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Overseas Chinese in China's Policy

—A Case Study of Malaysia

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I. Introduction

1. Overseas Chinese: A Definition

In its overseas Chinese affairs policy, China tries to define "overseas Chinese" as Chinese who live outside China but choose to remain Chinese citizens. Those who have been naturalized voluntarily and have obtained citizenship in their nation of residence are excluded from the designation "overseas Chinese." Such a tactic implies that implementation of the overseas Chinese affairs policy will involve only "overseas Chinese," not naturalized Chinese. But the issue of defining "overseas Chinese," both legally and morally, is neither so simple nor clear-cut as it earlier appeared. The problems of definition are multiple.

Firstly, problems in classifying naturalized Chinese separately from non-naturalized Chinese are frequently caused by changes of regime during the period of decolonization in Southeast Asia. Very often, overseas Chinese lost their citizenship status after the independence of their resident nation had questioned the loyalty of overseas Chinese. Such cases occurred in both Indonesia in the past and in Vietnam in recent years. In Indonesia, for instance, over 390,000 naturalized Chinese Dutch subjects, who had obtained their legal status during the 1945-9 period, later became solely Chinese nationals from their declining to apply for Indonesian citizenship and their not being regarded as Dutch citizens.¹ In Vietnam, the allegedly forcible naturalization of Chinese under the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem became a serious problem in defining their citizenship. Both North Vietnam and China had agreed that the forcible change of nationality of Chinese in South Vietnam was a matter that would be reopened for negotiation when the South and North were united again. But both China and Vietnam seem to have changed their minds about Chinese citizenship in Vietnam. China not only accepted many ethnic Chinese refugees from the North as returned "overseas Chinese," without identifying their real citizenship status, but also made an official protest over the expulsion of Vietnamese Chinese on the grounds

1. See Charles Coppel and others, *The Chinese in Indonesia, The Philippines and Malaysia*, London: The Minority Rights Group, 1972, p. 21.

that the naturalization of Chinese under the Diem regime was not recognized by China.² The key problem in this Vietnamese-Chinese issue related to the forcible change of nationality, which was not recognized by China, as China openly declared in 1956 when the issue took place. However, it was also clear to all parties concerned that whether or not the naturalization was mandatory for all Chinese was open to question. Again, the protest raised by China was unique and occurred at a time when many similar cases that existed in Southeast Asia brought no identical protest from China. Very clearly, the protest was made mainly for the purpose of rejecting political legitimacy for the Diem regime in favour of the regime in Hanoi. The political motivation — to give support to the communist regime in Hanoi rather than give support to the overseas Chinese community in Vietnam — was quite obvious. In short, both the Vietnamese and the Indonesian cases have proved a point: even a naturalized Chinese can become a Chinese national later, regardless of whether or not such action is taken by China or by the other nations concerned.

Secondly, the problem of determining China's actual stand in its policy of dealing with the issue of Chinese nationals abroad is constantly exacerbated by China's undecided position on the question of how China defines its nationals abroad. Legally speaking, it can be argued that the Nationality Act of 1929 is still valid in China, due to the absence of any new nationality legislation since 1949, when the present regime was established in Peking to replace the Kuomintang. If this is the case, the principle of defining a Chinese citizen still follows the principle of *Jus sanguinis*, which affirms a traditional principle that "Any person whose father was, at the time of that person's birth, a Chinese national is himself a Chinese national." Against this view is the one often indicated by Chinese leaders that China no longer regards as Chinese nationals. Those overseas Chinese who have become naturalized voluntarily as local citizens. For many countries in Southeast Asia, however, it is uncertain whether such a policy actually carries strong legal obligations. They wonder why China has announced such a measure in policy statements dealing with such an important matter and yet has not moved to enact a nationality act. In fact, the legal obligation of such a statement of policy was undermined when China had to sign and ratify a dual nationality treaty with some, but not all, nations in order to end the legal issue of dual nationality for Chinese abroad. If such a statement of policy has its own legal obligation, the governments concerned could have resolved the dual nationality issue simply by initiating its own nationality law.

Thirdly, China's attitude concerning the nationality of Chinese abroad became further complicated when China took action to protect overseas Chinese in various

2. See "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China on the Expulsion of Chinese Residents by Vietnam" in *On Vietnam's Expulsion of Chinese Residents*, Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1978, pp. 7-17.

crises in the past. Each time the protection issue was raised, the protected target was generally referred to as "overseas Chinese." From this practice of referring to the overseas Chinese in any crisis situation, it might be inferred that China actually considered only Chinese citizens in granting its protection. But it was, in fact, very difficult if not impossible, to determine who remained Chinese citizens and who had become naturalized in another country because of the lack of written documents in China identifying those who chose to remain citizens and those who chose to take local citizenship. Consider Malaysia as a case in point. In the past, when the Malaysian government took the initiative in starting naturalization for its Chinese residents, the People's Republic of China was not involved in any way and thus had established no record regarding this naturalization. Without such a record, granting protection to those broadly defined as "overseas Chinese" would naturally tend to involve non-Chinese citizens and thus cause even more confusion in interpreting the term "overseas Chinese." China's immediate response in receiving ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam into China without questioning their nationality illustrates this problem. This confusion was not caused by a single event but by various ones, such as the cases occurring in the 1965 Indonesian incident and those of 1967 in Cambodia and Burma. Considered as a whole, these incidents indicated that China cared less about differentiating between Chinese citizens and non-citizens than it did about granting protection for "overseas Chinese" during a crisis. Consequently, the term "overseas Chinese" has impressed many people as being a term that possibly includes all Chinese living abroad.

Furthermore, in its latest Constitution, adopted on March 15, 1978, China has once again announced its protection policy for "overseas Chinese," stating that "The state protects the just rights and interests of overseas Chinese and their relatives."³ The confusion inherent in this constitutional article is caused by the undefined term of "overseas Chinese," a designation that has the complicated nature analyzed above. It is even more confusing here to see the term "their relatives" included in the Constitution. Logically, if "their relatives" refers to Chinese citizens — as the terms "overseas Chinese" implies — it is unnecessary, if not illogical, to single out "their relatives" from "overseas Chinese." One might argue that "their relatives" refers to those Chinese citizens who are relatives of the "overseas Chinese;" relatives who are living in China. But without such specification, the term "their relatives" can also be taken to mean those non-citizen Chinese who are relatives of the Chinese citizens residing abroad. In considering the complicated issue of protection that occurred in Indonesia in 1965 and in Vietnam in 1978 because of being unable to identify and to protect Chinese citizens as a separate group from ethnic

3. See Article 54, The Constitution of People's Republic of China.

Chinese, it seems evident that this article of the Constitution will probably cause suspicion about the real definition of "overseas Chinese."

To conclude, when the problem remains so controversial, legally and morally, the term "overseas Chinese" that China officials so often use in their policy announcements has often been understood by indigenous people in Southeast Asia to mean all Chinese, including ethnic Chinese and "stateless" Chinese. For this reason, under policy operation, the term "overseas Chinese" must necessarily be defined in this paper as Chinese of various types. Necessarily, in a policy analysis, the actions of all concerned by the policy must be taken into the account. It is important, therefore, for policy makers to take into consideration the actual meaning of "overseas Chinese." It is also imperative to take into consideration the meaning of "overseas Chinese" in the concepts held both by "overseas Chinese" themselves and by the indigenous peoples of the various countries concerned.

2. Overseas Chinese and Malaysia: An Identification of Issues

While it appears at first glance to be quite simple and straight-forward in nature, the overseas Chinese policy of the People's Republic of China has been treated as a complicated issue by many observers and leaders in Asia. Very often, it was, and still is, believed to be a policy planned to make the Chinese a Fifth Column to serve Peking's national expansionism.⁴ Some see the policy as a measure taken by its planners to compete with the Kuomintang in Taiwan, winning over the loyalty of overseas Chinese and thereby gaining their financial power, which is badly needed for economic development by both Peking and Taipei.⁵ The main purpose of Peking's overseas Chinese policy, some believe, is to make use of Chinese populations and their economic strength as a pressure for achieving better relations with the resident nation of those overseas Chinese.⁶ Some observers state that the only interest Peking has in mind is spreading communism in the area through the Chinese population who believe communism could and will save China as well as the poor nations in the region.⁷

Many observers have tried to discover the major purpose of China's overseas Chinese policy; some have even ventured further, blaming China for major respon-

4. See Robert Elegant, *The Dragon's Seeds, Peking and the Overseas Chinese*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959.

