents, thereby relaxing the access right to the CSSA. The Court of Final Appeal decided in favour of the appellant—a “new immigrant” yet to attain permanent residency status whose husband in Hong Kong died one day after she had arrived. The decision is unpopular and has drawn wide criticisms. The “locust” metaphor was invoked again in some social media and chatrooms accusing new immigrants/ Mainlanders for exploiting the welfare system. Jason Y. Ng, “Kong vs Hong Kong,” *South China Morning Post*, 3 January 2014

<<http://www.scmp.com/comment/blogs/article/1396436/kong-vs-hong-kong>>

[2016-01-19].

identity recognition.⁶⁸ For another, besides the instrumental values, law is also a branch of rhetoric, as James Boyd White sees it.⁶⁹ White puts forward that law is a rhetorical activity in which people engage in speech and argument. Law as rhetoric is to be distinguished from law (or governmental activities) as bureaucratic process functioning according to the means-ends rationality.⁷⁰ He invites us to think about law not as an objective reality, but as a process of rhetorical activity which would engage people and is capable of creating collective identity, community and culture. He coins the term “constitutive rhetoric”⁷¹ whose ultimate subject is justice.⁷² Law, in this sense, is a set of resources—legal rules, judicial opinions, maxims, general understandings, conventional wisdom and all other technical and non-technical resources—for thought, speech and argument on occasion people considered as legal. People (lawyers and others) base on them to define one’s position, develop argument and persuade others to accept.⁷³

Can a more persuasive narrative on Hongkonger’s identity, based on law and the moral of equal respect and concern, be constructed, against the tendency of emerging xenophobia, selfishness and hatred, on which no genuine collective identity and

⁶⁸ Matthew Zagor, “Recognition and narrative identities: is refugee law redeemable?” in Fiona Jenkins, Mark Nolan, Kim Rubenstein, eds., *Allegiance and Identity in a Globalised World* (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 311-353, 321-322.

⁶⁹ James Boyd White, “Rhetoric and Law: The Art of Cultural and Communal Life,” in *Heracles’ Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law* (The University of Wisconsin Press 1985), 28-48. Rhetoric refers to as the activity and art of persuasion by using speech and writing (language). Here, White does not take the pejorative sense in which it is sometimes being understood: “ignoble art of persuasion”, “a false art”, propaganda or advertisement. (31-32)

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 32-33.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 34-35.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 31.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 33.

community can ever build?⁷⁴ To build a collective identity, people need to engage. People need to engage in reflecting, talking, imagining, associating and creating based on rules, principles and ethics. Civic and community engagement plays an important role,⁷⁵ so as a clear and strong moral voice in times of need.

Is There a Role for the Catholic Church?

Catholic faith cares deeply about the humanity: the dignity and well-being of the individual and human's communion with God and his/ her fellows. Human individual is created in the image of God and is unique in creation.⁷⁶ The individual is not a thing, for he possesses the dignity of a person, and is capable "of self-knowledge, of self-possession and freely giving himself and entering into communion with other persons" and is called by grace to a covenant with God "to offer him a response of faith and love that no other creature can give in his stead."⁷⁷ Human's own nature unites the spiritual and material worlds. The individual lives in this world and associates with others. The Church is concerned about the human

⁷⁴ Ibid., 38-39. White quoted the great literary work *Paradise Lost*, among others, to illustrate the power of constitutive rhetoric in community construction and the need for ethics and justice, in comparison with rhetoric used as a dishonourable art of persuasion "[T]he poem shows that no community can be built upon the language that [Satan and the rebellious angels] use, a language of selfishness and hatred...even by figures with such enormous capacities of imagination and will as [the author of the poem] represents the angels to be."

⁷⁵ 吳達明,〈法治教育, 培養什麼?〉, 戴耀廷 編,《法治@教育》(香港: 次文化堂, 2013), 101-106。[Simon T M Ng, "What does Rule of Law Education Cultivate?" in Benny Y T Tai, ed., *Rule of Law @ Education* (Hong Kong: Subculture, 2013), 101-106.]

⁷⁶ *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, no. 355,
<http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P1B.HTM> [01-02-2016].

⁷⁷ Ibid., no. 357.

conditions in this world, although our conditions are not always promising and sometimes are even in deep crises. And the Church’s role “has always had the duty of scrutinizing the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the Gospel.”⁷⁸

After the HKSAR Government decided to ask the NPCSC to reinterpret the residency provisions in May 1999, Cardinal John Baptist Wu issued a pastoral letter entitled *God is Love*.⁷⁹ He began his letter by a quote from the *Holy Bible* (Epistle to the Galatians):

“You were called to freedom, only do not use your freedom as an opportunity for the flesh, but through love be servants of one another. For the whole law is fulfilled in one word, you shall love your neighbor as yourself.” (Gal 5:13-14)

In it, he briefly reviewed the migratory nature of the Hong Kong society and how the society would welcome Mainland refugees even at times with no strong economy and firm social structure. He appealed to the kindness, generosity and benevolence of the Hong Kong people in helping to solve the question of Mainland born children to Hong Kong parents. He also saw the importance of resolving the problem locally and what far-reaching implications there would be if NPCSC was invited to do the job for Hong Kong.

The pastoral letter was not only a message of faith to the Church members, but also a message of public morality. Yet he invited

⁷⁸ *Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World*, no. 4, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html> [01-02-2016]

⁷⁹ Cardinal John Baptist Wu, *Pastoral Letter God is Love*, 6 June 1999, <http://www.catholic.org.hk/v2/en/message_jw/y1999_4_god.html> [01-02-2016]

Christians to see the right of abode incident in the light of the Gospel and extend it to the wider community:

“The whole of the Christian life is like a great pilgrimage to the house of the Father, whose unconditional love of every human creature we discover anew each day. This pilgrimage takes place in the heart of each person, extends to the believing community and then reaches to the whole of humanity.”⁸⁰

In critical time, when reasoned judicial justice was about to be overruled and when the vast majority of the society denied the rights of the children of some of its members simply because they were Mainland born, the pastoral letter served as a clear moral voice upholding the ethics of dignity and equal respect and concern, in an unfavourable situation. In simple, plain language intelligible to ordinary people, the pastoral letter sent out a powerful and persuasive message, by referring to Bible and Hong Kong’s history, laws and values, and tried to engage the readers, i.e. everyone in the Hong Kong society, to look at the problem in new perspective: the affected children are part of us!

Law provides the resources for us to imagine and construct a local belonging identity of Hongkongers. However, legal provisions only provide the basic “scaffolding” for the legal identity (permanent and non-permanent residencies). This identity would not turn into a civic identity without the moral force of treating every member with equal respect and concern. No free, inclusive and loving society would be possible without this morality. The Church, with her roles as prophet, teacher and servant, would have a big role to play.

⁸⁰ Ibid., paragraph 2.

〔摘要〕每個人都生活在某一處境中，受制於歷史和各種政治、法律和社會制度。個人的身份、權利、自由和義務，很大程度上受這些世俗制度界定和規範。最近，有關香港人身份的討論漸趨熾熱。然而，它的法律角度卻往往被忽略。究竟法律如何為香港人身份下定義？本文指出，香港的居留權法律為誰屬香港提供了基本架構，它為建構香港人的公民身份奠定基礎。「香港人」是具包容性和以權利為本的，而所有香港人都享有憲制賦予的共同權利和自由。這種具廣泛包容性的法律身份，同時需要一種平等地尊重和關懷每一個人的公共倫理觀予以配合。因此，以法律身份為基礎的論述會比其他身份論述優勝，例如只基於語言文化分類（如講廣東話和廣東文化）的論述。然而，要求一種平等地尊重和關懷每一個人的倫理對現時面對的狹隘、自我中心的本土論述氣氛未嘗不是挑戰，而作為人性尊嚴的護衛者，以及肩負起先知、教師和僕人角色的天主教會，在當中可扮演一定的角色，特別是作為一股道德力量。

佔領運動的價值衝突 對基督徒帶來的啟示和挑戰

朱偉志

[摘要] 佔領中環運動已邁過一周年，本文希望以另一個視角對這次香港有史以來最澎湃的社會運動作一檢視：佔領運動衍生的價值衝突，對本地基督信仰，特別是天主教社會訓導指引下的社會參與，帶來了甚麼的反思及出路？自六十年代天主教會的內部改革以後，本地教會加快走入群眾的步伐，使有宗教信仰的社運模式成為香港公民社會的初期發展的主要力量。九七回歸帶來的各種情緒，使身分認同問題成為一個隨時會爆發的計時炸彈。官方的主流論述與民間不斷增長的知識力量之鴻溝，使教會較為單純的投入向度也變得被動。而佔領運動的和平、理性、非暴力、非粗口（又稱「和理非非」）行動綱領便成為佔領期間藍、黃絲帶對峙之外，黃絲帶中的內部衝突（或所謂的左、右膠之爭），對投入這場運動的部份參與者而言是一個反高潮。本文希望能為有宗教信仰的社運參與者，提供上述的社會脈絡背景，以便有助消除其無力感之同時，亦提醒參與者一種新向度的自省是不能或缺的。

引言

這篇文章要討論一個問題：佔領運動衍生的價值衝突，對本地基督信仰，特別是天主教社會訓導指引下的社會參與，帶來了怎樣的反思及出路？

數年前仍未為人知的一個涉及參與社會運動者行動綱領的「和理非非」詞彙（即所謂「和平、理性、非暴力、非粗口」的指涉），在雨傘運動期間迅速並全面地由「褒詞」化為「貶語」，而當中的爭辯，¹不但涉及如何爭取民主才是有作為，更觸及宏觀的中港關係的未來走向，微觀的個人道德操守質疑，意識形態上的敵我分明，具體行動上的參與方式等等。究竟那些對「和理非非」的人之指控是反映責難者的無知、詭辯，還是代表著香港的社會氛圍（social ethos）或香港的政治光譜，已經出現一些範典式的轉變或新思維？然而，若社會氛圍真的有重大之轉變，為何政府或親北京的後佔中策略，仍是非常認真地思索如何幫助九十後「上樓」、「上位」（即有能力購買房子及有空間創業、升職等），或所謂一種物質主導的介入模式？這帶出兩個不同層次的反思：首先，究竟是建制中人面對現實，還是基進者自以為時移勢易？另外，教會面對過往沒有遇上的本土優先與抓緊中國經濟機遇兩股不同力量的拉扯，可站在怎樣的視域去處理新局面呢？

本文會先簡述本地教會回歸前的社會參與跟香港社會脈絡的互動關係，並嘗試指出那時相對集中的關注使張力未成氣候。然而，回歸後的中、港兩地之政經轉化對人心產生的微妙變化使緊繃狀況不斷累積。從親建制的角度看，香港人必須面對現實；但從基進(radical)的視角來說，香港已到了把舊抗爭模式來個大轉變的時候。我要陳述的是，由雨傘運動的出現而帶來的「和理非非」爭辯，正是前面時空的糾纏及拖延下而不能避免的引爆。

¹ 我必需強調，以下的討論是在一個描述各方的論點時，都沒有對任何一方被指收受政治黑金的疑竇/指控之處理，不然整個討論都變得徒然。

那麼香港將如何走下去呢？透過剛落幕的區議會選舉，這篇文章會嘗試作一個沒有信仰角度的預測，及一個有信仰角度的反思。

與貧窮者同行的年代

自上世紀六十年代梵蒂岡第二屆大公會議之後，基督信仰在追求平等、公義的議題上有著明顯的發展轉向。² 既然教會在世界的角色之轉變與時代脈絡的發展有不可分割的關係，本地的基督徒團體亦由上世紀六十年代末開始，由以往較單一的救濟及辦學角色，³ 走向為更廣泛的民生議題的社會運動參與，並見證相關的委員會及組織在六、七十年代起之相繼出現。⁴ 有評論甚至認為，部份信徒在七十年後期開始積極介入本地的社會政治之程度，更成為日後公民社會發展的支柱力量。⁵ 這情況其實可從嶺南大學文化研究系的《思想香港》這期刊的一期，專題討論『基督教與公民社會』中受訪的幾位局內人的描述中得窺一二。⁶ 普世合一運動及梵二會議所釋放的宗教力量進入社會過程這宗教因素，遇上六十年代在歐美開展的一波波反建制及平權運動這國際因素，再加上國內的文革在當時弄得似是而非的「革命無罪、造反有理」的中國因素，並配合當時已有充份準備的大都會發展

² 這裡特別指涉梵二會議中通過的〈論教會在現代世界牧職憲章〉；見林瑞琪，「天主教社會訓導的來源與發展」，在朱偉志等編，《教會的寶藏—天主教社會訓導簡易本》（香港：香港天主教正義和平委員會，2014），頁22-36。

³ Kit Man Li, Ka-hing Cheung and Kun-sun Chan, "The Social Role of Catholics in Hong Kong," *Social Compass* (1998, Vol.45, No.4), pp.515-16..

⁴ 例子有香港基督教工業委員會（1968）、香港天主教大專聯會（1971）、突破中心（1973）、香天主教正義和平委員會（1977）、香港基督徒學會（1988）等。See Chan Ka-wai (1997). "Hong Kong's Protestant Social Movement," in *Hong Kong's Social Movements: Forces From the Margins*, edited by Sophia Woodman (Hong Kong: July 1 Link), pp.109-16.

