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Conflict Behavior and the Escalation
of Crisis during the 1962
Sino-Indian Border Conflict

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CONFLICT BEHAVIOR AND THE ESCALATION OF CRISIS
DURING THE 1962 SINO-INDIAN BORDER CONFLICT

Kuang-Sheng Liao

Allen S. Whiting

I. Introduction

In undertaking this research we share the conviction that to understand war and international conflicts is the first step to avoiding them, and that the best way to understand them is through the examination of the interactions of the parties concerned.

The study of international conflicts has been an important interest in the study of international politics. There are empirical studies examining conflicts and wars at a cross-national level (R.J. Rummel, 1963; Bruce Russett et al. 1964; Ivo Feierabend and Rosalind Feierabend 1966; Singer and Small, 1966; Merritt and Rokkan, 1966; Raymond Tanter, 1966; Singer and Wallace, 1970, Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972). These studies have made great efforts to examine data from a large number of nations for the purpose of finding general patterns and characteristics in conflict behavior and war. Some other studies of international conflict have focused their interest on a single important conflict or crisis in order to explain its development and to attempt to abstract patterns and characteristics. (Robert North et al.

1964; Ole Holsti, 1964; Charles A. McClelland et al. 1965; Paul Smoker, 1969).

The study presented here is of this latter kind, examining a single conflict. The purpose of this study is to examine Chinese and Indian conflict behavior and the escalation of their conflict during the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict. The Sino-Indian border conflict was a limited war in the sense that force was used to achieve certain objectives of foreign policy rather than the complete annihilation of the enemy's forces or the destruction of the enemy's leadership. Both Peking and New Delhi mobilized only part of their national resources for the conflict. The scale of violence was limited at the ground level and conducted exclusively by army forces. Neither Peking nor New Delhi utilized its air forces in combat. The objectives of both parties were restricted to claiming ownership and establishing control of the disputed border areas. No threat of whole-scale war was made by either side. The clarity of the objectives kept the leadership on both sides from feeling that national survival was at stake.

There have been many works on the Sino-Indian conflict such as B.M. Kaul's the Untold Story, Neville Maxwell's India's China War (1972) and Allen S.

Whiting's The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (1975) discussing the development of the diplomatic and military confrontation in the conflict between China and India. Since this is an article based on research notes which were the products of collaboration of Allen S. Whiting and myself, much of what was presented in Whiting's book will not be repeated here. In this study we are not going to discuss any of the particular issues of the conflict or of the foreign policies of India or China, but to look at all the issues and incidents as a series of events in the two periods. Our approach is to examine diplomatic behavior and military activities in the pre-crisis and crisis periods in order to explore the characteristics of both sides' conflict behavior in the escalation of actions and reactions.

II. The Nature of Border Conflict

The Sino-Indian border conflict was a long territorial dispute between Peking and New Delhi. The first armed clashes between Chinese and Indian border troops occurred in August 1959, and the two governments openly charged each other with intrusion. These were scattered clashes by border guards and these continued to take place on and off. Although the two governments continued to exchange notes

accusing each other of intrusions, there was no serious increase in hostility between them. China became more critical of India after Nehru's visit to the United States in December 1961. Immediately after his return, the People's Daily accused Nehru of joining a new anti-Communist "axis" (USA-Japan-India) and offering his services in return for money that Kennedy had promised him.¹ However, on January 26, 1962, Peking's Foreign Minister, Ch'en Yi, declared, "The Chinese Government will not change her friendly position toward India; China desires to get along with her neighbors based on the five principles of peaceful co-existence."² And in March 1962, the Indian Prime Minister said: "We should still make every effort to solve this question by settlement and peacefully. If unfortunately, that is not possible, then, we may have to think of other means. But, there should be no jumping into methods which close the door and bar any approach to peaceful settlement."³ Nevertheless, increasing military build-up along the border areas aggravated relations between Peking and New Delhi. Mutual intrusions and diplomatic protests increased.