5. See Garth Alexander, *The Silent Invasion*, London: MacDonald, 1973.

6. *Ibid.*

7. It is so often expressed by some indigenous leaders of Southeast Asia nations, such as Indonesian leaders in recent years. See Jay Taylor, *China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974.

sibility in the perennial sociopolitical and racial crises in Southeast Asia.⁸ Ideologically, China is blamed for the rise of communist movements in the region because of the involvement of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asian communist revolutions. Politically and culturally, China is accused of causing difficulty in integrating Chinese populations into a new local identification, for China has failed to cut off in any way its relations with overseas Chinese. Racially, China is often blamed for the outbreak of conflicts between overseas Chinese and indigenous peoples. Some observers have pointed out that such attitudes are warranted because China has secretly used overseas Chinese populations to fulfill her diplomatic demands in the sense that overseas Chinese can be called upon to stand against the governments in their respective places of residence, particularly when these governments have appeared to be unfriendly to China. To counter this threat from the Chinese populations, indigenous leaders have no choice but to mobilize their own masses to fight back. Racial conflict has thus occurred, some observers claim. Furthermore, some observers claim that many violent incidents that have worsened sociopolitical relations between the Chinese and indigenous peoples were caused simply by the competition for the loyalty of the overseas Chinese communities between Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China. If lost in the game, the loser is liable to use any possible channel or weapon to combat his opponent. The existing racial hatred between the Chinese and the indigenous peoples, observers point out, is one of the convenient weapons that has often been used in Kuomintang-Communist rivalry.

There is yet another valid approach which should be developed in a study of the overseas Chinese issue. It is an approach based on the assumption that most of the anti-Chinese violence in Southeast Asia has originated directly from power struggles among the various indigenous leaders. Keeping in mind events like those of 1965 in Indonesia, of 1969 in Malaysia, of 1978 in Vietnam, one can develop a strong point for arguing that the anti-Chinese campaigns are normally used as a weapon for seizing power from governmental leaders by some anti-government faction. It is not necessary that the motivation of the anti-government action be directly related to the overseas Chinese issue. For the overseas Chinese issue is always an effective weapon in handicapping the national order, particularly the economic order, since, in most Southeast Asian nations, the Chinese contribution to economic order is indispensable. Once it is disturbed, the economic life will be effectively affected. And the economic order is easily disturbed. In the first place, the overseas Chinese communities are considered non-indigenous, if not totally foreign. Secondly, historically they have been brought in by colonial authority and play an important role in a colonial economic system. Thirdly — and economically — the

8. See Tungku Abdul Rahman, *May 13: Before and After*, Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu, 1969.

overseas Chinese are generally considered more **affluent** as a group than the indigenous population. Because of this **background**, it is **easy** for anti-government factions to use the affluence of overseas Chinese as an **accusation** against governments for not taking better care of the interests of **their** indigenous population. By using this as an issue the accuser often gains the **image** of a **crusader** in the eyes of a significant number — if not all — of the indigenous people. **Quite** probably, a few radicals will storm the Chinese community. If **this** happens, **racial** conflict will spread like wild fire. Such a situation will quickly **create** a trap to **catch** governmental leaders in a hapless position. They will be **trapped** in a **dilemma** in which neither the offer of protection to the Chinese community, in an effort to **safeguard** the economic order, nor strong measures for dealing with the anti-government leaders can save government leaders from **misfortune**. Still, the **economic order** cannot be resumed without giving protection to the Chinese community; and **without** the use of strong measures in dealing with anti-government leaders, the anti-Chinese campaign usually cannot be discouraged.

The situation of prolonged **discontent** centered around this critical issue of the overseas Chinese effectively **ended** the control of **Tungku Abdul Rahman**, the former premier of Malaysia, in 1969, and **Sukarno**, the former president of Indonesia, in 1965. Both leaders had come **out** for protection of the Chinese communities when they faced the problem of **anti-Chinese violence**. Not even the towering national fatherly status they had **gained** from **their** successes in leading their nations to independence could save them from **disaster**. **These** experiences taught many indigenous leaders to recognize **overseas Chinese affairs** as a sensitive issue and to realize the necessity for immediate **concern** and **control**. A tremendous amount of empirical data can be collected to **show** how **indigenous** leaders after **Sukarno** and **Tungku Abdul Rahman** have been **extremely** cautious in handling overseas Chinese issues, being neither too favourable to **their** Chinese communities, in their invincible economic growth, nor yielding too **much** to demands of radical factions.

The above paragraphs indicate that the **seemingly** simple nature of overseas Chinese affairs have developed into a very **complicated** issue. And this complicated issue has since widely divided academic study to **the extent** that even a sensible study of the issue may be treated insensibly by **academic** dissidents. Worse still, the sensitivity and the complication of the issue **have** often discouraged researchers from doing acceptable, objective studies, partly **because** of the difficulty in obtaining classified materials from strict **official** custody and partly because of **easily** incurred political suspicion by the authority **concerned**. **Furthermore**, this complicated issue has proved the point that any **single** approach to a study of it would be unsatisfactory. Once the issue has become **divided** into **so many** directions, attempting to follow a single root cause would **inevitably** result in **ignoring** too many related major parts. Such a study would be far too **one-sided**.

This paper, therefore, is thus directed so as not to be favourable to one particular approach, and yet not be too indecisive by considering many approaches. Any approach that appears to be genuinely significant is considered. Choosing Malaysia as a case study in this project does not imply that the issue of overseas Chinese in that country is particularly acute. Rather, the case has provided for the study of this issue all the necessary information for considering the various approaches mentioned above. And, more important, the Malaysian case has provided a number of important events that have proved the validity of certain approaches that cannot otherwise be established as valid when applied to events in other nations. The detail of this point will be discussed in the paper. In addition, it should be pointed out that this paper does not attempt to represent all aspects of the overseas Chinese issue in the Southeast Asian region. The Malaysian case is, in many ways, unique; but this does not decrease its value in understanding the complicated issue of overseas Chinese affairs. It is particularly useful to try to understand the overseas Chinese policy of China on one hand and the overseas Chinese policy of Malaysia on the other. Both Malaysia and China in their recent history have been very prudent in handling issues concerning overseas Chinese. The extra efforts of its leaders have made the Malaysian case even more valuable for understanding the issue. For the Malaysian case shows that, under certain circumstances, the issue would occur naturally rather than unnaturally.

Limits of time and space prevent any exhaustive discussion of all issues and the relevant studies discussed above. In this paper the author can deal only with those important issues which this seem most appropriate at this particular time.

II. The Role of Malaysia in China's Policy

In understanding the true nature of the overseas Chinese policy of the People's Republic of China, Malaysia provides a very useful case study because of the significant number of its Chinese population. It has been generally assumed that Peking has always used local communists and overseas Chinese communities as a weapon against unfriendly governments in Southeast Asia.⁹ In Malaysia, about 40 per cent of the total population are Chinese who are culturally very much Chinese. Economically, they have played an indispensable role in the national development. Politically, as its leaders have often pointed out, the Chinese in Malaysia have been the key to its stability. Also it must be remembered that, at the peak of the communist

9. It was widely reported that it was the main reason contributing to the exodus of overseas Chinese from Vietnam, according to the Vietnamese account. See *Hong Kong Standard*, May 6, 1978, p. 1. Nayan Chanda, "Cholon's Merchants Feel the Border Backlash," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 5, 1978, pp. 10-11.

revolts, there were about 100,000 guerrilla fighters and sympathizers who were mostly Chinese in origin.¹⁰ Hence, it is reasonable to believe that if Peking had intended to use overseas Chinese communities and local communists as weapons against unfriendly governments, as has been widely suspected, it had a very good chance to do so. In fact, however, the Malaysian case proves it to be otherwise. In the last three decades, in almost all instances of major difficulties in Malaysia, China has never tried to take advantage either directly or indirectly. On the contrary, China has repeatedly tried to face the crises calmly. Let us take a closer look at several major events in order to document this line of action.