⁵ 羅永生，〈編者的話〉，《思想香港》第四期（2014年6月）。

⁶ 馬國明，〈火紅年代的天主教大專聯會〉，《思想香港》第四期（2014年6月），頁1-12；陳順馨，〈服侍最小的兄弟：七、八十年代天主教的社會行動〉，《思想香港》第四期（2014年6月），頁13-20。

藍圖，但這藍圖仍是恪守高壓殖民管治手腕的本地因素——把香港的躁動元素全面誘發，繼而踏入一個火紅的年代。

馬國明及陳順馨兩位作為七十年代老社運成員，在憶述他們的經歷時不經意的告訴我們，「與貧窮人站在一起」(option for the poor) 變成一個最大公約數：無論你嘗試依從信仰精神行事，或認為世界應有更多平等公義，或覺得資本主義為萬惡之源，甚致相信文革的當下狀況可能是人類思潮的範典轉移——你作為一個理想主義者，總能透過這議題而安然對號入座。那些多看幾本書，接受解放神學的信仰性或社會性，喜歡與同儕爭論國粹派與社會派背後理念優劣年青人，不經意地成為公民社會的開路分子。無論是受西方學生運動的薰陶或受中國文化的洗滌，一種反建制及反殖民的情緒便徐徐著地。六七暴動之後，引退的只是左派工會帶頭的對抗政府之手法，登堂的是一種複雜的社會脈搏：一種混合了有信仰味道的關社心懷，配合了民族感、文化觀、反殖民反建制心態、及公民權益爭取的反思。

吊詭的是，這種多元的公民參與，⁷ 卻隨著港督麥理浩於1979年訪華與國家主席鄧小平會面，並就香港前途展開非正式討論開始，而被中港如何銜接的議題搶了風頭。本地教會由於顧及未來香港政治轉變而可能出現的不確定性（最具體之憂慮是中國政府對香港人可能會有的思想箝制），更覺得要對社會公義及公民參與議題着墨。⁸ 當中尤以香港天主教正義和平委員會的工

⁷ 例如1968年的「爭取中文成為法定語文」運動、1971年的「保衛釣魚台群島」運動及「盲人工潮事件」、1973年的「反貪污、捉葛柏」運動及「文憑教師薪酬運動」、1974年的「四反運動」[即反加價、反失業、反貧窮、反壓迫]、1978年的「金禧事件」、1979年的「油麻地艇戶事件」等；現在回顧起來，也不難感到當時的澎湃。有關這方面的記述與討論，可參看，吳仲賢《大志未竟——吳仲賢文集》（香港：吳葉麗容，1997）；香港專上學生聯會，《香港專上學生運動回顧》（香港：香港專上學生聯會，1983）。

⁸ Louis Ha, "Catholicism in Hong Kong," in *The Other Hong Kong Report*, edited by Sung Yan-wing and Ming-kwan Lee (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1991), pp.527-41; Tat-ming Ng, "Church-state Relationship Around 1997," in *Church Response to Rapidly Changing Society: Conference Proceedings*, edited by Cheung Ka.Hing (Hong Kong: Catholic Institute for Religion and Society, 1996), pp.289-300;

作，特別彰顯教會要肩負更為清晰的政治覺醒角色。⁹ 六四事件之後，數個天主教及基督教團體在支聯會每年在維園舉辦六四燭光集會前都會在音樂亭舉辦祈禱會，並在不同堂區舉辦紀念彌撒 ... 這一切在在展示一種長期抗衡的耐力。亦是由於六四事件，香港的回歸關注不經意地簡約成為一個在「八九六四」後如何在香港建立民主選舉制度的關注。

香港的新形勢

由這一角度看，從「用愛與和平佔領中環」發展到「雨傘革命」這場本地史無前例的社會運動，香港天主教會及其相關組織大體上都秉承着其三十年來 — 特別在民主訴求上 — 的一貫參與模式去爭取。而朱耀明牧師在 2013 年 3 月 27 日宣讀佔中宣言時的調子，其實正反映出這種思維模式。¹⁰ 一如以往，來自當權/既得利益者的誣蔑及攻擊幾乎是可以預計的。但從當時一群「佔中死士」之出現，¹¹ 一個有別於之前的民主運動的訴求出現了：如果今次依然無功而還，用身體佔中是一個情理兼容的總結性「攤牌」行動（即在最後關頭將所有情況向對方公開，把自己

Mee-Yin Mary Yuen, "Hong Kong Catholics' Recent Participation in Social Movements," in *Hong Kong's Social Movements: Forces From the Margins* (Hong Kong: July 1 Link, 1997), pp.117-32.

⁹ Kit-man Li, et.al, "The Social Role of Catholics in Hong Kong," 519-20.

¹⁰ 朱耀明在當日的記者招待會開始時這麼說：「今日我地以敬虔、謙卑及祈禱嘅心，去宣告用愛與和平佔領中環這運動開始。我們心內無恨，反之心懷愛意去做這工作。我們不會打倒任何人，我們亦唔會反抗任何嘅政權。反之我地要堅定守法，我們以自己的身違法去突顯制度嘅不公義。若果這行動令下一代嘅人爭取到更大自由嘅話，咁我地三個人或許失去自由，但其實係微不足道。..... 呢個運動係公民覺醒運動，係公民弱勢社群充權嘅運動。我地係有能力嘅，只要我們站出來發聲，我地會爭取到一個公義公平嘅制度」(由開始至一分三十秒的發言)；見獨立媒體視頻片段，<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=is耀EPIVTxAs>。

¹¹ 見〈十人「佔中死士」名單曝光〉；《信報》，2013 年 4 月 29 日，<http://forum.hkej.com/node/100783>。

的底牌給人家看），亦是一種捨身成仁的呈現，而這種犧牲精神多少也反映了運動背後的道德感召。

然而，對佔中行動說不的反對/譴責聲音，很快便出現於自非建制但又被歸類為泛民陣營下的基進本土派，而更甚者是那種指控是涉及道德層面（輕則是好心做壞事的「離地」心態，重則是機心算盡的「偽善」行為），這對那些有信仰背景但沒有參與關社事務，或那些沒有信仰背景，但又一值以來對本地教會的關社取向支持的人來說，就算不是一個反高潮，也不難有一種茫然感。

上面這個向度的關注，多少反映出香港當前「撕裂」的複雜性：這種不和遠遠不只代表着視民主制度需要循序漸進及一切以中央看法為大局的親建制派（即所謂「藍絲帶」），或視普世價值為圭臬，並覺得香港人應給與無篩選的提名及投票權的泛民（即所謂「黃絲帶」）的壁壘對立，¹² 還有更深層而令不少藍絲丈八金剛摸不着頭腦，但也樂見其成的敵方內鬨式對立（即所謂左、右膠，或又稱「大中華膠」/「民主回歸派」vs「本土派」/「勇武抗爭派」）。¹³ 或許有人會說，這種話語權的爭奪，從來

¹² 「黃絲帶」是指一群在 2014 年下旬，由「佔中運動」演化為「兩傘革命」這期間，支持學生罷課及隨後佔領運動的人士，用黃絲帶作擁有相同理念，參與行動時能互相識別的象徵，成為代表支持香港民主運動和要求有真普選的顏色；而那些反對佔領的人士為了在與這群「黃絲帶」抗衡及爭取象徵意義及輿論陣地，他們會用「藍絲帶」為識別。相關討論見

<http://evchk.wikia.com/wiki/%E9%BB%83%E7%B5%B2%E5%B8%B6>。

¹³ 基本上「左膠」並非學術名詞，而是從 2010 開始由以陳雲為先行者，對一些在本地被認為是為香港民主發展及社會公義發聲的政黨或社運人士的鞭撻調侃。隨著梁振英成為特首後，政治張力不斷升溫，加入陳雲行列的支持者不斷上升，而他們不少也善於行文辭令，這群批評者便自/被稱為「右膠」。而所謂「膠」，是來自「香港網絡」術語「硬膠」，與廣東俗語「靚居」有諧音，帶有愚蠢、思想僵化之意。由於 2010 年特區政府欲推行政改方案，在最後關頭民主黨受邀到中聯辦秘密會談並受說服支持方案，做成當時已不大團結的泛民主派正式決裂，一股更激進的政治動力便成型，陳雲成為當中的健筆，先把其面書(facebook)積累的文章有系統地輯成其《香港城邦論》，在 2012 年面世，再於 2013 年在其《香港遭民論》中對「左膠」再作詳述。至此，這詞彙便變成那些被「右膠」認為是只講理想，不切實際（離地）、或思想僵化（閉塞）但又以為/標榜自身正直清高

在真正尊重民主思維的平台上沒有甚麼大不了（所以藍絲陣營便沒有這煩惱）；問題是當各持分者之間的爭辯已提升到一個倫理的層面去爭奪「民主」的定義，即對方是否仍是可溝通的同路人時，¹⁴ 究竟是怎樣的社會脈絡變化把香港帶到這定點呢？或許這麼說，如果「命運自主」是長期累積下來而終於出現的時空呼喚，而「自己香港自己救」是對照這呼喚的具體行動指標，那麼「誰[能]代表我」的警覺性反問似乎是時勢造成了。我們能抓著甚麼因素去解釋這改變呢？

認同的始發位

作為一個起步點，「九七回歸」是當之無愧的座標。因為它的出現/重現，無論從歷史、政治、經濟及文化角度而言，都激起了很多回憶、爭拗、選擇。當香港的宗主國（即中國大陸）在 1981 年開始計劃逐步結束這帶有喪權辱國的殖民地身分時，社會及人心動蕩的場面也同步開始。人心不穩全因「一國兩制」這個國家政策的被引入：我們究竟把它視為一個把「不可能『變為』可能」的安排，還是一個「把不可能」『說成』可能」的政策？有了它，似乎一切的含糊和衝突都已被疏解。還是，有了它，一

（無知/虛偽）的社運分子，而到佔中時達至最陶醉高鋒的時期。至於「大中華膠/回歸民主派」，是指左膠中談政治時把香港和中國連成一體，並認為中國的民主與香港的民主有不能分割關係的人，與那些為了保障香港生活的質素及內容不變，而願意轉出去的本土派/勇武抗爭派人士完全對立。本文「勇武抗爭」一節會有再進一步的討論。有關於「左膠」的討論，可見香港網絡大字典不斷更新的定義，見 <http://evchk.wikia.com/wiki/%E5%B7%A6%E8%86%A0>；關於陳雲的處理，見陳雲，《香港城邦論》（香港：天窗出版社，2012），第一章；及陳雲，《香港遺民論》（香港：次文化堂，2013），第七至八章。

¹⁴ 2013 年下旬，左右膠的文字上的相互攻擊及社會行動上的執行衝突（在貨櫃碼頭工潮過程上）愈加凌亂。「左膠」認為「右膠」不尊重人權、歧視大陸人、排斥新移民，是法西斯主義；「右膠」認為「左膠」是共謀、無視香港人的利益。雙方已經不是在民意上以政治理念擊敗政治競敵，而是要「消滅」對面那些不道德、不能代表民主的傢伙；至使有人對此作出分析，見 <http://www.vjmedia.com.hk/articles/2013/10/30/53298>。

切變得更含糊不清？香港人被迫要在一個很短的時間（1981-84年）透過「中英聯合聲明」解決自身的「國民身分」問題。

然而，由於這個問題交織著客觀及主觀層面，已故的新華社副社長黃文放先生便曾經一針見血的說，¹⁵ 香港市民當時最強烈的感覺是一種無奈感，而這種無奈感在過渡期的十三年間不但沒有被好好處理，更因六四事件而深化；你推我就的結果，埋藏了九七前後的很多身分認同疑竇。一個基本的提問是，香港人對回歸的無奈感是否突顯一種無根特性？然而，香港人在 1989 年「六四」期間的悲痛，1991 年「華東水災」的捐獻，1996 年「保釣行動」的投入，2003 年「楊利偉訪港」的熱情，2008 年的「四川賑災」的參與，不都是證明香港人對中國大陸的投入嗎？

這複雜的社會狀態在在指出，「九七回歸」需要兩個層面之解構 — 政治層面上的「主權回歸」與感觀層面上的「民族回歸」。前者是相對地被視為一個不用爭拗的事實（就算基進的本土派也只是以後者為戰場，下述）；問題是，民族回歸是否只是一種當然的反應，還是需要理性辯論/思考，並牽涉多個反省層次的問題？

我們必須明白，構成香港成功起飛的其中一個主因 — 香港人的勤奮 — 背後卻隱含著一段尷尬歷史：五十年代中後期的香港，當時過半數的居民有類似的背景，即她/他們都因為想尋找較太平的生活而離開中國大陸。香港的發展不但使得大部份戰後第一代得到生活上的改善，更使之後一兩代成長的我們有一種享受上一代成果的實在感。這種土生土長的生活體驗，都是一些具體而有社會脈絡建構出來的回憶。回歸談判的出現以至一系列過渡期的安排，非常突然地提醒我們，要將香港的獨特回憶與一個我們不熟悉的社會環境結合，這又是否一個純屬兩國之主權談判，不存在香港人認同問題的一回事呢？自回歸問題出現後，我們與中國大陸的關係便不斷在一個「血濃於水」至「井河分隔」

¹⁵ 見有線電視新聞一台的專輯《回歸回望》之「中英談判」；首播日為 1997 年 7 月 24 日。

的尺度下徘徊，因應不同的事件而被期待有不同的表現。自從接管香港的特區班底出現之後，香港人開始收到的政治訊息告訴我們，「愛港」這前提之上還要加上「愛國」的道德要求，而在大陸政府眼中，「愛國」就自不然等同於「愛黨」。有趣的是，香港人會被要求「愛國愛港」，但從來我們沒有被要求要有「四個堅持」，¹⁶ 而箇中原因又回到「一國兩制」這條「百合匙」了 ... 可行嗎？

對於上述情況，中央怎會不明白？正是基於此脆弱的認同性，致使有特區政府官員及親中人士在 1997 年前後不斷談及在本地的教育制度內加強灌輸愛國教育的元素，從而使新一代對國家有更正面的認識。問題的癥結所在，是我們在處理「更正面的認識」或「更多的認識」之分別；前者是一種「愛國教育」的主軸，後者則是「公民教育」的精神。誠然，我們應對一己的國家歷史與文化有更多理解，問題是我們又有否足夠空間去留待自己去判斷經過理解後的中國之對錯正反？¹⁷ 1999 年為中華人民共和國國慶五十周年，民政事務局為慶祝國慶而宣布用四百萬於「國情教育」，結果如何？2012 年的反國教活動已把答案寫在牆上。又例如中國首位太空人楊利偉在 2003 年底訪港。我們是否相信，正由於特區政府率先向有關方面提出，楊氏就因此而先訪港，而不是中央一種「曲線」支持當時民望低迷的董特首之策略？更何況楊利偉的到訪是一個很好的撫平因廿三條立法失敗而導致的傷口之做法！誠然，政治從來就混合著計謀，並且一日也太久。在中港問題上，特別在廿三條立法爭拗之後，中央是認定了要處理香港人的愛國情緒問題。這又如何？

¹⁶ 「四個堅持」為堅持無產階級專政、堅持馬列毛思想、堅持共產黨領導、堅持社會主義道路。

¹⁷ 蔡寶瓊，〈教育的政治，政治的教育〉，《明報月刊》總第 369 期（1996 年），頁 28-30。

獨特的香港歷史

香港人並不是存在著一個有沒有根的問題；相反，基於過往數十年與中國大陸政權隔離，本地社會經濟層面之全面現代化及國際化，和中西文化思潮自由交流等現實的交織下，港人對中國大陸自成了一個既有感情投入，又有理性判斷的認同感。只要我們稍為留意，便會發覺港人這種對中國大陸若即若離的情愫，並不會在一般台灣人身上體現到類似的表現。這也現實地反映了一個兩岸三地的事實：當已故的鄧小平、前任國家主席江澤民、胡錦濤都認為炎黃子孫都樂見一統局面時，台灣人是否在認同另一個政治實體？反觀香港人，她/他們是否不經意地將認同感超越了政權或政治實體的層次，淡化了政治因素而保留了文化血緣脈絡？這不是港人刻意經營的效果，而是上一兩代人一種不信任這政權但又並非不惦念這民族，下一兩代人不瞭解這國度但又不全面離棄這文化所交織出來的獨特心路歷程（本土派的出現是例外，而它在過去幾年的不斷壯大及加深撕裂的局面更值得詳論；下述）。這或許就是獨特的香港歷史。

固然，任誰也沒有料到回歸後不消數年光景，香港的經濟及社會氣氛出現空前的逆轉。如果我們作一個粗略的衡量，後九七的社會紛爭是存在著兩個面向的：一方面是涉及特區政府如何處理香港與中國大陸的關係，而另一方面是牽連到政府如果處理內部的社會問題。在有關「居港權爭拗」的高峰期時，其中一個值得關注之處是來自那群爭取者的「生為香港人，死為香港鬼」這口號。¹⁸ 一群在大陸成長的青年，在這個前殖民地，要求這個強調回歸祖國的重要意義之特區政府，給與她/他們一個屬於這特區居民的身份，這是否較任何爭取直選特首、平反六四等的要求，來得更使特區及中央政府尷尬？在這問題上，坊間出現正反的聲音，其實已意味著一些法律條文的闡釋上、個人倫理考慮上、本地工人的就業競爭上，以至道德責任及程序公正的維持上

