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Political Opportunities, Social Mobilization and Collective Action: The Re-invigorated Pro-Democracy Movement in Hong Kong

Joseph M. Chan and Francis L. F. Lee

Abstract

This paper examines the wave of large-scale demonstrations which occurred in Hong Kong between 2003 and 2007, and which can be considered as forming the core of a reinvigorated pro-democracy movement in the city. The paper discusses the macro-, meso-, and micro-level factors which contributed to the rise of the demonstrations. At the macro-level, it is argued that changing political opportunities in the city have led to the formation of an alliance between political elites within the

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institutions and movement activists “on the streets.” Organizationally, evidence from onsite surveys illustrates the “self-mobilization” processes behind the demonstrations. While movement organizations are important in organizing the protests, media and interpersonal channels are more important in actually encouraging people to participate. At the micro-level, evidence from both onsite and population surveys is used to examine the social psychological factors behind protest participation. It is argued that the current wave of demonstrations has shown signs of sustainability. Yet the limitations of their actual influence are also discussed.

Introduction

Large-scale demonstrations have been one of the most prominent features of Hong Kong politics since the historic 1 July rally in 2003. More than half a million citizens marched on the streets on that day to protest against the national security legislation and government incompetence in handling various social and economic crises. In 2004, two public demonstrations calling for a faster pace of democratization were organized on 1 January and 1 July. They registered the participation of some 100,000 and 200,000 citizens respectively. The year 2005 saw the resignation of the highly unpopular Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa. No major social or political crisis broke out. The economy of Hong Kong also showed signs of sustainable recovery. But despite these “demobilizing” conditions, 20,000 citizens participated in the third consecutive 1 July demonstration. Then, one week before the Legislative Council (LegCo) was to vote on the Special Administrative Region (SAR) government’s political reform proposal, nearly 100,000 citizens took to the streets on 4 December 2005. They criticized the proposal as overly conservative and called for a concrete timetable for institutionalizing direct elections of the Chief Executive and the whole of LegCo. Finally, on 1 July 2006, about 40,000 Hong Kong citizens demonstrated again to call for more rapid democratization.¹

These large-scale demonstrations can be considered as forming the core of a new pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. Here, it is important first to clarify the meanings of certain key terms. A “movement,” following the conceptualization by Charles Tilly, refers to a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities by employing specific forms of collective action.² Such collective action aims at representing the worthiness, unity, numbers, and

commitment on the part of the participants and their constituencies. Meanwhile, democratization in the Hong Kong context refers mainly to the institutionalization of direct elections of government leaders.³ Therefore, to regard the wave of demonstrations mentioned above as forming a pro-democracy movement is to recognize them not as individual events, but as part of the same interaction between the Hong Kong public (or at least a large part of it) as collective claimants and the Hong Kong and Chinese governments as the target authorities, with the institutionalization of direct elections of government leaders as the central claim. Certainly, this interaction also involves politicians of different factions, media professionals, and social and economic elites as additional claimants, stakeholders, and/or mediators.

The current wave of collective action has a highly remarkable scale: in the history of the city, only the wave of rallies during the 1989 Tiananmen incident is comparable.⁴ A set of important questions can be posed: Why did this new pro-democracy movement emerge in 2003? What is the relationship between the rallies and the struggle for democratization within formal political institutions? What mobilized the individual citizens to participate in the rallies? Is this new pro-democracy movement sustainable? To what extent and in what ways is “people power” a force to be reckoned with in the democratization process in Hong Kong?

This article attempts to answer some of the above questions by putting the current wave of pro-democracy protests in both the larger social historical context of Hong Kong and the theoretical context of social movement scholarship. Decades of social movement scholarship have developed a number of theoretical perspectives for analysing the rise, decline, success, and failure of social movements. The early deprivation perspective focuses on the feelings of injustice and grievance as the cause of protest movements. The theory of relative deprivation, in particular, sees collective behaviour as the result “when members of groups come to see themselves as deprived relative to another group, an earlier time, or a future possibility.”⁵ Into the 1970s, realizing that not all aggrieved people would protest, scholars turned their attention from what makes people aggrieved to what makes aggrieved people protest. The emerging resource mobilization theory sees collective action as happening “because organizations exist which make possible the channeling and expression of [discontent] into concerted social action.”⁶ Organizations and strategies thus became the centre of scholarly attention. Then, in the 1980s, scholars grew dissatisfied with the resource mobilization approach as it answers

primarily the question of how but not why social movements arise at certain times and under certain conditions. The political process model was therefore developed. It explains the rise of social movements primarily in terms of changes in the availability of political opportunities at the macro-structural level.⁷

Although each of the perspectives was developed partly as a critique of earlier ones, they are best seen as operating primarily at different levels of analysis and as complementary to each other. Together they constitute a framework to understand why certain movements arise under certain conditions, why some succeed and some fail, and why some enjoy popular support and some do not.

Using this framework, this article begins by briefly discussing the history of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong in relation to changes in the political opportunity structure. The article then focuses on the organizational aspect of the current wave of demonstrations. It discusses the mobilization processes at work, especially the importance of informal social networks. It is followed by an analysis of the individual-level factors explaining protest participation. Throughout the article we draw upon findings from a number of onsite surveys of the rallies, population surveys, focus group studies with demonstrators, and media content analysis we conducted over the past three years. The implications of our analysis for the future of the current pro-democracy movement are discussed at the end.

Changing Political Opportunities for Democracy in Hong Kong

Democratization in Hong Kong began in the early 1980s as the British colonial government attempted to meet the challenges posed by rising popular demands towards the government and the Sino-British negotiations on the future of Hong Kong. It provided an impetus for a local pro-democracy social movement to arise. In 1986, 95 movement organizations in different sectors joined forces to form a pro-democracy alliance called the Joint Committee for the Promotion of Democratic Government.⁸ It was the largest and most important organization of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong in the 1980s.

However, throughout the decade political opportunities available for the pro-democracy movement remained limited. Here, we use the term political opportunities to refer to features of the political system and

political culture of a society which heighten the likelihood of successful mobilization. We do not attempt a comprehensive analysis of the “political opportunity structure” in Hong Kong in the past decades. Yet we should be able to gain a good understanding of the changing political opportunities for the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong by focusing on two major aspects of it, namely, the degree to which the formal political system is open to democratic change and the degree to which a pro-democracy, participatory culture has developed in the city.⁹

In fact, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, there was little room for activists to fight for democracy within the political system. Although direct elections of the legislature were institutionalized only in 1991, only 18 of the 60 seats were returned through the popular vote. The pro-democracy movement thus followed the path of other social movements in Hong Kong and launched their campaign mainly outside the formal institutions.¹⁰ Protests and rallies constituted the major activities of the movement at the time.