1. The Place of Malayan Communist Party in China's Policy

The Chinese Communist Party has been blamed for starting up the communist organizations in Southeast Asia. But when one examines the early history of the communist organizations of Southeast Asia from various sources,¹¹ one discovers an interesting point: the whole strategy and management of communist organizations in Southeast Asia had nothing to do with the Maoist communist party before World War II. The organization and management were the sole responsibility of Moscow. The history of the Chinese Communist Party also discloses that even the CCP was very much controlled by Moscow through the powerful representatives for its organization and strategy until the rise of the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, a man who had persistently challenged Moscow's instructions for China's communist revolution. Conflict between Moscow and followers of the Maoist line over the correct handling of the Chinese communist revolution occurred when proponents of Moscow's policy of an urban base tried to suppress those following the Maoist line of a rural base. Only after many failures in urban uprisings organized by the Moscow line did the Maoist line obtain the upper hand. Mao gained dominating leadership in the CCP only after the Tsungi Conference, which was held in 1935.¹² The difference in

10. Its exact strength was not known, some asserting that it had as many as 400,000 members or followers. The British Military Authority claimed that the MCP had 5,000 guerrillas and between 30,000 and 40,000 sympathizers. But Chinese communist sources claim that 35,000 Chinese were deported from June 1948 to the end of 1950. However it is believable that there were more than several hundred thousand sympathizers for the MCP.

11. See 1. Federation of Malaya, Director of Intelligence, A Confidential Report, *A Short History of the Malayan Communist Party*, Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1954; 2. Ministry of Culture, *Communism in Non-Communist Asian Countries*, Singapore: The Government Printing Office, 1967; 3. Brimmell, J.M. *Communism in Southeast Asia*, London: Angus and Robertson, 1965; and 4. Brimmell, J.H. *A Short History of the Malayan Communist Party*, Singapore: Donald Moore, 1956.

12. See 1. Stuart Schram, *Mao Tse-tung*, Penguin Books, 1966, p. 181; and 2. James P. Harrison, *The Long March to Power*, New York, 1974, pp. 245-250.

revolutionary lines is important in our argument here. Because, in later years — after the Mao group had established its independent control of the CCP and its revolutionary strategy — there was significant difference in policy between Peking and Moscow toward the communist organizations. It is doubtful if the history of the communist activities would be the same if Mao had had control of the communist organizations in Southeast Asia. He definitely did not have.

It has seldom been questioned that the beginning of the communist organizations in Malaya and Singapore were at the initiative of the Comintern.¹³ They occurred in early 1924, while the Comintern was still under the sole leadership of Moscow. At its beginning, the target community of communist interest was not the Chinese but the Malays. And their leaders were Alimin, Tan Malaka, and Musso, who were all Indonesians.¹⁴ But the slow progress, if not failure, in drawing indigenous populations into the communist organizations frustrated the communist leaders. Soon, their target was switched from the Malay to the Chinese community. Benefitting from the united front with the Kuomintang, the communist activities in Singapore and Malaya were quite successfully expanded. But when the Kuomintang had its first break with the CCP in their unhappy united front in 1927, the communist organizations in Singapore and Malaysia also suffered. By then, the communist group was separated from the Kuomintang and had formed its own party, which was known as the Nanyang Communist Party.¹⁵ The NCP branch office was established in Singapore, but its activities were not restricted to Singapore alone. All organizations in the Malays, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, and Indochina were under the supervision of the Singapore branch office, which in turn was directly under the control of the head office in Shanghai. And the Shanghai office was definitely under the direct leadership of Moscow. It was with this office that Mao had problems. It should be pointed out that it was also in 1927 that Mao had broken with Moscow's line of an urban base when he had written his article on the Hunan Report.¹⁶ Judging from the revolutionary activities organized under the NCP, it is quite significant that the pattern was identical to revolutionary activities in China. Both emphasized urban revolts that involved mainly workers and urban youths. Like their attempted revolts in China, all the revolts organized by the NCP failed and many leaders were arrested.¹⁷

The setback of the NCP because of heavy losses in leadership in the revolts finally caused alarm in the Comintern at the end of 1929. In 1930, the NCP was

13. See note 11.

14. See Lee Kuan Choi, *Politics and Life, Singapore: People's Action Party 1966*, p. 66.

15. Director of Intelligence, A Confidential Report, *A Short History of the Malayan Communist Party*, Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1954, pp. 12-14.

16. See Stuart Schram, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

17. See Lee Kuan Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

reorganized under instructions promulgated at the meeting of the Party Congress of Comintern representatives.¹⁸ From this time on, the NCP was dissolved. A Malayan Communist Party was organized with the hope that a relatively independent organization, such as it was supposed to be, would create greater initiative for its own development. The MCP, of course, was still under the leadership of Moscow; however, it was no longer under the direct control of the head office in Shanghai, but rather of the office in Hong Kong.¹⁹ This new head office in Hong Kong was a replacement for Shanghai, even though this new office took up responsibilities similar to those of the Shanghai office. The only difference was that the communist organizations in Southeast Asian were now enjoying increasing localization and initiative in forming policy. Even so, the new organization at this time, 1930, made no breakthrough. The Comintern then decided to send Joseph Ducroux to Singapore to review the situation. But Joseph Ducroux was arrested when he arrived in Singapore; and, after being questioned by the British authorities, Joseph Ducroux sold out his major comrades in Singapore and Malaya. With information from Ducroux, the British authorities were able to capture all the important communist leaders in Malaya. Even the new head office in Hong Kong was eliminated. The organization in Shanghai was also badly affected. The whole organization of communist activities was put to an almost full stop for four years.²⁰

The new connection between Moscow and Malaya was resumed in 1934; and this connection, again, was made through the new Shanghai office. A delegate was sent to Malaya for building up the new connection. The world economic crisis in 1933 had provided new hope for communist activities, mainly because of the increasing support from rubber and tin-mining workers, who had suffered under the depressed economic condition. Very soon, the Malayan Communist Party had established several branches throughout the Malay Peninsula. In 1934, the MCP was accepted as a full member party of the Comintern. Similar to patterns set in the 1920s, their tactics still emphasized very much the urban and industrial workers and youth movements. The peasant community was almost totally neglected. However, in 1935, in one of the most serious workers' uprisings in Malayan history, which took place in a Kuala Lumpur coal mine, their tactic was once again proven to be ineffective.²¹ Nevertheless, this tactic was maintained until the outbreak of World War II. World War II forced Moscow to establish a united-front tactic under which the bourgeois, the capitalists, and the colonialists were no longer considered as potential number one

18. See note 15.

19. *Ibid.*

20. Lee Kuan Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

21. *Ibid.*

enemies. For the number one enemies were the Japanese and the German Fascists. To comply with this united front tactic, MCP leaders were told to suspend their campaign against the British. Instead, the Japanese became their target this time.²²

It might be argued that the anti-Japanese united-front tactic could be considered a sign that the Maoist line of communist revolution had already gained an influential hold within the MCP. It is true that the anti-Japanese united front in Malaya was compatible with the Maoist tactic of a united front against Japan in China. But this similarity does not prove that the Maoist line was, at the time, well established in Malaya. In fact, the Maoist tactic of presenting a united front was quite different from the tactic of united front employed by MCP, particularly if one considers the way that the Malay and Indian communities were almost totally untouched, if not neglected, during the anti-Japanese campaign. Tactical interest focused almost completely on the Chinese community. It was understandable that the Chinese community was the natural enemy of the Japanese, who were hated by many overseas Chinese because of Japan's invasion of China; but this does not explain why the non-Chinese communities were untouched. In fact, when the anti-Japanese campaigns were launched, some of the British, the Indians, and the Malays — who were not ready to take the Japanese as the first enemy — were also offended. It was apparently not the way that a united-front tactic should be carried out. Actually, the whole vision of an anti-Japanese united front resulted as a legacy of the Moscow line inherited from the 1920s. The attempt to draw the non-Chinese communities into the communist organization had, in fact, not been seriously tried out. This happened mainly because the Moscow line of communist revolution in the regions of Southeast Asia had constantly placed emphasis on drawing urban-industrial workers into the communist activities. Moscow strategists believed that the workers were the sole vanguard of the communist revolution, not the peasants. In actuality, the overseas Chinese in Malaya were mainly urban and working class. The Malays were just the reverse. Once the tactic was established and an attempt made to organize only the urban-industrial workers, the Chinese became the more desirable target. And, partly because the Chinese had the nature of a working class and partly because the working doctrine of communist propaganda was aimed only at the working class, the Chinese population became naturally more susceptible or more inclined to the influence of the communist organization. The inclination developed into a habit, and a tradition then developed from the habit. The anti-Japanese tactic, with its emphasis on drawing only the Chinese, resulted basically as the legacy of this tradition. This tradition was maintained until early 1950s. It was only then that the Maoist line of communist revolution was fully recognized by some

22. *Ibid.*

of the leaders of MCP.