¹⁸ 蔡榮光，《香港人之香港史：1841-1945》（香港：牛津大學出版社，2001）。

之爭辯。官方立場上盡力建構的中、港一家親形象與居港權的當事人之積極爭取港人身份的訴求，形成鮮明的客—主觀矛盾。這種矛盾固然妨礙港人整理香港與中國的關係，但其實很少有評論會談及國內人士對中央對待香港的態度，而這些看法又足以加深中、港之間的矛盾。2000年8月發生的庾文翰小朋友不幸事件相信誰也不願看到，¹⁹但當特區政府在必須要對事件負責的前提下，積極尋求中央政府的協助時，中央默許傳媒的高調報導（既可提高機會尋到庾氏，另外亦可表達中央對港人的關懷），卻冷不提防引來國內人民的負面感覺。²⁰網民一句「香港人憑甚麼受這些厚待」，便反映出當中有部份中國人對「特區」的「特」頗不是味兒。香港人是否真的值得這樣厚待？國內的反應會否真的不置可否？或許我們應該細想，從來香港回歸的副作用可能有另一層的關注是我們很少顧及的。

我們再回想前國家主席在2000年對香港傳媒動氣的事。江澤民罵香港記者“simple and naive”；²¹香港的記者是不是沒有政治智慧並不是這裡的關注，他似乎沒有在意的是，在這些記者問一些「不該問」或「不該這麼問」的問題背後，是有一群讀者及觀眾，正正要閱讀中央如何面對指其「欽點」當時的特首董建華連任的看法。²²香港人是故意跟中央政府鬥氣嗎？或許這些對立並不是一種對著幹的態度，而是兩者生活經驗與體驗的不同下產生的必然結果，而這些情況並不是依賴特區政府主辦的活動或宣

¹⁹ 2000年8月24日上午，患有自閉症，有輕度智障及過度活躍症的庾文翰在市區與其母走失，而在當天下午，他被發現在羅湖邊境管制站，但當時入境事務處職員，因在他身上找不到任何身份證明文件，而把庾當作內地兒童送往深圳，自此下落不明至今。

²⁰ 〈內地網民不滿厚待港人〉，《明報》，2000年9月2日。

²¹ 2000年10月特首董建華到北京述職。當時已盛傳中央已拍板欽點董氏連任；就在國家主席江澤民接見他時，本港記者不斷追問，江澤民動了火，在五分鐘內三度從座位上起來走向本港記者並教訓她/他們，說其不識大體，並對著鏡頭用英語說記者“you ... simple and naive!”。

²² 見《明報》社評，〈錢其琛挺董連任不該不智〉，2000年10月27日；《信報》社評，〈昔日「江握手」，如今「錢支持」〉，2000年10月27日。有關片段之討論可參閱無線電視《新聞透視》之『中央挺董』；首播日期為2000年10月28日。

傳便機械化地解決了的。我們可以主辦國慶酒會、「百年自強」、「香港故事」等硬性或軟性活動，²³ 但香港人在接收這些官方（中央或特區）的訊息時，是否就是一個全無保留的受眾？市民會否對論述有保留，自然端視她/他們的思維有多少自由空間去反思，及有否那種敢言能耐表達出來：能力及膽量，缺一不可。

我們不妨撫心自問，香港這種公眾力量的凝聚及功效，是由其已在前面討論過的香港脈絡下建構出來，並且已變成本地一種無形的資產。這突顯了言論及思想自由，但社會又不一定會接受它們可以凌駕一切。其實它們可能結合著西方的程序公正、契約文化、與華人社會的家族關懷及人倫厚道下的一個社會文化。所以，沒有人認為特區政府需要對金融風暴及禽流感的出現負責，問題是政府如何處理這些危機。沒有人反對解決香港的房屋問題，但只顧履行一個既訂指標而不理會實際環境的轉變，並且不直接承認失敗，便是使人氣結的地方。

如果政府在管治手法及邏輯上，不斷違背這種由社會脈絡培養出來的社會精神，其實遠較任何力量更具催毀力。不幸地，現任香港特首梁振英的「造皇」過程，已變成了一個最壞的例子，香港亦正為此付出代價。管治文化出現變化，再加上香港內部出現經濟轉型及世界出現經濟衰退的雙重夾擊下，一種緊繃的社會氣氛又怎會不形成呢？事實上，回歸後的特區政府，無時不是面對著一群有一定參照水準的市民之檢視，而這種檢視能耐也是其成長經驗的自然積累之結果。當然，特區政府強調中、港一家，經濟一體化，這是經濟潮流所在；但在這種結合過程中，如果只有香港愈來愈像中國，而非香港保持著其獨特的社會規範，香港的價值/特性又是否可以保存？²⁴ 隨著 2008 年的金融風暴之後，中國經濟變成世界經濟的火車頭，中港兩地這幾年由政治衝突提升到物質資源及文化的衝突，走向是何等的全面！佔領中環及本

²³ 前者是由特區政府在每年國慶時都向各界友好發帖擁護的「硬招」，而後二者都是在回歸後香港歷史博物館加進成為常設展覽項目的「軟招」。

²⁴ 2003 年由香港劇團「進念」所策劃的演出《東宮西宮系列》第二集之「問責制唔制」，可算是這方面一個很好的參考。

土主義的糾纏，只不過是最後的稻草，引爆了香港回歸後一直拖延著的價值衝突而已！當中涉及的正是怎樣的心境化成政治動力之關連。但香港人的心境是何所指？社會氛圍到底有沒有改變過？這又對本地天主教會由信仰角度出發的社會參與產生甚麼沖激呢？

香港社會氛圍的官方版

筆者在文首時曾提及，佔領運動結束後，政府及建制人士都認真地覺得要幫助年青人「上樓」、「上位」化解佔中背後的主因：沒有向上流的機會。但這種思維模式不是與上文描述的社會狀況不咬弦嗎？這裏要提出一個分析向度：有關方面壓根兒不認為香港人是有真誠的政治熱情，而總體上是傾向一種非常在地的實務考慮 (*practical concern*)。對他們來說，這種分析並不是在掩耳盜鈴，而是有具體的憑証，而始作俑者就是劉兆佳在七十年代後期開始對香港的政治文化所奠定的分析架構。筆者在此必要表達一個重要的觀察：劉氏到目前為止，仍在在展示他的思想譜系不但對香港有堅實的解釋能力，並且對那些不是這系統的思路不以為然。這對瞭解我們稍後討論香港目前的撕裂狀態有深層的意義。

無可否認，劉兆佳不但對香港的政治文化 (*political culture*) 及社會氛圍 (*social ethos*) 作出詳盡分析；而且他一直沒有停下來，並透過演化他的主旨回應不斷變化的香港社會環境，從而展示他對香港分析的準確性。²⁵ 他的重點是去處理香港社會的「政

²⁵ 劉兆佳的有相關著作包括：Lau Siu-kai, *Utilitarianistic Familism: the Basis of Political Stability in Hong Kong*, Occasional Paper, No.74 (Hong Kong: Social Research Centre, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1978a); Lau Siu-kai, *From Traditional Familism to Utilitarianistic Familism: the Metamorphosis of Familial Ethos Among the Hong Kong Chinese*, Occasional Paper, No. 78 (Hong Kong: Social Research Centre, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1978b); Lau Siu-kai, "Chinese Familism in An Urban-Industrial Setting: The Case of Hong Kong," *Journal of Marriage and Family* (1981) Vol.43, No.4, pp.181-96; Lau Siu-kai, *Society and Politics in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1982); Lau Siu-kai,

治非活躍性」(political inactivity)。劉氏的基本提問如下：作為一個殖民政治體系，香港為何能避免一般殖民地史的社會動蕩不安之餘，還有飛躍的經濟發展？

對劉氏而言，「功利家庭主義」(utilitarianistic familism)解釋了香港華人的「政治中立」(politically neutral)，或「政治冷漠」(politically apathetic) 態度。²⁶ 逃港難民從開始的一刻已知道香港是一個殖民地，香港對她/他們而言是權宜棲身之所。難民的身份亦只是「過客」而已。作為一寄居者，其追求的是一個起碼能糊口，並且可能的話能積聚財富之地，而非如何投入其建設之內。只要這社會能提供一個有板眼的規矩制度，香港華人對香港之政治運作模式的內容又何須上心？故此，政府一種由上而下，著重招攬精英而完全沒有民主成份的委任手法之所以能運作，是有賴於本港華人對這種管治手法的單向性不以為然；而華人能作出這樣的抉擇，是由於華人家庭文化所做就的「資源網絡」(resource network) 能對華人產生一種支持，發揮著一種「社會〔家庭〕吸納政治」的作用，使市民不傾向對政府有所冀盼的結果。

依據其「功利家庭主義」的分析架構，劉兆佳進一步將它引申來構成其「低度整合社會政治系統」概念 (Minimally-Integrative-Social-Political System)。²⁷ 此概念有兩重

“Social Change, Bureaucratic Rule, and Emergent Political Issues in Hong Kong,” *World Politics* (1983) Vol.35, No.4, pp.544-62; Lau Siu-kai and H.C. Kuan, *The Ethos of Hong Kong Chinese* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1988); Lau Siu-kai and H.C. Kuan, “The Attentive Spectators: Political Participation of the Hong Kong Chinese,” *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* (1995, Vol.14, No.1), pp.3-24; 劉兆佳，〈新政治遊戲規則與特區的管治〉，《回歸後的香港政治》(香港：商務，2013)，頁 112-59；劉兆佳，〈香港民主發展的獨特性〉《香港的獨特民主路》(香港：商務，2014)，頁 159-87。劉兆佳的相關著作遠多於此；筆者只是集中呈現其在九七回歸前的一系列與社會氛圍這主題有關的討論，及其在離任中央政策組首席顧問一職後（即 2012 年後）的相關著作相比較，來展示其思維邏輯。

²⁶ Lau, Siu-kai, *Utilitarianistic Familism: the Basis of Political Stability in Hong Kong*, p.2.

²⁷ Lau, *Society and Politics in Hong Kong*, 17-24.

意義。首先，香港華人的難民背景加上其傳統文化的熏陶同時相互配合，造就了一種親屬鄰里守望相助精神；其次，香港政府對華人社會非不得已的介入政策，構成政府與華人的一種政治距離，而此種距離往往由一些中介媒體或人士（如民間機構的行動或社會知名人士的說話），把政府和市民間的意見相連或傳達，從而體現了一種低度整合的社會政治關係，一切以穩定及秩序維持為原則，好讓眾人能在這氣候下，用自由及公平的競逐方式開展財富累積，以及提昇生活質素的活動。

跟據上述的大方向，劉氏便為香港作了以下的定性：起碼直至 1970 年代為止，本地華人的取向是一種由文化傳統及當時的香港經驗所結合而成的。大多數逃港難民的一個共同背景，是如何逃避在中國大陸的艱苦生活及被迫害的危機。基於她/他們對政治的冷漠及對生活穩定的熱切希冀，這群華人極快地融入一個講求經濟發展、安定繁榮的戰後香港社會。難民雖然缺乏生活保障，但似乎也沒有要求政府的大量民生投入，更遑論會培養出對社會有所參與的公民意識了。政府當然會擔負著一定的社會角色，但其大前提似乎只在於提供基本的生活條件，以及保持一個公平的競爭環境，讓港人可自由角力。在這前提下，似乎只有自由市場的運作可釐定、排解各人的成王敗寇結局，並容許失敗者有捲土重來的機會。一言以蔽之，一個依賴精英制度及司法獨立運作，奉行放任自由主義經濟政策(laissez-faire economic policy)之餘而只為大眾提供著最基本福利網的政府，配合著一群對政治冷漠、尋求生治安定和物質水平提高的市民，共同構成了一個香港政治及社會文化的圖像：在社會的一方是盡量不干預市場及社會的政府；另一方是透過發奮努力以求不斷改善生活，但又不關心社會整體發展的市民。

在宏觀的經濟機會配合之下，香港便成為一個只重視商機發展而不講求政治開放的社會。自由開放指的是「機會」之長期存在，並且在清晰的遊戲規則之下，彼此相互較量的一個競技場，無論成王敗寇，參與者最後也各安天命，無悔無怨。市場機制被認為是一種公平的方式去解決資源之分配及收入之分布。只

有市場是解決所有問題的最終仲裁者，而這也是自由放任政策的最高境界。這種涉及社會經濟邏輯、政府管治手法、市民思維模式的結合，便似乎是劉兆佳的理論架構所要描述的社會政治系統相互間之互動模式的洞悉能力。

有趣的是，近的不說，劉兆佳的理論體系雖成型於 1970 年代後期，卻不見得他對我們上面談及的本地六、七十年代社會抗爭或運動有太大的關注。這些運動的出現，不就是對「政治非活躍性」這個重點的有力反擊嗎？然而，依據劉兆佳的觀點，政府對「六七暴動」的迅速介入以便重建安定環境，並且得到市民認同這種平亂的做法，在在都顯示出香港人的根本精神規範所在。有論者可能會認為，1968 年的「爭取中文成為合法語文運動」及 1971 年的「保衛釣魚台運動」，雖然是當時的大專學生所策動的運動，而且對普羅大眾而言，這肯定不是影響日常生活的關注，但這些社會事件多少也意味著本地的社會運動已逐漸形成一個初型吧？毫無疑問，踏入 1970 年代，政府已較以前放置大量的資源於公共事務上，但其對社會的投入依然脫離不了一種「見招拆招」的運作方式，而社會的急速發展亦標誌著社會問題的複雜化；換句話說，依靠個人的資源網絡解決日常面對的問題之限制亦愈來愈大。「功利家庭主義」的生活哲學，似乎更難應付個人及其家庭所需要面對的日常壓力，而教育的逐漸普及也提高了市民向政府要求其權利被保障。

然而，在劉兆佳的理論架構之內，這類零星的社會事件似乎並不對其低度整合社會政治系統構成「事實不符」的壓力。對他而言，這種轉變只反映出「功利家庭主義」作為一種香港市民的文化規範，如何逐漸轉化為一種「自我中心個人主義」(egotistic individualism) 的生活規範。²⁸ 市民會向政府提出各式各樣的要求，但這並不表示市民對社會的投入增加了；而是市民為了肯定個人的利益及尋求發展的空間得到保障，於是會在任何有損及這些前提的情況時作出一種爭取的表現。在一定程度上，這一種略

²⁸ Lau and Kuan, *The Ethos of Hong Kong Chinese*, 54.

