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FROM TRADITIONAL FAMILISM TO UTILITARIANISTIC FAMILISM: THE METAMORPHOSIS OF FAMILIAL ETHOS AMONG THE HONG KONG CHINESE*

by

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FROM TRADITIONAL FAMILISM TO UTILITARIANISTIC FAMILISM: THE METAMORPHOSIS OF FAMILIAL ETHOS AMONG THE HONG KONG CHINESE

The significance of 'familism' as the fundamental cultural ethos in traditional Chinese society, its conditioning effects on social organization and human behavior, as well its structural determinants, have long been underscored by all observers who are interested in Chinese society.[1] Much academic interest in the past has focussed on the lineage and clan organizations and their functions in the traditional, rural setting, with the general intent to delineate, in an ideal-typical way, the operation of this primary group and its relationship to the larger society.[2] In recent years, there has been increasing realization of the dynamic variability of the Chinese familial organizations and the content of the familistic ethos, resulting largely from studies done on the impact of industrialization, urbanization, and emigration on the Chinese familial system.[3] In a general manner, though far from being complete, Myron L. Cohen has captured the variability and elasticity of the Chinese familial organization, which has been casually treated in the past as being static and change-resistant:

> [T]he property-holding unit known in Chinese as the chia - which has generally been identified as the 'family' - was actually a kin group that could display a great deal of variation in residential arrangement as well as in the economic ties that bound its members together. These variations could appear within the history of a given chia in such a way as to make it equivalent at certain

> times to what is usually regarded as a family, but the *chia* could also exist as a social unit in the absence of a single family-like arrangement of all its members.[4]

In addition to the structural changes - the authority patterns, the inclusiveness of membership, ownership of common property, interpersonal relationships, etc. - which the Chinese family organization has undergone since the last century, changes in the ethos of familism have also taken place. The ethos of familism would include normative orientations toward the family as a collective entity, affective-cognitive identification with the family, an individual's obligations and responsibilities toward the family and the other members in it, the definition of the relationship between the family and the larger socio-political context,and the ideal structuration of the relationships among family members. Up to the present moment, no comprehensive treatment or intensive case analysis of the changing ethos of familism in the Chinese society have been reported in the literature, though cursory reflections on it are scattered among nearly all serious works on the Chinese family. As the ethos of familism constitutes a major component of the cultural codes of a society which underlies the operation of its social institutions and the patterning of human behavior, the general absence of attention to this area is deplorable.

The primary goal of this paper is to depict in a more or less ideal-typical manner the content of familism in the Chinese society of Hong Kong, which is a tiny British colony located at the southeastern corner of Communist China, and having an economy which has been prospering miraculously since the Second World War. To this type of familism, the descriptive qualifier of 'utilitarianistic' will be attached. Along several major dimensions, utilitarianistic familism will be compared with traditional familism. Structural factors which are instrumental to the emergence of utilitarianistic familism will be discussed, such factors would include structural changes in the Chinese family in the colony in the last several decades. The thesis of the whole study, briefly put here, is that in a society undergoing dramatic social change, the inability of that society to generate a relatively high level of socio-cultural and political integration, together with the low capacity of public institutions and organizations to cater to the needs of a majority of the people, would foster the emergence of the ethos of utilitarianistic familism or other similar versions of it. The emergence of utilitarianistic familism in Hong Kong signifies, in turn, the elasticity of the Chinese family as a principle of human organization, meaning that the interrelationship among the constituent organizational components of such an ascriptive-particularistic group can be transformed and their relative weightiness modified. This process of metamorphosis is largely guided by changes in the larger social environment and proceeds in the direction of maximizing the amount of resources that can be controlled and manipulated by the group and by the individuals in it. Though this metamorphosis is not forged by any explicit consciousness among the Hong Kong Chinese, the whole process can still be objectively interpreted as being rational in nature.

In the elaboration of the main themes in the paper, we would rely heavily on the data collected in a questionnaire survey of 550 respondents in Hong Kong in 1976-77.[5] Research findings on various aspects of the Hong Kong society, particularly those concerned with the Chinese family, will be incorporated along the process. Though, compared to other areas, family studies in Hong Kong are relatively advanced, still our research can only be considered to be exploratory in nature as the available information on the Chinese family in Hong Kong is still far from adequate.

The Content of Utilitarianistic Familism

The concept of utilitarianistic familism is a theoretical construct. It is derived from a process of abstraction through which a relatively coherent set of normative and behavioral tendencies is derived from a melange of normative and behavioral traits of the majority of the Chinese people living in Hong Kong. As a matter of fact, utilitarianistic familism can be considered as the dominant cultural codes in that society. In essence, utilitarianistic familism can be defined as a normative and behavioral tendency of an individual Chinese to place his familial interests above the interests of society as well as its constituent individuals and groups, and to structure his relationships with other individuals and groups in such a fashion that the furtherance of his familial interests is the primary consideration. Moreover, among the familial interests, materialistic interests takes priority over all other non-materialistic interests. Within the family itself, utilitarianistic considerations also looms fairly large, especially with regard to those family members who occupy the peripheral positions in the group and hence whose affectual-ritual linkage with the core members is less close. These utilitarianistic considerations within the family manifest themselves usually in the emphasis on economic interdependence among the family members, and the criteria used in 'recruiting' peripheral members (those related by distant blood ties or by no blood ties) into the family. In fact, the possession of a certain amount of liberty in the selection of these peripheral members not only means that utilitarianistic considerations are allowed to enter into the process, but also that the Chinese family in Hong Kong is rather fluid in size, as peripheral members, and occasionally core members, can be inducted into as well as barred from membership in the family. Furthermore, achievement criteria can also be used in the selection of new members, thus lessening the ascriptive-particularistic character of the Chinese family in Hong Kong.[6] Closely connected to this phenomenon is the fact that, along the process, the concept of family has picked up new meanings so as to allow it to be used in a more elastic and flexible manner by the Hong Kong Chinese to organize their own solidary groups in order to use them to enable them to cope with what in their eyes the far from benign social environment.

