

opposition to class-based struggle combined with a desire for revolutionary social change against existing elites. Understanding China's mid-twentieth century revolution in these terms gives Tsui's book a startling freshness. Its contemporary relevance is just one element of its quality; in the depths of its research and complexity and seriousness of its historical insights, it is a deeply significant work.

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Diaspora's Homeland: Modern China in the Age of Global Migration. By Shelly Chan. Durham, NC and London, England: Duke University Press, 2018. Pp. xiv + 264. \$99.95 cloth, \$25.95 paper.

How did Chinese migrants change China? During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries some twenty million Chinese left China (along with an additional twenty million who settled in Manchuria), forming one of the world's largest migratory movements. This migration more forcefully tied China to the outside world and brought back transnational monetary, cultural, and intellectual flows to the Chinese mainland. Shelly Chan's brilliant new work invites us to rethink the relationship between the Chinese diaspora and mainland China, particularly by tracing its evolution over time and its historical contingency.

Diaspora's Homeland makes exciting contributions to Chinese history and overseas Chinese history more broadly. It responds to a thread in the scholarship which has turned against the concept of diaspora. In the view of these scholars, the word "diaspora" promotes an essentialized Chinese identity and dangerously suggests that Chinese overseas and their descendants are ever loyal to the mainland. While agreeing that depictions of the diaspora as somehow tied to China are misleading and remove the agency of diasporic migrants themselves, Chan nevertheless argues forcefully that the concept of diaspora continues to be useful to the experience of Chinese overseas. Beyond simply illustrating geographic variations and transnational flows, a diasporic framework also allows Chan to focus on "temporal disjunctions" (p. 189) between China and the diaspora. Chan uses "diaspora time" to get at these disjunctions, and "diaspora moments" to capture moments of tension, division, and recombination with the diaspora. This sophisticated conceptual framework allows Chan to capture the contingency of the evolution of the homeland, the diaspora, and the relationship between the two, as well as capture multidirectional flows between

the diaspora and mainland China. Refreshingly, the moments that Chan examines in *Diaspora's Homeland* are not the well-trod moments in the Chinese national mythology where the diaspora makes an appearance, such as the Xinhai Revolution 辛亥革命 or the Second Sino-Japanese War. But Chan nevertheless picks five significant moments which point to larger structural transformations that reverberate both in China and among the diaspora. The approach provides a viable path to bring together Chinese history and Chinese diasporic history—as Chan notes, both are fractured and networked, and both are transformed by local and international forces over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The book highlights five moments in which local and international shifts led to substantive changes for both China and the diaspora. In Chapter 1, “A Great Convergence,” Chan argues that increasing migration, particularly the coolie trade (1847–1874), had the effect of increasing Qing engagement with the outside world. Taking place just after the Opium Wars and in the context of a need for labourers in settler societies, European powers eagerly sought out the Chinese as potential settlers and labourers. Yet coolie labour represented a notable break from already established patterns of private, family- and community-driven, and temporary migration from southern China to Southeast Asia and the settler societies around the Pacific Rim. Migrants themselves were reluctant to take part in the trade, and popular anger erupted against it. Yet the Qing state was initially unable to put an end to the worst abuses which took place during the coolie trade, particularly having to do with the recruitment and treatment of the labourers. Despite an image that these labourers were free, in actuality many were coerced, deceived, or outright kidnapped. The increasing international attention to the treatment of coolies, including the petitions from Chinese associations abroad, pressured the Qing state to respond, pulling “Qing China . . . into the dynamic orbit of Chinese indentured emigrants bound for the Americas” (p. 46). The result was a greater concern for its nationals located outside of its borders: provisions which concerned emigrants in international treaties; the establishment of consulates in the Americas; and the dispatching of investigative committees to Cuba and Peru to look after its subjects. This increased engagement with the outside world, motivated in part by a desire to prevent the worst abuses against emigrants abroad, was all crucial to the development of Qing sovereignty. Ultimately, increased attention to the abuses of the coolie trade, brought about in part because of publicity around Chinese coolie mutinies, (some from overseas Chinese associations themselves) provided the Qing government with the opportunity to put a final end to the trade. By the time that the Qing government decriminalized migration in 1893—a move Chan notes was designed in part to encourage repatriation of Chinese migrants and establish a closer relationship to Southeast Asian diasporic subjects, Qing China had already undergone its “transition to nationhood” (p. 32) during the crisis over the coolie trade.