為修訂的論述，似乎在勾劃以下的現象：隨著香港社會的發展，香港政府的資源投入無法不增加，但這種回應只是為了鞏固及強化香港的經濟發展，而香港市民對社會事務的要求之提升，是一種由私慾所推動的「情境道德」(situational morality) 多於作為一個公民對社會的責任之重視。²⁹ 就算在回歸期前後，政治參與的社會活動明顯增多了，但市民都是停留在一種認知上多於是行為上的參與，成為「有心的觀察者」(attentive spectators) 而已。³⁰ 故此，縱觀過去數十年的變遷，劉兆佳的結論是香港人的民主訴求的升降往往由實用或功利思想驅動這結論。³¹

誠然，對劉兆佳的批評自上世紀九十年代開始亦開始成型，但由於這並非本討論之中心，唯有不贅。³² 但對劉兆佳而言，他亦不會理喻這些評論，因為他的觀點若非是他對中國政府的建議，³³ 就是代表了中國政府的立場。³⁴ 而在佔中演變成雨傘運動之後，他被視為黃、藍對峙之「藍絲」。³⁵ 其實，劉氏並不止於

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 54-55.

³⁰ Lau and Kuan, "The attentive spectators: political participation of the Hong Kong Chinese.", 3.

³¹ 劉兆佳，「香港民主發展的獨特性」，13。

³² 話雖如此，但筆者必需指出，羅永生對劉氏的批評，簡言之是劉氏如何用他的「管理主義」學術論述對香港的殖民地管治加以合理化，並能使中方欣然接受他的主張，使他由彭定康殖民政府的非官方顧問過渡到特區政府，並由董建華連任起，做了十年中央政策組的首席顧問。羅氏對劉的分析，可算是目前在本地同儕中最深遠的。最新的分析見羅永生，《勾結共謀的殖民權力》（香港：牛津大學出版社，2015），頁 216-29。由於羅氏對劉氏的批評不獨是學術而更涉及其城府，故他對劉氏的「貢獻」是一種基本上是嗤之以鼻態度。筆者只能另文討論。

³³ 比方說，他在退下首席顧問一職後，便寫了「構建管治聯盟芻議」一文。見劉兆佳，《回歸後的香港政治》，頁 330-54。觀乎此文及其他他在 2012 年後撰寫的文章之語調，他已儼如就香港應如何管治向中央進言及排難的國師。

³⁴ 例如，他說「香港的民主派應該成為『忠誠的反對派』」(loyal opposition)，見《香港的獨特民主路》，頁 vii；或說「香港的民主發展需要從服從大局的角度考慮」（劉兆佳，《回歸後的香港政治》，頁 iii）；又或者說「中國政府不會接受那些會帶來不明朗情況和後果的香港政治體制和選舉安排」（同上：71）。這些論調甚至成為處理香港事務的中方官員的直接表白。

³⁵ 無論是自發掛上藍絲帶，還是被組織來參與抗衡活動，所謂藍絲，她/他們（或更具體的是由周融所帶領的「保普選反佔中大聯盟」）就是要表達支持中央，追

想指出他是冷靜及客觀地分析香港；他要用其論述所展示的理路來強化香港的社會格局就是這模樣的一個狀況。由於他認定香港自八十年代開展的民主化過程是一個「沒有獨立的非殖民地化」過程，民主化進程就只能在「非獨立」的政治框架內發生，即民主黨派就必須同樣在框架內「發揮」，其「反對」的最終極力量依歸，便應是如何改善而非如何取締的心境，而達至「忠誠的反對派」效果。³⁶ 這樣的表述又豈能在本土派中產生作用？

勇武抗爭對信仰精神的挑戰

香港政治發展論述的一種撕裂之對照，莫過於在上段提及劉兆佳撰寫的「構建管治聯盟芻議」，及陳雲差不多時段面世的「中華邦聯論芻議」，或稱之謂「香港城邦論」。³⁷ 筆者覺得迄今為止，陳雲把本土意識融入民主運動的嘗試相當明顯。他的論述最凌厲之處，並不止於他對其認為中國政府不是之鞭撻，而是他對那些他認為構成香港民主步伐裹足不前的人之指控，而這群被責難者都是在七、八十年代冒起的民主黨派及鬥士，並加上在九七後的非政黨之社運分子——一概被他稱為愚昧左翼 (leftist) 或左膠分子。³⁸

陳雲認為西方傳統的左翼分子是泛指政治上傾向馬克思主義，經濟上採納社會主義均富思想，不主張暴力奪權，而鍾情於輿論啟蒙、社會運動和議會民主方式的政團或個人。³⁹ 由於中國共產黨走了一條資本主義道路，並且已取得一定成就，但它又是一個獨裁體系，對外儼如一個帝國殖民主義的國度，以金錢外交延續其國際認受性，對內以高壓及利益輸送的手段鎮住反對者及保住既得利益者，與它糾纏等同以卵擊石。在這樣的背景下，如

求安定，擁抱繁榮的大原則。

³⁶ 見《香港的獨特民主路》，頁 159-65。

³⁷ 前者見劉兆佳，《回歸後的香港政治》，頁 330-54；後者見陳雲，《香港城邦論》（香港：天窗出版社，2012），頁 222-25；《香港遭民論》（香港：次文化堂，2012），頁 53-59。

³⁸ 陳雲，《香港遭民論》，頁 203-62。

³⁹ 陳雲，《香港遭民論》，頁 205-06。

果在處理中港關係時，只談理想政治而非現實政治，或不懂得分開終極目標（一個跨地域而包括當下中共國土，但不是中共政府的華夏聯邦的體現）與過渡狀態（香港在這過程中如何善用自身的資源，跟當下中國政權保持距離，但又為未來的聯邦的運作打好基礎），結果若非兩面不是人便是兵敗如山倒。⁴⁰

這個討論是陳雲對香港政治文化及出路的最震懾地方。陳雲認為，八九六四後，特別以民主黨及支聯會為首的民主抗共、建設民主中國的願景，把香港和中國捆綁在一起，而這群九十年代開始，帶領香港民主運動的人物及組織，便把「中國情花毒」不停灌輸給香港人。到了 2010 年，民主黨經過與中聯辦密室會議後改而支持曾蔭權的政改方案，這行動若不是徹底地展現了民主黨及相關人士的變節/媚共的真面目，便是反照著其「硬膠」特性，反正也是一樣：從當下起，要全力保住香港城邦。陳雲亦由當時開始，對中港情況作他的抽絲剝繭分析，指出對香港而言，當下的中國若即時變成民主中國為何會比共產專政中國更可怕；香港對大陸的貢獻如何多於大陸對香港的，因此港人不需妄自菲薄；又香港的新移民問題如何癱瘓了香港的政治思考，為何只爭取香港的自治而非獨立，要走的社運為何要轉到族群政治的鬥爭方法云云。⁴¹ 如果陳雲被認為是紙上談兵，「熱血公民」作為一政治組織，以及在後佔中階段出現的本土組織，便多少體現了陳雲理念的行動版了。2010 年後對民主黨的「票債票償」口號而引申出對民主黨參選者的選舉追擊，⁴² 及之後的一系列社會運

⁴⁰ 筆者這綜合及緊接的分析是游走於陳雲數本著作，包括前面已觸及的《香港城邦論》第一、二、四及六章，及《香港遭民論》第七及八章，還有其《香港城邦論 II：光復本土》（香港：天窗出版社，2011）第二及第五章；及《香港保衛戰》（香港：次文化堂，2013）第六章。

⁴¹ 陳雲這些觀點散見於上面的數本著作，並為勇武抗爭建立了後勤的理論支援。

⁴² 「票債票償」是由 2010 年民主黨跟中聯辦達成共識支持政改方案後，當時的立法會議員黃毓民對民主黨的宣戰，說民主黨欺騙了支持民主的選民，而選民一定會用選票向它說「不」。黃後來成立熱血公民，其成員亦貫徹這做法，派人到民主黨黨員參選的選區出選來挑戰他們的參選。

動的各自表述及爭辯狀況便正式展現，當然在佔中時期引發的「和理非非」爭論為白熱化的表象。

筆者必須指出，陳雲及其同路人要痛斥或罵醒的不會是建制派中人如劉兆佳等，而是那些在他們眼中 (i) 虛偽的政黨、政客，或 (ii) 自我感覺良好的離地中產，或 (iii) 只有熱情而歷練不多（很大程度是受第一類人的操控）的社運新手，或認為「民主追求是良好的」支持者。在建制者的角度來說，這是可笑及求之不得的，因為這只會做成一種不團結及自我削弱實力的效果。⁴³ 但「勿通匪類」（匪類當然是上面所指的第 (i) 類）是熱血公民追隨者的最低入場條件。而在佔領中環這大力宣傳的社會運動中，佔中三子與民主派人士關係密切這事實已經不大對徑，但更難接受的是三子的「離地」性。⁴⁴ 對熱血公民一族來說，如果佔領不擾民，何謂及何必佔領？而由於很多第 (iii) 類人士不大知就裏而願意投誠共闖，結果在締造一個預知了結果並且預告了會失敗的社會運動，更陶醉於「階段性勝利」，把人民的拼勁無謂的消耗了。⁴⁵

正由於此，勇武抗爭者一直指出，「佔領中環」運動在 9 月 28 日特區政府施放催淚彈，佔中大台呼籲群眾離開那一刻開始已經完結，代之而起的是自發的群眾運動。只是學聯陰差陽錯成為新發言人，但又完全不能指揮另外的佔領區之狀況下，而又被冠以是新的統籌者，而佔中辦公室又到現場維持秩序，便不能避免地營造了之後「誰能代表我」及「拆大台」的佔領區內之爭

⁴³ 劉兆佳正有這類的分析；他認為這種激進的勢頭不會被普羅大眾所接受，亦使反對派更難成氣候，見《香港的獨特民主路》，149-55。

⁴⁴ 「戴耀廷 ... 的方案是要經過精英挑選、排隊報名、磋商 ... 預演、簽署悔罪等。這好似是一場神學運動多於政治鬥爭，... 這是可笑的，因為香港人面對的中共是撒旦，不是上帝。」；見《香港保衛戰》，頁 274。

⁴⁵ 在佔中仍未爆發前，黃洋達在其網台節目中曾多次強調「佔中」這種安排是白做，這反過來會更傷害社會運動，他與佔中三子的分歧，不是和平與激進之分，而是合理與空想之別；他們反對佔中正是太珍惜這次機會而不想它在這準備不充分情況下去做；見 <http://temp.passiontimes.hk/?view=prog5&ep=114>；首播日為 2013 年 3 月 22 日。

論。⁴⁶「和理非非」在這狹隙中便變成更尖銳的對峙立場，並由此而回朔到那些社運人士的愚抹情懷當中尤以對社工界及宗教界為甚，把香港的獨特性在意或不在意地利用了，弄到如斯局面等的辯論。在這背景下，很多熱心的支持者「躺著也中槍」，但對熱血一族來說，早點弄醒那群有心但被愚弄或自我感覺良好的離地理想主義者，香港才會有多一些正面的挑釁力量匯聚，才能使共產政權知難而停（是停止再干擾香港以免自身得不償失），願意與香港保持一個互不干涉的關係。說到此，城邦論者究覺是否本身才是自我感覺良好呢？但若有人這樣反調侃，其心儀的香港出路又是甚麼呢？我們要回歸到劉兆佳的「忠誠反對派」出路？

何去何從：觀察香港的兩個向度

一石激起千重浪；此「石」可以用城邦論代入之？還是用「雨傘運動」？還是我們自身的慣性思維要經歷一範典轉移 (paradigm shift) 的所指？當我們以落幕不久的區議會選舉為照，⁴⁷ 熱血公民六名參選者全軍覆沒，是否就代表這種激進思潮此路不通？其參選者全都是空降迎戰，並申明是要把本土意識帶入地區，而區議會理論上主調在地區事務，而最後他們在各自的小選區中都得到五至十個百份點之支持，這不是有值得留意的地方嗎？范國威為主席的「新民主同盟」，十六人出選十五人當選，破盡紀錄，全都是反水貨、保本土為主調，也不似是鬧著玩。「青年新政」、「傘下爸媽」成員擊敗當區建制元老，特區政府打那上樓、上位牌是騷著癢處嗎？城邦論者一直強調，難道她/他們不欲安定、繁榮？只是此一思路看透的，是小恩小惠帶來的

⁴⁶ 由於九二八的突發性質而使當時的佔中司令台呼籲群眾撤退，究竟九二八之後金鐘佔領區的佔領行動應由誰帶領呢？當時的勇武抗爭派堅持這已是群眾運動，所有人都是領袖，沒有誰能代表誰，所以不應只有一小撮人能站台，或決定誰能上台。

⁴⁷ 這屆區議會是回歸後特區政府的第五屆區議會選舉，在 2015 年 11 月舉行，亦是雨傘運動後第一個全港性的民主選舉。

溫水煮蛙後果，真正有洞察力的人不會及不應再上當了。對，這是一種撕裂，因為攤牌了；為何這時攤牌？在我而言，因為時候到了，一個以天時、地利、人和所結合的時候所產生的結果：

- 1) 由 1982 年開始的中英談判至 1984 年中英聯合聲明簽定的港人被排除參與的荒誕感，到由 1984 至 1997 這十三年過渡期的無奈感之積聚而產生的扭曲
- 2) 千禧年伊始資訊溝通技術〈Information and Communication Technologies〉的不斷革命式突破而把人類溝通模式、溝通速度及溝通內容全盤改寫而引致人對社會事務的認知能耐及參與可能之提升；這一切對香港作為一個大都會有莫大的社會意義
- 3) 回歸後所經歷的變種病菌〈由不斷變種的禽流感到沙士〉的蹂躪，和全球經濟一體化的幾何發展速度而把亞洲金融風暴、科網股爆破到美國次按風暴的不斷引申骨牌效應所帶來的無助感及激起的怨憤
- 4) 中國在千禧年代之後的全面經濟發展但政治制度又原地踏步所產生的社會失序局面如何被香港解讀
- 5) (3) 及 (4) 點的此消〈香港〉彼長〈中國〉狀況如何把中港兩地的人民對自己及對方的評價產生影響及被再消化；而在這再生產過程中，夾雜很多各自的情、理考慮，亦由此加劇中港矛盾
- 6) 特區政府的過分自我投誠角色，加上港英時代遺留下來的商業精英與極待上位的二綫商業精英之爭鬥白熱化，也為(2)提供無盡話題和反思向度

這個天時、地利、人和的結合營做了一個不一樣的畫面：

- 1) 民主的爭取是大中華的還是本地的考慮〈由毋亡六四到五區公投再到城邦論及香港革新論〉⁴⁸

⁴⁸ 基本上人大八三一落閘後，大中華/民主回歸市場已沒有了市場，不獨是代表激進派的陳雲一早已用“情花毒”來對中港民主捆綁作調侃，新一輩的學者也以「天朝主義」來形容這種思維的不中用；前者上文已談及，後者見方志恒，《香

- 2) 從而引申到誰代表著民主訴求〈是由上而下的還是人民自發的〉
- 3) 再發展到如何消除阻礙民主訴求力量到位的因素〈右膠指責左膠虛偽、離地，左膠指責右膠偏激、狂奔〉
- 4) 「反對派」裡面〈「泛民」作為一個詞彙已失去了其表面的魅力及內容的清晰性〉有輩分、理念、手法之爭，是八、九十年代「反對派」的單一反共和爭取民主議題時，呈現著不可同日而語的複雜性