(1) Primacy of familial interests Our survey data demonstrate unmistakenly that the family is the major reference group with which most of our respondents identify with. Even though 51.1% of the respondents have given the evasive and non-committal answer by rating both society and family as of equal importance, it is clear that a much larger proportion of them would still prefer the family in

comparison with those who have picked society (34.5% as compared to 13.5%). A large number of the respondents would not even consider it worthwhile to contribute to social services in their spare time. Not only is the family of overwhelming significance to the middle-aged and elderly, it is the norm also for the young adults in Hong Kong, as seen in the studies by Stoodley,[7] and by Chaney and Podmore.[8] This primacy of familial interests reflects a continuation of the traditional Chinese familial ethos, and, as Stoodley has observed, traditional elements like ancestor worship and filial piety still play a key, though muted, role in serving as the cross-generational symbol of family solidarity, family identity and family morale.[9]

(2) Social-political context as the arena for the pursuit of familial interests Closely related to the primacy of the familial interests is the conception of the social-political environment of Hong Kong as a setting wherein one and one's family will strenuously pursue their best interests. Passive adaptation to the existing institutional structure is the norm, and active intervention in society with the purpose of transforming the social order is frowned upon, particularly if it leads to the disruption of social stability.[10] Conflicts or trouble with outsiders are to be avoided as far as possible, even if it might spell some losses for the family.[11] The government is perceived as primarily the guarantor of political and social stability so that an appropriate environment can be created for familial operations.[12] Familial and individual failures and difficulties are usually explained away in non-social and non-political terms, and are usually attributed to inadequate individual and familial

strivings or to the lack of luck, and the hope for future improvement is laid largely on one and one's family's efforts as well as on a change of fortune.[13] All these phenomena tend to point to a general prevalence of social and political powerlessness and alienation among the Hong Kong Chinese, which further reinforces the primacy of the family and the adoption of a suspicious and somewhat hostile attitude toward society and the government.

(3) Utilitarianistic considerations in the structuration of intra-familial relationships In a general sense, the family of the Hong Kong Chinese is an affectivity-charged social unit, as is true of the family both in China and in other societies. Nevertheless, utilitarianistic considerations have assumed enormous importance in the relationships among family members. These considerations usually lead to undue emphasis on the norm of mutual assistance among familial members. Though services and help can be extended to those members who cannot reciprocate, in many cases this will be considered as a long-term investment with the hope that it will pay off in the future. Of course we would not preclude helping behavior with no ulterior motives, what we have said above is merely to pinpoint the significance of service exchange among members of the Hong Kong Chinese family, especially exchanges in economic goods. As Robert E. Mitchell has described:

> [T]he Chinese in general and the Hong Kong population in particular tend to have the lowest levels of social involvement with kin, but these populations have the highest level of economic interchange among kinsmen.[14]

Mitchell's data also show that many adults in Hong Kong see relatively little of their parents who live elsewhere in the colony. 26% of the men and 36% of the women who do not live with their parents say they visit them less than once a month or that they never visit them. 35% of the men and 32% of the women visit their parents once or more a week. However, at the same time, 65% of the married men who have a parent still living give money to their parents, and 44% of the comparable female population also give money to their parents.[15]

The rendering of financial assistance to one's fellow family members is also reported in the middle-class Chinese families. In the middle-class families of Mei Foo Sun Chuen, a middle-class neighborhood, there are almost equal amounts of reciprocal aid and financial aid. In the words of Sherry Rosen, the investigator of that project, "It is no accident that there seems to be no loan companies in Hong Kong, for financial aid isstill an important part of family interaction. This help may take the form of ongoing participation in rent or mortgage payments, or it may come as regular monthly subsidies to old, inferior, or otherwise needy relatives."[16]

The norm of economic obligations to one's family members is also shared by the young adults in Hong Kong. The answers given by the young adults to two of the questions in the survey of Chaney and Podmore are of direct relevance here. To the question of "Do you think a man should help his brother with a loan, even if this deprives him and his family of something for which they have been saving for a long time?", the percentages of the respondents answering 'should', 'don't know', and 'should not' are 81.5%, 8.7% and 9.8% respectively.

Similarly, to the question of "Suppose your parents asked you for a loan to pay for something that was important to them, but you needed the money to pay the school fees for your children. What would you do?", the answers of 'lend', 'don't know' and 'not lend' are given by 79.9%, 12.4% and 7.7% of the respondents respectively.[17] In spite of the fact that in many ways the young adults in Hong Kong differ from their elders in their perception of family norms, the norm of economic obligation seems to be deeply internalized.[18]

Another piece of evidence bearing on the crucial significance of economic interchange in the integration of the Hong Kong family is provided by the study of Lawrence Hong. In his sample of families, Hong has found a widespread practice of familial ownership of property. In fact, it is practised by a majority of the Hong Kong Chinese families.[19] Moreover, economic cooperation within the family, particularly in the form of pooling of financial resources, is also popular. As this occurs in all socio-economic strata, it is "not necessarily a consequence of economic necessities, but it can also be a manifestation of the cultural values."[20]

Even local leaders in Hong Kong, who are relatively well-off, are not exceptional in their stress on mutual economic obligations among family members. On the significance of filial piety, the attitudes of the local leaders in an industrial community of Hong Kong as depicted by Graham Johnson are:

> Only 11 leaders (12 per cent) said their children had no responsibilities to parents and only 16 (18 per cent) said their children had no responsibilities to grandparents. . . .

> Financial contributions to elderly parents are . . . perceived as an extremely important obligation of children (specifically sons) as are rather more common cultural sanctions such as obedience and respect.[21]

That mutual economic obligations play an enormously important role in the structuration of the relationships among family members, even to the point of de-emphasizing the non-economic aspects, is also corroborated by our own survey data. Less than half of our respondents have maintained close interactions with their family members, and the intensity of contact with close relatives and distant relatives is extremely low. On the other hand, 60.5% of the respondents indicate that they have in the past received financial and other forms of assistance from their family members, while 73.3% of them say they had contributed financial and other help to their family members in the past. However, financial assistance received from and given to close and distant relatives are minimal, thus attesting to the dwindling role such people are playing in the family organization of Hong Kong.

The de-emphasis on the non-economic aspects of interpersonal relationships among family members can be illustrated again in the answers given by the respondents to a question which asks them whether they would support their family members if they were embroiled in trouble with others. Only 16% of them would definitely render support to their fellow family members, 70.9% are hesitant and 11.6% of them refuse to grant any support to them. Except for the economic ties, emotional attachment to other family members are rather tenuous among the Hong Kong Chinese.

(4) Non-significance of the social status of the family The reinforcement of economic ties among family members at the expense of social, emotional and ritual ties leads to another theme in utilitarianistic familism -- the insignificance of the family as a social status group. Put differently, the promotion of the social status of the family is no longer perceived as of much value, and the enhancement of family pride ceases to be a major motivation of an individual behavior. When we ask our respondents whether they feel any obligation to elevate the status of their families, a substantial proportion of them (47.8%) takes the rather uninvolved stance of 'having some responsibility', and 30.5% of them eschew all obligations whatsoever. Not only is familial prestige as a whole not significant to our respondents, it happens that prestige earned by someone else in the family also does not seem to transmit any sense of pride to them. When asked whether they would feel proud because of the achievements by other family members, 63.1% of them claim that they would not have such feelings. These findings not only reflect the low level of emotional solidarity in the Chinese family in Hong Kong, it also signifies the insignificance of the family as a collective symbolic entity with which one more or less totally identifies. Furthermore, the devaluation of symbolic rewards coming from society again testifies to the social and cultural alienation of the Chinese people in Hong Kong.

