

總〈導論〉中有一處關於歷史時期的表述，「晚清與二十世紀初葉 (the late Qing and early twentieth century)」(頁11)，似不妥當。眾所周知，清王朝並沒有在十九世紀末就壽終正寢，而是一直延續到二十世紀的第二個十年才滅亡的。如果用「晚清與二十世紀初葉」這種表述方式，那麼，清王朝進入二十世紀後的那十一個多的年頭還算不算是「晚清」呢？因此，此處似應該依循學界的習慣說法：「清末民初 (the late Qing and early Republic)」，而不要把兩種完全不同的歷史縱座標 (中國慣用的朝代更替標記法和西方的紀元法) 混為一體。

譯編者把梅蘭芳和程硯秋稱為“the famous Beijing Opera singers”(頁17)。此處“singer (歌唱者/家)”一詞用得不太確切，因為京劇是綜合了唱、做、念、打的特殊的歌舞劇，而不是純歌劇。竊以為，這裏宜用“performer (表演者/家)”或“master (大師)”。

譯編者在討論文士介入影戲創作的情形時，用了“intellectual (知識份子)”一詞 (頁95, 143)，這裏恐怕還是用“literati (文人)”一詞比較妥帖，因為前者明顯帶有某種現代的和西方的色彩。

此外，該書在編輯工作上也留下了一些令人遺憾的地方。例如：該劇本集多次提到譯編者有一部關於影戲的專著即將出版。這本專著的書名在多數情形下被寫作：*The Chinese Shadow Theatre and Popular Religion and Woman Warriors* (頁3, 5, 10, 254)，但是有時卻又被寫作*The Chinese Shadow Theatre, Popular Religion, and Woman Warriors* (頁13)，顯然有必要統一下。

還有，該書把「王朝聞」誤作了「王朝文」(頁261)、「饒宗頤」誤作了「堯宗頤」(頁261)、「臧晉叔」誤作了「藏晉叔」(頁262)。

類似的問題，書中還有一些，此處就不再枚舉了。筆者 (相信眾多的讀者亦是如此) 熱切地期待Fan Pen Li Chen關於影戲的另一部著作早日出版。

孫 玫

惠靈頓維多利亞大學

The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856–1873. By David G. Atwill. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. Pp. xii + 264. \$60.00.

Given the burgeoning interest in the Hui and all things ethnic in China, it is surprising that we have had to wait for quite so long for a “reappraisal” of the Panthay Rebellion (1855–1873). David Atwill’s book, *The Chinese Sultanate*, has made that wait worthwhile.

Atwill’s starting position is the need to question two basic assumptions that have underpinned most previous analyses of the rebellion: firstly, that it was rooted in Han-Hui

hatred and secondly, that it was primarily Islamic in character. In challenging both these assumptions, Atwill provides a scholarly and detailed exposition of the rebellion. The narrative framework may be familiar, but as Atwill teases out the complex causes of the violence and traces the many twists and turns of the tragic events, he constantly draws attention to a hitherto neglected aspect: the role played by non-Han indigenous groups. His themes are religion, regionalism and ethnicity; his aim is to shift the focus of our analysis from one that centres on the state to one that takes into account the complexities of local Yunnanese society in the mid to late nineteenth century.

It is often assumed that the Panthay Rebellion was triggered by the Kunming Massacre in 1856. In fact, as Atwill makes clear, this was merely one atrocity in a series of violent incidents that had punctuated the steady rise in communal tensions throughout Yunnan since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Lin'an Rising of 1817–1818, the Lisu Rising of 1821, the Mianning Massacre of 1839 and the Baoshan Massacre of 1845, in which some 4,000–8,000 Hui were killed, were all part of that same continuum of escalating violence. The earlier events did not make the Kunming massacre and subsequent rebellion inevitable, but they did provide the context for the rise of a strongly anti-Hui faction among the Qing officialdom in the provincial capital, a ratcheting up of communal tensions, and the shift from spontaneous to premeditated acts of violence.