On April 14, 1962, Peking released twenty-two diplomatic notes that had been exchanged between the two governments. For the first time the Sino-Indian

border issue was featured as a major headline on the front page of the People's Daily. This clearly indicates the increasing importance of the border conflicts as perceived by the Chinese government. From April to August the two governments continued to build up their border forces as is reported in Indian White Paper. However, they did not give up on the possibility of a settlement by a negotiation. The Chinese attitude is shown by an article entitled, "The Radiance of the Peaceful Co-existence Principles Can Never Be Obscured." It said:

Although the Indian government is following a policy unfriendly toward China, the Chinese Government and people will never change their stand of safeguarding Sino-Indian amity. Their stand of settling the Sino-Indian boundary question through negotiation on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence will certainly remain unaltered.⁴

However, during this period, the Chinese government was reported to have intensified its military activity with the construction of more than ten military posts along the western Sino-Indian border areas.⁵ Nehru's attitude was similar to that of the Chinese. In May he told Parliament:

"It is our policy to avoid war unless it is thrust upon us, but whether we avoid war or not, we have to be prepared for it and prepare for it to defend these areas and to recover them."⁶

Again in June, he said:

"We have made some considerable improvement in our position. That improvement does not justify any complacency The building of roads has gone on apace in those mountain areas and we have opened a number of new check-posts which give us a certain advantage. But whether it is China or whether it is Pakistan, or any other country, we do not wish to have war unless it is forced down upon us I have still not given up the hope of being able to solve these problems in a peaceful way. We have to be ready for all emergencies and that is what we have been doing all these years."⁷

Both Peking and New Delhi talked about negotiation. However, both were engaged in a race of military build-up along the border areas. After several clashes in July, Peking agreed on August 4 to an Indian proposal for further discussion on the boundary question.⁸ However, in late August, the possibility for negotiation disappeared when India insisted upon pre-conditions of complete withdrawal from the conflict areas before discussion could take place.⁹ Through late August, September and October clashes between the two sides increased rapidly. On October 20, China attacked Indian forces in the conflict area in major force.¹⁰

This study covers the period from April 13 to October 20, 1962. Because of the changes in the relations between the two governments that took place,

this study divides the period into pre-crisis and crisis periods. In our analysis the pre-crisis period started on April 13 when Peking published twenty-two diplomatic notes that had been exchanged by the two governments. The crisis period began and the pre-crisis period ended when the Indian government rejected Peking's request for unconditional talks on August 22. This period ended when Peking took a massive military action on October 20.

III. Conflict Behaviors in the Sino-Indian Border Conflict

The conflict behavior under investigation here is the construction of military posts in the border areas by both governments, diplomatic actions which both governments took in protest to each other, and the military activities of both governments in the conflict areas. In addition, as Indian government was reported to have undertaken a great number of logistical air activities in the conflict areas, these air activities must also be investigated in this study. These four types of conflict behavior are measured, and the measurements is used to discuss the development of the border conflict.

The increasing construction of military posts by the two governments was first reported in the early part of the pre-crisis period. The number of these

posts was steadily increased on both sides. By the end of the pre-crisis period in late August 1962, China was estimated to have increased the number by 32 and India by 13. This phenomenon continued in the crisis period. By the last day of the crisis period, October 20, Peking was estimated to have brought the number of its military posts to 49 and New Delhi to 28.¹¹ The construction of these military posts indicates the strengthening of military preparations in the border areas.

The diplomatic conflict behavior under investigation is the protests lodged by both governments against each other. In both pre-crisis and crisis periods, the two governments lodged a great number of protests against actions taken by the other government. Looking at the original diplomatic notes, one can see six different kinds of protests lodged by Peking and five different kinds lodged by New Delhi. These different kinds of protests show different degrees of intensity. In ascending order of intensity, the six kinds of Chinese protests are: protest, serious protest, strong protest, the strongest protest, the most serious strongest protest, and the most urgent most serious and strongest protest. Indian protests in ascending order are: protest, firm protest, emphatic

protest, strong protest, and strong and emphatic protest.¹² It is very clear that both governments intended the different kinds of protest to express differing attitudes of seriousness and weight. Thus, the intensities of the protests are distinguished here in the examination of the diplomatic interaction of the two governments.