(5) Utilitarianistic recruitment of family members and the fuzziness of the family boundary Undue emphasis on the utilitarianistic relationships among family members means that the recruitment of new

members into a family and the exclusion of other qualified (by blood) individuals from participating in the family are very much facilitated. As a matter of fact, the concept of family in Hong Kong has a rather flexible meaning. In addition to being used to call an exclusive group of individuals whose relationships to each other are strictly defined and whose membership are fixed according to rigid ascriptive criteria which seldom allow for the inclusion of outsiders or the exclusion of insiders, the term family can also be employed to designate, at the other extreme, a group of individuals who are closely related and who have mutual obligations to each other. In Chinese society, where pan-familistic feelings are pervasive, many non-ascriptive relationships are prone to be couched in familistic terms. In the case of Hong Kong, the typical family unit is one consisting of a core group of persons immediately related by blood, plus a selected group of relatives and kinsmen, and a number of persons who have no blood relationships to the others whatsoever but who are nevertheless recruited into the family unit on utilitarianistic grounds. Because of this flexibility of membership, the size of the family units can vary quite a lot, depending on the availability of resources and the successfulness of the family members in family expansion.

The operational family units and their sizes are only poorly reflected in the spatial distribution of their members. The shortage of housing and the smallness of the housing units in Hong Kong inevitably would lead to a spatial dispersion of the members of the family units. The physical structure of the Hong Kong family, according to Fai-ming Wong, has been changing toward the nuclear form with increasing industrialization of the colony:

> {T}he local family structure has been in a fluctuating situation throughout the history of Hong Kong. It swings from one form to another as dictated by the phase of industrialization in which it exists, and is seen to have gone through three stages of development. First, it started as a temporary, broken extended family when the economy of the Colony was predominantly of a trading and commercial nature. It was formed mainly by the Chinese immigrants who came to the city for short-term economic purposes and returned to their native home in Mainland China when these purposes had been accomplished. Then it switched over to a settled stem family with a single-trunk, three-generational patrilineal unit when early industrialization began to take place and pave the way for the emergence of an industrial economy ....Finally, as the Colony has entered into the phase of more advanced industrialization since the 1960's, it has been shifting toward a small nuclear unit which is composed typically of parents and their dependent children. The structure of this family unit is basically paternalistic, bilineal, neolocal, and with limited interference from the kinsmen, and is believed to be more suitable for the modern industrial society.[22]

Similarly, the 1976 by-census of Hong Kong has found that 60.2% of the Hong Kong households were of the nuclear type.[23] Nevertheless, the physical structure of the Hong Kong Chinese families is not much informative about their socio-cultural functioning and their effective size. As pointed out by Mitchell, "the fact that Chinese did not have a high proportion of large multiple-family residential units with joint or stem families is not especially significant because the residential unit is not the key to family strength and the services family members provide each other."[24] Even as spatial considerations "are still relevant to an understanding of trends in kinship networks. But this general issue must be reconceptualized to refer to the access that family members are to one another."[25] The compactness of the geographical area of Hong Kong means that, however dispersed the family members are, ties with other family members can still be maintained if one chooses to. In Hong Kong, an element of utilitarianistic rationality is deliberately adopted in the construction of a family unit, particularly with regard to individuals not belonging to the elemental family. In the process of recruitment of members into a family unit, several characteristics are noticeable. First, among individuals related to Ego by blood, there seems to be a clear choice of his intimate kin (parents, spouse, children). The percentages of our respondents who consider the appropriate relationships with their parents, spouses, children, and siblings to be 'very intimate' are 73.1%, 76.5%, 75.3% and 59.5% respectively. Contrariwise, close relatives and distant relatives are considered as 'very intimate' only by 12.9% and 3.1% respectively of the respondents. As a result, Ego's close and distant relatives are not automatic members of Ego's family unit, and, in order to be so, they have to be selected by Ego. Second, the concept of agnate is widened to include a far more heterogeneous range of people. Such people may be individuals bearing the same surname as Ego or individuals coming from the same territories and speaking the same dialect of Ego. Third, in addition to consanguineal ties, affinal ties are also invoked to enlist new members into a family unit. In fact, for many Hong Kong Chinese, assistance and service from one's affinal relatives are of crucial importance, and these affinal relatives are usually the most intimate ones. Close attachments to one's affinal relatives not only are significant to people of the working class, they are also of importance to middle-class Chinese. As Rosen, who has studied a middle-class neighborhood in Hong Kong, points out:

> In Hong Kong, as with residential patterns, the most glaring adaptation of the traditional kin network in patterns of socialization is the trend toward bilaterality. In almost every case where the wife had parents and/or siblings living in Greater Hong Kong, there was a good deal of visiting back and forth. This held true even when the husband's parents were living with the young couple (though the two sets of parents rarely met socially.)[26]

In addition, Rosen has noticed "an increased flexibility in patterns of residence, an increased sense of choice in association with extended-family members and concomitant relaxation of the patrilineal norm, and an increased likelihood of widespread geographical dispersal that threatens to cut family ties on a near-permanent basis."[27]

Fourth, individuals not related to Ego by blood relationships can also be treated as family members. In a general sense, these people can be considered as the friends of Ego and other members in his elemental family. However, kinship terminology in Hong Kong is flexible enough to even, sometimes, couch these friendship relationships in its terms. To further reinforce these relationships, sworn brotherhoods and sisterhoods can also be constructed to have these relationships formalized. Adoption is also a widely used strategy to co-opt friends into the family circle, though more commonly the strategy is used to cement the relationships between friends through unilateral or mutual adoptions of each other's children. How widely spread is the practice of adoption in urban Hong Kong is difficult to assess, though folk impressions are that it is fairly frequent among people in all socio-economic strata. A study in the market town of Yuen Long, which has been undergoing rapid socio-economic changes, may give a rough measure on this area, though the figures there might be somewhat higher than the average in Hong Kong as a whole.

> The abundant presence of [fictive kinship] ties is reflected in the fact that 27 per cent of 460 surveyed middle school students (medium age 17) in the Yuen Long district report having at least one fictive kinsmen.[28]

Among the friends most prone to be recruited into the family, neighbors and workmates who can offer economic and other assistance to Ego and his elemental family figure most prominently. The importance of friends as potential family members can be gauged by the fact that a higher percentage of our respondents consider that close friends, in general, should be very intimate to them than are those who pick close relatives and distant relatives (15.8% as compared to 12.9% and 3.1% respectively).

The salience of utilitarianistic considerations with regard to the selection of friends can be illustrated by our respondents' answers to the question 'If there is a person whose personality is deficient in many ways, yet who can solve problems for you and for your family. Would you still keep him as a friend?' 38.9% of the respondents say that they would still do so, 37.5% are more or less undecided, while only 22.0% of them are definite in declaring that they would not keep him as a friend.