Nevertheless, public support for democratization was limited. Survey research found that a substantial proportion of Hong Kong people defined a democratic government as a government willing to consult public opinion rather than a government elected through the popular vote.¹¹ Some scholars thus regarded political culture as an internal constraint on the city’s democratization process.¹² As a matter of fact, only about 5,000 to 8,000 citizens participated in the largest pro-democracy rally in Hong Kong in the 1980s.¹³

The situation changed abruptly after the events of 1989 in China. With two months of continual and heavy doses of media coverage, Hong Kong people had their attention fixed on Tiananmen Square. Between 20 May and 4 June, at least seven major public rallies or protests were organized. Numbers of participants ranged from 50,000 to more than one million.¹⁴ The Tiananmen incident and its tragic ending led to a surge of support for more rapid democratization in Hong Kong.¹⁵ Many pro-democracy activists, having obtained a high degree of fame by leading the protests in Hong Kong in 1989, joined hands to form the United Democrats of Hong Kong. The political party won a landslide victory in the 1991 LegCo elections, obtaining 12 of the 18 directly elected seats.

The British government also changed its approach to China on the Hong Kong question after 1989. The appointment of Chris Patten as the last governor of the city and Patten’s controversial political reforms led to five years of heated debates between the two countries.¹⁶ Patten’s reforms

further enhanced the already increasing opportunities within the formal political arena for the democrats. For example, the expansion of the voter base for the functional constituencies in the legislature greatly heightened the democrats' chances of winning seats. It strengthened the presence of the democrats within the LegCo, which in turn further strengthened the push for more democracy.

Paradoxically, this development did not lead to a stronger pro-democracy movement outside the formal political institutions. As pro-democracy parties came to have significant power within the formal political arena, they had little need to organize citizens' collective action (other than urging them to vote at election times). The remaining movement organizations, having low levels of public recognition, became even weaker and more marginalized. Only a few hundred citizens participated in the largest pro-democracy public rallies in the early 1990s.¹⁷ Throughout the last few years of colonial Hong Kong, the struggle for democracy was almost completely staged within the formal institutions.

Political opportunities within the formal political arena were narrowed down again when Hong Kong finally returned to China in 1997. The colonial legislature was disbanded and the Provisional Legislature was set up. Although many democrats returned to the legislature in the direct elections in 1998, their power was severely limited by the way the Council and the voting system had been set up. The Council is currently divided into two halves, with 30 directly elected legislators and 30 legislators returned through functional constituencies with restricted voter bases. The constitution of the functional constituencies, combined with the proportional representation system used in the direct elections, virtually ensure the presence of a majority of conservatives within the Council. Moreover, when the legislature has to pass a bill initiated by a legislator, the bill has to obtain more than half of the votes of the directly elected legislators and also more than half of the votes of the legislators from functional constituencies. It effectively minimizes, if not eliminates, the chance of the democrats initiating and passing any politically radical bills. On the other hand, if a bill is initiated by the government, it only needs the support of a simple majority vote of the members of the Legislative Council present. This gives distinct advantages to government-initiated bills.

Opportunities within the formal political system were also limited by the fact that the Basic Law has already set out the methods of electing the

Chief Executive and the legislature of the SAR up to 2007. Hence political reform was bound to become a non-issue in the first few years after the handover, unless politicians were willing to suggest the highly controversial possibility of revising the Basic Law.

In fact, limited political opportunities have led to internal debates among the democrats about whether they should leave the formal political institutions altogether and “return to the street.” In the end the democrats did not push for revision of the Basic Law, but neither did they leave the formal political institution. They are still clinging to the limited opportunities available to them in the formal political arena.

However, outside the formal political institutions, opportunities for a new pro-democracy movement were increasing. Generally speaking, the political culture in Hong Kong has been continually developing since the 1980s. Levels of political participation were on the rise throughout the 1990s, and years of political debate have generated a politicized society.¹⁸ More specifically, the SAR government has been in a state of constant crisis since an economic decline began in late 1997. Occasional social crises and outbursts of political controversy, such as the bird flu outbreak and the right of abode controversy, further demonstrated the incompetence of the Tung administration and highlighted the tensions within the “one country, two systems” formula. This state of affairs had a paradoxical impact on democratization. On the one hand, it led the government and the public to focus their attention on economic and social issues. Democratic reform was therefore further displaced from the public agenda in the first few years after the handover.¹⁹ But on the other hand, economic and social problems also led to very low levels of public approval of the government. Originally, many people might have regarded the problems as resulting from the incompetence of an individual leader. But when Tung Chee-hwa garnered enough support for a second term of office in 2002, many Hong Kong citizens were particularly discontented and might at that time have begun to see the problem as rooted in the political system itself.

At the beginning of his second term of office Tung initiated the process of national security legislation. The legislation was highly controversial because of its potential impact on a wide range of civil liberties. Some religious groups, professional journalists, and academics were among the most concerned. The government was heavily criticized for not allowing enough time for public consultation. The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) then hit Hong Kong in early 2003. The SAR administration, perceived to have tried to cover up the outbreak in the early

stages, was again heavily criticized for its incompetence. The outbreak also further damaged the Hong Kong economy. The conjunction of crises led to an unprecedented level of public discontent. In an opinion poll conducted in April 2003, more than 60% of the respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of the SAR government, with only 11.5% expressing satisfaction. In the same poll, Tung Chee-hwa's approval rating dropped to 39.5 on a 0-to-100 scale.²⁰ This is the background against which the historic 1 July protest in 2003 occurred.

It would be misleading to say that democratization was the primary theme in the 1 July 2003 rally. The demonstration was targeted first of all at the national security legislation, while many people might simply have wanted to voice their general discontent with Tung Chee-hwa. Democratization was at best a secondary theme, being vaguely carried by the second slogan of the rally — “return the rule to the people”. But after the demonstration, democrats and media discourses in a number of newspapers quickly linked the rally to democratization.²¹ Then, in September 2003, the democrats won a significant victory in the District Council elections as the conservatives lost ground. The victory was widely interpreted in public discourses as an indication of “the 1 July effect.” The transformation of a single rally to a pro-democracy movement was ostensibly completed when nearly 100,000 citizens participated in the 1 January rally in 2004. Democratization was the major theme of the rally, and from then on it has consistently been the main theme of the large public rallies.

Coincidentally, 2004 marked the time for the Hong Kong government to review the methods for electing the Chief Executive in 2007 and the legislature in 2008. Political reform thus returned to the top of the policy agenda. New opportunities were available and seized upon by the democrats. But the democrats' power within the legislature remained weak. And unlike in the early 1990s, the actual power-holders were highly reluctant to allow Hong Kong to democratize at a “rapid” pace. Hence there was a need and an incentive for the democrats to mobilize support from the general public through organizing collective action. Consciously or not, a strategy of combining the power of non-institutional collective action with the votes held by the democrats within the legislature was adopted.