Military activities by one government in the conflict areas constituted a direct threat to the other government. Both governments perhaps conducted many military activities which were not reported publicly either at the time or later. However, in the study of this conflict we are interested in those activities perceived as threats by the two governments, and we assume that unreported activities were not perceived as individually threatening. During both the pre-crisis and crisis periods, both governments reported on large numbers of military activities conducted by the other government. These activities include intrusions and provocative actions, such as fire by soldiers of the other side. Many of these actions did little damage to either side. However, because these were reported we feel that they are a very important index of the development of the border conflict and the escalation of hostility between the

two governments. As Thomas C. Schelling has pointed out: "it is not the pain and damage itself but its influence on somebody's behavior that matters."¹³ Thus, the reported military activities in the border areas during the pre-crisis and crisis periods are considered here to be a major factor for the study of Sino-Indian border conflict.

During both the pre-crisis and crisis periods, the Indian government conducted a great number of air activities in the conflict areas. These air activities were not directly conflict behavior themselves in the sense that they did not involve combat. They took place in support of Indian military supply and preparation. From time to time, Peking accused them of being intrusions and provocative moves. These air activities which were reported by the Chinese government are felt to be a factor that should be taken into consideration in the investigation of the development of the border conflict. Throughout the two periods, little Chinese air activity was reported. Thus, this study does not examine Chinese air activity.

IV. Measurement and Methodology

The measurement of international conflict behavior is a difficult problem. Frequency of events or actions is a popular measurement. However,

frequency alone ignores the intensity of each unit of behavior. Thus, in this study we would like to take the intensity of some Chinese and Indian conflict behavior into consideration. This will be done for diplomatic and military actions other than the building of border posts.

As mentioned above both Peking and New Delhi continued to build military posts in the conflict areas. The accumulated number of their military post in each time unit is used as the indicator for the strengthening of military preparation. In regard to diplomatic behavior, in accordance with our discussion above, a six-point scale in ascending order from 1 to 6 will be used to measure the intensity of Chinese actions and a five-point scale will be used for Indian diplomatic actions. As far as military activities are concerned, these can be weighed according to the degree of intensity of threat offered to the other side. A six-point scale is used for this purpose.¹⁴

Indian air activities were reported very frequently, and the intensity of these can be measured by the number of occurrences in each time unit.

The data for this study is derived from the White Paper which was issued by the Indian Foreign Ministry.¹⁵

This contains all notes exchanged between Peking and New Delhi throughout the pre-crisis and crisis periods. This document has been a major source for all study of the Sino-Indian border conflict. It has been widely used by Nevillie Maxwell, Arthur A. Stahnke, and Paul Smoker.¹⁶ In this study it supplies the two kinds of data which we required. First, it describes the diplomatic behavior of both countries. This provides us with material for studying the attitudes of the two countries towards each other. Because it contains every governmental statement and announcement on each border incident, the White Paper is a most valuable source for understanding the development of the Chinese and Indian attitude toward the conflict. The second type of information that can be obtained from the White Paper concerns the construction of military posts and the military activities of the two countries. These military deployments within the conflict area have been detailed in this compilation.

While the data are collected and coded on a daily basis for all variables, the unit of observation in this study is a three-day period. This is because the actions and reactions of the two governments were not all taken within the same day. For example, Indian military action was perceived by Chinese border guards;

they would report to the government in Peking, where the direction of reaction was decided. By the same token, Chinese military actions were perceived by Indian border guards; they would report to the government in New Delhi, where the decision on reaction was made. Therefore, this study takes the actions and reactions of a three-day period as the unit of observation. The scores of every three-day period are added together. Thus, the concept of reaction in this study is expressed in three-day units.