The exercise of selectivity with regard to the kinsmen one would like to interact with and feel close to, the discretionary inclusion of outsiders into one's family through the deliberate articulation of kinship terminology in a loose and vague manner, are contingent upon, in a large extent, utilitarianistic considerations which are in turn dependent on the social environment of the family. As this changes, the boundary of the family will also change, and hence the composition of the family will forever be in a fluid and fuzzy condition. Nonetheless, as the anchoring point in the family unit is the elemental family, which comprises Ego and his immediate kinsmen, social order in the Chinese society of Hong Kong can still be maintained, even though the boundaries of these family units overlap to a certain extent and are changing with time.

(6) Dilution of authority relationships and the growth of egalitarianism The low level of normative integration in the Hong Kong Chinese family, the emphasis on individual social status rather than on collective family honor and prestige, and the injection of the achievement criterion into the process of membership recruitment, are correlated with another element in utilitarianistic familism, i.e., interpersonal

relationships in the family should be more egalitarianistic than in the past. Of course this does not mean that there should not be any hierarchy of authority in the family, but that at least among the adult members, patriarchalism and commandism should not be the regulators of their relationships. Even adolescents in the family are expected to participate in the decision-making process in the family, especially with regard to those matters that might affect them.[29] However, this does not mean that the Hong Kong Chinese family is a democratic social group. As a matter of fact, compared to other Western countries, the families in Hong Kong are still very authoritarian in tone, and parental authority is still in vogue here, though its intensity has diminished, particularly in relation to the peripheral members who are not related by blood to the elemental family members.

Under utilitarianistic familism, society is conceived as a conglomeration of autonomous, and competing family units. Each family unit is to maximize the amount of resources under its possession. Within the family unit itself, solidarity is low and utilitarianistic ties function to hold the membership together. The major goal of the family unit as a collective entity is seen to be the promotion of the economic well-being of the members individually rather than the attainment of social status for the family as a whole. This instrumental attitude toward both the family unit as well as one's fellow family members constitutes one of the major features of the Hong Kong society.

Utilitarianistic familism and traditional familism

Utilitarianistic familism differs from the kind of familism which is characteristic of traditional China. Traditional familism is, ideally speaking, based on a family system which is multi-functional, more or less self-sufficient, hierarchically structured, and complexly organized. On the other hand, in terms of physical structure, the residential patterns as evidenced in the Hong Kong Chinese families do not differ drastically from those in traditional China. Lawrence Hong, after comparing the structure of the Hong Kong families with those in China as reported in a number of Chinese community studies in the last several decades, arrives at the conclusion that they are to a large extent similar.[30] Therefore, it is primarily Chinese familism, or the ethos with respect to the family, which has undergone a large measure of change in Hong Kong, again attesting to the relative insignificance of the physical structure of the Chinese family to the understanding of the familial behavior and ideals of the Chinese people.

Traditional familism is built upon the code of family reputation, with which all family members are to identify with, and its preservation and promotion constitutes the primary duty of all the family members. The primacy of familial interests in traditional familism is analogous to that in utilitarianistic familism. They differ, however, in the ideal conception of the relationship between the family and society. In the case of utilitarianistic familism, there is a disjunctive view of familial and social interests, which means that these two interests are more or less compartmentalized and that they are not arranged in a continuum of priority toward which one's duties and responsibility lies. As a consequence, in utilitarianistic familism, responsibilities toward society are not emphasized and one's obligations begin and end with only the family. In traditional familism, on the other hand, continuity between society and family is conceived, and there is a gradation of duties and responsibilities with respect to the family and society, in that order. The dominant value pattern in traditional China envisions an organic linkage between family and society and assumes that personal integrity and moral life in the family are sufficient conditions for a well-ordered community and a well-governed nation. A person in traditional China, after he has fulfilled his obligations to his family, is expected to upgrade and cultivate himself by going on to serve society, preferably by entering the governmental bureaucracy and, less desirably, by becoming teachers and instructors. Societal interests are not to be ignored.[31]

Closely connected with the conception of continuity between family and society in traditional familism is the endemic striving for social status for the family. Though there is also an explicit stream of political alienation and powerlessness in traditional familism, and different families are seen to be in a constant competition for scarce resources, socio-cultural rewards and symbols obtained from society are highly regarded. An utilitarianistic attitude toward other social groups and society as a whole can unmistakenly be found in traditional familism, as one of the criteria of social status is the amount of land owned by a family. Changes in landholdings may mean either prosperity for the family or its extinction. Nevertheless, unlike utilitarianistic familism, status rewards for the family coming from society are heatedly sought after, and it is stipulated that all family members are required to do their best to elevate and uphold family honor. In traditional China, for a family to achieve social reputation, five ways can be cited: (1) having members in ranking official positions, (2) passing academic examinations, (3) wealth, but wealth alone cannot build up family fame; a family may be known as a wealthy one, but not necessarily as one worthy of respect. Two additional factors are needed: first, some distinctive and gracious features which set it apart from its neighbors: and second, a certain degree of socialization which makes it a topic of discussion, (4) conspicuous virtue, e.g., an unusually filial son or an especially good daughter-in-law, and (5) a family known as a good neighbor.[32]

The obsession with family reputation in traditional familism presupposes a high level of socio-cultural integration with society on the part of the family as well as a family organization characterized by a high level of normative and structural solidarity. The heavy emphasis on the instrumental relationships among family members can in no way foster intense familial solidarity. Rituals and belief-systems, which play such an outstanding part in familial integration, are no longer the essential components of utilitarianistic familism. The ancestral cult is a case in point. The whole series of sacrificial rites associated with the cult "helped to perpetuate the memory of the traditions and historical sentiments of the group, sustain its moral beliefs, and revivify group consciousness. Through rites and the presence of the group in its full numerical strength, the [family] periodically renewed its sentiment of pride, loyalty, and unity."[33] Ancestral cult in utilitarianistic familism constitutes but a minor, residual constituent, and can in no way serve the function of normative integration of the family.

Emphasis on normative-affective solidarity in traditional familism precludes any primacy laid on utilitarian considerations in the structuration of relationships among family members. Economic cooperation, common ownership of property and mutual assistance in the family are also emphasized in traditional familism, and may be even to a larger extent, than in utilitarianistic familism, but interpersonal relationships in the family are never conceived to be solely instrumental. Morality and proper conduct toward specific kinsmen are deliberately cultivated in the family, and secondary institutions are developed to promote them. Ritualistic honors such as commendation at the ancestral rites, placing posthumous tablets in the ancestral hall, and recording exemplary behavior in the genealogy are some of the ways whereby moral behavior is rewarded, and it is also amply extolled by society, attesting again to the continuity between family and society in traditional familism. None of these conditions seem to hold prominently in utilitarianistic familism.

Socio-cultural solidarity in the traditional Chinese family depends to a very large extent on the relative stability of the boundary of the family group and the exclusiveness of its membership. Though there are several levels in family organization in traditional China, ranging from the elemental family, through the extended family and the lineage, to the clan, membership is still defined by the highly fixed criteria such as blood and genealogical relationships. Participation in the family is nearly total, as compared with the segmentary nature of partisanship in an utilitarianistic family (especially in the cases of the peripheral members). Participation is more or less permanent for the members, in contrast to the transient participation by a section of the membership in the utilitarianistic family. In short, traditional familism is built upon a territorially compact and persisting exclusive group with a corporate personality, which is not artificially constructed to serve some limited purposes. On the other hand, utilitarianistic familism is based on a family unit which exists in relation to an elemental family taken as a reference point and is deliberately constructed to serve some utilitarian purposes. In traditional familism, an individual belongs to the family; in utilitarianistic familism, the family belongs to the individual and his intimate group of kinsmen.