Without access to internal documents to show how the Maoist line came to be recognized and appreciated by the MCP, it is, of course, difficult to argue exactly when and how this recognition came about. However, an examination of the history of the MCP after World War II reveals that a great change in the revolutionary line occurred some time in the mid-1950s. For in the mid-1950s there were two major changes in the strategy of the communist revolution in Malaya. One was the establishment of the united-front tactic; the other was the decision to establish openly local identification of the overseas Chinese population in Malaya. The first change can be seen in the willingness of the communist leaders to explore the possibility of ending the insurgency with the designated independent government in Malaya, then under the leadership of **Tungku Abdul Rahman**. The other change is not so explicitly indicated but is, nevertheless, obvious. During the **Balin Meeting** between **Chin Pin**, the leader of MCP, and **Tungku**, the government leader, the issue of nationality for the Chinese communists was raised. The governmental point of view maintained that these communist members were Chinese in origin, not naturalized, and, therefore, should be sent back to China.²³ But **Chin Pin** argued that they were Malayan by birth. The status of overseas Chinese as indicated by **Chin Pin** was exactly identical with that held by China. In response to the talk held between **Tungku** and **Chin**, China openly endorsed the move claiming that the conflict between the MCP and the government was entirely an internal issue and one that concerned no other powers.²⁴ Attempting to duplicate this same move, China initiated its new overseas Chinese policy in which naturalization for overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia was openly encouraged and dual citizenship or overseas Chinese was declared undesirable.²⁵ An agreement to end the status of dual citizenship for overseas Chinese for all countries concerned was announced.

It is difficult to judge whether or not the MCP was influenced by this change in China, or vice versa. But the change, initiated by both the MCP and China at the same time, could hardly be considered coincidental. The most likely probability is that both the CCP and the MCP had finally come to a common ground regarding their revolutionary line. As **Edgar O'Ballance** observed, Mao had once advised **Lai Teck**, the leader of the MCP, to establish a united front with non-communist parties but not to attempt insurrection after World War II.²⁶ However, because of

23. See **Tungku Abdul Rahman Putra**, *Looking Back*, Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1977, p. 12.

24. See *Ta Kung Pao*, December 22, 1955, p. 3.

25. Editor, **Chou Mo Pao**, *Collected Works of Overseas Chinese Policy*, Peking: People's Publishing Society, 1957, pp. 20-28.

26. See **Edgar O'Ballance**, *Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-1960*, London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1966, p. 70.

the general overly offensive moves in Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union, the Western European powers and the U.S. had become more alarmed than ever before about global communist advances. In Southeast Asia, in line with the Moscow attitude, communist campaigns for revolutionary war against colonialism and imperialism were generally heightened. As a result, Lai Teck abandoned the MCP because of his foreseeable helplessness in resisting the overwhelming force of the increasing hardline within the MCP against colonialism in general and British authority in particular.²⁷ It can also be argued, of course, that the CCP itself had established an open revolt, rather than a united front, in dealing with the Kuomintang. But according to U.S. documents, Maoist revolutionary line at this time was not so radical as has been widely speculated.²⁸ It was rather Moscow's advancement in Europe and throughout the world that had alarmed the U.S. and the Kuomintang, which adapted a militant campaign against the CCP.²⁹ Finally, Mao and his party reacted with open warfare against the Kuomintang and its ally, the U.S. This reaction occurred even though immediately after Nanking had been occupied by the CCP army, Mao had sent Wong Hwa to Nanking to contact U.S. Ambassador, J. Leighton Stuart, and explore the possibility of obtaining recognition from the U.S. government and establishing a normal relationship between U.S. and China. And it occurred even after the Ambassador had given a favourable account of his talk with this special envoy, Wong Hwa, and had proposed normalization. The Ambassador, however, was instructed to act otherwise and was told to withdraw from the U.S. mission in communist-occupied Nanking. Hope for normalization between the U.S. and China thus perished.³⁰ Judging from such documents as the China White Paper and other sources, the U.S. decision to confront the CCP was overwhelmingly influenced by the European situation. In Europe, Soviet success in communizing Eastern European countries had threatened many European and U.S. leaders. A containment policy was therefore formed to counter communism in general and Soviet communism in particular. The basic assumption behind this policy was that all communists were the same in ideology and were under the sole leadership of Moscow. It was believed, apparently, that Chinese communism was no different from the Russian even though many American advisers in foreign missions and many scholars argued otherwise.³¹ With China encircled by this containment policy, Sino-U.S. relations worsened and,

27. *Ibid.*

28. See Department of State, *The China White Paper*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967.

29. See Chalmers M. Roberts, "How Containment Worked" in *Foreign Policy*, no. 7, Summer 1972, pp. 41-53.

30. This account was given by Chester A. Ronning to his son-in-law, Seymour Topping.

31. See Barbara W. Tuchman, "If Mao Had Come to Washington: An Essay in Alternatives" in *Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 1972, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 44-64.

finally, the Korean War resulted. According to one U.S. source in early 1950, Chinese military involvement in the Korean War was defensive rather than offensive, a battle waged to counter U.S. and U.N. forces because China's territories in the Yalu River were bombed and power sources damaged by the U.S. air force.³² It was this incident, rather than hatred of American imperialism or communist instinct, that forced China into battle. Undoubtedly, the containment policy, the Taiwan-U.S. Defence Treaty, and the Korean War had — one following upon the other — been factors that forced China to lean closer to the Soviet Union. If the U.S. policy toward the CCP had been better deliberated and more prudent, it is likely that the Maoist line in the communist revolution would have been continuously for a united front as it has been in later years. A great deal of evidence could be documented to show that Mao had confidence in his plan to oust the Kuomintang through his preferred united-front tactic immediately after World War II.

Judging then from the historical account presented above, it is doubtful that Mao would have advised the MCP leaders to make armed revolt against British authority immediately after World War II when he himself preferred to employ a united-front tactic. It is true that, at the same time that Mao had decided to engage the Kuomintang with arms, the MCP had also started its armed revolts. But it cannot be assumed that the MCP action resulted from Maoist advice, since Mao himself had no choice other than the armed clash with the Kuomintang. Again, Moscow's line of communist revolution endorsed the same flagrant aggression it adopted in its policy toward Eastern European countries. Furthermore, Moscow at this stage — about 1948 — paid particular attention to communist advancement beyond Europe while Maoist revolution was very much occupied in its battle against the Kuomintang. While Mao and his party were busily engaged in battles, it is doubtful that Maoist followers would, and could, risk their relationship with Moscow over the issue of a correct revolutionary line for developing areas as it was later to do in the 1960s. In fact, according to the most recently available Chinese sources, even Mao and his party were very much disturbed by Moscow's intervention through Stalin's favourite, Wang Ming, who was sent to China to give instruction to the CCP regarding revolutionary strategy. Wang and his instruction from Moscow could not be questioned, nor could there be disagreement. Wang Ming was considered by Chinese Communist sources, as was disclosed recently, to be the major rival of the Maoist line. According to one Chinese source, Moscow, when under the leadership of Stalin, had tried continually to establish tight control over the leadership of Comintern and communist parties across the world.³³ These considerations make it believ-

32. See Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960.

33. See *Cheng Ming Monthly*, no. 26, December 1979, pp. 48-51.

able that the armed revolts and the militant attitude of the MCP around 1948 were merely the results of Moscow's manipulation, not of Maoist. Captured documents from the MCP also indicate that the MCP revolts were at Moscow's instructions.³⁴

It is important, therefore, to emphasize that the militant line of communist revolution in Southeast Asia originated from the Moscow line, not the Maoist line. And yet, this issue to date has never been studied. Observers have continually taken for granted that the MCP, formed by ethnic Chinese, was dominated by the Mao-led CCP. This assumption should be reconsidered.