With the provincial capital of Kunming left temporarily under the direction of the Manchu governor-general Shuxing'a (himself no lover of Muslims), a series of skirmishes in the surrounding area was deemed to pose a serious threat to security. An order was sent to all prefectures and districts within 800 *li* of Kunming instructing that militias be formed to slay the troublemakers. For reasons that remain unclear but must be attributed, at least in part, to an atmosphere of smouldering tension, this instruction was interpreted as authorizing the Han to exterminate the city's Hui with impunity. For three days and three nights, men and women, old and young of the provincial capital's Muslim community were hunted down and killed. All in all, some 4,000 Hui (or as some sources attest 3–4 times that number) were massacred. Similar bloodbaths were sparked throughout the province in Tengyue, Wuding, Chengjiang, Zhaotong and so on.

Only six months later, in February 1857 with the return to Yunnan of Hengchun, the governor-general for whom Shuxing'a had been substituting, was the court finally informed of the true cause of the violence. By this time, however, the Hui had united against those who were intent on exterminating them. According to Atwill, faced with a full-scale rebellion, the court had little to gain from re-casting the Hui in the role of victims, still less from acknowledging that the rebels had the support of many non-Han groups and possibly even some Han. In Beijing the rebellion had already been categorized as a Han-Hui conflict: an interpretation that was to be handed down largely unchallenged to generations of historians.

Meanwhile, in the west of Yunnan, several communities in the vicinity of the trading centre of Dali had fallen to the rebels. By October 1856, Dali too had been taken and Du Wenxiu, who had emerged as the leader of several competing groups, was invested with the title of Generalissimo. Information on the Dali Sultanate is scant, but based primarily on European eye-witness accounts Atwill, nevertheless, sustains his argument. Just as he suggests that we should not view the Yunnan rebellion as a simplistic Han-Hui dichotomy,

so he is also keen to show that Du's political vision for the state of Pingnan rested on garnering support from all of Yunnan's diverse indigenous groups. Emphasising that Du Wenxiu's administration was multi-ethnic, including Bai, Yi, Dai, Hani, Lisu and Manchu officials, he argues that despite the revitalization of Islamic learning, the printing of the Quran and the building of mosques and *madrasas*, the underlying ideology of the state was syncretistic and Islam was never allowed to overwhelm the multi-ethnic character of state. The point is well taken; this was no theocracy, and yet in the face of so little information about the workings of the Dali Sultanate, it is important to recognize that, not surprisingly, Du Wenxiu adopted a tripartite ethnic framework that did not deviate far from the Qing conceptualization of *Han*, *Hui* and *Yi* (indigenous people), the so-called *sanjiao* (three teachings or cultures), and there was little acknowledgement of the diversity among the *Yi*.

As Du Wenxiu struggled to consolidate Pingnan, by the summer of 1857, Kunming was besieged by Hui and non-Han rebels under the leadership of Ma Dexing, Yunnan's pre-eminent religious leader, and two of his former students Xu Yuanji and Ma Rulong. The siege lasted nearly a year and saw countless deaths, including that of Hengchun, the Qing governor-general who, having failed in his effort placate the violence, committed suicide. Nevertheless, the rebels proved unable to take the city and finally withdrew.

Notwithstanding this setback, throughout 1858 and 1859, Ma Rulong gradually consolidated his forces, becoming the most important rebel leader in the south and controlling an area nearly as large as the Dali regime. In early 1860, at the behest of Ma Dexin, Ma Rulong acted to divert a renewed Qing threat to Du Wenxiu's stronghold in Dali. However, with his mission accomplished, when that summer Ma Rulong was offered a post in the government of the Dali sultanate, he turned it down. On the one hand, therefore, by 1860 it is clear that there existed a loose alliance between Ma Rulong, Ma Dexin and Du Wenxiu who together controlled broad swathes of Yunnan. On the other hand, Yunnan was now divided into spheres of control with Du Wenxiu in the northwest, Ma Rulong in the south, and the east divided under several local leaders. Meanwhile, Qing authority in the province had all but disappeared.

Like others before him, Atwill sets out the importance of the distinctive regional landscapes of Yunnan: the deep gorges and mountains of the west, the Yunnan plateau to the east and the subtropical lowlands to the south, but it is in his analysis of Ma Rulong's activities that the political importance of these regional divisions are made most apparent. Regionalism, Atwill argues, and not religious schisms undermined the Muslim cause, moreover, there was never a simple Han-Hui divide.