Multi-bondedness among family members in traditional familism and more-or-less mono-bondedness among family members in utilitarianistic familism are also vividly reflected in the authoritarianism in the traditional family as compared to the egalitarianism in the utilitarian family. Concentration of authority and power in the lineage and clan is a well-known phenomenon, which is in turn based on genealogical ordering, power (economic or political) and sex differentials among the family members. Authority exercised by family heads is more or less total, and it can take on quasi-legal judiciary power, while at the same time buttressed by the ancestral cult and a battery of punishment devices. Each family member is governed by a set of prescribed norms of behavior which varies according to his status and role in the family and which is further reinforced by the proper performance of rituals. From these status-ethics and ritual-ethics, there is no easy escape. Moreover, familial authority is legitimized and supported by societal and political authority, making it even more potent. From these, utilitarianistic familism are different, and the failure of societal and political authority to lend reinforcement to familial authority is congruent with the discontinuous view of family-society relationship in utilitarianistic familism.

Structural Conduciveness to Utilitarianistic Familism in Hong Kong

Convergence of a number of factors in the historical-structural context of Hong Kong is instrumental in fostering the metamorphosis from traditional familism to utilitarianistic familism among the Hong Kong Chinese. Inasmuch as traditional familism has already been undermined in China prior to the Second World War as a result of socio-economic changes and contact with the West,[34] the transition from it to utilitarianistic familism is not as drastic as it would seem to be, particularly in view of the fact that utilitarianistic familism does not exist in a pure form in Hong Kong. Traces of traditional familism are still to be found in the familial ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese, signifying not only differential rates of change in the components of traditional familism, but also that an evolutionary conception of the process which envisages the ultimate displacement or total elimination of traditional familism would be dangerously misleading. In fact, both traditional familism and utilitarianistic familism share a host of similarities, and the differences so far detected reflect divergences in emphasis and salience. In general, the metamorphosis from traditional familism to utilitarianistic familism involves the selective retention and extinction of traditional elements (e.g., the retention of the primacy of the family and the economic interdependencies among family members, the extinction of affectual ties with a majority of the kinsmen), the incorporation of new elements (e.g., extensive inclusion of new family members through achievement channels and the stretch of the meaning-content of the term 'family' to create new groups), and the rearrangement of the order of priority between these elements (e.g., the underplaying of the importance of family honor and status in comparison with economic well-being, and the almost exclusive attention to the economic relationships among family members as compared with other ritual-ethical ties.) Structural transformations in the society of Hong Kong, structural adaptations experienced by the Chinese immigrants from China as well as their outlook on life, and inadequacies in the institutional structure of the colony have indubitably contributed to the metamorphosis process, but it can perhaps also be surmised that once the emotionally-laden and change-resistant traditional familism has been eroded by the structural factors which have made their inexorable impact, rational calculations among the Chinese would add momentum to it. As the whole process is not pre-planned both in content and in timing, it does not fail in creating an uneasy coexistence among the various elements in the familial ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese, such uneasiness being explicitly realized in the orientational conflicts between individuals in various generational, educational and socio-economic categories who have internalized the elements of both traditional familism and utilitarianistic familism differentially, both in extent and in intensity.

Three structural conditions are of utmost importance in generating utilitarianistic familism among the Hong Kong Chinese, and these conditions are so closely interrelated that together they constitute a valid characterization of the society of Hong Kong and account for a wide spectrum of specific social phenomena and individual behavior in the colony.

(1) Chinese immigration and the orientations of the immigrants Ever since Hong Kong was ceded to the British in 1842, it has been a society populated predominantly by immigrants, more than half of whom are, especially in recent times, refugees from China. Before the Communist takeover of China in 1949, the inflow of immigrants to Hong Kong took the sporadic, ebb-and-flow form, and was largely instigated by the incidents that happened in China.[35] Most of the immigrants had borne no intention to stay permanently in the colony, and they would return home whenever political turmoil was over or when they had accumulated enough wealth to enable them to enjoy at least a decent livelihood back home, though this was no longer true for the refugees fleeing from the civil war and Communism since the end of World War II.[36]

As the largest influx of refugees into Hong Kong is that which took place in the period of 1945-50, their normative orientations and organizational experiences in Hong Kong are most pertinent to the explanation of the genesis of utilitarianistic familism. Like most Chinese immigrants in the history of Hong Kong, many of these refugees came to Hong Kong in pursuit of wealth, or at least to improve their standard of living. In describing earlier Chinese immigration, James Hayes has made the following comment:

> The pursuit of wealth has long been a common goal in Hong Kong. It has drawn generations of businessmen from the West and from China alike. The Colony has always afforded an outlet for talent for which Kwangtung is famous. For centuries its inhabitants have been described (by other Chinese) as lovers of money, subordinating all else in its pursuit.[37]

The predominance of economic motives among the refugees is accompanied by an intense aversion to politics, particularly among those who were former government officials in the mainland or who were related, in one way or another, to the overthrown Nationalist regime.[38] In a broad sense, the immigrants and refugees coming to Hong Kong came by self-selection and were prone to be apolitical. The colonial political structure in Hong Kong further reinforces this apoliticalness through the foreclosure of political careers for practically all Chinese immigrants who happened to have the aspiration. As a consequence, economic motivation looms large in Hong Kong, and it is in turn buttressed by the post-War economic boom in the colony.

The undue emphasis on economic utilitarianism and the de-emphasis on symbolic rewards from society, and family prestige and status, is facilitated by the organizational characteristics of the Chinese immigrants themselves. For those immigrants, who constitute the minority, coming from the urban-industrial centres of China, notably Shanghai, previous experiences have accustomed them to fierce economic competition with each other in order to promote their familial interests. The majority of the immigrants are from the province of Kwangtung, or more specifically, from that part of Kwangtung which is called the Pearl River delta, where commercialization, invasion of foreign goods, high level of agricultural tenancy, rural poverty, population pressure, banditry and social instability were the order in the last century or so. Competition in the struggle for survival has been keen and relentless, and the Cantonese immigrants have carried with them habits appropriate to that struggle. Once in Hong Kong, they are cut off from the moral ties with their home communities and hence are exempt from their moral sanction. Chinese immigrants into Hong ong are hence less bound to the preservation and elevation of family honor and reputation; and, as their home communities are also in the midst of drastic social transformation, which has cast the criteria of family prestige into doubt, concern for family status in Hong Kong amongst a people whom they do not care or respect would seem to be too farfetched and impractical. Chinese immigrants feel a minimum of obligations to each other and to the Hong Kong society as a whole, hence espousing high levels of political and social estrangement. utilitarianistic considerations are adopted to structure interpersonal relationships, and the sole purpose is to advance the economic prosperity of their own families.