In addition, history since the mid-1950s also indicates that Peking's line was not to militant as has generally been thought, particularly when compared with Moscow's line. The most appropriate criteria for such a comparison can be found in the party-to-party relationship. Moscow's line of party-to-party relationship is apparently quite different from that of Peking. The former insists on a close and very cohesive party relationship, an attitude that often drives Moscow to press other parties to comply with Moscow's leadership. As a result, Moscow, when permitted, tries for tight control over other parties or at least continuance by them in a submissive role. In contrast to Moscow, Peking insists that the party-to-party relationship should be equal, with no superior or inferior party. One party may accept advice from the other, but only of its own free will. Nor should one party be given authority to press another into a submissive role. Peking maintains this attitude of non-control towards both neighbouring and distant parties. This difference in basic attitudes about party-to-party relationships has drive Moscow and Peking to follow very different behaviour in their foreign policies.³⁵

Many observers tend to believe that Moscow has become more moderate in the post-Stalin era. This impression is, in fact, quite illusory. In the post-Stalin era, throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the Soviet Union has been ready at all times to overthrow non-communist, or even communist, regimes by force whenever the time was appropriate. This can be seen in the crisis of 1956 in Hungary, the crisis of 1968 in Czechoslovakia, the crisis of the 1970s in Angola and Cambodia, and the crisis of 1980 in Afghanistan. These crises occurred even when Moscow was under different leadership—of Khrushchev and of Brezhnev. These crises occurred because all leaders have believed in one principle in guiding the party-to-party relationship: securing the control of other parties. In order to secure control, Moscow has not and would not hesitate in employing drastic measures to help other parties to seize power by force. Through this strong commitment and through military involvement, Moscow tries to maintain its control through "Bolshevikhization," just

34. See note 15.

35. See *Documents of Sino-Soviet Debates*, Hong Kong: Cultural Data Supply Publishing Society, 1977.

as Stalin often did with other parties both near and far from Soviet land. In nature and in style, the militant line of Khrushchev and Brezhnev against Hungary and Czechoslovakia was basically the same as the Stalinist "Bolshevikization" through which control of other communist parties was secured. Adherence to this practice has never been abandoned. Recently, under Moscow's leadership, the practice is again being used by the Vietnamese Communist Party. Their military action against the Khmer Rouge was categorically the same as the Soviet action in maintaining control over the communists in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.³⁶

In contrast, Peking has never attempted to set up control over other parties. The recent split between Vietnam and China provides a good case for proving the point. It is quite unthinkable that Vietnam could break with the CCP if Peking had control over the Communist Party of Vietnam. China launched an attack on Vietnam, but it launched it not in any attempt to establish control over the party in Vietnam. The attack did not follow the style of the Soviet attacks on Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Rather, China's act was a type of punishment given Vietnam for its attempt to overthrow Khmer Rouge. The whole issue of the recent Indochinese crisis has strongly indicated that Vietnam tried to establish tight control over the other communist parties in Laos and Cambodia while China was trying to maintain the principle of no intervention in other parties and other governments.

Observers have often believed that China was quite militant in the 1950s and 1960s. But, in fact, China would not, and could not be militant and has not been militant since the 1950s. This lack of militancy has been due mainly to its belief in non-control of other parties and due to its policy of not exporting revolution. Mao has constantly pointed out that, if imposed from outside, revolution would be premature and would not be successful when economic, social, and political conditions are not badly depressed. History repeatedly illustrates that China has had only a limited influence over other parties, certainly not control over the other parties. In his interview with James Reston in 1971, Chou En-lai indicated that, although China had helped the Vietminh to defeat French colonial power in Indochina in the early 1950s, Chinese influence over the Vietminh was very limited. As Chou pointed out, the Vietminh was quite unwilling to participate in negotiating with the French government at the Geneva Conference in 1954 to end the Indochinese War. China somehow had convinced Vietminh leaders into going to the conference, but the Vietminh leaders had considered it poor advice. Otherwise, the Vietminh leaders believed, South Vietnam would have been liberated following the victory at the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Apparently the Vietminh leaders had told Chou their feelings over the issue of Geneva Conference of 1954. For many years later, in 1971,

36. See *Hong Kong Standard*, January 20, 1979, p. 10; and *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 21, 1978, pp. 17-22.

Chou was still discouraged about influencing Vietnamese communist leaders to participate in the Second Geneva Conference of the 1970s. Chou indicated that under no circumstances would China influence the thinking of Vietnamese leaders over the issue of Indochina. The final breakup between China and Vietnam over the present issue of Indochina substantiates the correct account given by Chou when he was interviewed by Reston.³⁷

In his visit to Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, Teng Hsiao-ping was pressed by the governments of the three nations to abandon the local communist parties. But Teng disagreed. He pointed out that, if China chose to do so, it would be even more dangerous for the three governments because those communist parties would quickly fall under the control of Soviet-Vietnamese.³⁸ By saying this, Teng indicated that the CCP had, in fact, only a very limited connection with these communist parties. He would not have worried about loss of contact if the CCP had had strong control over the local parties. Many observers have also pointed out that the relations between the CCP and communist parties in Southeast Asia were moral rather than physical.³⁹ It should additionally be pointed out that following the split in Sino-Vietnamese relations, China's influence over the communist parties of the three nations seems to be facing a great challenge from Soviet Union and Vietnam. The Vietnam issue has also reviewed that the Communist Party of Thailand had developed split within the Party. The quick impact of Sino-Vietnamese rivalry on communist unity in Southeast Asia has strongly indicated the limited influence by China over those parties.⁴⁰

One might argue that China certainly intends to establish control over Vietnam if possible. It is true that Vietnam might not be easily controlled by any country. But it is also true that China, if it chose, could easily control Cambodia and Laos, countries very vulnerable to outside control. Yet China seems to be making no such attempt. One might argue that the failure to achieve control over the communist parties in Southeast Asia has been primarily due to geographical distances that China could not overcome. Again, such an argument is quite weak. Taking Indochina as a case in point, one could argue that all communist parties in Indochina are neighbours of China. Yet China has made no attempt to seek control over them. But Malaysia has provided an even better case in elaborating this point.

Close investigation shows that continuation of the MCP insurgency war

37. James Reston, Tillman Durdin, and Seymour Topping. *Report from Red China*, New York: Avon Publishers of Bard, 1971.

38. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 17 and 24, 1978.

39. See Stephen FitzGerald, *China and the Overseas Chinese*, Cambridge, 1972.

40. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 8, 1980, pp. 32-3, July 21, 1979, pp. 30-31; and *Bangkok Post*, July 4, 1980, p. 6.

against the Malaysian government would inevitably put Peking in a dilemma. For Peking's policy is one of attempting to bring Malay and Chinese, communist and non-communist, together in a united front against the hegemonism of the Soviet Union — a policy China has emphatically pointed out in recent years.⁴¹ But the Chinese majority in the MCP membership has made it difficult, if not impossible, to form such a united front. Both in the past and at present, some Malay leaders have expressed fears of the MCP because of its communal base. To ease their fear, they also tend to form their party on a communal base, and, as a result, communalism has been widely practiced in Malaysian politics.⁴² Under these circumstances, the deadlock cannot be broken if both sides continue in their rigid positions. And, — facing the challenge of the third party, the Soviet Union, — Peking cannot feel comfortable about continuation of the deadlock. China cannot, however, tell the Malay community to take the initiative in ending the deadlock, since Malaysia is definitely too distant for Peking to initiate such a step. As most observers are inclined to believe, the only remaining hope for Peking in ending this deadlock is to rely on the MCP with its Chinese base. Logically, it is quite reasonable to believe that the ethnic and ideological ties between the MCP and the CCP form a natural ground for Peking to establish control over the MCP. The MCP would simply do whatever Peking tells its leaders to do. In actuality, this logic proves quite untrue. Similarly, if one tries to argue that the Malayan Chinese Association would do whatever Taipei told its leaders to do because of ethnic and ideological ties between Kuomintang and MCA, few people would accept such an argument. It is quite obvious how unthinkable the MCA under Kuomintang control would be, merely because of ethnic and ideological ties. Influence, perhaps; but not control. Ethnicity cannot secure a common unity for all Chinese.