This strategy is best illustrated in the vote on the SAR government's political reform proposal in December 2005. The government needed the support of two-thirds of the legislature to pass the proposal, which was

criticized by the democrats for being overly conservative.²² After the LegCo elections in 2004, 25 of the 60 legislators were regarded as democrats. Therefore, the goal of the government's lobbying effort was to obtain the votes of six democrats. As a move to demonstrate the public support behind them and to ensure that no democrat would dare to "defect," a rally was organized on 4 December. Nearly 100,000 citizens participated in it. In the end, 24 of the 25 democrats in the legislature voted against the government proposal, leading to an impasse on the issue of political reform.

After the government proposal was voted down, Chief Executive Donald Tsang claimed that at one point during the lobbying the government had succeeded in obtaining six votes from the democrats. If this was true, it would mean that the strong showing of the 4 December rally had probably deterred the six would-be "defectors" from supporting the government. In other words, the demonstration affected the result of the vote, for good or for bad, by influencing a small number of crucial votes in the legislature.

This also demonstrated how "people power" manifested in the rally on 1 July 2003 was translated into an oppositional force within the establishment. The rally succeeded in forcing the SAR government to postpone national security legislation largely because it succeeded in persuading the Liberal Party, a pro-business and politically conservative party, to withdraw their support for the legislation. At that time, the seven Liberal Party legislators constituted the crucial minority whose decision could change the overall result of a policy vote.

The strategy of combining institutionalized power with the non-institutionalized power of public demonstrations will probably continue in the future because neither one of the two alone is likely to be enough in the struggle for democratization. Under the right conditions, "people power" can be translated into social structural change. Political elites have come to understand that they have to try to use "people power" more actively. Hence, in terms of political opportunities, we can argue that part of the basis for a persistent pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong would include having the issue of democratic reform regularly returning to the top of the policy agenda (which would be inevitable as long as the issue remains unresolved) and the democrats forming a sizable minority in the legislature. It is under these conditions that public demonstrations will be organized and seen as relevant.

Weakness of Movement Organizations and Citizens' Self-Mobilization

Opportunities in the political structure facilitate the rise of social movements but do not by themselves generate collective action. Given that the conditions favour the rise of a movement, the next question would be how people can be mobilized to participate in it.

Understandably, much social movement research has generally treated movement organizations and civic associations as central to protest mobilization.²³ Sociologist Denny Ho's study of an urban housing protest movement in Hong Kong, for example, focused particularly on the movement organization's strategies.²⁴ However, mobilizing the general public to support democratization arguably presents a different and bigger challenge than mobilization for "group-specific" protests. The latter usually involves well defined goals obviously tied to the concrete and material interests of the group members. A labour union may mobilize members to fight for laws regarding minimum wages. Educational reform may face opposition from the teachers' union because of the impact of the reform on the everyday work of teachers. Even the "post-materialist" environmental movements involve concrete goals and interests to the extent that various types of pollution can be sensed through sight, sound, and smell. Comparatively speaking, democracy is more abstract. It is relatively difficult to convince people that democracy will bring them concrete and/or material benefits.²⁵

Second, mobilization for a group-specific cause usually means that the constituency is well and narrowly defined. It can be made up of members of an occupation, residents in a geographical area or housing estate, and so on. The members of the constituency are tied to each other through informal social networks and are therefore relatively easy to reach through interpersonal means. Moreover, there is a high probability that the movement organization — a labour union, a professional association, etc. — will be well known among members of the specific constituency. All these provide the basis for a process of mobilization starting from the centre of the movement organization and reaching outward.

The challenge is different in the case of a mass demonstration which tries to involve the public at large. In Hong Kong, this problem is compounded by the fact that no pro-democracy organization has the fame, resources, and network needed to generate a large-scale rally through a top-down mobilization process. The Civil Human Rights Front, the organizer

of the large-scale rallies from 2003 to 2006, was a coalition of more than 30 non-governmental organizations formed in late 2002. But it had such a low level of public recognition that even the person introducing the speakers at a public rally it organized on 9 July 2003 made a mistake about its name. The media too paid little attention to the Civil Human Rights Front. For example, between 1 July to 31 December 2003, *Ming Pao* and the *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, two elite-oriented Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong, published a total of 685 articles mentioning the "1 July rally." Among these articles, only 30 mentioned the Civil Human Rights Front, while 146 mentioned the Democratic Party and 196 mentioned the phrase "the democratic faction."²⁶

More broadly speaking, Hong Kong people have long had low levels of trust in politicians and political groups.²⁷ Political parties generally have low membership figures.²⁸ Labour unions enjoy more success in membership recruitment, but their mobilization power is also very weak.²⁹ In terms of public perception, traditionally many Hong Kong people tended to see politics as dirty. Politicians, in this conventional view, are people striving for their own political power and interests rather than sincerely serving the interests of the public.³⁰ People might therefore see the mobilization efforts on the part of political groups as efforts to manipulate them.

This suspicion was held even by some of the rally participants. In a series of focus group studies we conducted in the summer of 2005, we found systematic differences in the interpretations of the pro-democracy rallies and related events offered by people who participated in the 1 July rallies in 2003 and 2004 but not in 2005 and those offered by people who participated in all three 1 July rallies up to that time. One of the differences is that the former tended to see the rallies as organized by politicians and groups who may have their own interests and goals, while the latter tended to see the rallies as channels for citizens to express their opinions directly, without the mediation of political representatives and institutions. However, one thing is common to both groups of participants: they did not regard themselves as responding to the calls to actions issued by politicians and social or political associations.³¹

If top-down mobilization is weak, then a decentralized and bottom-up mobilization process among the citizens themselves would be needed. Our research has shown that such a decentralized mobilization process was indeed at work behind the current wave of pro-democracy demonstrations.

A series of onsite surveys have found that interpersonal communication and the mass media were primarily responsible for generating the two large-scale protests.³² The most politically active citizens tended to receive information and persuasive messages from the media at an early point in the mobilization process and then pass the information and messages to their acquaintances. The stepwise process was most apparent in the 1 January 2004 demonstration, in which opinion leaders were found to pay significantly more attention to the news media and were more likely regard the mass media as the most important source of influence. To the followers (i.e., those who acknowledged that they were asked by their acquaintances to join them in the rally), interpersonal influence is rated as the most important.

The general importance of interpersonal networks is also demonstrated by the fact that many protesters often came with their friends, family members, and colleagues. In the rally on 1 July 2003, this proportion is as high as 88%. Only about 12% attended the rally alone or with associations. A comparison of the patterns of mobilization across rallies has led us to conclude that the role of the mass media in the build-up to social protests differs according to the scale of the protests and the social atmosphere prevailing at the time. For smaller protests, organizational mobilization tends to play a more important role and the mass media are of limited influence. In contrast, larger protests and controversies will entail a larger role for the media for the transmission of information and mobilizing messages, especially among the “opinion leaders” in society.