Chinese immigration into Hong Kong in the period 1945-50 took place yet in an extraordinary form which had long-range effects on intrafamilial relationships, as compared to the pre-1945 immigrations. Pre-World War II family emigrations to Hong Kong were well-planned and well-coordinated: "first the able-bodied young men, followed by their younger siblings who could learn a trade early, help out in the business. The dependents would come later and make their stay permanent."[39] This type of mobility would not strain family relationships too much and would leave the original ideal of kinship ties intact. Family emigration after 1945 "was not well planned and it usually involved drastic interruptions of family relationships because of continuous and morally damaging uprootedness necessitated by events and dictated by risks of personal security."[40] This disorderly process of family mobility has resulted in an attenuated, fragmentary, and dispersed kinship structure, which makes the application of precise and rigorous kinship terminology to regulate interpersonal relationships impossible. It is also in a weakened position to enforce strict conformity to kinship obligations upon its members. The diminution of the patrilineal emphasis, the exercise of selectivity in the choice of kinsmen as interacting partners, and the recruitment of non-relatives into the family through the application of vague kinship labels are thus possible.

(2) Institutional Inadequacy and the need for interdependence among family members As Hong Kong is a colonial society with a laissez-faire economic philosophy, its institutional structure is geared primarily to the maintenance of law and order and to the fabrication of an environment appropriate for economic activities, especially those of the capitalists, both foreign and Chinese. These factors, together with the fact that Hong Kong is dependent on foreign markets for its exports, mean that economic insecurity, both objective and subjective, is a built-in

aspect of the colony, and it is not alleviated by any institutional structure which would promise support and assistance in times of need.

It is not surprising to find that for most of the Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong, public institutions are not of much help to tide them over the crisis of economic survival. In such an institutional vacuum the Chinese family system has to play a prominent role in the accommodation of the new immigrants. The viability of the family system can be clearly seen in the absorption of the great influx of refugees pouring into Hong Kong since 1945. A. Doak Barnett has coined the term 'social osmosis' to describe the process whereby the refugees, as individuals, families or small groups, are maintained in Hong Kong, largely through the efforts of the family system.[41] In the words of Barnett;

> It would be difficult to estimate how many unemployed or partially employed refugee relatives and friends are supported by the well-to-do members of this one web of relationships, but the number is obviously large. The assistance given is in the form both of cash handouts and jobs, and often it is difficult to draw a clear line differentiating the two. The result is that a large number of persons who in other types of societies would probably become public charges are absorbed into the community with a minimum of strain visible to the outsiders.[42]

As a result of this process of 'social osmosis', the influx of refugees in Hong Kong has resulted in a minimum of social disorder. Moreover, the need for mutual help among family members, particularly economic assistance, tends to accentuate the utilitarianistic relationships among them. And, as the available amount of resources is in most cases insufficient to enable all kinsmen to have a share in it, and as it is the natural tendency of each family unit to expand its resource base through the enlisting of new members, the selective inclusion of kinsmen into the family group and the manipulation of kinship terminology to cover non-relatives are the results.

Institutional inadequacy is still the rule in Hong Kong today, though things have changed somewhat as institutions have been set up and resources allocated by both the government and other public bodies (particularly voluntary associations) to deal with problems created by industrialization and urbanization. However, the dearth of old-age pensions and assistance, unemployment insurance, public financial aid, as well as other essential social welfare services, together with the undersupply of other social facilities running the gamut from employment service to child nurseries, all serve to contribute to the continual viability of utilitarianistic familism and the functions it can serve for the Hong Kong Chinese, particularly for those whose resource base is limited.

(3) Socio-economic development and the erosion of the basis of traditional familism Traditional familism with its ideal structural manifestation in the lineage and clan system finds its most appropriate socio-economic environment in Southeastern China, from where most of the Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong are originated. Therefore, from the start, the Hong Kong Chinese are more familistic than the average Chinese in China, and that explains a lot of the persistent ethos of familism among the Hong Kong Chinese. On the other hand, however, the major bases for the proliferation of traditional familism in Southeastern China are no longer there in Hong Kong because of its urban-industrial

nature and the rapid socio-economic changes it has undergone in the past several decades. The survival of the lineage or the clan, and hence traditional familism, requires that it possesses a certain amount of economic surplus (primarily land) which enables it to exist as a corporate entity by the performance of certain corporate functions (defense, welfare provisions for its members, rewards for illustrious members, etc.) The almost total dependence on the lineage or clan on the part of its members places them under the social and political control of an authority hierarchy which is based mainly on the genealogical order and occasionally on economic and political power. As the majority of the lineage or clan members are geographically concentrated, lineage or clan solidarity can be maintained through both cooperations and interactions in various forms and common identification with the larger social entity, and it is further reinforced through its relationships (usually marked by avoidance, hostility, and exploitation, and occasionally friendliness and alliance) with other lineages and clans. To minimize internal conflicts, an elaborate system of kinship terminology and obligations is designed to structure interpersonal relationships, which prescribes individual behavior specifically in accordance of his status-ritual status.

Socio-economic development in Hong Kong as well as its urban-industrial setting has removed almost all the bases of the lineage or clan's existence as a corporate entity. The loss of common landholdings, the assumption of many of the clan functions by public agencies, particularly the government, individual geographical and social mobility, the economic and social autonomy acquired by the individual Hong Kong Chinese (especially by the young and the females), and the dispersal of the lineage or clan membership all contribute to the demise of traditional familism. Nevertheless, the continual cultural legacy of familism among the Hong Kong Chinese as well as the need for family cooperation and cohesiveness along specific lines of endeavor have served to transform traditional familism into utilitarianistic familism which is more adapted to the new socio-economic setting of Hong Kong.

Conclusion

Delving into ideal-typical comparisons, which inevitably leads to a relative over-emphasis on differences and a relative neglect of similarities, we have analyzed the components of traditional familism and utilitarianistic familism, and the structural conditions in Hong Kong which are conducive to the transformation from the former to the latter. This process of transformation can be seen to be proceeding on in two directions: toward functional specificity and toward domain stretch. By moving toward functional specificity, traditional familism has become a more specific form of familism in which relationship among family members tend to revolve more or less exclusively around utilitarianistic considerations, while affective-ritual ties are becoming muted and are generally restricted to the core members with closely intimate relationships. In heading toward the direction of domain stretch, traditional familism has foresaken the exclusively ascriptive criteria of membership and thus allows for the use of utilitarianistic, achievement-oriented criteria for the recruitment of new family members, as well as the non-inclusion of those who should have been members by ascriptive definition. In such ways, the ethos of familism are not inhered in a pre-existing group, as in traditional familism, but has become the normative order for the regulation of the operation of a group deliberately organized for some specific purposes.