The statistical methods employed in this study are correlation and regression analyses. In the correlation analysis the coefficient of correlation indicates the degree of association between two characteristics, but does not imply any causal relationship or take other factors into consideration. In the multiple regression analysis, we use a standardized regression coefficient (beta coefficient or B) to indicate the relative weight of impact on the dependent variable of the independent variable. Since beta coefficients are standardized, each variable is measured on a scale whose unit is the standard deviation of that variable in the data under study. We are then able to observe some meaning in the comparison of the different impacts of the

independent variables.¹⁷ R represents the multiple coefficient of correlation which is a measure of the accuracy with which the dependent variable can be explained by the independent variables. The multiple correlation coefficients range from 0 to 1.0. The square of the multiple correlation is the percentage of the variance accounted for by all of the independent variables.¹⁸

For pragmatic purposes the following studies use ordinal scales as if they conform to interval scales. Although some small errors may accompany this treatment with correlation analysis, it can be offset by the use of a more powerful, more sensitive, better-developed and clearly interpretable statistical tool such as regression analysis.¹⁹

V. Coordination between Diplomatic and Military Actions

The governments in Peking and New Delhi were both under strong leadership. In Peking no significant dissension about the border issue was reported. Foreign policy was under close direction by the Party. In New Delhi, Nehru had firm control over policy concerning the border issue. And his policy was strongly supported by the Parliament. Both governments had tight control over their military and diplomatic behavior towards each other.

In this section we are interested in examining the associations between the diplomatic actions and military activities of the CPR and India.

Table 1
Correlation Matrix Among Conflict Behavior
During the Pre-crisis Period N = 45

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. IDA						
2. IMP	.04					
3. IAA	.15	.20				
4. IMA	.21	-.22	.05			
5. CDA	.07	.24	.35	.02		
6. CMP	.16	.83	.28	.03	.14	
7. CMA	.32	.44	.24	-.03	.23	.39

.95 Significant Level = .29

IDA: Indian Diplomatic Actions
 IMP: The Construction of Military Post by India
 IAA: Indian Air Activities
 IMA: Indian Military Activities
 CDA: CPR Diplomatic Actions
 CMP: The Construction of Military Post by China
 CMA: CPR Military Activities

As Table 1 shows, during the pre-crisis period, the association between CPR diplomatic actions and military activities was low. (.23) On the Indian side,

the association between diplomatic actions and military activities was also low. (.21). This indicates that the coordination between diplomatic actions and military activities on the part of both states was not very good. This may argue that during this period both Peking and New Delhi were still looking forward to negotiation and that both governments had not yet exerted tight control over their military and diplomatic organizations.

However, during the crisis period, as shown in Table 2, the association between diplomatic and military actions was also very low. The correlation coefficient between CMA and CDA is 0.5. On the Indian side, the associations between diplomatic actions and military activities are also very low. These figures show that the coordination between the diplomatic and military actions of both countries was no better than during the pre-crisis period. Both the CPR and Indian indiscriminately took diplomatic action and initiated military activities without coordination between their organizations of foreign and military affairs. Thus it seems that military actions and diplomatic actions were independent of each other. This finding agrees with the findings of MacClelland and Hoggard (1968) that use of force generally is independent of

Table 2

Correlation Matrix Among Conflict Behavior
During the Crisis Period N = 19

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. IDA						
2. IMP	-.22					
3. IAA	.08	.43				
4. IMA	.20	.07	.11			
5. CDA	.43	.17	.45	.49		
6. CMP	-.04	.91	.46	.16	.21	
7. CMA	.09	.06	-.05	.44	.05	.01

.95 Significant Level = .46

diplomatic conflict behavior.²⁰ Any attempted explanation for this low coordination between military action and diplomatic action is bound to be speculative. It may be due to the different pace and routine of the military and diplomatic organizations in Peking and in New Delhi as well, using the concepts of Allison's Organizational Process Model.²¹ Or it may be, as suggested by Richard Snyder and Glenn Paige (1958), that the decision-making scheme might be relevant in explaining this uncoordinated behavior. It might also be due to the 'rational nature' of diplomatic conflict

behavior as suggested by Raymond Tanter. That is diplomatic conflict behavior tends to be relatively well planned and controlled. Thus, diplomatic responses tend to be of relatively low intensity.²²

