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The Political Culture of Kwun Tong:
A Chinese Community in Hong Kong

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by

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The Political Culture of Kwun Tong:
a Chinese Community in Hong Kong*

Ambrose Yeo-chi King

I. The Concept of Political Culture and Political System

The important function of culture in systems perspective has been most adequately expounded by Talcott Parsons. Parsons states, "the central functional exigency of the interrelations between a society and a cultural system is the legitimation of the society's normative order. Legitimation systems define the reasons for members' rights and for the prohibitions incumbent upon them."¹ The political scientists have singled out political culture from general cultural system by using it as a concept to explain variations of political behavior of different political systems. According to Verba:

"The political culture of a society consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics." ²

Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell put it more succinctly, "Political culture is the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations toward politics among members of a political system."³ In essence, for the individuals, political culture "provides the guidances of political behavior;"⁴ for the political system, it provides "a systematic structure of values and rational considerations which ensures coherence in the performance of institutions and organizations."⁵ The concept of political culture has merits, methodologically speaking, in that it provides us with a conceptual tool by means of which we can bridge the "micro-

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macro" gap in political analysis. It makes the transition possible from the study of the individual in his political context to the study of the political system as a whole; it makes sense to relate individual interviews and responses to the aggregate statistics and group behavior patterns which reflect the course of a system's total behavior.⁶

At this juncture, it is advisable to say something about the concept of political system. The term political system is used by modern political behavioral scientists to substitute the term government or state as used by traditional political theorists. To substitute the term political system for government or state involves more than mere style of nomenclature. This new terminology reflects a new way of looking at political phenomena. The old terms -- state and government -- are limited to legal and institutional meanings; they are limited to governmental institutions such as the legislative, the executive and the judicial. If we employ this formal and institutional approach to study the political behavior, we are bound to be deprived of understanding the total dynamics of politics, since politics occurs also outside of governmental spheres. Moreover, if this approach is employed to study the politics of non-Western societies, the shortcomings are even more serious because some formal institutions might not even exist in those societies. And even when they do exist, they do not necessarily have the actual performance; there is a gap between what it prescribes and the way it actually behaves, a phenomenon coined by Riggs as "formalism."⁷ The advantage of the term political system is that it sensitizes us to the entire scope of political activities within a society, regardless of where in the society such activities may be located, thus enabling us to grasp the dynamics of the total polity and the intricate relationship between polity and society.⁸ Moreover, it also enables us to study politics of any society, whether or not it has a government.⁹

What, then, is political system? By political system, we refer to an entity of which its component units are engaged in the processes of identifying and posing problems and in making and administering decisions in the realm of public affairs.¹⁰ With this definition, the boundary of political system separating from total

society is definable, and it allows us to include not only governmental institutions, but also other kinds of structures which involve political activities.

To study the political culture of a political system is to study the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among members of the system. According to Almond and Verba, a political system can be broadly conceptualized as having four objects.¹¹ These four objects are (1) the system as a general object; (2) input objects (referring to something, be it structures, incumbents, or decision which are involved in the political or input process. By input process, it refers to the flow of demands from the society into the polity and the conversion of these demands into authoritative policies.) (3) output objects (referring to something, be it structures, incumbents, or decisions, which are involved in the administrative or output process. By output process, it refers to that process by which authoritative policies are applied or enforced.) and (4) the self as an object (referring to the content and quality of norms of personal political obligation, and the content and quality of the sense of personal performance vis-a-vis the political system.)

The individual's orientation toward political objects, in the views of Almond and Verba who follow the scheme suggested by Parsons and Shils, can be analytically distinguished into three types: (1) cognitive orientation, that is, knowledge of and belief about the objects; (2) affective orientation, that is, the feeling about the objects and (3) evaluative orientation, that is, the judgments and opinions about the objects; that is, the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings. Thus conceptualized, the political culture can be differentiated into three types basing upon the frequency or different kinds of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations towards the four political objects. The first type is "parochial political culture" in which the frequency of orientation to political objects of the four kinds approaches zero. The second type is "subject political culture" in which there is a high frequency of orientations toward the political system as a whole and toward the output aspects of the system, but orientations toward input objects and

toward the self as an active participant approach zero. The third type is "participant political culture" in which there is a high frequency of orientations toward the objects of all the four kinds.

II. Political Culture in Kwun Tong

This is a study of political culture in Kwun Tong, a community of Hong Kong. Kwun Tong, covering an area of more than 1,200 hectares, is a newly developed industrial district, with a short history of 17 years. Kwun Tong has a population of about 450,000 (1971 H.K. Population Census figure). Physically, the district is rather isolated; it lies at the eastern end of the Victoria Harbour, separated from the Kowloon Peninsula by Kowloon Bay and Hammer Hill. The chain of Kwo Pui Shan, Black Hill and Devil Peak form a natural barrier and serve as the east and north-eastern boundary of the district. At the north, Clear Water Bay Road separates Kwun Tong from Wong Tai Sin District. More important, there is only one land transportation route -- Kwun Tong Road connecting Kwun Tong and other districts of Kowloon. Therefore, the physical boundary of Kwun Tong as a community is rather easy to be identified. However, the socio-political boundaries of Kwun Tong are not congruent with the physical one. According to the findings, if we compare the intra-Kwun Tong flow of social communication with that between Kwun Tong and other districts of the Colony, there are strong indicators showing that Kwun Tong, socially, politically and economically speaking, is more a functioning part of the Hong Kong metropolitan city rather than a separate community with a high degree of self-containedness.¹² Thus, we think the findings of political culture in Kwun Tong should be able to shed sights on the nature of political culture of the Hong Kong metropolitan city as a whole.