So also with ideology. For the ideology of communism seems to provide a strong ground for common unity among many Chinese in China, but not among all Chinese in all the world, or — for that matter — even in all China. It is, therefore, quite wrong to assume that communism as an ideology has provided a strong ground for universal Chinese unity. It is not even correct to assume that all Chinese communists were, and are, bound together with no differences among themselves. The history of the CCP documents this point well. Therefore, it cannot be taken for granted that the MCP is physically controlled by the CCP because of their ethnic and ideological ties.

41. See "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism" in *Peking Review*, vol. 20, no. 45, November 4, 1977, pp. 10-38.

42. See K.J. Ratnam, *Communalism and the Political Process in Malaysia*, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1967.

Records of the first peace talk between MCP members and the Malayan Government in 1955 provides a close look at CCP-MCP ties. Observers tend to believe that the MCP's willingness to discuss ending their insurgency war was clearly a sign of Peking's control. It might be true that the MCP's decision to hold a peace talk was a sign of influence from Peking, which had widely propagated a united front tactic at this time. Hoping to draw governments in the region into its united-front forces, Peking definitely saw the necessity of ending the insurgency war in order to clear the way for success of the united front. But the failure of peace talks between the MCP and the Malayan Government significantly proved that the so-called control of the MCP by Peking did not exist. Similarly, it might be correct to believe that Peking had successfully convinced the MCP to come out of jungle as a first case to test the possibility of ending the insurgency war through peace talks. But this possibility was proved to be in vain by failure of the peace talks. Peking's influence over the Southeast Asian communist parties in general and over the MCP in particular had become an up-hill struggle, even though the MCP appeared to be still going along with Peking without much difficulty. But the real problem surfaced when Peking began its purge of united front leaders within the CCP at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1965. Apparently, the MCP was very pleased to see the purge occurring in Peking. Leftist papers published in Malaysia and Singapore showed their amusement when they cheerfully gave wide support to the purge of united front leaders in China. The purge of Liu Shao-chi and Tao Chu was emphatically supported in the leftist papers of Malaysia.⁴³ More important, the force behind the dying armed revolts of the MCP was suddenly revitalized. Many leaders of united front organizations were also purged throughout Malaysia. Governmental leaders like Tunjku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew were given the label of "clique" by leftist papers in Malaysia as well as by the public media in China.⁴⁴

Many observers tried to argue that this militant attitude of the MCP and its supporters was clearly the sign of a strong tie between Peking and the MCP. But such an assumption is not correct. It might be more reasonable to point out that the return of the militant attitude of the MCP and its supporters was a sign of refutation of the united front tactic of Peking before the Cultural Revolution. The dying armed revolt of the MCP should not be interpreted as the result of Peking's control. Rather, the decline of armed revolt should be considered a direct result of increasing support given to the government by both the Malay and Chinese communities. Peking had also, in part, made some contribution to the Malaysian

43. See the party paper of Barisan Socialist, *Cheng Seng Pao* (陣線報) December 8, 1968, p. 3.

44. For example, see New China News Agency's news-text in English, 0352 GMT, May 20, 1969 B.

government in its success in containing the armed revolts of the MCP. This point has been neglected by all observers, including the Malaysian governmental leaders. But it is undeniable that Peking had made definite its intention to make an attempt to bring Malay and Chinese communities together, hoping that this unity would pave the way for the success of a united front to counter the assumed number one enemy of the world at that time—the U.S. Encouraging the end of the MCP armed revolts was only a part of the united plan. Encouraging overseas Chinese to support the government of their residence and to apply for citizenship in their resident country, along telling those who remained Chinese citizens not to become involved in politics, are all well documented as part of Peking's overseas Chinese policy.⁴⁵

But in one way or another all these attempts of Peking worked contradictorily to the interest of the MCP. First of all, encouraging Malayan Chinese to apply for Malayan citizenship was definitely a move against the interests of the MCP. The MCP had openly discouraged Malayan Chinese from accepting Malayan citizenship; for, to the MCP, encouraging overseas Chinese to accept citizenship would imply recognition of the independence of Malaya. For in their justification of continuing to fight against the newly independent government, the MCP was forced to deny the legitimacy of the Malayan Government. They continued to claim the *mer deka* was a deceitful one. They argued that the so-called "independence" was a trick to mask the real face of neo-colonialism. Because of this deceitful "independence," the so-called government should be rejected. And the granting of citizenship by this deceitful government should also be rejected. This position of the MCP openly contradicted the position held by Peking. For, though Peking did not extend diplomatic recognition to the Malayan Government until 1974, *de-facto* recognition was established long before this date. Immediately after the independence of Malaya in 1957, the government was referred to as "government" in Peking's public media;⁴⁶ and governmental leaders were accepted as legitimate authorities. But this favourable treatment was rescinded during the Cultural Revolution. Heads of government like Rahman and Razak were labelled, instead, the "Rahman-Razak clique," just as the MCP and the local leftists had often labelled them. After the high peak of Cultural Revolution in the early 1970s, the respectable title of government again appeared in public media in China. Therefore, it is quite clear that the Peking position toward the government and its leaders in Malaya was quite contradictory to the position held by the MCP, except during the period from 1965 to 1969 when the Cultural Revolution was at its peak.

45. See Liao Cheng-chih, "Criticize the Gang of Four and Their Revolutionary Fallacies of Overseas Relations," *People's Daily*, January 4, 1978; and People's Publishing Society, *Collected Works of Overseas Chinese Policy*, Peking, 1957.

46. See *People's Daily*, August 31, 1957.

In addition, encouraging overseas Chinese to accept the citizenship offer by Malaya had created another complication for the MCP. Legally, as the overseas Chinese policy of Peking indicated, those who had not and would not accept citizenship would remain Chinese citizens. And, remaining Chinese citizens, they were supposed to stay out of local politics. This position of the PRC clearly clashed with the position held by the MCP. The MCP insisted that overseas Chinese in Malaya should not take citizenship offered by a government they did not recognize. But differing from Peking, the MCP could not, and would not, tell the overseas Chinese to stay out of politics. Instead, they energetically drew them into the political struggle against the government. To the MCP, thisetically drew them into the political struggle and was no small matter. For if they listened to and followed the position held by Peking, they would face a dilemma: either they must accept citizenship and behave as good citizens as the Malayan Government insisted, or they must reject citizenship and stay out of politics as Peking proposed. Either position was untenable; therefore, they chose to continue the armed revolt. The positions held by Peking and by the Malayan Government were both ignored, and the issue of citizen status for MCP guerilla members remained unsolved. To the Malayan Government, they were not citizens; but, to the MCP, they were Malayan, even though without legal status. To Peking, their status was somewhat unclear; presumably they were Malaysians. But no official documents relating to this issue have yet been made public. From the fact that Peking stopped acceptance of captured communist suspects deported by Malayan Government, it is likely that Peking considered them Malaysians. Certainly it is undeniable that Peking and the MCP were far apart on the issue of citizenship status for Chinese in Malaya. However, judging from the strong approval given by the leftist media published in Malaysia and Singapore to the purge of united front leadership in China and in Malaysia, and judging from the revitalization of the MCP armed revolts during the Cultural Revolution, it becomes that differences over the issue of Malayan overseas Chinese had damaging effects on CCP-MCP relations.