None of these explanations seem satisfactory. The study of the Sino-Indian conflict suggests that diplomatic and military behavior are two different kinds of actions. And that they do not necessarily proceed on parallel paths. Diplomatic actions were not intended to achieve any concrete goals but to be responses to external acts, to signal reactions and attitudes. However, military actions were always planned to achieve certain objectives, such as the strengthening of defense or the preparation for attack. During the conflict period, both in the pre-crisis and crisis periods, diplomatic and military behavior seem to have been used to serve different purposes. Diplomatic action may have been utilized to delay the outbreak of war for the strengthening of military preparation. As pointed out in the above sections, both China and India did speak about negotiation. But in fact, both sides were expanding their military activities for a confrontation. Under such circumstances, diplomatic actions cannot be coordinated with military actions.

VI. Actions, Reactions, and Escalation of Sino-Indian
Border Conflict

As pointed out by David Singer, Jr. in his "Escalation and Control in International Conflict" (1970), if two nations become involved in a conflict, the most natural and probably the most frequent response is to stand firm on the original conflict-inducing position.²³ This is exactly what happened in Peking and New Delhi throughout the period under study. Despite the talk about negotiations by both governments, neither side made any concessions to the other. Both seemed to adopt a strategy of delaying while improving their military positions.

1. The Pre-crisis Period

In the study of international conflict, it is often believed that the high tension results from the escalation on both sides, not one side alone.²⁴ Thus, we would like to examine the interactions between the two sides. In this section, our primary interest is the evaluation of how Indian diplomatic and military actions affected CPR diplomatic and military actions and vice versa. In the discussion of interactions we are compelled to use the words "action" and "reaction" for the purpose of distinguishing the action of one side from that of the

other. Neither term implicitly or explicitly indicates the initiation of aggression.

Table 3
CPR's Reactions to Indian Actions During the
Pre-crisis Period

	IDA	IPC	IAA	IMA	R	R ²
CDA	.01	.19	.30*	.05	.39	.15
CMP	.07	.85*	.09	.19*	.87	.75
CMA	.29*	.40*	.12	.00	.55	.30

* indicates a significant level higher than .90
($p \leq .10$)

As shown in Table 3, Peking's diplomatic behavior in this period was significantly affected by Indian air activities (IAA). Increases in Indian air activities led to a higher level of hostility as expressed in Chinese diplomatic action. ($B = .30$) Chinese construction of military posts (CMP) was significantly affected by Indian construction of military posts and Indian military activities. (.85 and .19) As for Chinese military activities (CMA), these were affected by both Indian diplomatic actions

(IDA) and India's construction of military posts (IMP), the B are .29 and .40. The positive impacts of IDA and IMP on Chinese military activities indicate that Chinese military activities increased when Indian construction of military posts increased and Indian diplomatic attitudes became more hostile.

Table 4
Indian Reactions to CPR's Actions During the
Pre-crisis Period

	CDA	CMP	CMA	R	R ²
IDA	.00	.04	.31*	.32	.10
IMP	.11	.77*	.11	.85	.72
IAA	.30*	.20	.09	.43	.18
IMA	.03	.05	-.05	.06	.00

* indicates a significant level higher than .90.
($p \leq .10$)

On the Indian side, Indian diplomatic actions (IDA) were significantly influenced by Chinese military activities (.31). This indicates that the more intense and frequent Chinese military activities were, the more hostile was the attitude expressed by


Indian actions. Indian construction of military posts (IMP) was significantly affected by the increase of Chinese military posts (.77), mirroring what occurred on the Chinese side. Indian air activities (IAA) were affected by Chinese diplomatic actions (.30). More hostile Chinese diplomatic actions stimulated more Indian air activities. However, Indian military activities were not significantly affected by any Chinese action.