The central organizer was certainly important in deciding to hold the demonstration and issuing the first call to action, but it played only a limited role in the mobilization process as a whole. This is evidenced by the fact that only a small proportion of the rally participants recognized its influence. Other civic associations were also apparently of secondary importance in the mobilization process. For example, only 25% of the protesters in the 1 July 2003 rally were members of some social or political group, and only 30% of them participated in the group’s activities “frequently” or “very frequently.” In other words, only about 7.5% of the rally participants are active members of social and political groups. The corresponding figures are 9.0% and 9.8% for the 1 July 2004 and 2005 rallies respectively. At the same time, as noted in the above paragraph, most protesters participated in the demonstrations with friends and family members. In contrast, in the 1 July 2003 rally only 4.2% of the protesters participated with the groups to which they belong. The figures went down

further, to 3.5% and 3.8%, in 2004 and 2005. We therefore argue that the large-scale rallies are the result of citizens' "self-mobilization."³³

One may wonder if the pro-democracy movement can be sustainable without a strong organization serving as the mobilizing agent. However, what we found in our research is that the repeated occurrence of large-scale protests has produced a social basis for protest participation. Since the large-scale protests were prominent events, citizens were likely to have received much information and formed opinions about the protests. Through interpersonal communications, people would also come to know the opinions held by those around them. As a result, some protesters may find themselves embedded in a "supportive social network," that is, they are surrounded by friends and family members who are supportive towards democratization and protest actions. The friends and family members may or may not participate in the protests themselves, but as long as a protester perceives his or her acquaintances as supportive towards his or her action, the likelihood for the person to participate should be higher.

We examined this possibility in the onsite survey conducted during the 4 December rally in 2005 by asking rally participants if their friends and family members held political attitudes similar to their own, and whether their friends and family members supported their protest participation behaviour. We found that the vast majority of the protesters (about 75%) either frequently or sometimes discuss politics or public affairs with their friends and family members. More importantly, the protesters reported substantial agreement between themselves and their friends and family on political issues. More than 55% of the protesters reported that their political attitudes are "mostly the same" as their family members, and 32.2% reported that their political attitudes are "mostly the same" as their friends. Only 10.1% of the protesters reported that their political attitudes are "mostly different" from their family, and 9.4% reported that their attitudes are "mostly different" from their friends. Comparatively, in a population survey conducted in late 2004 which included the same questions, only 33.5% of Hong Kong citizens said their political attitudes are "mostly the same" as their family members, and only 22.5% said their political attitudes are "mostly the same" as their friends.³⁴ In other words, the amount of political agreement the protesters experienced in their own social networks is substantially higher than the usual amount of political agreement an average Hong Kong citizen would have.

The protesters also reported that their friends and family members are generally supportive towards their protest participation. It is notable that

the percentages of family members and friends supportive towards protest action (71.7% and 50.1% respectively) are even higher than the percentages of family members and friends holding mostly similar political attitudes (55.5% and 32.2% respectively). The findings thus suggest that the protesters in the 4 December 2005 rally were indeed embedded in supportive social networks. In fact, by cross-tabulating support for protest action from family members and friends, we can see that 79.1% of the protesters had their protest action supported by either their family or friends (or both). On the contrary, among the 724 respondents in the 4 December rally onsite survey, only one single respondent reported that their protest participation was opposed by both family and friends.

Individual-Level Factors in Protest Participation

In the previous sections we have discussed the macro-level conditions for the rise of the pro-democracy movement and the patterns of social mobilization involved. But no matter what macro-level conditions and mobilizing structures there are, in the end it is individuals who make the decision to join the protests. In one sense, to analyse macro-level conditions is to understand the background to the behaviour of individuals. Examining the characteristics of the protesters and the factors behind their protest behaviour is important for an understanding of the nature of the protests, the social forces represented in them, and what factors may affect the sustainability of the large-scale demonstrations. Such individual analysis is especially important for the current pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, the reemergence of which, as we have already seen in the previous section, is not dependent so much on the power of movement organizations as the protest participation of citizens mostly unconnected to social and political groups. With these premises in mind, in this section we ask: exactly who are the protesters? What individual-level factors could explain their participation in the rallies and support for future rallies? We will again draw on the onsite surveys of rally participants and population surveys to shed light on these questions.

Predictors of Protest Participation

Table 1 shows the demographics of the participants of the five large-scale rallies in connection with which onsite surveys were conducted. The exact percentages vary from one rally to the other, but there are also similarities

among them. On the whole, the large-scale rallies involved the participation of people from a wide range of social and demographic backgrounds. Nevertheless, it is clear that well educated middle-class professionals constituted the majority of the participants in the five rallies. With the exception of the 1 July rally in 2005, more than 60% of the rally participants regarded themselves as belonging to the middle class. This figure is higher than that obtained by a population survey we conducted in March 2004, in which 43.5% of the respondents regarded themselves as such. At the same time, more than half of the rally participants (again with the exception of the 1 July 2005 rally) had received some kind of tertiary education, while the corresponding figure for the Hong Kong population above 15 years old is only 16.4%.³⁵ Moreover, about 30 to 40% of the participants in each of the rallies were professionals or semi-professionals.

While the onsite surveys are useful in providing a descriptive profile of the rally participants, we have to turn to population surveys to examine the social and psychological factors explaining individuals' protest participation. Our first population survey aiming at tackling the

Table 1. Demographics of the Rally Participants (%)

	1 July 2003	1 Jan. 2004	1 July 2004	1 July 2005	4 Dec. 2005
Age:					
Below 30	44.1	23.0	35.0	25.4	24.2
30 to 49	48.4	58.8	49.4	41.9	42.1
Sex:					
Male	60.1	67.2	65.4	69.1	62.0
Social class:					
Middle class	62.9	70.7	65.7	55.4	62.6
Lower class	34.9	27.6	31.8	39.9	26.9
Education:					
Secondary	43.1	39.6	38.3	38.2	32.0
Tertiary	55.1	55.5	58.1	46.7	51.5
Occupation:					
Professionals or semi-professionals	40.6	41.4	30.7	30.2	32.7
Religion:					
Roman Catholic	—	8.9	8.9	7.2	8.1
Protestant	—	17.5	19.5	14.2	15.9

problematic here was conducted in March 2004 by the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at The Chinese University of Hong Kong.³⁶ In the survey we examined whether participation in the 1 July 2003 protest and participation in other kinds of political activities (which include 4 June commemoration rallies, "other rallies and protests," and voting) can be explained by basic political attitudes such as efficacy and interest in politics, connections with groups and acquaintances, and evaluation of the economy of Hong Kong.