Borne along on a ripple of victories, in autumn 1860, Ma Rulong and his troops closed in on Kunming. As they tightened their control over the surrounding region, the provincial governor Xu Zhimin opened negotiations with Ma Rulong and the religious leader Ma Dexin. The negotiations broke down; another siege ensued and only on 1st March 1862, with the city poised on the brink of starvation, was a truce brokered. According to Qing sources, the rebels had capitulated, but to some observers it may have appeared more like a rebel victory. Ma Rulong was afforded the rank of regional commander and presumably continued to command many of his troops, while Ma Dexin was given religious title and authority. Whatever the court chose to believe, it is doubtful that any Qing official in Kunming was really convinced by Ma's change of heart — at least not until the events of the following

year. In spring 1863, with Ma Rulong temporarily absent from the city, the Hui generals Ma Liansheng and Ma Rong, who had strong ties with Du Wenxiu, launched an insurrection, killing the recently arrived governor-general Pan Duo, and occupying the city. Before Du Wenxiu's troops could arrive to consolidate the victory, however, Ma Rulong returned, recaptured the city and handed control back to the Qing authorities. Ma Rulong may have gone some way to win over sceptics and demonstrate where his loyalties now lay, but what had brought about this change of heart?

According to Atwill, Ma Rulong's willingness to capitulate to the Qing was not so much a Damascene conversion to the Qing cause, as a reflection of his deep animosity towards Du Wenxiu's growing influence. This, he attributes to Ma's intense regional pride and deep sense of frustration that the role of the south, and presumably his own role, in the revolt had been under appreciated. In effect, Ma and Du were now vying for the position of leadership of the Hui in Yunnan. Atwill does not choose to conjecture afresh on how throwing in his lot with the Qing helped Ma Rulong's cause. Instead, he focuses on the lack of evidence to support the assertion that the schism with Du Wenxiu was caused by religious division, both having been students of Ma Dexin, a practitioner of *Gedimu* teachings. Dependent as we are on Qing official sources and the accounts of Western observers, such as Émile Rocher and Loius de Carné, we still know all too little about the role of religion in this rebellion, yet there can be no doubt that religious factionalism between the *Gedimu* communities and the Sufi orders did exist in the region, and possibly played a role in the collapse of the Dali regime. That said, until more sources come to light concerning the religious life of Yunnan during this period, Atwill is on firm ground in asserting that it was regionalism and, one might add, a good measure of personal rivalry, rather than religious doctrine that lay at the heart of the friction between Ma and Du.

In 1863, Ma Rulong dispatched a mission to persuade Du Wenxiu to surrender and by 1864 even Ma Dexin was trying to cajole Du into discontinuing the rebellion, on the grounds that it could only lead to Hui killing Hui. But Du had no intention of surrendering and the Dali sultanate was able to fend off Qing attacks and endure for another eight years, before finally collapsing with the death of Du Wenxiu in late 1872.

As we have seen, Atwill skilfully weaves his themes of ethnicity, regionalism and religion throughout the narrative, but it is in fleshing out that narrative, in particular in respect of the causes of the rebellion, that he makes his strongest contribution. The corollary of acknowledging that the rebellion was not a clear Han-Hui divide, driven by conflict between believer and non-believer is, of course, that we need to reappraise the causes of the revolt. With the preponderance of sources emanating from the state and a lack of sources generated by the rebels, Atwill sensibly approaches this problem by seeking to understand the local background to the revolt.

It was the Mongols who, having integrated Yunnan into China in 1253, were largely responsible for bringing the earliest Muslim presence to the region. Yet, even throughout the Ming, Yunnan continued to be regarded by the court as an unstable, hostile region, not the least because large swathes of territory were under the control of local *tusi* (chieftains), many of whom paid only nominal allegiance to the central authorities.

When the Qing finally gained control of Yunnan in the late seventeenth century, there followed another push to assert state control over this inhospitable, though clearly fertile and

resource-rich region. Under the reign of the emperor Yongzheng (1723–1735), the Qing introduced a programme of administrative consolidation (*gaitu guiliu*) which amounted to an attempt to remove the *tusi* administrative framework, often with considerable violence. As a result, indigenous rule was significantly weakened, but by no means eradicated. Prefectures and counties in each region were now grouped together and placed under a military commander, but if there was a perceived gradual taming of the region in the late eighteenth century, it was largely due, not to the increased Qing administrative presence, but to the rising numbers of often impoverished and destitute Han, as well as the inevitable adventurers, who decided to take their chance in Yunnan. Lured by the prospect of fertile lands, the opportunity to find work in the copper, tin or silver mines, or to make their fortunes by taking advantage of Yunnan's prosperous trade in tea, tobacco, cotton, salt or sundries, Han flooded into the region.