This political culture study of Kwun Tong is only attempted to get a general cognitive and psychological map of politics of the ordinary men and leaders of Kwun Tong. What we have tried to do is to locate special attitudes and propensities for political behavior among parts of population, or in particular structures of the political system; in other words to find out the cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations of the ordinary men and the elites toward the

political objects of the four kinds: system, inputs, outputs, and self as actor. The methods used in this study are mainly structured questionnaire survey and intensive interview for the ordinary men and leaders. The term leader is here loosely referred to those with most power in a group, and we have called those who are the heads of organizations of various types as leaders, though a large percentage of them are in no sense those with most power in the community as a whole. In the following pages, we want to describe and analyze the cognitive, affective and evaluative dimensions of political orientations of individuals, ordinary men and leaders toward the political objects.

A. Cognitive Dimension:

In studying the political cognition of people, we are primarily concerned with their knowledge about and awareness of government and politics. What we are trying to find out is the degree of their exposure to mass media. According to the Life Quality Study* survey based on 1,065 cases of which 32.6% are male, 67.4% female, we have the findings as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Frequency with which respondent follows accounts of public and Governmental affairs: by ordinary men

	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
regularly	70	6.6
from time to time	453	42.5
never	533	50.0
other	4	.4
don't know	2	.2
no response	3	.3
	<hr/> 1,065	<hr/> 100.0

* The Life Quality Study is part of the Kwun Tong Industrial Community Research Programme by Dr. Stanley Shively. The survey data were collected in May, 1971.

Table 1 shows that 42.5% of the ordinary men in K.T. follow the accounts of public and governmental affairs "from time to time", and 6.6% of them follow it "regularly". These two groups of people who, comprising 49.1% in total, follow the accounts of politics either regularly or from time to time should be interpreted as having interest, concern and knowledge of politics, and might be characterized as belonging to the "political strata" in the political system.¹³ In comparison with countries, like U.S., U.K., Germany, Italy, and Mexico, the percentage of people in Hong Kong who follow politics regularly (6.6%), or may be labelled as "attentive public", is considerably low; while the percentage of people who follow politics from time to time is rather high.¹⁴ The fact of matter is that the size of political strata is not small; the majority of people are not necessarily politically apathetic as was often stated. In interviewing with 15 civic and governmental leaders about their view on ordinary men's concern for current public affairs, ten of them say "moderate", one even say "very great", but none say "very low". People in Hong Kong often say that the ordinary men have an extremely high degree of political apathy by referring to the fact that at the elections of Urban Council, the Colony's only elective political body, the voting rates are very low. For example, in March 1971, only about 26% of the registered voters actually voted which is equivalent to roughly 5% of the potentially qualified voters.¹⁵

However, voting behavior, the most important index of political participation in Western democracies, cannot be a meaningful indicator in Hong Kong simply because HK is ruled by Colonial bureaucrats who are not subjected to election, and the Urban Council is in no way a real powerful rule-making body. As was pointed out by a political scientist that "apathy towards the Urban Council elections is just as likely to be the result of the limitations on the Council's powers and influence as it is to be consequence of a general lack of interest in politics or in the actions of government."¹⁶ But political apathy does exist in Kwun Tong; Table 1 shows that 50% of the respondents never follow public and government affairs. This percentage is indeed high comparing with other countries.¹⁷ The lack of concern of public

affairs is further confirmed by the Kwun Tong Health Study survey, in which 478 or 68.1% of a total of 702 cases agree with the statement: "Residents of this district are more concerned about their own (family) affairs than with the welfare of the whole district", and only 84 or 12% of them disagree. These data suggest that more than half of the population in Kwun Tong are oriented primarily toward traditional familistic social organization thus showing clear elements of parochial culture. For those who never follow politics and have orientation toward parochialism can be called "politically inert", or characterized as belonging to the "apolitical strata."

As of the leaders of Kwun Tong, the political cognitive map is different. Among 13 civic leaders (heads of Kaifong and MSB), 12 or 92.3% say they "always" or "sometimes" follow the politics. In three separate surveys - Kwun Tong Economic Organization Study*, Kwun Tong Religious Organization Study** and Kwun Tong Medical & Health Study***, we have investigated the political cognition of 346 economic leaders, 45 religious leaders and 94 doctors by asking them of their degree of concern with public and government affairs. The findings are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Degree of concern with public and government affairs: by leaders

Degree	Economic		Religious		Medical	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Very much	15	4.3	13	28.9	8	8.5
Moderate	244	70.5	18	40.0	39	41.5
Little	70	20.2	9	20.0	21	22.3
Nil	10	2.9	2	4.4	23	24.5
No response	7	2.0	3	6.7	3	3.2
	346	99.9	45	100.0	94	100.0

* Kwun Tong Economic Organization Study, Social Research Centre, summer 1971.