Chapter 2, “Colonists of the South Seas,” turns to the establishment and expansion of the Department of Nanyang (South Seas) Cultural Affairs 南洋文化事業部 at Jinan University 暨南大學. The Department of Nanyang Cultural Affairs contributed a great deal to our academic understanding of Nanyang *huaqiao* 華僑, including thirty books and two journals, and set the tone for overseas Chinese studies in the present. Chan places the development of this body of scholarship in the context of the movement of both Chinese intellectuals and workers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as the concern over Japanese military and economic expansion into the South Seas during the First World War, some of which targeted overseas Chinese in the region. The work of Jinan scholars marked a departure from the traditional relationship between the Chinese state and its neighbours in Southeast Asia and inflected it with understandings of European and Japanese colonial ventures. Inspired by thinking of settler colonization, Jinan intellectuals also began to imagine “Chinese migrants as incomplete colonists in the South Seas and China as an incomplete nation in the world” (p. 62). In the future, these scholars, thought, migrants, and the Chinese nation would reinvigorate one another. During the Second World War, Jinan University would resettle in the Nanyang, taking up temporary residence in Singapore and publishing the *Journal of the South Seas Society* together with local intellectuals. This chapter elegantly captures the circulation of people, goods, and especially ideas that followed the greater integration of the Nanyang with China and Japan after the late nineteenth century. These circulations of workers and intellectuals simultaneously provoked another “diaspora moment,” leading to conceptualizations of the diaspora and the Chinese nation together, as intellectuals abroad recognized that the development of the Chinese nation-state was dependent upon its diaspora abroad.

Turning to an example of intellectuals from the diaspora first moving to a European metropole and then “returning” to mainland China, Chapter 3 centres on the fascinating case of Lim Boom Keng 林文慶. Moving beyond traditional depictions of Lim, which either contrast him with Lu Xun or showcase him as a cultural intermediary between China and the West, Chan instead looks at Lim as a product of his formation as both a diasporic Chinese and a European subject in Southeast Asia. As a medical student in Scotland, Lim took up the study of Chinese culture. After returning to Singapore, he was instrumental to the foundation of the English-language journal the *Straits Chinese Magazine* and advocated for a return to Chinese culture, free of local Malay and European cultural influences as well as Chinese superstitions: one that was both modern and on par with European cultures. As China experienced a move towards modernization, intellectuals like Lim encouraged Straits Chinese to return to China to help. Lim himself would accept a position as president of Amoy University 廈門大學 in Fujian province in 1921, though his continued espousal of

Confucian revivalism meant that he ran afoul of students and other intellectuals during his tenure. Chan examines Lim as a part of a group of “Western-educated Chinese colonial intellectuals seeking to interpret the West for China and to interpret China to the West since the late nineteenth century” (p. 78). In so doing, the chapter does a lot to complicate a tendency to view the diaspora “in the terms of closed, bounded opposites between East and West and between tradition and modernity” (ibid.).

Chapters 4 and 5, together a substantive part of the book, turn to the post-1949 period, examining the evolving relationship between the People’s Republic of China and overseas Chinese. Chapter 4 explores the pivotal role of wives of overseas Chinese (*qiaofu* 僑婦) in Guangdong province who were caught up in the socialist transformations of the early 1950s. In Guangdong, twenty per cent of residents belonged to a transnational household, and through generations of labour abroad, overseas Chinese and their families had accumulated a substantial portion of the land. During the post-1949 agrarian reform, this meant that many of those whose lands were confiscated in Guangdong province were overseas Chinese or their dependents. During the implementation of land reform, overseas Chinese dependents saw themselves as being unfairly targeted. Yet in both cases, the backlash against these reforms along with the drop in remittances from overseas Chinese forced the government to reconsider. Both individuals and associations wrote letters protesting the large fines and mistreatment levied on their family members in China, and brought out into the open the conflict between *huaqiao* aspirations and the goals of the government. As a result, the government scaled back the extent of reform and began to view overseas Chinese and their dependents in a special category, “allow[ing] *huaqiao* families to remain outside the socialist transition and installed the women who stayed behind as chief intermediaries between the state and emigrant men” (p. 107). A new Marriage Law, allowing for equality between husband and wife and facilitating divorce, also was rolled back among *huaqiao* families in light of opposition at home and abroad. As the relationship between socialist change and Chinese overseas was being renegotiated, the party-state relied on women to serve as intermediaries, participating in political reform while encouraging remittances from abroad (p. 141). This chapter demonstrates that “rural landscapes had long been entangled in emigrant networks, that women were important conduits, and that overseas Chinese support for socialism could be won or lost” (p. 119). The chapter elegantly accounts for the ways in which socialist transformation was complicated by the region’s links with the outside world, and most vividly demonstrates the clash of temporalities present within Chan’s framework. The chapter advances our understanding of the relationship between overseas Chinese dependents (*qiaojuan* 僑眷) and the People’s Republic of China, and adds to the scholarship on gender in the Chinese diaspora by illustrating the role that women played in serving as intermediaries

between the Chinese state and their husbands overseas. Just like some of the most interesting recent scholarship on migration, it integrates the women who stayed behind as fundamental actors in the migratory process.