Table 2 shows the results of the logistic regression analysis. First, it can be noted that while Table 1 has shown that the participants in the large-scale rallies are disproportionately well educated and middle-class people, Table 2 shows that participation in the 1 July 2003 rally has no significant relationship with the demographic factors. It does not mean that the findings contradict each other. In the population survey examined here, significant bivariate relationships between the two demographic factors

Table 2. Predictors of Participation in Protests and Voting

	Participation in 1 July rally	4 June rallies	Other rallies	Voting
Demographics:				
Sex	-.10	-.14	-.07	-.08
Age	-.07	.01	.00	.24***
Education	.12	.05	.06	.01
Household income	.01	-.02	.01	.05
Social psychological factors:				
Interest in public affairs	.85***	.46***	.41***	.15
Internal efficacy	.18	.30*	.20	.33***
Collective efficacy	.44***	.00	.10	.19*
External efficacy	-.85***	-.62***	-.47***	-.18
Social connection	.00	.16	.21	.23**
Group connection	.18	.29**	.38***	.19*
Economic evaluation	-.24	-.03	-.02	-.14
N	933	935	935	893
Model Chi-Square	227.28***	79.71***	75.90***	125.02***
-2 log-likelihood	801.59	648.33	696.12	1081.53

Notes:

1. Entries are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients.
2. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; ^ $p < .08$.

and participation in the 1 July demonstration can also be found. It is only in the context of multivariate analysis, that is, when other variables are included and controlled, that the bivariate relationship disappears. In other words, the relationships between demographics and participation in the 1 July 2003 protest are mediated by the social and psychological factors being examined.

Second, the factors explaining participation in different types of political activities are not exactly the same. Interest in public affairs, for example, is significantly related to participation in the 1 July demonstration, 4 June commemoration rallies, and "other rallies and protests." But it does not seem to drive people to vote in LegCo elections. Internal efficacy, which refers to an individual's belief in their own ability to understand politics and public affairs, relates significantly only to voting and participation in 4 June rallies. It did not drive people to participate in the 1 July 2003 rally. Instead, the 1 July 2003 demonstrators had particularly high levels of collective efficacy and low levels of external efficacy. Collective efficacy refers to citizens' belief in the capability of the public as a collective actor in politics and public affairs. Given the concrete success of the 1 July 2003 rally in forcing the government to postpone national security legislation, it is no wonder that the participants had particularly high levels of collective efficacy. External efficacy, on the other hand, refers to the belief in the responsiveness of the political system to public opinion. Its negative relationship with participation in different types of rallies thus simply indicates that grievance remains an important factor explaining protest participation at the individual level.

Table 2 shows no significant relationship between citizens' economic evaluation and participation in the 1 July 2003 protest. However, it does not mean that economic evaluation is not influential. It is possible that the effect of economic evaluation on participation is mediated by external efficacy. That is, negative evaluations of the Hong Kong economy would lead citizens to regard the political system as irresponsive, which in turn leads to participation in protest. This argument is supported by our data. If external efficacy is removed from the regression model, economic evaluation would have a strong and highly significant relationship with participation in the 1 July protest ($\beta = .49, p < .001$).

Table 2 also shows that connection with social and political groups plays an important role in participation in 4 June commemoration and other rallies and protests, but not in participation in the 1 July 2003 rally. This corroborates the findings from onsite surveys reviewed in the previous

section and the argument that social and political groups played a very limited role in mobilizing people to join the large-scale pro-democracy rallies. It also corroborates the argument that smaller-scale group-specific protests and large-scale pro-democracy rallies are likely to involve different types of mobilization processes.

While the previous section argues that social networks are important in the mobilization process, Table 2 shows that social connection has no significant relationship with participation in the 1 July protest in 2003. But this is not inexplicable. Although social networks are important in the mobilization process, we have also pointed out that it is mainly people located within social networks supportive of democratization and protest actions who are likely to mobilize or be mobilized by their acquaintances. In other words, the existence of shared political attitudes within social networks is a condition for the networks to become channels of mobilization. There is no reason to expect a general positive relationship between general density of social networks and participation in protests.

Sustainability of the Pro-Democracy Movement

In sum, from Table 2 we can argue that participation in the 1 July rally in 2003 was indeed primarily driven by a sense of grievance towards the Tung administration. This can certainly be expected, given the conjunction of social, economic and political crises in 2003. But it also raises a question for government leaders, politicians and researchers alike: if the original 1 July demonstration in 2003 was driven primarily by grievance, would people's willingness to participate in the large-scale pro-democracy protests decline or even disappear when the social and economic situations improved? Chinese national leaders seemed to believe that the answer is yes. After the 1 July 2003 rally, the Chinese government implemented a number of policies attempting to revive the Hong Kong economy. The Chinese government also finally decided to "abandon" Tung Chee-hwa and accepted Donald Tsang as the Chief Executive despite his "record" of being a high-level civil servant from the British colonial administration. The change in administration coincided with the long awaited end of Hong Kong's economic downturn. Improved social and economic conditions should lead to a significant decline in people's willingness to participate in pro-democracy protest.

The number of rally participants did indeed decline from 500,000 in 2003 to 200,000 in 2004, and then to 20,000 in 2005. But it has become

stabilized since then — the 1 July demonstrations in 2006 and 2007 had about 30,000 to 40,000 participants. The large-scale rallies have continued and given the right conditions (such as an upcoming vote within the legislature on a policy proposal) the number of participants could rise again (as in the 4 December rally in 2005). As social and political conditions change, we believe the factors explaining participation in the 1 July 2003 protest may not be exactly the same as the factors explaining citizens' willingness to participate in further pro-democracy protests in the future. We therefore conducted an analysis using another population survey conducted by the Quality Evaluation Center at the City University of Hong Kong in September 2005. The dependent variables are not actual participation in specific rallies in the past, but whether the respondents believed that the 1 July rally should continue every year, and whether the respondents would be willing to participate in a pro-democracy demonstration in the future.

Table 3 summarizes the results of the multiple regression analysis. We find that younger people are more likely to give continual support to the pro-democracy movement when other factors are controlled. Education, interestingly, also relates negatively and significantly with willingness to participate in future demonstrations. However, it should be noted that the relationship between education and support for the pro-democracy movement is non-significant and even slightly positive at the bi-variate level.

More importantly, external efficacy does not relate significantly to support for organizing a 1 July rally every year. It does relate significantly and negatively to willingness to participate in future protest. That is, willingness to participate in pro-democracy demonstration is still partially driven by a sense of dissatisfaction with the responsiveness of the political system. But in Table 3 external efficacy is only one among a large number of factors having a significant impact on willingness to participate in future demonstrations. In terms of the size of the regression coefficient, it is also far from being the most powerful predictor in the regression model.