In generalizing from the above findings, first it is very clear that both sides were engaged in a race of building military posts in the conflict areas. The increase of Indian military posts lead to an increase of Chinese military posts and vice versa. However, the competition in building military posts is not shown to directly result in the deterioration of diplomatic relations between the two governments. It was the Indian air activities which significantly affected the Chinese diplomatic attitude as reflected in diplomatic actions. And it was Chinese military activities that significantly affected the Indian diplomatic attitude. In other words, Indian air activities and Chinese military activities were the main factors leading to the deterioration of diplomatic relations. Furthermore, it is also clear that

there emerged an interaction between both governments' diplomatic attitude and the military activities of the other. The increases of hostility in both governments' diplomatic attitudes further stimulated hostile military activities from the other side. Thus, during this period, there was a continuing escalation of hostile diplomatic relations and military activities by both governments. (See Diagram 1)

Diagram 1

The Simplified Model of Escalation of Conflicts
Between Peking and New Delhi During the Pre-
crisis Period*



* This is based on the findings above

2. The Crisis Period

The crisis period was characterized by the increasing of diplomatic protests and military clashes by both sides and further examination reveals complicated interactions between the two governments.

Table 5

CPR's Reactions to Indian Actions During the Crisis Period

	IDA	IMP	IAA	IMA	R	R ²
	B	B	B	B		
CDA	.33*	.05	.35*	.38*	.70	.49
CMP	.16	.94*	-.01	.07	.92	.85
CMA	.04	.12	-.16	.44*	.46	.21

* indicates a significant level higher than .90
($p \leq .10$)

As shown in Table 5, in this period, as in the pre-crisis period, Chinese construction of military posts was significantly affected by the increase of Indian military posts (.94). In regard to the Chinese diplomatic attitude, as reflected in diplomatic actions, this was significantly affected by Indian diplomatic actions (IDA), Indian air activities (IAA), and Indian military activities (IMA) (.33, .35, and .38). This indicates an increasing sensitivity in the Chinese diplomatic attitude to Indian diplomatic actions, air activities, and military activities. The most striking point is in

the attitude toward Indian diplomatic actions. The positive impact of Indian diplomatic actions on the Chinese diplomatic attitude indicates a confrontation at the diplomatic level. More hostile Indian diplomatic actions were met with the more hostile diplomatic reactions from Peking.

As for Chinese military activities, in contrast to the precrisis period, they were positively affected by Indian military activities (.44). This indicates that further Indian military activities were met with further Chinese military activities.

Table 6

Indian Reactions to CPR's Actions During the Crisis Period

	CDA	CMP	CMA	R	R ²
IDA	.45*	-.14	.07	.45	.20
IMP	-.03	.91*	.05	.91	.82
IAA	.37*	.38*	-.07	.59	.34
IMA	.45*	.05	.41*	.64	.41

* indicates a significant level higher than .90
($p \leq .10$)


On the Indian side, as it was on the Chinese side, according to Table 6, the construction of military posts is shown to have been significantly affected by the increase of Chinese military posts (.91). During this period, Indian diplomatic attitude was significantly affected by Chinese diplomatic actions (.45). More hostile Chinese diplomatic actions were met with stronger Indian diplomatic actions, mirroring the Chinese situation. As for Indian air activities, these were also positively affected by Chinese diplomatic actions and the increase in Chinese military posts (.37 and .38). In other words, the more hostile diplomatic attitude from Peking and the increase of her military posts led to the increase of Indian air activities. As far as Indian military activities are concerned, they were affected not only by Chinese military activities but also by the Chinese diplomatic attitude (.41 and .45). Stronger Chinese military activities were met with stronger Indian military activities, exactly like the Chinese military reactions to Indian military activities.