This point may be better comprehended if one examines the similarity of viewpoint regarding Malaysian citizenship held by Peking and the Malaysian Chinese Association, a bitter rival of the MCP. When the MCP had campaigned to boycott the citizenship offered by the Malayan Government, the MCA, as a partner of the ruling party, had made great efforts to rally Chinese together under its leadership and persuade them to apply for Malayan citizenship. Under the auspices of MCA leadership, mass applications for citizenship were made all over the peninsula of Malaya. The lives of the MCA leaders were threatened by the MCP over this issue of citizenship.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, many new members were recruited when they came

47. See Tan Siew Sin, *Blueprint for Unity*, Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Chinese Association Headquarters, 1972, pp. 225-236.

to MCA offices to seek help with **their** applications. Ironically, Peking and the MCA were ideologically in opposition **each** other, **because** the latter was associated with worldwide anti-communist movements. Yet **Peking** definitely extended a helping hand to the MCA in its campaign regarding acceptance of citizenship though not citizenship by explicit endorsement.

However, a question certainly arises about the legitimate right of the MCA to encourage Malayan overseas **Chinese** to accept **naturalization** without legal consent from the legitimate government of **China**. The **government** in Taiwan, it can be argued, could have been the legitimate authority for giving such consent. But the authority in Taiwan has never **endorsed** a policy of encouraging naturalization of overseas Chinese. Legally, **Peking's** policy of **adopting** foreign citizenship for overseas Chinese can be seen as an implicit consent for **what** the MCA had attempted to do. Psychologically, the encouragement for naturalization from Peking also contributed to the success in obtaining massive applications for citizenship. People feared being rejected in attempts to return home some day if **they** did not accept the advice from Peking. Also, overseas Chinese **had** heard so **often** about the socialist transformation in China and they worried about their **adaptability**, or even their survival, in a socialist system if and when they **had** to leave **Malaysia**. In fact, many had been told by people who had gone **back** to China that Peking was not pleased to see overseas Chinese return to their **homeland**. As a **result**, many overseas Chinese were drawn into the MCA campaign to accept Malayan citizenship. Many even joined the MCA to fight for better sociopolitical rights through legal channels. Support for the MCP was thus decisively reduced after the independence of Malaya. The MCP's image as the only protector of **Chinese** interest in Malaya was no longer generally held, and the fighting ability of the MCP was **severely** impaired. Finally, the MCP was badly defeated by the government in the **early** 1960's and withdrew into remote mountainous areas to seek sanctuary along the **Thai-Malayan** border.

It is undeniable, as the discussion above indicates, that this defeat of the MCP, was in part caused by **Peking's** policy toward both the MCP and overseas Chinese in Malaya. Therefore, the strong approval given by the MCP for the purge of united front leaders in **China** during the Cultural Revolution should not be interpreted as a sign of control of the MCP by **Peking**. Rather, it should be interpreted as a sign of their resentment against the moderate leaders and their united front tactic. The purge of united front leaders **made** members of the MCP feel more confident in their revolution. They welcomed the purge and hoped that the radical leaders who seized power during the Cultural Revolution would then provide them physical assistance rather than only moral. It is interesting to observe that when the radical movement died down in **China** in the **early** 1970s, all strong support for communist movements in Southeast Asia in **general** — and in Malaysia in particular

— also gradually died down.⁴⁸ The title of “clique” for the radical government leaders was replaced by “enemy” in Chinese public media in the early 1970s; but it continued to be used in leftist broadcasts in Malaysia.⁴⁹ In 1972 the term “enemy” was replaced by the respectful term “government.” And after the radical leaders of the Gang of Four were purged in 1976, the reports about MCP winning battles against government forces in Malaysia that had been seen so frequently in Chinese media were dropped entirely.⁵⁰ For example, for the entire year of 1979 only the MCP’s greeting on the PRC’s 30th anniversary national day was published in *People’s Daily*. In addition, from 1965 to 1971, most communist activities were reported directly, giving the impression that the reports were made under the initiative of Peking. From 1971 to 1973, the pattern changed. Most of the reports on communist activities were published either entirely in quotation or mostly in quotation, particularly if the news was in any way offensive to the government.

This new pattern of reporting suggests that Peking officials were trying to avoid the responsibility for any offensive version conveyed by the reports. However, the MCP revolts had not been dying down, even as late as 1980, from the time of its second comeback in 1965. Starting from 1978, CCP leaders have on several official occasions expressed their hope of seeing all political forces of Southeast Asian nations united together against Soviet-Vietnamese hegemonism. On one occasion, Ji Peng-fei, Director of International Liaison Department and Vice-Premier, former Foreign Minister, a party leader in charge of CCP relation with communist parties in Southeast Asia, specifically told the reporter of the *Bangkok Post* that Peking would like to see the Communist Party of Thailand stop its fight against the Thai Government in order to concentrate efforts against Soviet-Vietnamese hegemonism.⁵¹ The CPT is active in north and south Thailand, and the branch in the south is very closely associated with the MCP, whose members have often sought sanctuary along the Thai-Malaysian border. Both the CPT and the MCP are believed to have strong ties with the CCP because of the ethnic Chinese background of their leaders. Following the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in 1978, the CPT of north Thailand has reportedly come to a crossroad: either it should be pro-Soviet and pro-Vietnam or else be continually pro-China. Reports show that attacks on government forces have also been reduced significantly, mainly because Thai communist bases in Laos and Cambodia were being forced out by the Vietnamese.⁵² The group in the south

48. This conclusion is reached from the source of *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Washington DC, from 1970 to 1978.

49. This information is obtained from the Clandestine Broadcast of the MCP received in Malaysia in 1978.

50. See note 48.

51. *Bangkok Post*, October 21, 1979, p. 1.

52. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 8, 1980, pp. 32-33.

shows no sign of internal split or of slowing down their revolt. So also with the MCP. The fact that no split immediately followed the beginning of Sino-Vietnamese rivalry cannot, however, be interpreted as proof that the MCP has submitted totally to Peking.

Unlike the CPT in the north, the CPT in the south and the MCP have received much of their support from local Chinese communities in rural areas. The recent expulsion of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam by its communist party is considered by local Chinese communities as part of an anti-Chinese campaign rather than an anti-capitalist campaign. Associating with an allegedly anti-Chinese party, like the Vietnamese Communist Party, would naturally affect local Chinese support for their parties and would inevitably affect their very existence. Again, the lack of any immediate impact on the MCP from Sino-Vietnamese rivalry should be taken as a sign that the MCP has limited, if any, relations with Peking. Otherwise, an immediate impact of some type would have been evident. But, to date—two and half years since Peking in 1978 asked for a united front—there is no indication that the MCP intends to reduce efforts in their revolt against the government. Nor is there any sign of internal split. If the MCP were really under the grip of Peking, some sort of internal split would have occurred after the open clash between Peking and Hanoi. A close tie with Peking would be only a source of irritation, since Peking shows interest only in a united front tactic between the communist party and the government—an interest that is impossible to realize with the uncompromising attitude on the part of the government.

If the communist disliked this diplomatic approach of Peking, it would probably attempt to establish ties with Hanoi and Moscow, hoping thereby to secure physical support from the Vietnam-Soviet bloc that has currently been showing interest in disturbing the established balance of power in the Southeast Asian region. The factor of anti-Chinese feeling as noted above in the recent expulsion of Chinese refugees from Vietnam has, of course, inhabited the attempt for any MCP association with Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Yet, if there had been a close tie between the MCP and the CCP, it is not unlikely that leaders of the MCP would not see the potential benefits of siding with Vietnam and Soviet Union. In fact, as one sees benefits from open military intervention from outside, such as Vietnam provided in the Han Samrim regime, one would probably consider the mass support as secondary, or even as insignificant.⁵³ So far, the MCP has been able to avoid any internal split because they have maintained only limited relations or have held to a neutral position between Peking on one side and the Soviet-Vietnam bloc on the other. It is, as this paper proposes, only an aloof attitude toward Peking that has allowed the

53. *Hong Kong Standard*, January 20, 1979, p. 10.

MCP to avoid irritation and to avoid any internal split. Yet this interesting development has been neglected by many observers and by governmental leaders of Southeast Asia. Many leaders and observers continue to believe the version of maintenance of close ties between the CCP and the MCP; or they choose to see the MCP in a submissive role to Peking, based on the fact that the MCP and the CCP are ethnically related and ideologically similar. But neither ethnicity nor ideology can any longer be argued as strong bases for establishing relations, as numerous empirical cases have shown.