Chapter 5 turns to the topic of “returned” overseas Chinese, or *guiqiao* 歸僑. In the context of decolonization in Southeast Asia and anti-Chinese sentiment in the region, over 420,000 Chinese relocated to the People’s Republic of China. This return also provoked considerable tension—between new arrivals and the population of the province, between *huaqiao* desires and aspirations and the desire of government officials of the province at large. Hoping to smooth over the integration of *guiqiao*, the group was granted special privileges including “permission to engage in private consumption, access to extra rations of food grains and other basic necessities, and opportunities to purchase rare consumer goods,” as well as “preferential treatment in financial aid, jobs, and housing” (p. 150). These privileges did not put an end to tensions between the Guangzhou Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau 廣州市僑務辦公室 and returning overseas Chinese. While the bureau directed them to return to their sending regions and to take part in agricultural and industrial production, poorer *guiqiao* themselves preferred to remain in Guangzhou. At the same time, rich *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* with investment capital were encouraged to construct and settle in Western-style apartments in the city. Nevertheless, richer *guiqiao* also began to voice discontent with and circumvented socialist reforms, including travelling to Hong Kong and Macao and receiving packages in lieu of remittances. The passive and active resistance of returned overseas Chinese frustrated officials at the bureau, who referred to them as being “difficult.”

The Conclusion and Epilogue touches on what is likely a new diaspora moment, a reconnection between the Chinese party-state and overseas Chinese during the Deng Xiaoping era and the six million “new migrants” since then. These migrants are broadly celebrated and urged to contribute, in sharp contrast to the approximately 200 million internal migrants who left the countryside and settled in China’s major cities. Notions of diaspora might also allow us to bring alternative notions of Chineseness in Taiwan and Hong Kong into the conversation. Together, the changes in these disparate communities point to larger global changes which together will have an impact on the evolution of China’s relationship with the diaspora.

Diaspora’s Homeland is an impressive work of scholarship. The framing of the project as “global Chinese history” brings together Chinese-American, overseas Chinese, and modern Chinese history. Of course, Chan’s work follows a long line of scholars who have worked transpacifically, using multinational archives and languages, but Chan’s work stands out in the way it moves between different sides of the Pacific Ocean, making a contribution to each of the three fields. The sources demonstrate considerable breadth, including libraries and archives in Hong Kong,

Xiamen, Guangzhou, Vancouver, Singapore, and Taiwan—encompassing sending communities, communities of settlement, and places of transit. The temporal and chronological scope is remarkable, particularly for a first project, moving from Qing China to the Republican period and finally the post-1949 period. Moreover, the fact that each chapter is different in subject matter and methodology, from a study of scholarly production to an against-the-grain reading of bureaucratic records, shows Chan's versatility and breadth as a historian. It will stand as both a challenge and an encouragement to subsequent scholarship to emulate the same scope and breadth. Indeed, Chan's remarkable work—the “flashes of insight” (p. 196) into the workings of diaspora and transnational history that she has found—seems to invite more work into the relationship between the diaspora and the homeland (or homelands, as Chan has also suggested Hong Kong and Taiwan as alternatives). Are there innumerable diaspora moments of tension and rupture? And what might it look like if a diaspora was not undergoing such a rupture?

In sum Shelly Chan's memorable work will be required reading for scholars of modern Chinese history and historians of the Chinese diaspora, and will have great appeal beyond these broad fields. Written in a clear and accessible way, it also would be a book well suited for advanced undergraduate history and Asian-American studies courses.

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Writing for Print: Publishing and the Making of Textual Authority in Late Imperial China. By Suyoung Son. Harvard-Yenching Institute Monograph Series 112. Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Asia Center, 2018. Pp. xiii + 249. \$39.95/£28.95.

In *Writing for Print*, Suyoung Son (Cornell University) develops an original approach to interpreting the role played by printing in the affirmation of textual authority in the Qing dynasty (1644–1911). She relies on two case studies, the first longer than the second, on the books produced by Zhang Chao 張潮 (1650–1707) of Yangzhou, and Wang Zhuo 王晫 (1636–1707) of Hangzhou. The author introduces her readers to the intellectual milieus and practices of Chinese authors and/or publishers in the Jiangnan region in the seventeenth century, and of the censorship mechanisms in both China and Korea in the following century.