信仰角度的反思

作為有信仰的社運參與者，在參與大夥兒的「維權」運動時，你總不能在啟動前叫停眾人先來俯首祈禱吧。這在在指出，當我們離開「宗教界」而進入「社運界」時，我們要接受另一套思想規範來行事，而從來在「社運界」，那種自強不息、人定勝天、不屈不撓精神都是基本要求；「自己香港自己救」自然具鼓舞性及聚焦，「我的香港上帝救」就不能擺出來，頂多是你自身的原動力而已，不然你就成為另一個「離地」例子。又或者說，無論是劉兆佳或陳雲，壓根兒不會去處理天主教社會訓導的意義，因為在當下的多元社會思潮中，基督信仰已沒有了七十年代的「與貧窮人在一起」的相對單純時代脈絡了。當信仰要求我們要去支持家庭團聚先於資源考慮，或最低工資應涵蓋本地外藉傭工於受惠群體時，不用勞煩熱血一族說我們「離地」，就是堂區教友也可能嘩聲四起。

我們再回到文首說的「和理非非」；和平、理性、非暴力（暫且把「粗口」放下），本質上為何會被質疑呢？對於基進的民主追求者來說，如果我們反對人大「八三一決定」是因為它把結果定於選擇之前這種邏輯，我們為何要贊成未開始抗爭就把它的結果寫在牆上這種思維呢？結論似乎只有兩個可能：一就是作為政客的虛偽及計算，不然就是愚昧或浪漫主義之奴隸了。

其實，真誠的宗教信仰會否是一個有力的第三個可能？相對於老社運如馬國明的經歷，在這個世代已變得太遙遠，因為無論抽象層面上而言的人文思潮的發展，社會層面上而言的實務利益考慮，及政治層面上的中港軟硬實力角力，整個社會脈絡也變了。但基本上教會的社會訓導仍在，對居港權人士之支持，對新移民的支援，對公民抗爭的認同但又對抗爭手法的執著，理論上都有豐富的神學觀點作後盾。問題可能不在其「離地性」（教會的立場），而是其追隨者的一致性。這個年頭的公權力之被重視，透明度之被視為正常，資訊流通之快而引申監察來得更易，都使一個表示會以信仰行事的人更易被檢視，但真金並不會怕爐火亦是另一個很重要的承托。

說到底，從信仰角度而言，我們受了洗，這代表了甚麼？天主對我們的感召發生了，我們領會到/開始領會一切也由於祂，我們開始面對更多喜樂，但同時間，亦開始面對現實的掙扎。以往可能被羨慕，覺得可能需要有學識或感召才能有的「離地」感，現在是一種被懷疑的起點，對有信仰的參與者來說，這是否亦是一次不錯的歷練，有新一重的反思動力及見證需要？

[ABSTRACT] The Occupy Central Movement has gone through its anniversary. This article hopes to provide another perspective in examining this most controversial social movement that Hong Kong has experienced hitherto: what kind of reflection can be captured by the Social Teaching of the Roman Catholic Church in lieu of the conflicting values as elaborated during the entire period? The analysis will start with a recapitulation of social movements in Hong Kong since the turn of 1960s when the Catholic Church itself was having its internal reform. Social activists with Christian background and echoing its social teachings became an important force of social movement during the early period of the development of civil society in Hong Kong. The reunification of Hong Kong to China has brought about much mixed feeling and turning the identity

issue into a time bomb. The gap between the conventional discourse on the social ethos of Hong Kong against the enriching capture and analysis of Hong Kong identity has turned the social context into a much complicated mood. The emergence and evolvement of vocal “nativist” or “local” group becomes a new faction, the so-called *yau gao* (the “rightards”) that would not bother much to challenge the pro-institution faction, but more to those, who they stated as *jaw gao* (“leftards”) who have been using a “peaceful, rational, non-violent and non-offensive” approach to fight for democracy in Hong Kong but yet achieving nowhere. The *jaw gao/ yau gao* (leftards/rightards) dispute as a conflict within the yellow ribbon faction on top of the rivalry between the blue ribbon and yellow ribbon factions somewhat reflect how Hong Kong has been torn apart. By going into details the conventional discourse of the pro-institutional views as well as the rationales of *yau gao*, this article hopes to allow those Catholic Social Teaching followers a reflection on the changing social context, and how to rethink their possible role in the future.

Building Heavenly Kingdom on Earth: The Roman Catholic Church and Deepening Democracy in Brazil and South Korea

LAI Yan Ho

[ABSTRACT] Democratic consolidation, which follows democratization, consists of both institutionalisation and internationalization of democratic norms and values in the state and society, and individual citizens as well. Civil society therefore plays a major role in ‘deepening democracy’ through civil engagement, empowerment of citizenship and multiple forms of democratic practices.

The Catholic Church was regarded as an active force favouring liberal democracies during the third wave of democratisation. However, the literature on the roles of Roman Catholic Church in deepening democracy needs to be expanded. This article discusses the role of the Catholic Church in deepening democracy by a comparative analysis between the Church in Brazil and South Korea. The Catholic Church, as a member of civil society, contributes to deepening democracy by its own doctrine, which frames the justification of its social and political involvement, its resources for mobilizations, and its strategies that utilise political opportunities at both the national and local level. It also cooperates and builds coalitions with many local NGOs and even religious organizations for a greater influence in their social and political engagements. By comparing the behaviours of the Catholic Church in South Korea and

Brazil, the author highlights that, apart from the strategies and size of the faithful, three modes of dynamics are essential to continue the field of study, i.e. the relationship between the national and local levels of the Catholic Church, the inter-religious relationships and the relationship between state, business and religion.

Introduction

Roman Catholic Church has long been involved in politics, and the discussion of church-state relations has lasted centuries. In recent decades, the Roman Catholic Church involves herself in public affairs as a religion in society, and is independent of any state apparatus. She was regarded as an active force favouring liberal democracies after her renewal in the Second Vatican Council, of which the Church advocates human rights and social justice as a mission.¹ She was even viewed as successful in fostering movements for “third wave” democratisation.² In short, she is working on the mission of building heavenly kingdom on Earth.

This article continues the debate on the role of Catholic Church in “post-democratisation” era, in particular her relations with other societal actors striving for the same goal. In this article comparative method is used. It compares the Catholic Church in Brazil and South Korea, and reasons are threefold. Firstly, the Catholic Church’s support was instrumental in the democratisation of Brazil in 1985 and South Korea in 1987. Both countries were experienced

¹ Paolo G. Carozza and Daniel Philpott, “The Catholic Church, Human Rights, and Democracy: Convergence and Conflict with the Modern State,” *Logos* (2012, Vol. 15 Issue 3), pp.15-43.

² Daniel Philpott, “The Catholic Wave,” *Journal of Democracy* (2004, Vol. 15 Issue 2), pp. 32-46.

democratic transition due to the resurrection of civil society and frequent mobilisation against the state. The Catholic Church supported the democratic movement which brought the collapse of military regimes.³ Secondly, both the Brazilian and South Korean Catholic Churches have popular local organisations engaging in public affairs. The outstanding examples are the Base Ecclesial Communities (Comunidades Eclesiais de Base / CEB) and Catholic Priests' Association for Justice (CPAJ) in South Korea. Thirdly, the countries differ in the proportion of the Catholic faithful in the population. According to the Brazilian Institute of Statistics and Geography, around 65% of total population in Brazil claimed to be Catholic in 2010.⁴ Yet in South Korea, even the latest census illustrates that Catholics only account for 10.3% of the total population.⁵

This article is divided into four parts. Part 1 reviews the literature on the key concepts of this article. Part 2 compare the work of Catholic Church in Brazil and South Korea, and their relations with various parties in deepening democracy of their countries. Part 3 evaluates the comparative study in a comprehensive sense. Part 4 concludes the article with an invitation for further relevant research.

³ For those who are interested in the political history of the two countries can be found in the list of Further Readings at the end of this article.

⁴ "Brazil Catholics await new pope amid challenges," *BBC News*, [Online] 8th March, 2013. Available at: <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-21690108>> [Accessed on 20th Aug., 2013].

⁵ Statistics of the Catholic Church in Korea 2012, *CBCK News*. [Online] Available at: <<http://english.cbck.or.kr/news/5108>> [Accessed 20th Aug., 2013].

Democratic Consolidation, Deepening Democracy and Civil Society

Democratic consolidation, deepening democracy and civil society are key concepts in this article. Democratic consolidation refers to democratic survival, i.e. to avoid democratic breakdown and democratic erosion.⁶ Its original idea focuses on the institutional rearrangement of a state after the democratic transition.⁷ A broader concept of democratic consolidation regards democratic consolidation as the second stage of democratic transition. The second stage of democratic transition is completed only if democratic procedures are extended to social institutions, and substantial equality is achieved.⁸ It also emphasises the internalisation of democracy. Linz and Stepan suggest that a democratic regime is consolidated when a large majority of the public holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern a society.⁹

For “deepening democracy”, it concerns democratic values, norms and practice beyond an institutional perspective. Bandyopadhyay defined deepening democracy as enabling citizens to exercise deeper control over public decisions by participation and

⁶ Andreas Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?” *Journal of Democracy* (1998, Vol. 9 Issue 2), pp. 103.

⁷ Renato R. Boschi, “Social Movements, Party System and Democratic Consolidation: Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina,” in *Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia*, ed. Diane Ethier (Hampshire and London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990).

⁸ Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

⁹ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp.5-7.

involvement.¹⁰ Although the institutional design constrains the political space of civic engagement and determines the scope of democratic practices,¹¹ how democratic rules and values can be utilised is dependent on the behaviours of individual citizens and civil society groups.

This article adopts the concept ‘deepening democracy’ instead of ‘democratic consolidation’. Internalisation of democratic norms and values in social and private spheres may be sufficient requisites to consolidate democratic culture and practice, but they are not necessary for securing democratic institutions and preventing authoritarian reversal. However, such internalisations from the roots are necessary if the quality of democracy is to be raised, in terms of citizenship and the individual’s engagement in civil society. The idea of deepening democracy is therefore more appropriate than a broad concept of democratic consolidation of institutional arrangements in the research.

Lastly, civil society is a public sphere in which non-state activities and autonomous social organisations can flourish and be independent of the state. There are two models of civil society. In the ‘critical’ model, the absence of government intervention guarantees the independent capacity of the civil society to check and maintain the balance of a democratic state power. Another is the ‘solidarity’ model. It aims at consolidating individual citizens and social groups to deepen democratic values and achieve common good. It is a public space for citizens and a public sphere of social interactions among

¹⁰ Vikas Jha, Bhavita Vaishnava and Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay, *Citizen Leadership: Deepening Democratic Accountability in India, Brazil and South Africa* (New Delhi, India: Academic Foundation, 2011).

¹¹ Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Patrick Heller and Marcelo K. Silva, *Bootstrapping Democracy: Transforming Local Governance and Civil Society in Brazil* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011).

citizens carrying a public role without government involvement.¹² Once a strong social fabric is built with democratic culture, which internalises social actors on different levels, not only does it consolidate political democracy, but also deepens the quality of the democracy.¹³ This model of civil society contributes to deepening democracy when democratic norms and values are institutionalised in civic associations. According to Tocqueville and Putnam, flourishing civic associations promote democratic culture, enhance social capital and civic engagement in public good, build up a sense of common well-being, and thus consolidate democracy.¹⁴ This is an extension of the democracy to private associations and social groups, and is essential to deepening democracy.

This article regards deepening democracy as a bottom-up process driven by civil society, of which the Catholic Church plays a role in it. The purposes of deepening democracy from civil society are twofold. The first is to internalize democratic norms and values among citizens to create a sustainable democratic culture for the next generation. The second is to prevent alienation of democracy due to power abuse. The possibility of an authoritarian reversal is low in mature democratic states, yet an alienation of democracy is possible. Civil society carries a duty to resist state power abuse and

¹² David Ost, *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland since 1968*. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), pp.20-21.

¹³ Guillermo O'Donnell, "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes," in *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Indiana, USA: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992).

¹⁴ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (1835&1840), Mansfield and Winthrop eds. (Chicago, USA: University Of Chicago Press, 2002); and Robert Putnam, et al., *Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy* (Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press, 1993).

consolidate democratic culture from the bottom of a democratic regime.

Civil society deepens democracy through its organizations and mobilizations. Organizations are essential to the education of individual citizens on civic engagement and different forms of democratic participation, while mobilizations empower citizens and civil groups through a collective exercise of civil and political rights in public arena. There are three elements of deepening democracy by civil society. They are ‘civic engagement’, ‘empowerment of citizenship’ and ‘multiple forms of democratic practice’. Firstly, civic engagement refers to the participation of citizens in public affairs and organizations in the public domain. Secondly, empowerment of citizenship refers to the building up of the citizens’ capacity to exercise their civil liberties and democratic rights. Thirdly, ‘multiple forms of democratic practice’ means that civil society deepens democracy by practicing different kinds of democracy apart from the classical electoral form.

Deepening Democracy in Brazil and South Korea

Three approaches are adopted for analysis of Brazil and South Korea in both national and local levels. The first approach concerns the Catholic Church’s own behaviours in deepening democracy. They are categorized as ‘ecclesial action’. I adopt some categories from social movement concepts. They are ‘framing’, ‘resource mobilization’, and ‘political opportunity’. With regard to ‘framing’, the Catholic Church adopted pro-democratic discourses to justify their participation in democratization after Vatican II. The idea of resources mobilization is also applied to analyse how the Catholic Church utilises her resources to mobilize campaigns in civil society and to promote democratic norms and values. In light of political

opportunities, the Catholic Church promotes democracy by cooperation with friendly political parties or groups.¹⁵

The second approach concerns a horizontal relation between the Catholic Church, civil society organizations or NGOs, and other religions, especially the Protestant Churches. I term it as ‘ecclesial-societal relations’.

The third approach concerns the relations within the Catholic Church *per se*. I term it as ‘intra-ecclesial relations’. Like a state, the Church has both national and local levels in her administration. The National Catholic Church is usually led by a group of bishops in their National Bishops Conferences. The local Catholic Church consists of parishes, local church communities and ecclesiastical organizations. There are sometimes tensions between the Churches on the two levels, in particular on social and political issues.

National Ecclesial Action

National Conference of Bishops in Brazil (CNBB) is the highest authority of the Catholic Church in Brazil. Despite the change in political context, a rise of rival churches and the change of Vatican’s attitude towards the role of Church in Brazil, CNBB remains its contribution to Brazilian democracy in threefold.

Firstly, CNBB reframes its discourse on social and political engagement after democratic transition. CNBB realised that after a tough political era, it has to justify its continuing participation in Brazilian political and social affairs and to make the public realise that the Church would not support a particular side of political parties. Thus, it restructured its mission with regards to Brazilian contexts and Catholic Social Teaching. In 1997, CNBB issued a National

¹⁵ Luis Felipe Mantilla, “Explaining Catholic Church Support for Democratization in South America,” *Politics and Religion* (2010 Vol.3), pp.553-79.