In a society such as Hong Kong, where the public institutional structure is inadequate to handle the needs generated from society first in connection of large-scale influx of immigrants and later due to rapid industrialization and urbanization, it is not surprising to find that private devices are designed, either deliberately or unconsciously, by the majority of the Chinese populace to enable them to cope with an environment which appears to them to be risk-prone, hostile and highly unpredictable. The continual salience of familism, (despite the fact that many critical conditions for the survival of traditional familism are no longer existent)---in a society where social solidarity is low because of the colonial situation and the apathetic attitudes of the uprooted Chinese immigrants -- means that familistic ties are the most handy organizational principles to form groups with larger resource bases in order to protect or promote one's interests in society. Under utilitarianistic familism, the formation of these particularistic groups will enable individual Chinese to personalize his socio-economic environment through the personalization of his relationships to the critical individuals in his environment and the inclusion of them into his familial group. Personalization of the environment will, in turn, make his environment less unpredictable, and thus allows him to relax in a private circle of security amidst a society of insecurity. The predominance of utilitarianistic familism in Hong Kong, consequently, not only points to the continual significance of familism in a modern society, but also the elasticity and adaptability of Chinese familism even when it has been removed from its natural setting.[43]

Notes:

[1] See, for example, Francis L.K. Hsu, *Clan, Caste and Club*(Princeton, N.J.: D. van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1963), p. 72; Hui-chen Wang Liu, *The Traditional Chinese Clan Rules* (New York: J.J. Augustin Incorporated Publishers, 1959), pp. 1-3; Hu Hsien-chin, *The Common Descent Group in China and Its Functions* (New York: Viking Fund Inc., 1948), p. 95; and Ch'eng-k'un Cheng, "Familism, the Foundation of Chinese Social Organization", *Social Forces* 23, 1(Oct., 1944), pp. 50-59.

[2] The most notable summarization of the literature on this area can be found in the two books written by Maurice Freedman: *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China* (University of London: The Athlone Press, 1970) and *Chinese Lineage and* Society:Fukien and *Kwangtung*(University of London: The Athlone Press, 1971). Freedman's explanation of the dominance of the lineage organization in the frontier region of southeastern China is highly popular among students on the Chinese lineage, though an at least equally plausible alternative explanation has been put forth by Burton Pasternak, based on his village studies in Taiwan. See Pasternak, "The Role of the Frontier in Chinese Lineage Development," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 28, 3 (May 1969), pp. 551-61, and *Kinship and Community in Two Chinese Villages* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1972).

[3] In particular, see Hugh D.R. Baker, *A Chinese Lineage Village:Sheung* Shui (Berkeley and L.A., Calif.:University of California Press, 1968); Jack M. Potter, *Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant: Social and Economic Change in a Hong Kong Village*(Berkeley and L.A.: University of California

Press, 1968); Jean A. Pratt, "Emigration and Unilineal Descent Groups: A Study of Marriage in a Hakka Village in the New Territories, Hong Kong," Eastern Anthropologist, 13, pp. 147-58; Dorothy H. Bracey, The Effects of Emigration on a Hakka Village (Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1967); and James L. Watson, Emigration and the Chinese Lineage: The Mans in Hong Kong and London (Berkeley and L.A.: University of California Press, 1975).

[4] Myron L. Cohen, "Developmental Process in the Chinese Domestic Group," in Maurice Freedman (ed.), Family and Kinship in Chinese Society (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 21-36, p. 21. Cohen then goes on to discuss the three components of the chia - the chia estate, the chia group, and the chia economy - and the variety of forms the connections between them could assume (p. 28).

[5] The sample of respondents was derived from the sample of respondents used in the Biosocial Survey conducted by the Social Research Centre of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (in cooperation with the Australian National University) in 1974. The sampling frame of the Biosocial Survey was a stratified sample with equal probability in the selection of sampling units. The resulting sample was a proportionate stratified random sample with 4,001 sampling units in the form of living quarters. In addition, a supplementary list of 1,600 addresses was also randomly drawn to replace those unsuccessful interviews in order to obtain the required number of 4,001 completed cases. At the completion of the survey, a total of 3,983 households had been successfully interviewed, and they represented cases from both the original sample and the supplementary sample.

These 3,983 completed interview cases constituted the sampling frame of our survey with one modification: cases from some of the census districts had been deleted because these census districts lay outside the urban centers of Hong Kong and Kowloon and the inclusion of them would increase substantially interview costs. A systematic sample of 735 addresses was taken from this modified sampling frame. Students from the Chinese University of Hong Kong were employed as interviewers, some of whom had accumulated considerable amount of experience from previous surveys conducted by the Social Research Centre. A total of 550 interviews was successfully completed, thus obtaining a response rate of 74.8%, which was not at all unsatisfactory given the difficulty of interviewing in Hong Kong.

Among the 550 respondents, most of them were male (59.5%), married (77.5%), largely located in the lower educational levels and in the low or moderately low income categories. Therefore, the socio-economic profile of our respondents tended to be biased toward the lower ends of the social hierarchy in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, as the Chinese people who are low in socio-economic status represent the majority of the Hong Kong population, findings based on this sample can be generalized, to a large extent, to the rest of the Chinese population in Hong Kong.

[6] The membership in Chinese familial groupings can be achieved as well as ascribed has also been reported by Morton H. Fried in his study of the clans and clan associations in modern Taiwan. One type of these groups is the tz'u-t'ang, which tends to be a tightly structured corporate unit with carefully apportioned rights, duties, and privileges. The other

type, known as t'ung-ch'in hui is loosely organized, with a theoretically unbounded membership that comprises all people of the same surname, including those from different parts of China, of different languages, and even of different ethnic origins. Expansion of membership through this means allows these groups to exercise a higher level of political maneuverability. For details, see Morton H. Fried, "Some Political Aspects of Clanship in a Modern Chinese City," in Marc J. Swartz et al (eds.), Political Anthropology (Chicago, Ill.: Aldine, 1966), pp. 285-300.

[7] Bartlett H. Stoodley, "Normative Family Orientations of Chinese College students in Hong Kong," Journal of Marriage and the Family, 29, 4 (November, 1967), pp. 773-782.

[8] David Chaney and David Podmore, Young Adults in Hong Kong: Attitudes in A Modernizing Society (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1973); see also their "Family Norms in a Rapidly Industrializing Society: Hong Kong," Journal of Marriage and the Family, 36, 2 (May 1974), pp. 400-407.

[9] Stoodley, op. cit., p. 782.

[10] More than half of our respondents would not approve the behavior of those people who, in safeguarding their familial interests, engage in social conflict with others, thus resulting in social unrest.

[11] When asked about whether conflict with outsiders (people outside of the family) should be avoided as far as possible even if that would incur damages to oneself and one's family, 82.2% of our respondents answer in

the affirmative. This indicates that even though familial interests are of enormous importance, these still do not justify conflict with outsiders lest these interests would be threatened. Unless the stake concerned is so large that conflict avoidance would mean utter dissolution of familial interests, the family is willing to concede as far as possible in order to shun conflict with others.