** Kwun Tong Religious Organization Study, Social Research Centre, January 1972.

*** Kwun Tong Medical and Health Study, Social Research Centre, May 1972.

The figures in Table 2 are interesting in many ways, for they indicate that, with the exception of religious leaders, the percentage of all other leaders who are "very much" concerned with politics is very low; but, the percentage of the leaders who have "moderate" concern of politics is considerably high. Moreover, among the economic and religious leaders, only 2.9% and 4.4% show lack of concern or interest in politics respectively. But, there are 24.5% of medical doctors who have shown no concern in politics. This figure is rather high, although still lower than that of the ordinary men; we tend to think that it may not be very legitimate to consider medical doctors, be West-trained physicians or Chinese herbalists, as leaders, for they are seldom heads of organizations as others are. Anyhow, the overall indication is clear that the percentage of the leaders who are politically inert or belonging to the "apolitical strata" is much smaller than that of the ordinary men. In other words, the leaders are more oriented toward extra-familistic objects, thus, less parochial in nature.

B. Affective Dimension:

In talking about the affective dimension of politics, we are in effect looking at the state of feeling of people about government and politics. We believe that for a person to engage in political activities the first thing comes to him is the feeling of safety to do so. Hong Kong is not a democratic system, but, it is widely believed that people in the Colony enjoy a high degree of freedom. Engaging in politics needs, first of all, freedom of expression. It is held by political scientists that talking politics with other people is an active form of political participation, while exposure to mass media is relatively passive. Talking politics with other people can indeed be viewed as having an orientation toward system, input objects and toward self as an active participant. The feeling of freedom in talking politics with other people by ordinary men in Kwun Tong is empirically found as shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Feeling of Freedom in Talking Politics With Anyone:
by Ordinary Men

	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
-2 Strongly disagree	12	1.1
-1	54	5.1
0	332	31.2
+1	373	35.0
+2 Strongly agree	67	6.3
Don't know	29	2.7
No answer	198	18.6
	<u>1,065</u>	<u>100.0</u>

$$\bar{X} = 0.51$$

$$S.D. = 0.79$$

Actual text of the question, 'Agree or disagree' :
"I feel perfectly free to discuss public affairs with anyone".

The figures in Table 3 show that (1) 41.3% of the respondents in Kwun Tong feel moderately and/or strongly that it is perfectly free in talking politics with anyone; (2) only 6.2% of the respondents feel that it is not free for them to talk politics with anyone. However, a significant phenomenon emerging in Table 3 is that 21.3 percent of respondents either "don't know" or give "no answer" to the question at all. The rather high percentage (18.6%) of the sample in giving "no answer" is something not totally unexpected. In fact, according to our interviewers, there is a significant number of people in Kwun Tong who just do not want to talk the very concept of politics at all, even we have "skillfully" avoided using the word "politics" in the actual text of question. Those respondents who give "no answer" should be interpreted either as being ignorant or as having no orientation toward the input object or toward the self as political actor here.

But, the overall meaning of Table 3 is unmistakably clear that the percentage of people who feel perfectly free in talking politics with anyone is considerably high in comparing with other countries.¹⁸ However, a word of caution is worth mention.

This rather high percentage might be attributable to one plausible factor, that is, in the actual text of question, as was mentioned, we use the words of discussing "public affairs" instead of "political affairs". This wording is purportedly used with the intention of avoiding the possibility of getting a high percentage of "no answer". However, because of this wording design, we might have created a possibility of getting high percentage of the sample in the category of "free to discuss public affairs." We suspect that if we adopt the same wording of the question as was used by Survey Research Ltd. (Hong Kong) in 1966-67: "Do you think that people in Hong Kong are free to criticize the actions of the Hong Kong police force without fear of punishment?", the percentage of positive answer would be decreased and the negative answer and/or "no answer" would be significantly increased.¹⁹

What interests us here is that 49.1% of the ordinary people in the political strata claim they take part in the political communication process (Table 1), and only 6.2% of the same sample feel lack of freedom in talking about politics (Table 3). These figures should suggest with reservation that there is a high degree of openness of political communication process of the political system in the mind of people. And this might suggest that there is a positive orientation toward the system.

What is the feeling of freedom of leaders in Kwun Tong in talking politics with others? We have directed this question to 402 heads of different organizations in Kwun Tong: 346 of economic organizations, 45 of religious, 8 of Kaifong, and 3 of MSB. The results are shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Feeling of Freedom in Talking Politics with Others:
by Heads of Organizations.

Percentage who say they	N	%
Feel free to talk politics with anyone	228	56.7
Feel free to talk politics with most people	34	8.5
Feel free to talk politics with a few	57	14.2
Don't feel free to talk politics with anyone	32	8
No answer or other	51	12.7
	402	100.1

The figures of Table 4 are of interest, for they suggest (1) that 56.7 percent of elites of the sample "feel free to talk politics with anyone", and it is 15.4 percent higher than that of the ordinary men (i.e. 41.3%); (2) the percentages of heads of Kaifong Associations, economic and religious organizations, who either follow the accounts of politics "regularly" or "sometimes," or are concerned with politics "very much" or "moderately," are very high, i.e., 92.3% of Kaifong, 74.8% of economic and 68.9% of religious organizations, and only 8% of them feel seriously restricted in talking politics. This should mean that the leaders of the political strata do have a feeling of safety in engaging in the process of political communication, and an orientation toward the system in positive way. But, a word of caution is again needed; there are not lack of cases in which the leaders said they feel there is no restriction in talking politics with anyone, yet, they have shown reluctance in commenting on the policies and/or incumbents of the government.