By the late eighteenth century, more and more Han settlers were heading for Yunnan, not just from neighbouring provinces such as Sichuan, but from all over China: Hunan, Hubei and Guangdong. The numbers speak for themselves. From 1775–1850, Yunnan's population surged from *c.* 4 to 10 million. In a familiar pattern, initially, this new wave of settlers were drawn to the urban centres, but gradually they began pushing deeper and deeper into the lands of the indigenous people, thus sparking a pattern of violence all too common on the frontiers of expanding empires. On the one hand, private Han traders were illegally entering non-Han areas to trade and thereby depriving locals of their profits, on the other, the new immigrants were encroaching on non-Han land.

By abusing the *dian* system (conditional sale), unscrupulous *tusi* began to circumvent the prohibition on outright sale of land and authorized the transference of vast areas to Han immigrants. But it was not the rising resentment over land acquisition by the Han immigrants alone that caused clashes between locals (including Han and Hui), and the newcomers. As Atwill points out, environmental historians, such as Christian Daniels, have shown that in the case of the Lisu Rising in 1821, for example, there was also anger at the devastation of the hill lands. This resulted, not least, from the intensive mushroom farming favoured by the newcomers, for once the felled trees on which the mushrooms were cultivated had decayed, the mountainsides were left bare and prone to landslides. Consequently, the combined pressures on economic resources, coupled with a series of natural disasters and the increased penetration of the state, accentuated tensions. But if local *tusi* were colluding with the Han immigrants and the Hui frequently found supporters among the indigenous people, where, if anywhere, were the “ethnic” fault-lines?

The figures which are regularly cited in respect of Yunnan's ethnic make up at this time appear in a memorial by Zhang Liangji, when he was serving as governor-general of Yun-Gui in 1860: “In Yunnan province the Yi (indigenous peoples) are the most numerous; they comprise 7 out of every 10, the Han not more than 2 parts and the Hui people only 1 part” (*Qinding pingding Huiifei fanglüe* 9: 19b). These figures are generally regarded with caution, but having made an exhaustive trail through the gazetteers, in his unpublished work on Yunnan, the late Joseph Ford concluded that despite considerable local variation, they are, indeed, an acceptable guide. The more important question is, of course, how the distribution of different groups related to outbreaks of violence, as well as the intriguing issue of local truces, but for this we must await a more detailed survey. Nevertheless, it is well attested that

while in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries Han and Hui came to dominate the urban centres, early immigrants were widely scattered and lived in close contact with the indigenous peoples. It would have been surprising if over several generations many of the early migrants, whether Han or Hui, had not adopted non-Han customs. Equally significantly, like the various groups of Dai, Tibetans and Miao alongside whom they lived, they naturally adapted to the topographical and economic realities of their environment, interacting with traders from Tibet, Burma, Thailand or Sichuan. Thus, Atwill suggests, “the primary concerns of Yunnan were not inextricably linked to the interests of the distant imperial center. [. . .] These people were not simply for or against the Chinese state; they were not simply functioning inside or outside state-proscribed channels of interaction. Rather, their actions were often motivated and shaped by local contingencies” (p. 14). Here again we see Yunnan conforming to the story so frequently found on the frontiers of large empires: while indigenous peoples and early settlers may have traditionally been drawn towards multiple centres, in the modern period the stronger the imperial state becomes, the more it endeavours to redirect the political, economic and even cultural focus of the frontier towards the political centre resulting, more often than not, in rising tension and eventual conflict with the state.

The blurring of identities, the common economic interests and the interaction with multiple polities, all make it unsurprising to find that during the early stages of communal friction, long-term Han residents often took up the causes of the non-Han against the new arrivals. In the Qing records, these people were referred to as *Hanjian*, opposed to *Yifei* (non-Han bandits) and *Huifei* (Hui bandits). But interestingly, Atwill observes that the term had all but disappeared from official records by late 1830s, the point at which he suggests the court became firmly focussed on the Hui as the instigators of the violence. What we are witnessing here, according to Atwill, and this is central to his thesis, is a shift in the state’s concern “from a category of people to a single ethnic group” (p. 63).