In short, both Peking and New Delhi had similar attitudes towards each other. Both took a confrontation policy in diplomatic attitude and military

activities. Stronger diplomatic actions from one side were met with more hostile diplomatic actions from the other. Stronger military activities from one side were met with stronger military activities from the other. This was a confrontation situation.

Diagram 2

The Simplified Model of Confrontation Between Peking and New Delhi During the Crisis Period*



* This is based on the findings above

VII. Summary and Implications

The findings of this research may be summarized in two models, an escalation model and a confrontation model. In the pre-crisis period, the development of increasing hostility between the two governments can be explained by the escalation model. In this model (see Diagram 1), there is a continuous competition of military build-up in the conflict areas (IMP and CMP). Furthermore, there is a continuous escalation of diplomatic behavior and

military movement. However, there is no direct interaction between the diplomatic actions of the two governments. It is the continuous interaction of military build-up by both governments (IAA and CMA) which results in the escalation of the hostility of the conflict into the crisis period. In the crisis period, a confrontation model (Diagram 2) shows that two types of direct confrontation emerged in the relationship between the two governments in addition to the competition in building military posts. One is the confrontation between military actions. One side's military action was confronted by the other immediately. The other confrontation was between diplomatic actions.

The escalation model indicates continuous deterioration in the relations between two governments if the processes of escalation do not stop. Since there is no diplomatic confrontation between the two governments, negotiation appears to be a possible approach to heading off the deterioration. Without negotiation a crisis period will be entered. If Nehru's proposal for negotiation in July and Peking's agreement to hold such negotiations reflect a recognition of such a danger, then, in late August Nehru's insistence on the withdrawal of troops as a

precondition for such negotiations shows either a miscalculation of the speed of the escalation of hostility towards the crisis period, or pressure by domestic factors as self-aggravating effects within the Indian government.²⁵

The confrontation model is relevant to the situation in which the hostility between the two governments has already reached a breaking point. Since diplomatic confrontation has emerged, negotiation appears to be harder or very unlikely unless one side offers a new concession. Under these circumstances war is imminent. As pointed out by Ole Holsti and his colleagues, a substantial difference between the 1914 First World War and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was the relative clarity with which tension-reducing moves were seen by the participants in the late case.²⁶ The major difference between the escalation model and confrontation model is that tension-reducing moves are more difficult in the latter model. The diplomatic confrontation between Peking and New Delhi apparently made both sides believe that negotiations would do no good, even if held. Military confrontation eventually will compel one side to take pre-emptive action against the other.²⁷ The government which first completes

its military preparation or which has superiority in military forces will take that action. This was the case in the conflict under investigation here.

Footnotes

1. People's Daily (PD), editorial, December 7, 1961.
2. PD, January 27, 1962.
3. Nehru: Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, Vol. I, Part II, no date, p. 82.
4. People's Daily (PD), June 3, 1962.
5. White Paper, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, Vol. VI, pp. 88-89.
6. Nehru, op. cit., p. 94.
7. Ibid., p. 96.
8. White Paper, Vol. VII, p. 17. This note was published by the People's Daily on August 7, 1962.
9. Ibid., p. 37.
10. See Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indo-China, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1975, Chapters 2-5.
11. This is calculated based on the reports in White Paper.
12. These terminologies of Chinese and Indian protests were originally used by Peking and New Delhi, not translated by the authors.

13. Thomas C. Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence," in Robert Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, ed., The Use of Force, Boston: Little Brown, 1971, p. 78.
14. From the least intense to the most intense the categories are listed as follows:
 - Intrusion by soldiers numbering less than 10
 - Intrusion by soldiers numbering between 11 and 20
 - Intrusion by soldiers numbering over 21
 - Scattered fire by soldiers numbering less than 10
 - Group fire by soldiers numbering 11-20
 - Heavy fighting by soldiers numbering over 21
15. Peking also published all documents in the Sino-Indian border dispute. See Chung Hua jen min Kung ho kuo t'ue wai kuan hsi wen chien ch'i, Peking, V. 9, 1962. These documents are identical with Indian White Paper.
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