At this juncture, a finding more explicit on the individual's orientation toward the system is worth comment. In the Kwun Tong Medical and Health Study, 94 doctors are asked to respond to the question: "Whether or not do you think the role of doctors will be different under different politico-economic systems?" 11 or 11.7% of them say "very different"; 17 or 18.1% say "different"; 44 or 46.9% say "not much different"; and 21 or 22.3% are "undecided"; together with 1 or 1.1% providing no answer. These figures are of interest,

for they suggest that almost half of the total sample do not see the different system effect on the role of doctors; and more than 20 percent of them even cannot give their opinions on the system object. Granted the doctors are usually less politically oriented than other kinds of roles, nevertheless, it is at least one valid indicator that the doctors' orientation toward system is not sensitive or high.

Among the heads of organizations, we have also studied their feeling toward governmental authorities by inferring from their expectation of how they will be treated by them. We ask 399 heads of local organizations: i.e., 346 of economic, 45 of religious and 8 of Kaifong, on how they see government officials' reaction to their opinion and suggestions. The results are shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Amount of consideration expected from Government officials for their opinions and suggestions: by heads of organizations

Percentage who expect	Economic	Religious	Kaifong	Total	%
	N	N	N	N	
Serious consideration	33	9	2	44	11
Moderate consideration	56	8	6	70	17.5
To be ignored	61	4		65	16.3
Depends	147	19		166	41.6
No response	49	5		54	13.5
	346	45	8	399	99.9

These figures are of great significance, for they tell us that leaders of Kwun Tong community have a fairly low expectation of consideration and responsiveness from government officials given to their point of view in the public realm; only 11% and 17.5% of them feel that their opinion and suggestions will be given serious and moderate consideration by government officials, while 16.3% of them feel that their opinion and suggestion will be totally ignored.

If we compare these figures of leaders with those of other countries in which the respondents are only ordinary citizens, we have the result as shown in Table 6.

Table 6. Amount of Consideration expected for point of View from Government Officials: by Countries

Percentage who expect	U.S.	U.K.	Germany	Italy	Mexico	K.T. (Hong Kong)
Serious consideration	52	66.5	56	35	13	11
A little consideration	26.5	17.5	14.5	14	47	17.5
To be ignored	8.5	5	4.5	11.5	28	16.3
Depends	10	8	14	20.5	6.5	41.6
Others	3	1.5	11	19	4	13.5
Total percentage	100	98.5	100	100	98.5	99.9
Total number	970	963	955	995	1,007	399

The figures of U.S., U.K., Germany, Italy, and Mexico are derived from the studies of Almond and Verba, and those figures have been recombined here for the purpose of comparison. (Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1965), p. 72.

The comparative figures in Table 6 are striking, for they tell us that only 11% of the leaders of organizations of Kwun Tong expect serious consideration from governmental officials, should they try to express their point of view, in contrast with 52%, 66.5%, 56%, 35%, and 13% for the ordinary men in the U.S., U.K., Germany, Italy and Mexico respectively. It also tells us that there is 16.3% of the leaders of organizations of Kwun Tong expect that their point of view will be totally ignored by governmental officials, in contrast with 8.5%, 5%, 4.5%, and 11.5% for the ordinary men in the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Italy; it is only lower than that of the ordinary men in Mexico, i.e., 28 percent. These comparative figures unmistakably show that, on the whole, the leaders of Kwun Tong have unfavorable expectations of government. And we have reasonable ground to say that the ordinary men of Kwun Tong would have much more unfavourable expectations of government authorities. The rather negative attitudes toward government of ordinary men of Kwun Tong can be partially proved by another of our findings. Among 1,065 ordinary men interviewed, 32.6% of them agree or strongly agree with the statement that:

"The primary reason for being a government official is 'to make money'," while only 25.1% of them disagree or strongly disagree with that statement. We might say that both the elites and the ordinary men have some suspicions about or low affective expectation of the output objects of the political system.

C. Evaluative Dimension:

The last dimension of the political culture of Kwun Tong we have explored is on men's sense of citizen duty and political efficacy. Men's sense of citizen duty and political efficacy have a great deal to do with individual's orientation toward the input object and toward the self as an active political role. By sense of citizen duty, an alternative label for it might be "sense of civic obligation", we mean "the feeling that oneself and others ought to participate in the political process, regardless of whether such political activity is seen worthwhile or efficacious."²⁰ By political efficacy, we mean "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one's civic duties."²¹ It is held by Dahl that there is "a strong relationship between a person's sense of political efficacy (the confidence that what one does really matters) and the extent of his political involvement. The weaker one's sense of political efficacy, the less likely one is to become involved."²² And this statement is strongly confirmed by empirical findings of Campbell and his associates.²³

With regard to the sense of citizen duty of the people in Kwun Tong, we have findings of the ordinary men with a sample size of 702. When they are asked to respond to the statement: "Improvement of the district (Kwun Tong)'s living condition is a responsibility of the Hong Kong government, not that of ordinary citizen." 168 or 23.9% of the sample say "yes", 89 or 12.7% say "no", and with 445 or 63.4% "undecided". These figures show that only 12.7 percent of the ordinary men have an orientation toward the self as an active participant, while 23.9 percent show rather an orientation toward the self as an

passive role of subject of the system. Moreover, 63.4 percent of the sample are either ignorant of or of no orientation toward the input object or toward the self as an active participant. Therefore, it is more a parochial than either a subject or a participant culture.