Internal efficacy and interest in politics relate positively and significantly only to willingness to participate in future protest. Not surprisingly, both dependent variables are related to support for democratization itself.³⁷ More importantly, Table 3 shows that the experience of participating in the 1 July 2003 rally has both a direct and an indirect impact on future participation in the pro-democracy movement. In the regression, participation in the 1 July 2003 rally relates significantly to

Table 3. Continual Support for the Pro-Democracy Movement

	Having 1 July rally every year	Participate in future protest
Demographics:		
Age	-.08*	-.11*
Sex	.05	.04
Education	-.05	-.17**
Family income	-.03	.08
Political attitudes:		
Interest in politics	-.04	.13*
Internal efficacy	.02	.18**
Collective efficacy	.16***	.14**
External efficacy	-.06	-.10*
Support for democracy	.33***	.10**
Participated in 2003 rally	.11**	.28***
Voting participation	-.04	.02
2012 direct election possible	.01	.10*
Adjusted R ² for model	17.5%***	27.8%***
N	800	360

Notes:

1. Entries are standardized regression coefficients.
2. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$
3. Only people who supported democratization were asked about their willingness to protest for democracy. Pairwise deletion of missing cases was used.
4. Coding of dichotomous variables: Sex, Male = 1, Female = 2; Participation in 1 July 2003 demonstration, Yes = 1, No = 0.

both dependent variables. The relationship is particularly strong in the case of willingness to participate in future protest. Our onsite surveys of various large-scale rallies have shown repeatedly that more than 70% of the participants did take part in the 1 July 2003 rally. In other words, the more committed citizens have become reliable participants in the pro-democracy demonstrations, forming the hardcore of the protesters.

It should be noted that the regression model has controlled for the effect of past voting participation, and in fact voting participation has no significant relationship with the dependent variables. Therefore, the effect of participation in the 1 July rally in 2003 cannot be explained as an effect of a general disposition towards political participation. Instead, this impact of the 1 July 2003 rally participation can perhaps be explained in three ways. First, the experience may have “normalized” the action of protest for

the individuals. When compared to others who had not been at the rallies, past participants have a concrete sense of what joining a protest is all about, and it is likely that the inertia dragging their feet will be less. Second, past participation may generate norms for further participation.³⁸ Participants in previous 1 July rallies may start questioning themselves, or be questioned by their acquaintances, about their commitment to democratization when they start to entertain the possibility of discontinuing participation. For some, this would create social and psychological pressure for further participation. Third, the experience of participating in a large-scale rally may result in a stronger commitment to the cause on the part of protesters. Put differently, the experience of participating in the 1 July rally in 2003 contributed to further participation by enhancing people's collective efficacy. As pointed out earlier, the unexpected success of the 2003 rally in forcing the government to postpone national security legislation has given many participants a sense of empowerment, which generated or reinforced political commitments. This is analogous to the effects of baptism or confirmation in religion.

Admittedly, not all rally participants would interpret the effect of the 1 July 2003 rally in the same manner. Our focus group studies found that those participants who continued to participate in the 1 July rallies in 2004 and 2005 tended to interpret the effect of the 2003 rally on the government's decision to postpone national security legislation as direct, strong and inevitable. Those who withdrew from participation in 2005, on the other hand, tended to qualify the effects of the rally in 2003 and/or highlight the role of the Liberal Party in forcing the government to respond to the rally. Therefore, the protest experience does not enhance the collective efficacy of every participant to the same extent. But in general there is an enhancement effect. The enhanced collective efficacy, as Table 3 shows, would then lead to continual support for the pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong.

Last but not least, one noteworthy finding is the relationship between the perceived likelihood of having direct elections of the Chief Executive in 2012 and support for pro-democracy demonstrations. From the perspective of economic rationality, people should support a course of action that has higher chances of success. Table 3 shows that people who believe in the possibility of having direct elections in 2012 are indeed more likely to express willingness to participate in future protests. But the relationship is rather weak. Partly this is because the complex calculus of the possible benefits and the potential costs involved in the struggle for

democratization can hardly be captured by a single variable on the perceived chance of direct elections in 2012. Partly it is also because Hong Kong citizens' collective actions probably cannot be explained completely through a perspective of economic rationality. In fact, only 21.5% of the respondents in the population survey regarded direct elections in 2012 as "likely" or "very likely." The sizes of the pro-democracy rallies should have been much smaller if belief in the chance of success were a pre-requisite for participation.

The Future of the Pro-Democracy Movement in Hong Kong

The 1 July rally in 2003 was a contingent event. No one will ever know what would have happened if the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) had never hit Hong Kong, or if it had hit the city at a different time. No one will ever know what tragedies would have resulted had the Liberal Party not withdrawn their support for the national security legislation in time to stop the conflict between the government and the protesters from further escalation. However, it is our contention that once the 1 July rally happened and ended in the way it did, the transformation of a single anti-government rally into a continuous pro-democracy movement was not a matter of chance. Changes in the political opportunities in Hong Kong after the handover (and especially after the beginning of Tung Chee-hwa's second term of office) provided the incentives for the pro-democracy politicians to forge a closer alliance with social forces outside the formal political institutions. Meanwhile, continual development in the city's political culture has generated a citizenry with significant levels of participatory potential. These conditions combine to pave the way for the reinvigoration of the pro-democracy movement.

At the meso-level, the lack of powerful and resourceful movement organizations is compensated for by the combination of mass communication and citizens' self-mobilization through their own informal social networks. At the individual level, while discontent towards the SAR government was the primary impetus for people to participate in the 1 July 2003 rally, the factor has become less and less important as the pro-democracy movement continued amidst improved social and economic conditions. Protest participation is driven not only by basic political attitudes such as interest in politics and internal efficacy, but also directly and indirectly by the experience of participating in the rallies itself.

The analysis, as a whole, points to the sustainability of the current

pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. As some democrats argued during the debate on the government political reform proposal in 2005, since the government did not respond to citizens' demands for more rapid democratization satisfactorily at the time, the demands will only be stronger in the future. The major failure of the political reform debate from 2004 and 2005 is that the issue of political reform was left largely unresolved. In the end, no methods to elect the Chief Executive and the legislature in 2012 and afterwards were decided upon. Nor did the SAR administration answer the calls from the pro-democracy movement to provide a concrete timetable for democratization. After the legislature voted down his political reform proposal, Chief Executive Donald Tsang claimed that Hong Kong should from then on focus mainly on social and economic matters. But the fact is that the issue is bound to return to the top of the policy agenda within a few years at the latest. The political opportunity structure still favours the continuation of the pro-democracy movement in the foreseeable future.

At the same time, the pro-democracy demonstrations are likely to continue to receive the support from a significant number of citizens. The wave of large-scale rallies should have established "street demonstration" as a key item within Hong Kong citizens' repertoire of collective action. It does not mean that citizens will take to the streets every time a pro-democracy demonstration is organized. Some citizens may participate in the 1 July rallies more or less ritualistically, while others may participate in the rallies only occasionally. The former may regard continual participation as a demonstration of one's commitment, while the latter may regard demonstrations as a means to be used only when something concrete is at stake. The sizes of the rallies have varied and will inevitably continue to vary according to social, political, and economic conditions.