Episcopal Document 'Way to the New Millennium: 1997-2000', to restate principle of option for the poor and human rights.¹⁶ Between 2008 and 2013, more than a quarter of CNBB statements (25 out of 101) were concerned with political, economic, ecclesial ethics of life and environmental issues.¹⁷ CNBB became a 'watchdog' for Brazilian Catholics and civil society to broaden their social awareness to other fields apart from the political economy.¹⁸

Secondly, CNBB promotes civic engagements and citizenry empowerment thought mobilisations with its ecclesial resources. Episcopal Commission of Charity, Justice and Peace is the core unit of CNBB responsible for social engagement of the Church at national level, in order to fulfill its role as the 'prophetic voice of God's Kingdom and the social pastor questioning unjust structures of society.'¹⁹ Every year during Lent, the commission organises 'Fraternity Campaign'²⁰ to raise awareness of social issues. Activities of the campaign include poster competition, spreading of thematic messages, seminars, donations and social action. In recent years, CNBB and the Commission also organised Brazilian Social

¹⁶ Edward L. Cleary, "The Brazilian Catholic Church and Church-state Relations: Nation-Building," *Journal of Church and State* (1997, Vol. 39), pp.253-72.

¹⁷ Readers can find the statements in the website of CNBB. Available at: <http://www.cnbb.org.br/site/publicacoes/documentos-para-downloads/cat_view/368-notas-declaracoes-e-saudacoes-da-cnbb/370-notas-e-declaracoes> [Accessed on 21 Aug 2013]

¹⁸ Kenneth P. Serbin, "The Catholic Church, Religious Pluralism, and Democracy in Brazil," in *Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions and Processes*, ed. Kingstone and Power (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), pp.149.

¹⁹ About us: Charity, Justice and Peace (Quem Somos: Caridade, Justiça e Paz), *National Conference of Bishops in Brazil (CNBB)* [Online] Available at: <<http://www.cnbb.org.br/site/comissoes-episcopais/caridade-justica-e-paz/2818-quem-somos-caridade-justica-e-paz>> [Accessed on 21 Aug 2013]

²⁰

<http://www.cnbb.org.br/site/publicacoes/documentos-para-downloads/cat_view/241-cf-campanha-da-fraternidade> [Accessed on 21 Aug 2013]

Week to educate Brazilian Catholics on social ethics and missions, and to promote greater civil participation in society.²¹ Moreover, CNBB has long supported and sponsored local secular organisations fighting against land policies of the state, such as ‘Movement of the Landless’ and ‘Land of Pilgrimage’.²²

Thirdly, CNBB makes use of the Brazilian election campaign to deepen democratic values and practices. During elections, CNBB issued documents and statistics to influence citizens. In 1986, they issued ‘For a New Constitutional Order’ before the first election. They abstained from endorsing candidates, but urged voters to select individual candidates whose profile illustrated a firm stance on moral issues, described by the Church. Despite some progressive clergies endorsing various candidates in local constituencies, the bishops maintained their impartiality in the election campaign.²³ During the latest election campaign in 2012, CNBB also opened a campaign called ‘Vote Awareness in 2012 Election’ (VOTO CONSCIENTE - ELEIÇÕES 2012), providing guidelines, radio spots, video clips and printed materials spread among dioceses and parishes to educate Catholics and Brazilian citizens to exercise their civic awareness in public issues as well as their political rights.²⁴

In South Korea, CBCK continues its concern on the politics and social affairs of the country after democratisation, continuing to

²¹ Commission CNBB discloses the 5th Brazilian Social Week (Comissão da CNBB divulga a 5ª Semana Social Brasileira), *National Conference of Bishops in Brazil (CNBB)* [Online] 29 July 2011. Available at:

<<http://www.cnbb.org.br/site/comissoes-episcopais/caridade-justica-e-paz/7194-comisao-da-cnbb-divulga-a-5o-semana-social-brasileira>> [Accessed on 21 Aug 2013]

²² Serbin, pp.151.

²³ Ibid, pp.152.

²⁴ Campaign Vote Aware Election 2012 (Campanha "Voto Consciente - Eleições 2012"), *National Conference of Bishops in Brazil (CNBB)* [Online] Available at: <http://www.cnbb.org.br/site/publicacoes/documentos-para-downloads/cat_view/450-campanha-qvoto-consciente-eleicoes-2012q> [Accessed on 21 Aug]

deepen South Korean democracy by addressing and framing social issues to the public audience, promoting public deliberation with its resources and making use of political opportunities to promote democratic values.

Firstly, CBCK frames its religious doctrine with social issues to attract awareness and promote citizenry empowerment. The Church often addresses their issues of concern on particular Sundays during the year, which is when most Catholics gather in parishes and churches. An example is Farmer's Sunday, which is an annual occasion for inviting farmers to speak in Catholic mass throughout the dioceses and parishes across the nation. The farmers are encouraged to speak in parishes, and use the pulpit to garner support for farmlands affected by the influx of inexpensive, imported agricultural products.²⁵ CBCK also issues statements to express their positions and advice on different annual occasions, such as World Day of the Migrants and Refugees, Human Rights Day and Day for the Environment.²⁶ This provides a platform on which much discussion can occur as it publicly declares the Church's position on social and political issues.

Secondly, CBCK set up Episcopal Commission for Social Affairs, which is one of the four top standing Episcopal Commissions in CBCK, initiates most public engagements on behalf of the national Catholic Church.²⁷ The commission publishes books on Church's teachings related to social issues, celebrates 'Social

²⁵ Farmers Plead For Support During Farmers' Sunday Masses, *UCANEWS*. [Online] 20 July 2007 Available at:

<http://www.ucanews.com/story-archive/?post_name=/2007/07/20/farmers-plead-for-support-during-farmers-sunday-masses&post_id=6105> [Accessed on 19 Aug 2013]

²⁶ All the statements are freely available at: <<http://english.cbck.or.kr/news>> [Accessed on 19 Aug 2013].

²⁷ *Episcopal Commissions, Catholic Bishops' Conference of Korea*. [Online] Available at: <<http://english.cbck.or.kr/commissions>> [Accessed on 19 Aug]

Doctrine Week', to distribute instructional materials including the fundamental concepts for social doctrine and the special prayer texts to each diocese and parish, in order to extend civic education and raise awareness of parishioners.²⁸ It also uses a gentle approach to promote its concerns and social engagements, such as organising concert for abolition of the death penalty in 2011,²⁹ and open seminars discussing the limits of government power in 2009.³⁰

Thirdly, CBCK also makes use of the political opportunities during Korean elections to address democratic values and the social issues concerned. In his Lentern Message of 2010, the archbishop of Seoul also asked people to properly exercise their voting rights and select candidates who will serve their people instead of their parties.³¹ Another example is the CBCK's election questionnaire to the presidential candidates in 2012. On October 16 2012, they delivered a questionnaire to the major candidates for the 18th president of South Korea along with suggestions on public commitments of the candidates, including the right to life, freedom

²⁸ Social Doctrine Week 2011, *Catholic Bishops' Conference of Korea*. [Online] Available at:

<http://english.cbck.or.kr/index.php?mid=news&page=3&document_srl=4089>
[Accessed in 19 Aug 2013]

²⁹ Concert for Abolition of Death Penalty: "Say Peace, Sing Life", *CBCK News*. [Online] 31 Aug 2011 Available at:

<http://english.cbck.or.kr/index.php?mid=news&page=4&document_srl=3932>
[Accessed on 19 Aug 2013]

³⁰ Seminar on the Common Good and the Government Power, *Catholic Bishops' Conference of Korea*. [Online] Available at:

<http://english.cbck.or.kr/index.php?mid=news&page=12&document_srl=2027>
[Accessed on 19 Aug 2013]

³¹ Bishops Set Respect For Life, Truth, Love As Election Criteria. UCANEWS, [Online] 21 March 2000. Available at:

<http://www.ucanews.com/story-archive/?post_name=/2000/03/21/bishops-set-respect-for-life-truth-love-as-election-criteria&post_id=15685> [Accessed on 19 Aug]

of the press and protection of laborers.³² CBCK provides Korean society with an example which demands transparency and responsibility from potential political officials.

Local Ecclesial Action

In the local level of Brazil, CEBs were the most significant forces in Brazilian democratization during 1970s and 1980s. Although the Church de-emphasized the confrontational strategy during 1990s, in 2000 CEBs still had 2% of the total population as its following, i.e. 2 million.³³

CEBs support local movement by its material and organisational resources. In the landless movement, CEBs have kept supporting the local peasants to form organisations since 1970s. Within the CEBs, landless peasants met regularly to discuss their problems and to devise ways of solving them with the assistances of CEB leaders. At the same time, each individual CEB was linked to other CEBs through a wide-ranging verbal communication network. The network not only served as ideal training grounds for social movement activists but also enabled different groups of landless peasants to communicate and thereby recognise that their grievances, though distinct, were highly complementary. In this way, the financial and organisational support provided by the Church was crucial in fostering the emergence of coordinated collective action among the landless in Brazil.³⁴

³² Presidential Election, Catholic Bishops' Conference of Korea. [Online] Available at: <http://english.cbck.or.kr/index.php?mid=news&page=2&document_srl=4869> [Accessed on 19 Aug]

³³ Paulo J. Krischke, *The Learning of Democracy in Latin America: Social Actors and Cultural Change*. (New York: Nova Science Publishers Incorporation, 2001).

³⁴ Rudolf von Sinner, "The Churches' Contribution to Citizenship in Brazil" *Journal of International Affairs* (2007, Vol. 61 Issue 1), pp. 171-89.

Furthermore, CEB transmitted its ecclesial legacy to Brazilian civil society since democracy was installed in the late 1980s. The new-born democracy provided opportunities for the growth of civil society organisations and political parties. It also brought many leaders who were active in CEBs to join trades unions, NGOs, social movements or even administrations run by Workers' Party (PT) in various parts of the country. CEBs continue to exist, but have lost their avant-garde role in society.³⁵

But it also implies the weakening influence of the CEBs. This is a result of the change of social context. After democratization was completed, the social atmosphere was far less contentious between the state and the Church. CEBs used to be the frontier organisations against the military state, but now its outstanding character does not fit Brazil that has formal democratic institutions and mechanisms nowadays. In addition, the spread of Pentecostal Protestantism made the Catholic Church responded with the introduction of Charismatic Renewal Movement, and made the radical approach of CEBs less popular. Maclean's research proves that the CEBs' high demands for commitment and participation of public affairs in new social circumstances had the paradoxical effect of driving members away, and Catholics found it difficult to take confrontational roles like CEBs in a wider society.³⁶

In South Korea, the local church organisations advocate social and political issue in a more progressive way than that of Brazil. For the priests of CPAJ and local parishes, there are two main ways to mobilise collective actions and advocate their public concerns: religious mobilisation and social mobilisation.

³⁵ Rudolf von Sinner, "Healing Relationship in Society: the Struggle for Citizenship in Brazil" *International Review of Mission* (2004 Vol. 93 Issue 369), pp. 238-54.

³⁶ Iain S. Maclean, *Opting for Democracy? Liberation Theology and the Struggle for Democracy in Brazil* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Incorporation, 1999).

Religious mobilisation refers to the actions in which the priestly activists use the religious ritual practices for social advocacy. They practice worship and liturgy such as prayer service, Mass and fast in public space to address social and political issues. The first example is the movement for abolition of the National Security Law. CPAJ holds Catholic Masses for abolition of the National Security Law every year. In 2004, nine CPAJ priests started their fast for the sake of abolishing that Law on 18th November until 1st December.³⁷ They claimed themselves as fasting rather than doing hunger strike because they regarded their actions as a religious practice, fulfilling their 'prophetic duty' rather than activists' pursuits.³⁸

Another example is an open-air Catholic Mass in response to a crackdown on building tenants, which was attributed to the ruthless removal action of the local Korean government. About 100 priests from CPAJ celebrated an open-air Mass in downtown Seoul to comfort family members of five tenants who died in the wake of the police action in Yongsan, central Seoul. About 1,000 people, not all of them Catholics attended, with some carrying placards that read "Brutal massacre, (President) Lee Myung-bak out" or "Stop the redevelopment project."³⁹ Although these activities are religious in

³⁷ Priests End Fast But Promise to Continue Campaign For Abolition Of National Security Law. *UCANEWS*, [Online] 3 Dec 2004. Available at: <http://www.ucanews.com/story-archive/?post_name=/2004/12/03/priests-end-fast-but-promise-to-continue-campaign-for-abolition-of-national-security-law&post_id=25033> [Accessed on 11 Aug 2013]

³⁸ Priests Fasts To Protest Against National Security Law, Cites Prophetic Duty. *UCANEWS*, [Online] 30 Nov 2004. Available at: <http://www.ucanews.com/story-archive/?post_name=/2004/11/30/priest-fasts-to-protest-against-national-security-law-cites-prophetic-duty&post_id=25028> [Accessed on 11 Aug 2013]

³⁹ Priests slam government, police in wake of crackdown on building tenants. *UCANEWS*, [Online] 4 Feb 2009. Available at:

nature, CPAJ priests also made use of the opportunity to address their concerns and discontent towards the government, and the participants' placards coloured the 'divine' Catholic Mass with dimension of social advocacy as well.

In terms of social mobilisation, CPAJ and some local parishes mobilise their priests into social actions which has strong contentious elements and support local movement by their resources. For example, CPAJ and other activists protested against government proposal of the construction of a naval base which would harm the environment and increase regional tensions. In 2011, some activists including 11 diocesan priests trespassed on the construction site in a bid to block additional blasting by the company. At the end 16 activists and the priests were arrested. The priests were found guilty of obstructing police in the execution of their duties.⁴⁰ Although the government had not changed its mind, the priests' actions stimulated Korean society, and raise awareness of the problem of naval base construction.

Another example is the movement against the government proposal of building the first nuclear waste disposal site near a town. From July to December 2003, county residents in Wido have protested against the government proposal. The Catholic parish in the town backed up the movement. Most of the 1,000 parishioners have joined the candlelight rallies and offered its building and grounds to

<http://www.ucanews.com/story-archive/?post_name=/2009/02/04/priests-slam-government-police-in-wake-of-crackdown-on-building-tenants&post_id=49869> [Accessed on 11 Aug 2013]

⁴⁰ Clergy demand release of protesters. *UCANEWS*, [Online] 13 March 2012. Available at:

<<http://www.ucanews.com/news/church-demands-release-of-protesters/44966>> [Accessed on 12 Aug 2013]

accommodate protesters.⁴¹ At the end, the government took a step back in its plan to build a nuclear waste dump. One of the participant said that parishioners were not upset about the eruption of the activists in the parish as they felt proud "leading the protest".⁴² This movement reveals how local Catholic parish supported citizens in social mobilisation, and empowered the parishioners to recognise and participate in public affairs.