In contrast with the low degree of sense of citizen duty of the ordinary men, the leaders of Kwun Tong show a high sense of citizen duty. 13 leaders of Kaifong, MSB and District organizations, are asked: "How do you think the ordinary men should participate in the local community affairs?" All of them unanimously answer that the ordinary men should "actively participate" in the local community affairs. This bit of evidence do indicate that the leaders have an orientation toward the self as an active participant. However, another bit of information seem somewhat contradictory to what we have just said. Among 346 heads of factories, 67 or near 20 percent fail to provide their opinion on what degree the government should control industry. And among 94 doctors, 43 or near 46 percent are unable to give their opinion on whether or not the government should exert more control on medical practice of the West-trained physicians. These two figures do, in one sense, suggest that a significant number of the leaders are either ignorant or lack of orientation toward the input object or toward the self as an active political role. Thus, the overall picture of the political citizen duty of the leaders indicates that the leaders' orientation toward the self as an active political role is a mixed one: a mixture of parochial, subject and participant orientation.

With regard to the political efficacy, we have also tried to examine the ordinary men first. In Life Quality Study, 1,065 respondents are asked to think what they can do about it, when there is a government regulation which they believe is unjust. The self-image of political efficacy of the ordinary men is shown in Table 7.

Table 7. Percentage who say they can do something about an unjust governmental regulation: by ordinary men

Who say they can do	N	%
A great deal	10	.9
Some, but not much	140	13.1
Nothing at all	872	81.9
Other	6	.6
Don't know	12	1.1
No answer	25	2.3
	1,065	99.9

Actual text of the question: "Extent to which respondent think he/she can do something about an unjust government regulation."

Table 7 shows that only 14% of the respondents think they can do something about an unjust government regulation, while 81.9% of them think that there is nothing at all they can do about it. These figures are of great significance in comparing with those of U.S., U.K., Germany, Italy and Mexico as shown in Table 8.

Table 8. Percentage who say they can do something about an unjust government regulation: by nations

Nation	%
U.S.	76
U.K.	70
Germany	55
Italy	39.5
Mexico	45
Kwun Tong (Hong Kong)	14

(The figures of other five nations are adopted and modified from the studies of Almond and Verba: The Civic Culture op. cit. p. 142)

Table 8 shows that the political efficacy of the ordinary men of Kwun Tong is more than five time lower than that of the ordinary men both in United States and Great Britain; more than three time lower than that of Germany and Mexico; and more than two time lower than that of Italy. This phenomenon of low political efficacy indicates that the "civic competence" of the ordinary men of Kwun Tong is very limited. To state it alternatively, the ordinary men's orientations toward the input object or toward the self as an active participant is strikingly low, if not totally absent.

As of the political efficacy of the leaders of Kwun Tong, among the 12 heads of organizations interviewed, of which 8 are Kaifong, 3 are MSB and one is District Association, 4 of them say they can do "something" about it; 6 say they can do "very little"; and 2 say "nothing at all". Based on this limited sample, we can find only 4 or 33.3% of it have shown political efficacy; and it is higher than that of the ordinary men in Kwun Tong, but still much lower than that of the ordinary men in the above-mentioned countries.

The leaders' orientation toward the input object and toward the self as an active participant is also considerably low. And this statement can be further supported by the findings on 94 doctors. When they are asked to respond to the question: "Suppose there is some kind of conference held in Kwun Tong to discuss the medical and health issues and problems concerning the District, will you or will you not participate in it?" 4 or 4.3% say "definitely yes"; 61 or 64.9% say "probably yes"; 28 or 29.8% say "definitely no"; and one or approximately 1% gives no answer. This bit of evidence suggest that there exists a considerable amount of political apathy among the doctors; there is only a tiny proportion of them who have a high input orientation and an active self-image of political role.

The findings on leaders' political efficacy unmistakably tell us that the leaders of Kwun Tong share a parochial culture, but tend to have a relative higher subject and participant culture than the ordinary men.

III. Summary and Discussion: The Continuity and Discontinuity of Traditional Chinese Political Culture

In summing up the empirical findings on the political culture of Kwun Tong, we can state it briefly as follows: First, among the ordinary people in Kwun Tong, about half of the sample of 1,065 (49.1%) have some knowledge of public and government affairs. They can be loosely characterized as belonging to the "political strata." The popular view that the people of Hong Kong are politically apathetic should not be accepted without reservation. However, the other half of the sample do lack knowledge of or concern in politics: they never follow the accounts of public affairs. They belong to what we call the "apolitical strata." The majority of sample of 702 indicate that the ordinary men's orientation tend primarily toward traditional familistic organization: family, thus, showing characteristics of parochial culture. As for the leaders or heads of local organizations, the political cognition of the leaders is clearly higher than that of the ordinary men. And the leaders are oriented more toward the extra-familistic larger system, thus, showing less parochial characteristics.

Secondly, of both the leaders and the ordinary men, the feeling of safety or freedom in talking politics with others is comparatively high: only about 6 and 8 percent of the ordinary men and the leaders respectively feel that there is serious restriction in engaging in the process of political communication. These figures, though not without reservation, do tend to confirm the general view that although Hong Kong is not a democracy, it has high degree of political freedom, at least freedom of expression. This finding shows, in one sense, an orientation toward the system as a whole in a positive way, though the data do not allow us to say whether the people are cognizant of the nature of the system. However, the people's orientation toward the government or the output object is far from being positive; a significant percentage of the ordinary people tend to believe that the primary reason for being a government official is "to make money". More significantly, the leaders of the local community have an extremely unfavourable expectation of the responsiveness of government officials, should they try to explain their point of view to them. Only 11 percent

of the sample of 399 expect to get serious consideration from government officials for their views. This figure which is extremely low in comparing with that of countries like United States, Britain, Germany, and Italy, should suggest nothing but that the leaders are somewhat suspicious of and negatively oriented toward the output object.