The sizes of the 1 July rallies from 2005 and 2007 were only about 20,000 to 40,000. But they are nonetheless much larger than the size of the largest pro-democracy rallies in the 1980s and 1990s. Over the past two decades, development in political culture has outpaced development in political institutions in Hong Kong. The participants in the demonstrations from 2005 to 2007 can be regarded as the hardcore. As the above analysis shows, these hardcore participants are mostly embedded in social networks supportive towards democratization and the demonstrations. With the hardcore as the backbone, the 1 July rally can become an annual event similar to the annual 4 June commemoration rallies. It can then serve as an enduring torch of the pro-democracy movement and a site for the

production and reproduction of common traditions, identities, and collective memories. These cultural aspects are highly important to any sustainable social movement.³⁹

However, the analogy between 1 July pro-democracy demonstrations and 4 June commemoration rallies also points to the distinction between the sustainability and the influence of a movement. Tens of thousands of Hong Kong citizens have been gathering every year to request a re-evaluation of the Tiananmen incident. But there has been a lack of linkage between the rallies and the elites within the political institutions in China. There was also no incentive for or willingness on the part of Hong Kong citizens to escalate their actions in the face of non-response from the Chinese leaders. The pro-Chinese democracy movement in Hong Kong whether it will be influential is another matter.

It serves mainly as a reminder of a past tragedy and as a symbol of people's constant demand for rehabilitation. By the same token, while we argue that the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong is likely to be sustainable, whether it will ever be influential in the future is another matter.⁴⁰ As discussed in this article, the pro-democracy rallies in Hong Kong have been influential at least occasionally because of the alliance between the social forces that the movement represents and the institutionalized power that the democrats hold within the legislature. The power of the people should not be mythologized. More importantly, since the democrats' institutionalized power remains highly limited, it remains questionable whether the combination of social forces and institutionalized power can really force the Hong Kong and Chinese governments to democratize to the satisfaction of the public. As was seen in 2004, Hong Kong citizens and the democrats, after staging various protests, had to comply with the National People's Congress's ruling out direct elections of the Chief Executive in Hong Kong in 2007.

A question crucial to understanding the power and limitation of the current pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong is: If the Chinese government simply will not allow Hong Kong to democratize further at a faster pace, are Hong Kong people ready to employ more radical means and pay higher costs? The answer seems to be no, not because Hong Kong people are economic animals who are concerned with prosperity and stability more than democracy and liberty, but because the current pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong has defined its own worthiness in terms of rationality and peacefulness. In public discourse after the 1 July rally in 2003, the dominant message was that citizens could take pride in

themselves because the large-scale demonstration did not result in any brawls, riots, looting, or any kind of major collective violence. This has become the moral self-understanding of the pro-democracy movement. This self-understanding would inevitably limit the forms of collective action Hong Kong citizens are likely to endorse and participate in. If radicalism is not the path to democracy in Hong Kong, what else will work?

As with all other social movements, persistence is a prerequisite for their success. One lesson that can be learned from the 1 July 2003 rally is that the number of participants does count in the equation of public opinion and politics. A rational and peaceful demonstration of public determination will carry its political weight only if it is coupled with social mobilization on a large scale. How this can be achieved is a question which will haunt the democrats and those who are concerned about the future of Hong Kong's democracy.

Notes

1. The exact number of protesters in the different demonstrations has been a subject of debate. Besides the figures provided by the police and the demonstration organizers, since 2004 some academics and research teams have tried to obtain independent estimates. The rough numbers stated here for different demonstrations are what the results of most independent research teams come closest to.
2. Charles Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768–2004* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2004), pp. 3–4.
3. There were actually debates among the pro-democracy movement organizations and activists in Hong Kong regarding what “democratization” refers to. Some movement activists argued that the idea of democratization should be broadened to include not only direct elections of political leaders but also issues such as citizen participation in the processes of policy-making, expansion of opportunities for people to participate in civic life, and so on. Nevertheless, direct elections of the Chief Executive remains the most conspicuous demand and the loudest rallying cry made in the pro-democracy demonstrations.
4. Pik-wan Wong, “The Pro-Chinese Democracy Movement in Hong Kong,” in *The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong*, edited by Tai-lok Lui and Stephen Wing Kai Chiu (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), pp. 55–90.
5. Steven M. Buechler, “Toward a Structural Approach to Social Movements,” *Sociological Views on Political Participation in the 21st Century*, Vol. 10

- (2002), p. 6. Researchers have captured the sense of grievance with concepts such as external efficacy, general economic or political dissatisfaction, or sense of injustice. For relevant studies, see Mindy D. Foster and Kimberly Matheson, "Double Relative Deprivation: Combining the Personal and Political," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, Vol. 21 (November 1995), pp. 1167–77; William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1968); Ian McAllister and Stephen White, "Political Participation in Post-Communist Russia: Voting, Activism, and the Potential for Mass Protest," *Political Studies*, Vol. 42 (December 1994), pp. 593–615; James R. Kluegel and David S. Mason, "Political Involvement in Transition: Who Participated in Central and Eastern Europe," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 40 (February 1999), pp. 41–60.
6. Quoted in William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1990), p. 138. Also see John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, *The Trend of Social Movements in America* (Morristown, N J: General Learning Press, 1973); John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 82 (May 1977), pp. 1212–41.
 7. More precisely, the political process model identifies political opportunities, existing mobilizing structures, and the process of cognitive liberation as the three conditions for the rise of movements. But it is generally agreed that the concept of political opportunity structure is the most unique emphasis of the theory. See Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930–1970* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982). For recent discussions and critiques of the political process model, see Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper (eds.), *Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).
 8. Ming Sing, "Mobilization for Political Change: The Pro-Democracy Movement in Hong Kong (1980s–1994)," in Lui and Chiu (eds.) (Note 4), p. 24.
 9. It should be noted that "political opportunities" and "political opportunity structure" are themselves highly contested concepts in recent social movement scholarship. Reviewing and commenting on the debate on these concepts is beyond the scope of the present article. Suffice it to note that the general definition of political opportunities and the two aspects of political opportunities identified here are adopted to suit our purposes of discussing the Hong Kong case. For critiques of and debates about the concept, see Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper (eds.), *Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).
 10. Tai-lok Lui and Stephen W. K. Chiu, "Introduction: Changing Political Opportunities and the Shaping of Collective Action: Social Movements in Hong Kong," in Lui and Chiu (Note 4), pp. 1–19.