Local Catholic organisations and parishes also form coalition for their mobilisations. Thus they can take it as a platform for exchange of resources and network, and thus expand the scope of struggle with injustice and the abusive governments. In 2004, twenty Catholic NGOs working with farmers held a joint press conference to demand the government prevent more imported rice from entering the Korean market.⁴³ Besides, in 2012, the East Coast Solidarity for Anti-Nuke was formed by four Justice and Peace committees from their dioceses.⁴⁴ In these coalitions, they enjoy moral legitimacy and

⁴¹ Parish Becomes Center Of Protest Against Nuclear Waste Disposal Site. *UCANEWS*, 4 Dec 2003. Available at:

<http://www.ucanews.com/story-archive/?post_name=/2003/12/04/parish-becomes-center-of-protest-against-nuclear-waste-disposal-site&post_id=23450 > [Accessed on 12 Aug 2013]

⁴² Government Apology Over Nuclear Dump Plan Gets Cautious Welcome. *UCANEWS*, [Online] 12 Dec 2003. Available at:

<http://www.ucanews.com/story-archive/?post_name=/2003/12/12/government-apology-over-nuclear-dump-plan-gets-cautious-welcome&post_id=23467 > [Accessed on 12 Aug 2013]

⁴³ Catholic Groups Take Stand For 'Food Sovereignty'. *UCANEWS*, [Online] 20 Sept 2004. Available at:

<http://www.ucanews.com/story-archive/?post_name=/2004/09/20/catholic-groups-take-stand-for-food-sovereignty&post_id=24731> [Accessed on 15 Aug 2013]

⁴⁴ Diocese Set Up Anti-nuclear Group. *UCANEWS*, [Online] 16 January 2012. Available at:

<<http://www.ucanews.com/news/dioceses-set-up-anti-nuclear-group/39988>> [Accessed on 14 Aug 2013]

flexibility of mobilisation, as they have certain degree of autonomy from CBCK. This enables them to empower citizens through resources of the Church.

National Ecclesial-societal Relations

In Brazil, the monopoly of the Catholic Church as the opposition camp against the state was broken since new political parties, trade unions and NGOs were born after democratisation. Although influence of the Catholic Church diminishes, it has not left the socio-political circle completely.

CNBB takes many initiatives to work with NGOs on different social issues. Taking the issue of trafficking as an example, in 2010 the Human Mobility Sector of CNBB created a working group focused on the issue of trafficking in persons. This group consisted of approximately 15 institutions from both the Church and civil society. In 2011, CNBB again sponsored the second seminar for "identifying problems, indicators and actions taken to strengthen the pastoral coping with this reality in our country."⁴⁵ On the issue of mining, in response to the new 'Regulatory Framework of Mining', CNBB invited entities, organisations and civil society movements to a meeting in the World Water Day in 2013. In the meeting, the Church representative stressed that the meeting was an initiative to create opportunities for dialogue and joint reflection with a view to

⁴⁵ Church, Judiciary and Civil Society debate Slavery and Human Trafficking (Igreja, Judiciário e Sociedade Civil debatem o Trabalho Escravo e o Tráfico de Pessoas), *National Conference of Bishops in Brazil (CNBB)* [Online] 12 Aug 2011. Available at: <<http://www.cnbb.org.br/site/comissoes-episcopais/caridade-justica-e-paz/7317-igreja-judiciario-e-sociedade-civil-debatem-o-trabalho-escravo-e-o-traffic-de-pessoas->>
[Accessed 21 Aug 2013]

strengthen the perspective of social organisations in the debate and policy intervention on the new regulatory framework.⁴⁶

However, there aren't any Protestant groups involved in such activities. This does not mean that the Protestant groups are not interested in public affairs; rather, they are influential in political election campaigns and party politics.⁴⁷ The reason may lie in religious competition. Since the mid-1980s, Brazil experienced a Pentecostal boom while Roman Catholicism declined. Protestant ministers already outnumbered Catholic priests. Thus the Catholic Church no longer enjoyed its former pre-eminence in Brazilian society.⁴⁸ The Pentecostal growth threatens the major position of Catholic Church in Brazilian religion and society. The response to the Pentecostal threat is the promotion of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal, which is a Catholic lay movement exported from the United States in 1970s. The movement focuses on personal salvation and even pre-Vatican II spirituality, and its Pentecostal character becomes a way to compete with Pentecostal Protestantism.⁴⁹

The consequences of the widespread of charismatic movement in the Brazilian Catholic Church are twofold. Firstly, the movement

⁴⁶ Civil Society Organizations discuss New Mining Regulatory (Organizações da sociedade civil debatem novo Marco Regulatório da Mineração), *National Conference of Bishops in Brazil (CNBB)* [Online] 22 March 2013. Available at: <<http://www.cnbb.org.br/site/comissoes-episcopais/caridade-justica-e-paz/11648-organizacoes-da-sociedade-civil-debatem-novo-marco-regulatorio-da-mineracao>> [Accessed on 21 Aug 2013]

⁴⁷ Feliciano, N. Ivette (2005) *Politics, Pentecostals and Democratic Consolidation in Brazil*. [Online] Available at: <<http://people.carleton.edu/~amontero/ivette%20feliciano.pdf>> [Accessed on 21 Aug 2013]

⁴⁸ Madhvi Gupta, "Health Deficits and (the Absence of) Popular Mobilization in Brazil" *Journal for Brazilian Studies* (2013, Vol. 2 Issue 1), pp. 169-201.

⁴⁹ Serbin, pp.153-4.

moved the national Church from liberationist and progressive side to a conservative one. This coincides with the removal of progressive Brazilian bishops by Pope John Paul II, who supported the Catholic Charismatic Renewal strongly.⁵⁰ Secondly, the conservative character of the movement influenced the local Catholic Church, so as to counteract the less progressive attitude it prior it developed since the democratisation period.

In South Korea, the CBCK's also works with other religions and NGOs on national issues, yet to a smaller extent compared to the CNBB. The national campaign against capital punishment is an obvious example. In 2009, the Committee for Justice and Peace of the CBCK commemorated the event for World Day against the Death Penalty, in alliance with the Amnesty International South Korea, Catholic Human Rights Committee, and other religious and civil groups, in downtown Seoul. Representatives from seven main religions in South Korea submitted together 'the Special Bill on Abolishing the Death Penalty'⁵¹ to the National Assembly. Cooperating with other groups works greatly to the advantage of the Catholic Church, as it enhances solidarity within South Korean civil society, where a strong base of society is needed to deepen democratic values and practice among civil groups and citizens. However, the research discovers that there is far more cooperation between Catholic Church and other religions and NGOs at the local level.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p.148.

⁵¹ Campaign for the Abolition of Death Penalty, *CBCK News*. [Online] 26 Oct 2009. Available at:<http://english.cbck.or.kr/index.php?mid=news&page=10&document_srl=2425> [Accessed on 20 Aug 2013]

Local Ecclesial-societal Relations

CEB carries a role of structuring civil society at grassroots level, and constituting new social actors, such as neighbourhood associations, labour unions or political parties. Krischke interviewed 40 leaders of regional boards of the movement in the different areas of Sao Paulo. They say the church has four contribution in developing local organisations and social movements. First, the church is a strategic channel to overcome neighbourhoods' social and cultural heterogeneity as the church transcends the specific differences among residents. Second, the church provides an entrance point to and institutional support for the movement. Thirdly, the church's network is a part of a social arena occupied by popular organisations, which goes beyond the limits of their neighbourhood. Last but not least, it is the convergence between church's influences and the use of participatory methods of local organisation. It means that the local church often took up methods of democratic resocialisation to support the residents' struggle to realize their citizenship.⁵²

However, because of the rivalry between the Brazilian Catholic Church and Protestant churches, CEB and local Catholic Church rarely cooperate with the Protestants in deepening democracy. While we found a close relationship between CEBs and local groups and NGOs, there is no collaboration between CEBs and other local Protestant groups. It leads to a fact that there are no obvious Christian coalitions in developing democratic civil society and empowering local citizens in a coherent sense. That is why Sinner comments the non-cooperation between Christian churches that is, if ecumenical cooperation could work better in Brazil, a stronger

⁵² Krischke.

contribution would be made by these churches together rather than against each other.⁵³

Unlike Brazil, the local churches of South Korea have close collaboration with Protestant churches and Buddhist monks in social and religious mobilisation. Forming coalition for particular issues with other religious groups is a way to empower individual participants and groups with shared networks and resources, and to encourage civic engagements backed by solidarity of the civil society groups. Furthermore, since a coalition consists of groups from different ideological, cultural and religious background, it makes plural forms of expressions and actions in the movement possible.

An example was the movement of saving Saemangeum Tidal Flat in 2001, in which the local Catholics, Buddhists and Protestants worked hand in hand. It is a movement demanding the cancellation of a large-scale reclamation project. On March 14, 2001, some 500 Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists and Won Buddhists held a prayer service at the Buddhist Chogye temple in Seoul and marched to protest against the reclamation plan.⁵⁴ On May 25, 2001, before the authorities announced the final decision on the project, a Catholic priest and a Buddhist Monk declared themselves against the project and the practiced the "Three Steps One Bow" ascetic prayer. It is a Buddhist ascetic practice, the first step of which is to repent of selfishness and greed, the second step of which is to arouse compassion for all living beings and the third step of which is for a commitment that one will help to save all suffering beings. The three

⁵³ Sinner, p. 254.

⁵⁴ Diocese Asks Prudent Study On Controversial Sea Reclamation Project. *UCANEWS*, [Online] 18 May 2001. Available at: <http://www.ucanews.com/story-archive/?post_name=/2001/05/18/diocese-asks-prudent-study-on-controversial-sea-reclamation-project&post_id=18431> [Accessed on 14 Aug 2013]

steps are symbolic acts of overcoming Greed, Anger and Stupidity, the so-called three anguishes that harm the goodness of humans in Buddhism. The one bow represents one's own repentance for neglecting life. However, the authorities went forward with the construction. Thus in 2003, four ascetics of four religions, including Roman Catholic Church, Buddhism, Won Buddhism and Presbyterian Church went on a pilgrimage from Tidal Flat to Seoul covering 309 km over 65 days, practicing the '3 Steps 1 Bow' again. The march created a big response as time passed, and promoted the national movement for protection of life and environment across the country.⁵⁵

Intra-ecclesial Relations

In Brazil, the relationship between CEBs and the national Catholic Church is that it has become indifferent after democratic transition. On one hand, CNBB recognized CEBs' contribution to Brazilian Church and Society through an official statement in 2010.⁵⁶ But on the other, CNBB has long kept its distance from CEBs in deepening democracy since transition was completed. According to Hewitt, references to the CEBs per se in official documents since late 1980s are almost non-existent. The term CEB, in fact, is rarely used in major documents of CNBB. What frequently appears in its place is the generic 'church communities' (comunidade eclesial), which

⁵⁵ Movement for Life and Peace. *CPAJ*. Available at: <http://www.sajedan.org/english/aboutus/aboutus03_02.htm> [Accessed on 14 Aug 2013]

⁵⁶ Message to the People of God in Ecclesial Base Communities. (Mensagem ao povo de Deus sobre as Comunidades Eclesiais de Base) *National Conference of Bishops in Brazil (CNBB)* [Online] 15 May 2010. Available at: <<http://www.cnbb.org.br/site/imprensa/notas-e-declaracoes/3341-mensagem-ao-povo-de-deus-sobre-as-comunidades-eclesiais-de-base>> [Accessed on 22 Aug 2013]

refers not only to CEBs, but dioceses, parishes, families, or Church-related associations or movements.⁵⁷

The reason was the decline of the progressiveness of CNBB after transition. The replacement of bishops by the Vatican, and the rise of Brazilian civil society brought CNBB a step back. It had a dramatic effect on the way that the CEBs and their role have come to be conceptualised by the upper hierarchy. The lack of emphasis on the CEBs had brought a severe lack of both the moral and material support required to keep the CEBs involved in social political affairs since the late 1980s. Furthermore, many members of CEBs left to political parties and trade unions. The loss of leadership had resulted in lack of activation of community projects in Sao Paulo.⁵⁸

In South Korea, the relationships between local (CPAJ and local parishes) and national Catholic Church (CBCK and the bishops of the dioceses in South Korea) are not always in harmony. The tensions between the two levels of Catholic Church mainly lie between CBCK and CPAJ, in which the latter is not endorsed by CBCK.

The first example is the fasting campaign against the National Security Law in 2004, in which I have discussed previously. Despite the fact that 33 Church-based human rights groups, including 8 diocesan justice and peace committees, have joined his solidarity group, CBCK did not express its stance in the issue. One of the fasting priest openly criticized CBCK that their silence was "not performing their prophetic roles is obvious neglect of their duty". However, only a retired archbishop of Seoul expressed that he

⁵⁷ W.E. Hewitt, "Religion and the Consolidation of Democracy in Brazil: The Role of the Comunidades Eclesiaisde Base (CEBs)" *Sociological Analysis* (1990, Vol. 51 Issue 2), pp. 139-52.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.147-9.

avored revision, not abolition, of the security law.⁵⁹ In this case, the tension occurred because of the lack of verbal support on local priests' actions from CBCK.

The second example refers to the suspicion of which the leader of CPAJ was forced to stop his duty after the release of 'Samsung Scandal' since 2008. In October 2007, a retired head of Samsung's legal division, and members of CPAJ went on live television to charge that the bribes of Samsung went well beyond prosecutors and included government officials.⁶⁰ The release shocked around the country, and the National Assembly eventually passed a bill to activate special investigation.⁶¹ Yet in the following year, a priest, who was the president of CPAJ, was given a sabbatical year that his official duties are ceased by the order of the Bishop of Seoul. Media reported that the priest's involvements in social issues, in particular the US\$200 million Samsung slush fund scandal, had also made him unpopular with the Church hierarchy. His sabbatical year was extended twice to 2010. The decision of Cardinal Cheong, the Bishop of Seoul, was widely criticised as the priest declared that he did not want to have sabbatical years on one hand, and on the other a priest judged the Archdiocese of Seoul in television program that an

⁵⁹ Priest Fasts To Protest Against National Security Law, Cites Prophetic Duty. *UCANEWS*, [Online] 30 Nov 2004. Available at <http://www.ucanews.com/story-archive/?post_name=/2004/11/30/priest-fasts-to-protect-against-national-security-law-cites-prophetic-duty&post_id=25028> [Accessed on 14 Aug 2013]

⁶⁰ Korea's Samsung Scandal Deepens. *Asian Sentinel*, 5 Nov 2007. Available at: <http://www.asiansentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=855&Itemid=234> [Accessed on 13 Aug 2013]

⁶¹ Catholic Priests' Campaign Against Samsung Bears Fruit. *UCANEWS*, [Online] 28 Nov 2007. Available at: <http://www.ucanews.com/story-archive/?post_name=/2007/11/28/catholic-priests-campaign-against-samsung-bears-fruit&post_id=27985> [Accessed on 13 Aug 2013]

archdiocesan foundation of Seoul had also received lots of donation from Samsung, and the public associate it with the sabbatical order of the Cardinal.⁶²

What CPAJ did was an obvious instance of how civil society checks and balances the corruption of state power, and a meaningful example for individual citizens and groups to follow. But the absolute order by the Cardinal of Seoul not only spread a public perception that the church authority is not on the side of the people, but also threatened the priests' level of engagement in social affairs. The inconsistency between the national and local Catholic Church may become an obstacle to mobilise the faithful as they could be confused by the different stances taken by the national and local Catholic Church on social political issues and the resulting actions.

Evaluation

The divisions between national and local level of this study enable us to understand the commonalities and differences between the ecclesial actions and relations between Brazil and South Korea.