Thirdly, insofar as the people's conception of political role is concerned, we find that the sense of citizen duty of the ordinary men is very low; more than 60 percent are either ignorant of or have no orientation toward the input object and toward the self as an active participant, thus, showing strong characteristics of parochial culture. As of the sense of citizen duty of the leaders, although the limited data do not allow us to make a definite account, we do find that the leaders' sense of citizen duty is higher than that of the ordinary men. But, the fact of matter is that among the leaders there is no lack of ignorance or absence of orientation toward the input object or toward the self as an active political role. What is unmistakably clear is that both the leaders and the ordinary men are, more or less, cognizant of and have an orientation toward the output object or the administrative side of the political system. They tend primarily to think that it is the government, not the individual citizen, that should bear the responsibility to improve the living conditions of the community. We are inclined to believe that the people in Kwun Tong still hold strong traditional, paternalistic view of the government. Furthermore, according to our data, the political efficacy of the ordinary men is extremely low in comparison with that of people in countries like Italy and Mexico, not to mention that of United States, Britain and Germany. When asked what they can do about an unjust government regulation, more than 80 percent say they could do "nothing at all", and only 14 percent of them give a positive answer. Surprisingly or not, the political efficacy of leaders, though relatively higher than that of the ordinary men, are also considerably low. The feeling of powerlessness and helplessness among both the ordinary men and the leaders is undisputably high. The data on political efficacy indicate that the orientations toward the input object or toward the self as an active participant are low among both the ordinary men and the leaders.

In conclusion, we might say that there are some indicators showing the political culture of the leaders is different from that of the ordinary men, though the line of demarcation is far from being clear-cut. In fact, it is sometimes rather blurred; the difference is but a matter of degree. The data do not allow us to make a comprehensive and rigid statement about these two structures' exact frequency of different kinds of cognitive, affective and evaluative orientation toward all four political objects: system, input, output and the self as an active participant. What might be legitimate for us to do is to give a rough approximation of the political culture of both the ordinary men and the leaders.

The political culture of the ordinary people is predominantly a parochial culture: despite the fact that they have a considerable high degree of political cognition, and there are not total lack of orientation toward the output, or administrative aspects of the system, and even toward the input object or the self as an active participant. Yet, the majority's orientations toward the system, the input object and the self as an active role are extremely low. The political culture of the leaders is predominantly a subject culture: despite the fact that some of them are not absent of parochial orientation on the one hand, and some of them are not absent in orientations toward the input object and toward the self as an active participant on the other. Yet, the fact of matter is that the majority's parochial or participant orientations are relatively low, while their orientation toward the output or the administrative side of the political system is salient. Needless to say, Kwun Tong has a mixed political culture sharing the characteristics of all three kinds of political cultures: parochial, subject and participant, in which the ordinary men share more the parochial one; the leaders share more the subject one, while both of these two structures of population share some of the participant culture. But it might not be too wrong to say that overall culture of Kwun Tong is a mixed parochial-subject culture.

At this juncture, a word of further clarification is worth mention. We have not in this study examined the demographic variables, such as age, sex, and especially some crucial socio-economic status ones:

education, income and occupation. We have reasons to suspect that the difference of political culture between the ordinary men and the leaders has a great deal to do with two demographic variables: i.e., sex and education, since the majority of the sample of 1,065 of the ordinary people are predominantly female (32.6% are male, 67.4% are female) and of low level of education (31.6% are of no schooling; 45.4% are of primary school level; and 18.5% are of secondary school level; and a small percentage are above post-secondary level.), while the samples of the leaders are predominantly male and of relatively high level of education.²⁴

That education is the most important variable strongly related to political sense of citizen duty and political efficacy has been verified by empirical studies in United States and in Kwun Tong. And the sex variable is also crucial in the sense that men are somewhat more inclined to have a sense of political efficacy than women.²⁵

What we are trying to do in the following pages is to give a plausible factor accounting for the mixed parochial-subject culture of Kwun Tong. We think that the mixed parochial-subject culture of Kwun Tong is, at least partially, the continuation of Chinese political tradition.

The Traditional Chinese Political Culture:

Before talking about the political tradition of China, it is advisedly to say a few words of the political system of Hong Kong. Admittedly, Hong Kong is a typical colonial system of British pattern. However, the British government has in many ways tried to preserve the Chinese arts of administration, the Chinese social organizations and behavior for one reason or another. According to our interviews with local leaders, we are with the impression that the local leaders are praising the British government for their symbolic capability in manipulating Chinese cultural-political symbols and values.²⁶ Behaviorally, both the leaders and the ordinary men are still very much living under

the traditional Chinese cultural-political values, even though there are significant signs of discontinuity of traditional Chinese culture.²⁷

Regarding the political-cultural tradition of Imperial China, we must first of all be minded that there is no one unitary and homogeneous Chinese "great tradition" as such. In fact, the most dominant official ideology of Chinese empire, Confucianism, is, as well known by Sinologists in general, a "Taoist-Legalist-Confucian amalgam." Yet, it is still correct to say that Confucianism was the most persuasive prescriptive system for the Chinese political system in the last two thousand years.²⁸ Under the Confucian political-cultural system, the individuals are persuaded to be oriented toward the Almond-Verba's four political objects as follows:

(A) System Object: Confucianists are not, to begin with, interested in the form of government or system, rather they are more interested in the quality of officials. Indeed, they take the form of absolute monarchy as something for granted. Almost all Chinese thinkers, except those of Legalist school, hold that the moral character of the ruler is the ultimate fact which determine the nature and quality of his government; and in the past, no single philosopher has ever advanced the view that a change in the form or principle of government is vital for good ruling until late in early 20th century by West-educated Dr. Sun Yet-sen. All the reform movements from the above are, ideologically and behaviorally, nothing more than the change of policies and personnel, but not the form of governmental system. Surprisingly or not, even all the violent mass movements from the below are aimed at the change of personnel, rather than the change of form or principle of government. It is perceptively contended by Thomas Meadows that "Of all nations that have attained a certain degree of civilization, the Chinese are the least revolutionary and the most rebellious."²⁹ In brief, the Chinese are not too keen about the system: its form, principle, and nature.