Clearly, one cannot conclude a review of this book without mention of the issue of Hui identity. A large section of the first chapter is, in fact, devoted to a re-run of the Hui identity argument. Atwill positions himself firmly in the camp of those who view the Hui as an “ethnic” group arguing that a clear distinction between ethnic and religious identity does seem to have existed in mid-nineteenth century Yunnan and even that in the Qing period, identity was construed in the same way as ethnicity is understood in the modern era. Personally, while agreeing with Atwill that the rebellion in Yunnan and, indeed, all the Hui rebellions of the nineteenth century marked a watershed in the divide between Han and Hui, I remain unconvinced of the advantage in regarding the Hui as a separate ethnic group at this time, preferring to acknowledge the fluidity of identity and the importance of endeavouring, wherever possible, to determine how individuals positioned themselves, and others, in terms of allegiance to the state, religious groups etc etc, at any given time. But if it is difficult to find the voice of rebels who were, as in the case of the Hui, often thoroughly literate in Chinese, how much more difficult is it to give voice to the non-Han, who despite Atwill’s best efforts remain a shadowy, silent presence in these events — albeit an important one.

And so to shortcomings; if there is one in this book, it is that in focussing on the consequences of Qing policy, we tend to miss the whole range of attitudes and approaches that existed among Qing officials (whether Han or Manchu), and the efforts made, not just

by Hengchun, but others too, to avert these terrible events; still less do we feel the full effect of the tragedy that results when a distant emperor is misled by incompetent, fearful and prejudiced officials. But how are we to get closer to the question of how attitudes towards the Hui were shaped prior to the events of the mid-century? As Atwill's study so clearly underlines, to suggest that the Hui were viewed just like any other non-Han group, is clearly not the case. Indeed, I am still troubled by the unsubstantiated, yet oft cited suggestion made, I believe, originally by Owen Lattimore, that when the Zuo Zongtang advanced into Xinjiang, his troops dealt with the Hui much more severely than the Turkic Muslims, because they were regarded as Chinese who should have known better. Could there be any truth in this statement? Did not many Han Chinese believe that the Hui, so almost-perfectly "civilized" were, in fact, Han Chinese who had perversely adopted an alien religion? But here I am at risk of re-awakening old and unfashionable arguments.

In conclusion, then, *The Chinese Sultanate* is an excellent book which will hopefully serve as a launching pad from which Yunnan will be integrated more thoroughly into the debates on identity and ethnicity in late imperial China, as well as that on imperial frontiers in general. It is a book that should be read.

L. J. NEWBY
University of Oxford

Allegoresis: Reading Canonical Literature East and West. By Zhang Longxi. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2005. Pp. x + 256. \$39.95/£22.95.

Is Comparative Literature a dead discipline? Gayatri C. Spivak has recently raised such a question, to follow on many other scholars and critics, who continue to make available the requiems for comparative poetics or the reports of its failing health: that sales of classical literature in translation have shrivelled, interests in languages other than English and Chinese or Spanish have drastically declined, and practitioners of comparative literature are graying, no longer able to attract students at the internet age of media and cultural studies.

Apparently, Longxi Zhang thinks differently. His new book, entitled *Allegoresis*, offers most erudite and nuanced, not to mention comprehensive, accounts of reading canonical as well as contemporary literature—East and West, ranging from the *Iliad* and *Book of Poetry* to *Richard II* and *Hai Rui Dismissed from Office*. The book is a welcome addition to the burgeoning interdisciplinary field of interpretation and translation studies. It offers fresh methodologies and insights on allegorical theories of reading. It will certainly win notice, as it complements Angus Fletcher's seminal *Allegory* (1964), Annabel Patterson's *Censorship and Interpretation* (1984), Zhongshu Qian's *Guan zhui bian* (1986), among a handful of classical treatises on the very subject. Not only does Zhang consider literary examples from Greco-Hebraic tradition, examining the cultural politics of interpretation as exercised by the Jewish and Christian missionaries in relation to Chinese classics, but he also reinterprets a great number of foundational traditional Chinese commentaries while engaging a rich diversity of critics such as Aristotle, St. Augustine,