In the national level, the Catholic Church in Brazil (CNBB) and South Korea (CBCK) are common three ways. Firstly, both of them frame the mission of the Church relates to social and political engagement. While CNBB elevates itself to be a moral watchdog of Brazilian politics, CBCK displays itself as a strong figure in political

⁶² Social Action Priest's Sabbatical Year Draws Media Speculation. *UCANEWS*, [Online] 27 Aug 2008. Available at:

<http://www.ucanews.com/story-archive/?post_name=/2008/08/27/social-action-priest-s-sabbatical-year-draws-media-speculation&post_id=49092> [Accessed on 13 Aug 2013]; and Priest made to take another sabbatical year. *UCANEWS*, [Online] 19 AUG 2010. Available at:

<http://www.ucanews.com/story-archive/?post_name=/2010/08/19/priest-made-to-take-another-sabbatical-year&post_id=60749> [Accessed on 13 Aug 2013]

and social affairs in South Korea. Secondly, both of them utilise their resources in terms of organisation, network, and material, to support both national social campaigns and local groups. Thirdly, they make use of the opportunities of general elections in both countries to address their concerns, monitor candidates and raise the awareness and involvement of citizens in electoral democratic politics.

The differences between CNBB and CBCK are twofold. The first difference is issues of concern. While CNBB focuses on economic and social justice, CBCK concerns death penalty and environmental protection more. The reason is historical. Brazil has long been under serious economic inequalities, and economic justice was the major concern of citizen. In the case of South Korea, on one hand, people have long been suffered from fierce military rule and brutal suppressions, thus they have greater desire of right to life, which often contradicts action of death penalty; on the other, passed the stage of modernisation, South Korea becomes a developed country, and people begin to concern more of post-material issues, such as ecology. The second difference lies on the relationship between Catholic Churches and other religion. While CNBB maintains a cooperative relationships with NGOs but not the Church; CBCK co-opt with other groups and had often cooperated with other protestant churches for general social and political concerns.

In the local level, we can find three distinctive comparisons between Brazilian and South Korean local Catholic Churches. First of all, in terms of mobilisation we can see the local Church in South Korea is more progressive than that of Brazil. CPAJ and local parishes often take radical actions and critical mobilisations to challenge the government and empower local citizens, while the local Brazilian Church organisations like CEBs stepped back to support civil society by resources and exporting civic leaders.

Secondly, their relations between local Church organisations and other religions or NGOs are different. For South Korea, the local Church organisations are closely tied with Protestant organisations, Buddhist groups and NGOs to engage in social and political affairs. They cooperate on an equal base. However, despite their sharp decline of political significance, CEBs are leading groups among their NGO partners. This is because CEBs has the reputation and experience in social movement since the military era, and they are capable of flourishing other NGOs or local groups to strengthen civil society.

Thirdly, the relationships between national and local Church in South Korea is even more tense and contentious than that of Brazil. In Brazil, CNBB in general takes an indifferent attitude towards CEBs today, despite a certain degree of appreciation CNBB showed in few official statements. However, in South Korea CBCK and CPAJ often have tensions, when the latter group radically challenged the government and even the Church authority. These events often lead to some decisions made by CBCK which is not in favour of CPAJ, and tensions are intensified at the end.

While the Brazilian Catholic Church leans toward the solidarity model of civil society, the South Korean Church inclines to the critical one. In Brazil, both CNBB and CEBs prefer to promote civic engagement and empowerment of citizenship by non-confrontational means, since they are not aimed against the state or other social agents, but at empowering participants of the campaigns or programmes offered by the Church, thus strengthening solidarity in society. However, the Catholic Church in South Korea is more critical of the government. The CBCK often challenges government laws and policies by its official statements associating their concerns with the Church's teaching. The local Catholic Church organizations such as CPAJ are even more radical. They plan

different social or religious actions to attract public and media attention on current issues, and pressure the relevant government agencies to compromise. Citizens can engage in these church-based campaigns and collective actions, and they can be empowered by exercising their political rights in public assembly.

Another obvious finding is that the population of the Catholic faithful has effects on the roles and forms of mobilizations of the Catholic Church. The majority of Brazilian citizens are Catholic. But it takes less contentious measures in deepening democracy and the CNBB and CEBs of Brazil are unwilling to collaborate with Pentecostal groups on the work of deepening democracy. In contrast, although the Catholic Church is a minority in South Korea, it is more critical of the state, and is more cooperative with other religions in promoting civic engagement and empowering citizens. CBCK and CPAJ are always willing to cooperate and support other Protestant churches and even Buddhist monks in social movements.

The reasons are twofold. Firstly, when the Catholic Church is a minority in society, it would be easier to cooperate with other religions since they understand that a strong coalition contributes to both the work of consolidating civil society and their growth of significance. However, when the Catholic Church is the majority, it regards other religions as rivals instead of partners. Thus, maintaining its social and even political significance, and preventing the growth of rivals becomes a major task for the Catholic Church.

The second reason refers to the historical development of the Catholic Church in the two countries. The Catholic Church in Brazil was a collaborator with the colonial government, but became aligned with the opposition when the Military regime began. Once democracy was installed in Brazil, the Church began to step back from the frontline of fighting for democracy. The reason might be that the Church wanted to resume a normal relationship with the state.

On the contrary, since Buddhist monks, Protestant pastors and the Catholic priests had long partnerships in fighting against the military government of South Korea, they built a strong coalition for checking and balancing the state power. The solidarity of religions in civil society overcomes the problem of being a minority religion, which is assumed to have less influence in public affairs.

Conclusion

This article aimed to discover the role of the Catholic Church in deepening democracy by a comparative analysis between the Church in Brazil and South Korea. The case studies support the early-provided theoretical framework that civil society, using either a critical or solidarity model, deepens democracy through civil engagement, empowerment of citizenship and multiple forms of democratic practices to internalize democratic norms and values, and prevent alienation of democracy. The Catholic Church, as a member of civil society, contributes to deepening democracy by its own doctrine, which frames the justification of their social and political involvement, its resources for mobilizations, and its strategies that utilise political opportunities at both the national and local level. It also cooperates and builds coalitions with many local NGOs and even religious organizations for a greater influence in their social and political engagements. In sum, the Church in South Korea is more progressive in deepening democracy, although it owns only a small portion of Catholic faithful in the country. Religion, in particular the Roman Catholic Church, is still influential in public affairs and politics. The article also reveals that relations between the national and local levels of the Catholic Church, the inter-religious relationships and the relationship between state, business and religion are worth further researching. The author sincerely hopes that more

scholars will continue to study the dynamics between the Catholic Church, civil society and democracy, and thus evaluate her mission of building heavenly kingdom on Earth.

Further Readings

Armstrong, Charles K ed. *Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State*. London: Routledge, 2002.

Baiocchi, Gianpaolo, Patrick Heller and Marcelo K. Silva. *Bootstrapping Democracy: Transforming Local Governance and Civil Society in Brazil*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011.

Boschi, Renato R. “Social Movements, Party System and Democratic Consolidation: Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina” in Ethier, Diane ed., *Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia*. Hampshire and London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1990.

Chang, Paul Y and Gi-Wook Shin. “Democratization and the evolution of social movement in Korea” in Shin, Gi-wook and Paul Y Chang ed., *South Korean Social Movement: From democracy to civil society*. Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2011, Chapter 1.

Hochstetler, Kathryn. “Democratizing Pressures from Below? Social Movement in the New Brazilian Democracy” in Kingstone, Peter R. and Timothy J. Power ed., *Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions and Process*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000, Chapter. 8.

Huntington, Samuel. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century*. Norman : University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

_____. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997.

Jha, Vikas, Bhavita Vaishnava and Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay. *Citizen Leadership: Deepening Democratic Accountability in India, Brazil and South Africa*. New Delhi, India: Academic Foundation, 2011.

Kang, Wi Jo. *Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea: A History of Christianity and Politics*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.

Krischke, Paulo J. *The Learning of Democracy in Latin America: Social Actors and Cultural Change*. New York: Nova Science Publishers Incorporation, 2001.

Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996.

Maclean, Iain S. *Opting for Democracy? Liberation Theology and the Struggle for Democracy in Brazil*. New York: Peter Lang Publishing Incorporation, 1999.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes" in Mainwaring, Scott, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela ed., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*. Indiana, USA: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992.

Pereira, Luis Carlos Bresser "Economic ideologies and the Consolidation of Democracy in Brazil" in Ethier, Diane ed., *Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia*. Hampshire and London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990.

Putnam, Robert et al. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy*. Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Serbin, Kenneth P. "The Catholic Church, Religious Pluralism, and Democracy in Brazil" in Kingstone and Power ed., *Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions and Processes*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000, Chapter. 7.

Tocqueville, Alexis de (1835&1840), Mansfield and Winthrop eds. *Democracy in America*. Chicago, USA: University Of Chicago Press, 2002.

[摘要] 民主化之後的鞏固民主過程，既包括國家和社會中民主準則和價值觀的體制化和內化，亦包括公民個人的內化。因此，通過民間的參與，公民充權和多種形式的民主實踐，公民社會在「深化民主」方面起著重要角色。在第三波民主化的過程中，天主教教會被視為支持自由民主的一股積極力量。然而，羅馬天主教會在深化民主角色方面的文獻需要擴展。透過比較分析巴西和韓國的教會，本文討論了天主教會深化民主的角色。透過社會和政治參與的教義、動員的資源，以及運用國家和地方層面的政治機會的策略，作為民間社會的一員的天主教教會，在深化民主上作出了貢獻。它還與許多當地非政府組織以至宗教組織合作，試圖在社會和政治參與上發揮較大影響力。通過比較韓國和巴西天主教教會的行為，筆者強調，除了策略和信徒的大小，三種模式的動態對繼續研究該領域起著重要作用，即國家和地方之間的天主教教會的關係、宗教之間的關係，以及國家、企業與宗教之間的關係。

約稿

為鞏固中國與國際間在研究香港、中國及海外華人團體這方面的學術工作，雙語性質的「天主教研究學報」將接受以中文或英文的投稿，並附以相對語文的摘要。間中或包括書評及有關本中心活動的簡訊。本刊主要以電子方式每年出版一次。我們鼓勵讀者及作者以本刊作互動討論的平台，並歡迎對本刊批評及提出建議。

「天主教研究學報」以同儕匿名審稿方式選稿以維持特定的學術水準。本刊的性質可大體屬於人文科，以科學方法研究天主教與中國及華人社團，同時著重文本及考察的研究。本刊歡迎個別投稿及建議期刊專題。本刊下期專題為「二十世紀香港天主教歷史」。

投稿章程

請進入網址：

http://catholic.crs.cuhk.edu.hk/downloads/guideline_c.doc

稿件請電郵至：catholic@cuhk.edu.hk

Call for Papers

To enhance academic exchange and bridge the worlds of China and international scholarship, in a domain concerning Catholicism in Hong Kong, China and the worldwide Chinese-speaking community,

the *Hong Kong Journal of Catholic Studies* is a bilingual publication that welcomes contributions in Chinese as well as in English. Each issue has articles in both languages, with abstracts in the other language. Occasional book reviews and news on the activities of the centre will also be included. We shall publish one issue per year, starting from this issue in electronic format only. We encourage our readers and authors to regard our journal as a forum of interactive debate and welcome all comments and suggestions.

Submissions will be reviewed by external referees on a double-blind basis aiming at the highest professional standards. Evaluation is based on scholarly quality and originality. The scope of the journal is broadly defined as humanities as well as scientific approaches to Catholicism and the Chinese world, with an emphasis on research based on documentary sources and field study. Both individual submissions and projects for guest-edited issues are welcome. Our next guest-edited issue will be on History of Catholic Church in Hong Kong in the 20th Century.

Submission Guidelines

Please visit our website for details:

http://catholic.crs.cuhk.edu.hk/downloads/guideline_c.doc

All submissions should be sent to: catholic@cuhk.edu.hk

香港中文大學天主教研究叢書主編

夏其龍教授（香港中文大學）

譚永亮教授（召集人）（香港中文大學）

學術顧問團

包智光博士

譚偉倫教授（香港中文大學）

賴品超教授（香港中文大學）

張學明教授（香港中文大學）

楊秀珠教授（香港中文大學）

關俊棠教授（香港中文大學）

房志榮教授（台灣輔仁大學）

田英傑神父（宗座外方傳教會）

蔡惠民教授（聖神修院神哲學院）

勞伯壩教授（聖神修院神哲學院）

Prof. Leo D. LEFEBURE（Georgetown University, Washington D.C.）

陸鴻基教授（多倫多約克大學）

Prof. Roman MALEK, SVD（Monumenta Serica Institute, Sankt Augustin）

Prof. Peter C. PHAN（Georgetown University, Washington D.C.）

鐘鳴旦教授（Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium）

Prof. Leonard SWIDLER（Temple University, Philadelphia）

General Editors of the Series

HA, Keloan Louis（The Chinese University of Hong Kong）

TAVEIRNE, Patrick, CICM（The Chinese University of Hong Kong）

（Coordinator）

Advisory Committee

BARRIQUAND, François

TAM, Wai Lun (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

LAI, Pan Chiu (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

CHEUNG, Hok Ming (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

YEUNG, Sau Chu Alison (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

KWAN, Tsun Tong Thomas (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

FANG, Chih Jung Mark, SJ (Fujen University, Taipei)

TICOZZI, Sergio, PIME (Pontifical Foreign Missions Institute)

CHOY, Wai Man (Holy Spirit Seminary College of Theology and Philosophy)

LO, William, SJ (Holy Spirit Seminary College of Theology and Philosophy)

LEFEBURE, Leo D. (Georgetown University, Washington D.C.)

LUK, Hung Kay Bernard (York University, Toronto)

MALEK, Roman, SVD (Monumenta Serica Institute, Sankt Augustin)

PHAN, Peter C. (Georgetown University, Washington D.C.)

STANDAERT, Nicolas (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium)

SWIDLER, Leonard (Temple University, Philadelphia)

香港中文大學 天主教研究中心

《天主教研究學報》〈個人、社群、教會和國家〉

叢書主編： 譚永亮、夏其龍

本期主編： 阮美賢

出版： 香港中文大學天主教研究中心

香港·新界·沙田·香港中文大學

電話： (852) 3943 4277

傳真： (852) 3942 0995

印刷： 4a Color Design (葵涌 金龍工業中心第4座6樓C室)

網址： www.cuhk.edu.hk/crs/catholic

電郵： catholic@cuhk.edu.hk

二零一五年十二月初版

ISSN： 2219-7664

Centre for Catholic Studies,

The Chinese University of Hong Kong

“Hong Kong Journal of Catholic Studies” Issue no. 6

‘The Individual, Community, Church and State’

Series Editors: Patrick TAVEIRNE, Louis HA

Chief Editor: Mary YUEN

Publisher: Centre for Catholic Studies, the Chinese University of
Hong Kong, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong.

Tel.: (852) 3943 4277

Fax.: (852) 3942 0995

Printer: 4a Colour Design (Flat C, 6/F, Blk 4, Golden Dragon Industrial Centre)

Website: www.cuhk.edu.hk/crs/catholic/

Email: catholic@cuhk.edu.hk

First Edition: Dec 2015

ISSN: 2219-7664

All Rights Reserved © 2015 by Centre for Catholic Studies, the Chinese University of
Hong Kong