(B) Input Objects: In the ultimate analysis, the Confucian political theory is a bureaucracy-centered moralistic doctrine. The traditional Chinese political system, according to Chien Mu, is one of "trusteeship" in which the emperor and his ministers are jointly vested by the people with the authority to administer the empire.³⁰ And the

bureaucracy have a monopoly of all political functions: input and output functions. It is small wonder that the permanent feature of Chinese society is officialdom. In the eyes of Confucianists, what is the best administration is the best government. And a good administration can be achieved if, and only if, when it is run by the best people: i.e., superior men. Therefore, governing is something left exclusively in the hands of superior men, or the moral and cultural elites, while the people at large are excluded; thus, we have the sayings: "You don't talk politics, if you are not in the (government) position." and "The people can be made to follow it (a policy or decision decreed from above); they cannot be made to understand it." In practice, the goal of the ruling class is to make the people a submissive and subservient subject.³¹ True enough, the great tradition of Confucianism does encourage the superior men to develop an "input orientation" toward the government system in transcending their familistic identity; they are persuaded not only to be exclusively concerned with cultivation of the self, but also be committed to a total cultivation of society. This is a doctrine called "Sageliness within and Kingliness without".³² But, the basic functional requirement of the familistic ethics of Confucianism is such that it has militated against public spirit or the sense of citizen duty.

(C) Output Object: One of the most important themes in Confucianism is the doctrine, primarily debted to Mencius, of "the paramountcy of the people". But the doctrine is a step short of a genuine democratic spirit in the sense that it has never recognized the need of government by the people, although it does emphasize the ideal of government of and for the people.³³ Faithful to this doctrine, the Chinese literati have never failed to pay attention to what the government officials do to the people. Any student of Chinese history cannot be blind to the fact that superior men as well as people at large are, more or less, oriented toward the administrative side of the system. The whole censorial tradition bears witness to it.

(D) The Self as an Active Participant: In spite of the doctrine of either "the paramountcy of the people" or "Sageliness within and Kingliness without", the Chinese social philosophers are silent about all of the people's political rights except that of rebellion.³⁴

The Chinese law is administrative in nature.³⁵ It is concerned with administrative fairness and justice rather than with individual rights, as one student of Chinese law states: "The law was only secondarily interested in defending the rights -- especially the economic rights -- of one individual or group against another individual or group, and not at all in defending such rights against the state."³⁶ Herbert Franke writes: "The concept of 'citizen' as an individual possessing certain inherent or explicit subjective rights, has no roots in Chinese tradition, nor has the legal protection of social minorities."³⁷ The ordinary man has neither a role in national politics nor a voice in community decision-making process. The so-called "village democracy" or autonomy is hardly a reality in its true meaning. What should be mentioned here is that the moral and cultural elites who are either bureaucrats or gentry remain subjects of the Son of Heaven. Fundamentally, the Confucian political culture, as Pye argues, intends to constitute a form of authority.³⁸ Therefore, it is legitimate for us to expect that the individual's orientation toward the self as an active participant in traditional Chinese culture would be absent.

In summing up, the traditional Chinese political culture is intended to orient the individual, be ordinary people or elite, toward the output or administrative side of the political system, and to unquestioningly accept the system as it is. And it is definitely not intended to orient the individual toward the self as an active political role. What makes the difference between the ordinary people and the elite is that it tends to orient the elite toward the input object, and to develop in them a sense of "subject" duty, while it is silent about not only the rights but also the duty of the ordinary men. Thus, the traditional Chinese political culture is a mixed parochial-subject culture, at least at the normative level.

If the above analysis is not totally wrong, we have reason to say that the Kwun Tong's mixed parochial-subject culture is largely a continuation of traditional Chinese political culture. But, as analyzed in the preceding pages, there is a small sector of the population of the ordinary men who have already acquired characteristics of subject culture; and moreover the percentage of the ordinary men

and the leaders have shown an orientation toward the self as an active participant. The trend seems to us is moving from a mixed parochial-subject culture to a mixed subject-participant one. We do see the discontinuity side of cultural change. The influence of Western democratic ideologies on traditional Chinese political culture is not difficult to be detected.