11. Siu-kai Lau and Hsin-chi Kuan, *The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1988); Hsin-chi Kuan and Siu-kai Lau, "The Partial Vision of Democracy in Hong Kong: A Survey of Popular Opinion," *The China Journal*, Vol. 34 (July 1995), pp. 239–63.
12. Ming Sing, *Hong Kong's Tortuous Democratization* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004). However, the argument of a "backward" culture constraining institutional development in Hong Kong has been heavily criticized since the late 1990s. See Wai-man Lam, *Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004); Joseph Chan also argues for a more dynamic evaluation of the political culture of Hong Kong in view of the "people power" as expressed in the rally on 1 July 2003. See Joseph Chan, "'Hong Kong-Style People Power': Social Mobilization and the Reconfiguration of Political Culture," in *Hong Kong Cultural Studies*, edited by Chun Hung Ng, Tai-lok Lui and Eric Ma (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006) (in Chinese).
13. Ming Sing (Note 8), p. 34.
14. Wong (Note 4), p. 66.
15. Alvin Y. So, *Hong Kong's Embattled Democracy* (New York: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
16. Agnes S. Ku, *Narrative, Politics, and the Public Sphere: Struggles over Political Reform in the Final Transitional Years in Hong Kong (1992–1994)* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999); Siu-kai Lau, *From the "Through Train" to "Setting up the New Stove": Sino-British Row over the Election of the Hong Kong Legislature*. Occasional Paper No. 80 (Hong Kong: Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998).
17. Ming Sing (Note 8), p. 44.
18. Michael DeGolyer and Janet Lee Scott, "The Myth of Political Apathy in Hong Kong," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 547 (1996), pp. 68–78; Hsin-chi Kuan, "Escape from Politics: Hong Kong's Predicament of Political Development?" *International Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 21, No. 10 (1998), pp. 1423–48.
19. Agnes S. Ku, "Postcolonial Cultural Trends in Hong Kong: Imagining the Local, the National, and the Global," *Crisis and Transformation in China's Hong Kong*, edited by Ming K. Chan and Alvin So (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002). Francis L. F. Lee and Joseph Man Chan, "Jingji yadao minzhu? Huigui hou de yixie mindiao shuju fenxi" (Has Economics Trumped Democracy? Analysis of Post-Handover Poll Data), *Twenty-first Century* (online edition), No. 24 (March 2004).
20. Such poll findings are available at <http://hkupop.hku.hk>.
21. Joseph Man Chan and Francis L. F. Lee, "Reconstructing Public Political Culture in a State of Energized Public Opinion: Analyzing Public Discourses Surrounding the July 1 Rally." Paper presented at the Conference on Politics

- and Culture in Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong, November 2005, Hong Kong. Joseph Man Chan and Francis L. F. Lee, "Revision in Media Political Parallelism in a State of Energized Public Opinion," *Hong Kong Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 31 (2006), pp. 71–96.
22. More specifically, the reform proposal was criticized most heavily for failing to provide a concrete timetable for institutionalizing direct elections of the Chief Executive and the whole legislature.
 23. E.g., Steven E. Barkan, "Explaining Public Support for the Environmental Movement: A Civic Voluntarism Model," *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 85 (December 2004), pp. 913–37; Doug McAdam, "Micromobilization Contexts and Recruitment to Activism," in *International Social Movement Research*, edited by Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, Vol. 1 (1988), pp. 125–54.
 24. Denny Kwok-leung Ho, *Polite Politics: A Sociological Analysis of an Urban Protest in Hong Kong* (Vermont: Ashgate, 2000).
 25. In fact, people may even worry about the negative impact of democracy on economic development and government efficiency in general. Such worries can explain why the middle class in Hong Kong is actually ambivalent about democratic development. See Tai-lok Lui, "Rearguard Politics: Hong Kong's Middle Class," *The Developing Economies*, Vol. 46 (June 2003), pp. 161–83.
 26. The figures were derived from a search conducted with the Wise News archive.
 27. Siu-kai Lau, "Decolonization Without Independence and the Poverty of Political Leaders in Hong Kong," Occasional Paper No.1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1990); Siu-kai Lau, *Democratization, Poverty of Political Leaders, and Political Inefficacy in Hong Kong*, Occasional Paper No. 72 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1998).
 28. Ivan Chi-keung Choy, "Political Parties and Political Participation in Hong Kong," in *Political Participation in Hong Kong: Theoretical Issues and Historical Legacy*, edited by Joseph Y. S. Cheng (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 1999), pp. 121–47.
 29. Ming Sing, "Weak Labor Movements and Opposition Parties: Hong Kong and Singapore," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2004), pp. 449–64.
 30. Lau and Kuan, *The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese* (Note 11).
 31. Francis L. F. Lee and Joseph Man Chan, "Making Sense of Participants: The Political Culture of the Pro-democracy Demonstrators in Hong Kong," *The China Quarterly* (forthcoming).
 32. Considerations of space mean that we omit discussions of the methodology of the studies we conducted. For details about the methods and findings of the onsite surveys in 2003 and 2004, see Joseph M. Chan and Francis L. F. Lee, *Mobilization and Protest Participation in Post-Handover Hong Kong: A Study of Three Large-Scale Demonstrations*, Occasional Paper No. 159 (Hong Kong:

- Hong Kong Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, 2005); Joseph M. Chan, Robert T. Y. Chung and Francis L. F. Lee, "Mobilizing Social Capital: Internet's Role in a Historic Rally in Hong Kong," paper presented at the 2004 International Communication Association Annual Convention, New Orleans, USA; Joseph Man Chan and Francis L. F. Lee, "Causes of Political Mobilization in Hong Kong," in *Political Crisis, Mobilization and Confrontation in China's Hong Kong*, edited by Ming Sing (New York: M. E. Sharpe, forthcoming); Joseph Chan, "'Hong Kong-Style People Power': Social Mobilization and the Reconfiguration of Political Culture," in Ng, Lui and Ma (eds.) (Note 12).
33. Chan and Lee (Note 31).
 34. Francis L. F. Lee, "Ordinary Political Conversation and Public Opinion Expression: Is Existence of Discord Necessary?" *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, Vol. 82 (Winter 2005), pp. 891–909.
 35. According to government statistics available online.
 36. Again, we omit discussions of the method here because of space considerations. Interested readers can find relevant information in Chan and Lee (Note 31).
 37. The strength of the impact of support for democratization on the dependent variable is much weaker in the case of willingness to participate in future protest. It is because in the latter regression only people who indicated support for democratization are included. In other words, what the second column of Table 3 shows, precisely speaking, is that the extremity of support for democratization has a significant but only moderate or even weak impact on willingness to participate in future protest.
 38. Karl-Dieter Opp, "'What Is It Always Becoming What Ought to Be': How Political Action Generates a Participation Norm," *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 20 (February 2004), pp. 13–29.
 39. Charles Tilly, *Stories, Identities and Political Change* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).
 40. Besides drawing an analogy between the 1 July demonstrations and the 4 June commemorations, another interesting question is whether and how the two sets of rallies are related to each other. Some democrats may believe that the 4 June commemorations can serve as useful occasions for mobilizing supporters to join the 1 July demonstrations. For example, in our onsite survey in the 2007 1 July demonstration, 42.6% of the respondents reported having joined the 4 June commemoration a month earlier. Nevertheless, given that both rallies share the same pro-democracy theme, a certain extent of overlapping between the participants of the two rallies is to be expected. Further analysis is needed to specify the actual connection between the two sets of rallies.