[12] When asked to choose between social stability and economic prosperity, 87.3% of our respondents would prefer the former. In addition, 41.8% of them are even willing to stay in a society with social stability but without much social justice as compared to only 27.1% who are not willing. This obsession with social stability has led to the definition of the government's function to be that of maintenance of social stability. 57.3% of our respondents regard the primary responsibility of the government as the performance of that function.

[13] These descriptions are based on a small-scale research project of the third-year sociology students done in 1977, which required them to have long, intensive talks with their relatively less well-off kinsmen with the purpose of understanding their perceptions of society and their own lives.

[14] Robert E. Mitchell, "Residential Patterns and Family Networks(II)," International Journal of Sociology of the Family, 3, 1 (March 1971), pp. 23-41; p. 40.

[15] Ibid, pp. 34-35.

[16] Sherry Rosen, Mei Foo Sun Chuen: Middle-Class Chinese Families in Transition (Taipei: Orient Cultural Service, 1976), p. 196.

[17] Chaney and Podmore, Young Adults in Hong Kong, p. 63.

[18] Stoodley, op. cit, and ibid.

[19] Lawrence K. Hong, The Chinese Family in a Modern Industrial Setting: Its Structure and Functions (Doctoral dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1970), pp. 142-3.

[20] Ibid, p. 145.

[21] Graham E. Johnson, Natives, Migrants and Voluntary Associations in a Colonial Chinese Setting (Doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1971), p. 239.

[22] Fai-ming Wong, "Industrialization and Family Structure in Hong Kong," Journal of Marriage and the Family, 37, 4 (November 1975), pp. 998-9.

[23] Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong By-Census 1976: Basic Tables (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1977), p. 43. According to official definition, a nuclear family consists one of the following combinations: (1) a married couple without children, or (2) a married couple with one or more never married children, or (3) one parent (either father or mother) with one or more never married children.

[24] Robert E. Mitchell, "Residential Patterns and Family Networks (I)," International Journal of Sociology of the Family, 2, 2 (September, 1972), p. 216.

[25] Ibid, p. 223.

[26] Rosen, Mei Foo Sun Chuen, p. 200.

[27] Ibid, p. 206.

[28] John A. Young, Business and Sentiment in a Chinese Market Town (Taipei: The Orient Cultural Service, 1974), p. 61.

[29] The trend toward conjugalism in the relationship between spouses has been described by Fai-ming Wong in his "Modern Ideology, Industrialization, and Conjugalism: The Hong Kong Case," in International Journal of Sociology of the Family, 2, 2 (September, 1972), pp. 139-50, which nevertheless focuses on the middle-class Chinese families. The dilution of authority relations in lower-class families, however, has also been found. With respect to the treatment of the young, according to Robert E. Mitchell and Irene Lo, lower-class Chinese mothers "are not penetrating and permeating the entire lives of their children, and even the very young are able to make decisions by themselves; their mothers also do not closely monitor their behavior, thereby giving them further experiences of learning the world through their own unimpaired manipulation of it." ("Implications of Changes in Family Authority Relations for the Development of Independence and Assertiveness in Hong Kong Children," Asian Survey, 8, 4 (April 1968), p. 315.) Going one step further, the two authors consider that "the source of change in child-training practices of mothers may be related to more basic changes in the distribution of authority within families. Two changes are especially noteworthy. First, the authority of the male line, especially the father, has declined, and the mother wife occupies a new and extremely important role in the family. Second, age as a basis for authority has radically declined in significance. This is true for siblings over their younger

brothers and sisters." (Ibid, p. 301.) Accordingly, "a growing proportion of families in Hong Kong can be characterized as having egalitarian relations among their members."(Ibid, p. 321). Moreover, it can also be noted that in some areas of decision-making, for example, in the choice of marriage partners, the young people are able to assert more and more independence, see Podmore and Chaney, "Family Norms in a Rapidly Industrializing Society: Hong Kong," pp. 404-5.

[30] Lawrence Hong, The Chinese Family in a Modern Industrial Setting, pp. 94-101.

[31] Though the dominant values in traditional China stress the importance of social responsibility, in reality they may not be translated completely into actual behavior. A content analysis of a sample of clan rules contained in the Chinese genealogies by Liu reveals a heavy emphasis on personal integrity, family prosperity, family harmony, and, by the extension of family interest, clan cohesion. Contact with people and groups outside the kinship groups are to be held at a minimum. What the clan rules aim at is an ideal type of personality so closely and even exclusively oriented to the family and the clan that he can hardly be expected to play an active role in community life, let alone political matters. See Hui-chen Wang Liu, The Traditional Chinese Clan Rules, p. 36.

[32] Martin C. Yang, A Chinese Village: Taitou, Shantung Province (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), p. 46.

[33] C.K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961), p. 43.

[34] For example, see Olga Lang, *Chinese Family and Society* (Archon Books, 1968; orig. Yale University Press, 1946).

[35] The T'aip'ing Rebellion in the 1850's, the Boxer Uprising in 1900, the Japanese invasion of China in the 1930's, the civil strife between the Nationalists and the Communists since the end of World War II, and the Communist takeover in 1949 are the high-water marks in this process.

[36] In a survey undertaken by Hambro among the Chinese refugees, 99.4% of them are unwilling to return to China immediately, as compared to only 0.6% who are willing. See Edvard I. Hambro, *The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong* (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1955), p. 154.

[37] "Hong Kong: Tale of Two Cities," in Marjorie Topley (ed.), *Hong Kong: The Interaction of Traditions and Life in the Towns* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1975), pp. 1-10; p. 3.

[38] See A. Doak Barnett, ""New Force" I - The Idea," *American Universities Field Staff Reports, East Asia Series,* 1, 2, pp. 1-12; p. 2.

[39] William T. Liu, "Family Interaction Among Local and Refugee Chinese Families in Hong Kong," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 28, 3 (August 1966), pp. 314-323; p. 315.

[40] Ibid, p. 315.

[41] A. Doak Barnett, "Social Osmosis - Refugees in Hong Kong, " *American Universities Field Staff Reports: East Asia Series,* 2, 5 (December 1953), pp. 1-8.

[42] Ibid, p. 4. Of secondary importance in the 'social osmosis' process is the part played by voluntary associations among the Chinese, particularly the clan and district associations, the members of which are related to each other through particularistic ties. See Robert A. Burton, "Self-help, Chinese Style," American Universities Field Staff Reports, 4, 9 (July 1958), pp. 1-10.

[43] Some traces of utilitarianistic familism can also be found in overseas Chinese communities, though, because of differences in historical and social contexts, no full-blown version of it has been developed. For comparative purposes, see, for example, Maurice Freedman, Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), and Donald E. Willmott, The Chinese of Semarang: A Changing Minority Community in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 260-302.