Notes

1. Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice-Hall, 1966), p.10.
2. Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (eds), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p.513.
3. Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 50.
4. Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 1-2.
5. Pye and Verba (eds), op. cit., p. 7.
6. Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 51 ff.
7. F.W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), Chap. 1.
8. This new way of studying politics is first articulated in Almond's "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics" in The Politics of the Developing Areas, eds. by G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman, (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1960), pp. 3-64.
9. Lucy Mair, Primitive Government (Linotype Georgian: Hazell Waston & Viney Ltd., A Pelican Book, 1970), p. 16.
10. Roy C. Macrids and Robert E. Ward (eds), Modern Political Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1963), p. 8.
11. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little Brown Company, 1965) pp. 13 ff.
12. Ambrose Y.C. King and Y.K. Chan, "The Theoretical and Operational Definition of a Community: The Case of Kwun Tong", Social Research Centre, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, July, 1972.
13. Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1963), pp. 56 ff.
14. The frequency with which the ordinary citizens follow accounts of public and governmental affairs in United States; Britain; Germany, Italy and Mexico are shown in the following table.

Following accounts of political and governmental affairs: by nations

Percentage who report they follow accounts	U.S.	U.K.	Germany	Italy	Mexico
Regularly	27	23	34	11	15
From time to time	53	45	38	26	40
Never	19	32	25	62	44
Other and don't know	1	1	3	1	1
Total percentage	100	100	100	100	100
Total number	970	963	955	995	1,007

(From Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1965), p. 54.

15. These figures are compiled from the Annual Report of the Director of Urban Services Department and Chairman of Urban Council for 1969/70 and 1970/71.
16. John Rear, "One Brand of Politics" in Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony ed. by Keith Hopkins, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 111.
17. See Note 14.
18. The percentage of the ordinary men in United States, Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico who reported they felt free to discuss political and governmental affairs with anyone are 29%, 29%, 23%, 22%, and 19% respectively. (Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 83)
19. The results of the Survey Research Ltd., based on a sample of 254 respondents of that particular question were as follows: only 27% of respondents said yes, while 40% refused to answer. Of the remaining 33% who answered no and volunteered supplementary comments, only one respondent indicated some actual experience with the police. The others, presumably basing on 'common knowledge' rather than experience, thought that criticism in a British Colony was illegal, that the police would interfere with one's business establishment, that 'the Government has a right to do anything,' and that Chinese people are afraid of Government officials. The Star (Hong Kong), 12 November, 1966, p.1. quoted and discussed in J. Stephen Hoadley, "'Hong Kong is The Lifeboat': Notes on Political Culture and Socialization." in Journal of Oriental Studies, Vol. 8, (January 1970) No. 1, pp. 206-218.
20. Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren S. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston, Ill.; Row, Peterson, and Company, 1954) p. 194.
21. Ibid., p. 187.
22. Dahl, op. cit., p. 61.

23. Campell et. al., op. cit., pp. 187 ff.
24. Please see table on p. 29.
25. Ibid., pp. 190-1; and Stan Shively, "Political Orientations in Hong Kong -- A Socio-psychological Approach" Social Research Centre, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, May, 1972.
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27. Aliza and Stan Shively, "Value Changes During a Period of Modernization -- The Case of Hong Kong" Social Research Centre, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, May, 1972.
28. S.N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires: The Rise and Fall of the Historical Bureaucratic Societies (N.Y.: The Free Press, paperback ed. 1969) esp. chap. 9.
29. T.T. Meadows, The Chinese and Their Rebellions (1956; reprint, Stanford, Calif., n.d.) p. 25.
30. Chien Mu, Kuo-shih hsin-lun (A New Treatise on Chinese History). (Reprint, Taipei: Commercial Press, 1966), p. 35.
31. Hsiao Kung-chuan, Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century (Seattle, Wash: University of Washington Press, 1967), p.501.
32. Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (N.Y.: The Macmillan Company, 1964), pp. 8-10; Benjamin Schwartz, "Some Polarities in Confucian Thought" in Confucianism in Action, ed. by D.S. Nivison and A.F. Wright (Stanford; Calif: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 50-62.
33. Derk Bodde, "Authority and Law in Ancient China," in Authority and Law in the Ancient Orient, Supplement No. 17 (1954), Journal of the American Oriental Society, pp. 54-55.
34. Liang Chi-chao writes: "People's rights were unknown in the old days in China. The Legalist school emphasizes rights but not people, the Confucian school emphasizes the people but not rights, the followers of Motze and Laotze have no interest in these questions. So on the question of democracy all four schools are equally silent." Liang Chi-chao, History of Chinese Political Thought during the Early Tsin Period, trans. L.T. Chen (N.Y.: 1930), p. 196.
35. A. Hulsewe, Remnants of Han Law, vol. 1 (Leiden, 1955), p. 5.
36. D. Bodde and C. Morris, Law in Imperial China (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967) p. 4.

37. Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tson (eds) China in Crisis, Vol. 1. Book One, China's Heritage and the Communist Political System (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 48.
38. Lucian Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass: The M.I.T. Press 1968), p. 33.

Note 24.

Number and Percentage of Leaders in Kwun Tong by Education

(Percentage in brackets)

Organization Education	CDO	Kaifong	MSB	Religious	Economic	All Organ- izations	All except Econ. Org.
Primary	0	2	0	0 (0.0)	102 (29.5)	104(25.1)	2 (2.9)
Secondary	1	3	1	5 (11.1)	104 (30.1)	114(27.5)	10 (14.5)
Post-Secondary	6	1	2	29 (64.4)	51 (14.7)	106(25.5)	38 (55.1)
University	3	2	3	9 (20.0)			17 (24.6)
Self-educated	0	0	0	1 (2.2)	15 (4.3)	16(3.9)	1 (1.5)
No Response	0	0	0	1 (2.2)	74 (21.4)	75(18.1)	1 (1.5)
Total	10	8	6	45 (99.9)	346 (100)	415(100.1)	69 (100.1)