Discussions of MCP-CCP relations often focus on whether or not the MCP can survive alone and not be non-submissive to the CCP. The rationale for this observation comes from the assumption that the communist organization was originated by and has been led by a group of intellectuals trained or sent for the mission from a parent organization, an organization that is normally controlled by the other country. In the case of the MCP, the parent organization is assumed to be Peking. Its leadership is drawn from intellectuals: the whole revolutionary exercise, in fact, is an intellectual rather than a political game. But it is a game based on the serious matter, though, of the need for revolution felt by the masses. Such an observation focuses almost exclusively on party organization rather than on the mass base of the party.

But such an assumption fails to take into account the mass, perhaps because of the possibility that the changing sociopolitical attitudes of the mass itself might have an important impact that would, in one way or another, force the party itself to change its position in relation to its foreign connection. It is, however, extremely difficult to obtain data directly from MCP sources that would provide information for evaluating how the MCP might possibly be influenced by any change of the sociopolitical attitude of the mass base. But it is undeniable that the change of sociopolitical attitudes towards Peking on the one hand and toward Kuala Lumpur on the other is a very real change. And the impact of this change of attitudes on other political parties that have operated legally can also be clearly established. Generally, the Chinese population in Malaysia are much more for "Malaysianization" than they were before the nation gained its independence in 1957. A survey completed by this author shows that the generation that grew up in the 1960s and 1970s lack the knowledge about China that older generations had. The generation now in their school years are not fully aware of major events that have occurred in China. In the 1950s, students in the Chinese high schools of Malaysia were considered very Chinese-minded politically and socially. The situation is changing now. More than 200 students from Chinese middle schools interviewed in the survey were questioned about their knowledge of events that had occurred in China and about their ability to identify well-known leaders of China and Malaysia. Results show that their knowledge about Chinese leaders is much less than their knowledge about Malaysian

leaders. Compared with other Chinese students in English middle schools on the same basis, there are no significant differences. It is, therefore, quite reasonable to conclude that, in general, Malaysianization — or the sense that people think of themselves and concern themselves more about Malaysia — is far stronger among the younger generation than it is among the older generations.⁵⁴ It is reasonable to assume that, if the current trend persists, a better political and social integration will result. Because, as this author assumes, as general knowledge about China declines among the Chinese population, any intimate feeling, or loyalty, toward China is declining too.

Chinese refugees in their recent escape from Vietnam provided a very valuable empirical case for understanding the overseas Chinese attitude toward China. Among 65,000 Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong, almost 75 per cent are overseas Chinese, with an overwhelming majority coming from South Vietnam. Yet almost none of these refugees would choose to be resettled in China, even if offered the chance.⁵⁵ Overseas Chinese in South Vietnam are quite comparable to overseas Chinese in Malaysia. Both groups were naturalized around the mid-1950s. Since the mid-1950s neither the Chinese in South Vietnam nor the Chinese in Malaysia have been allowed to visit their relatives in China. Localized political integration was initiated at the same time both in Malaysia and South Vietnam, and both governments have remained quite unfriendly to the PRC since the mid-1950s. Socially, both South Vietnamese Chinese and Malaysian Chinese are quite different from the indigenous population. However, when the Chinese population are forced to leave their nation of residence, an overwhelming majority choose neither Taiwan nor China but prefer to be resettled in a land which appears to them to offer better hope for economic prosperity.⁵⁶ Their choices indicate that their most immediate concerns are economic rather than political ones. The repeated pattern in their choice provides a strong case to contradict the assumption, held by many observers for many decades, that overseas Chinese are politically loyal to China. For it is hard indeed to believe one refuses to choose for his residence a nation to which he is dedicated.

As the Chinese population become increasingly ignorant about China, their choice of political identification with local parties becomes more and more that of "Malaysianization." Among the major political parties in Malaysia that have been able to draw substantial support from the Chinese population, such as the Malayan Chinese Association, the Democratic Action Party, and the National Front, none have ever stressed a "China platform" in their political campaigns. Rather, all of

54. Based on the survey done by this author.

55. This information is obtained from the office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in Hong Kong.

56. *Ibid.*

them have consistently and emphatically dissociated their parties from any connection with either Taiwan or China. In the MCA, an anti-Mainland China politics has even been stressed.⁵⁷ And it has become the largest and the ruling party, with its support coming mainly from the Chinese population. Before the Labour Party became inactive prior to the 1960s, most of the observers believed that the support from the Chinese population it had been able to obtain was due to its pro-China stand. But the Party lost significantly its support from the Chinese communities in the last two general elections, when it decided to come back to join the election campaign which it had decided to boycott earlier.

The same experience is probably applicable to the MCP, with the great impact of Malaysianization on the Chinese population. It is probable that the MCP has been forced to comply to this trend too. Otherwise, the Party would become alienated if it clung to its Chineseness while the mass advances further on the road to Malaysianization. To the Malaysian Chinese, Malaysianization is not an optional matter: it is a matter of survival. As the MCA and other parties have often reminded the overseas Chinese to be a Malaysian is the best way to keep out of political entanglements with power politics in which Peking might be involved and the Chinese community be closely associated with.⁵⁸ When the People's Action Party — the ruling party of Singapore since its independence — was still in the family of Malaysia, its leaders launched the campaign of "Malaysian Malaysia" as a prime platform of the Party.⁵⁹ The purpose of this platform was not only to fight for the legitimate political right of the Chinese in Malaysia — whose loyalty to the nation had often been questioned by the indigenous community — it was also an attempt to pledge the Chinese to take root politically, socially, and culturally in Malaysia, cutting off totally their inherited link with China. The attempt of such a massive and decisive desinicization program by the PAP was, by category, a first case in the Malay Peninsula. The MCA had made a similar appeal to the Chinese community in Malaya earlier. But, because of the political association among the leaders of the Kuomintang and the MCA, total desinicization had actually never been carried out so decisively as the PAP proposed. When this proposal was first tested throughout Malaysia, the result was a total surprise to many parties concerned. The PAP's proposal received massive support from the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaysia. As a result of this support, PAP emerged as a rising super-star in the Malaysian political arena. The ruling party of the Alliance was not the only one

57. See Tan Cheng-lock private papers which are located in the library of Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

58. Tan Siew Sin, *Blueprint For Unity*, Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Chinese Association Headquarters, 1972, p. 231 and p. 257.

59. Lee Kuan Yew, *The Battle For A Malaysian Malaysia*, Singapore: A Ministry of Culture Publication, 1965.

to feel a strong challenge from the PAP. The leftist parties, like the Labour Party in Malaysia and the Barisan Socialists in Singapore, also received deadly blows from the unexpected victory of the PAP.⁶⁰ Victory in and of itself did not cause that much damage. It was, rather, the issue of Malaysiansation brought out by the PAP which Labour Party and Barisan Socialists really placed in a difficult situation. In its Malaysiansation campaign, the PAP had made it very definite that Malaysian Chinese should identify themselves totally as Malaysians, not as Malaysian Chinese. Politically, they should remain aloof from any influence from politics in China. The PAP government in Singapore took the initiative in becoming a government far more alienated from China than any other nation in the region of Southeast Asia. Culturally, the PAP suggested that all Chinese in Malaysia be totally integrated into the Malaysian culture.⁶¹

But all leftist parties were not so decisive and definite as the PAP. In their united effort against the PAP, they confused the concept of Malaysiansation with anti-sinicization. It was non-sinicization. Malaysiansation would not affect the Chinese alone; it would also affect other ethnic groups. Furthermore, they also confused Malaysiansation with the politics of anti-China. Unlike the PAP, they considered it unnatural and immoral, if not impossible, for the Chinese in Malaysia to cut off political links of any kind with China. Instead of keeping away from China, they continued to take socialist China as the sociopolitical inspiration for their revolution in Malaysia.⁶² Even worse, anti-PAP politics, which were very much due to ideological differences with the PAP, were widely interpreted by the public as anti-Malaysiansation. Of course, the PAP was not slow in taking advantage of this situation and charging the leftist parties with anti-desinicization.⁶³

In losing the battle, the leftist parties learned a lesson about the serious problem of Malaysiansation. That they had by then given serious thought to Malaysiansation was shown from the great debate over the issue of Malaysiansation of Chinese literature and arts published in leftist public media.⁶⁴ In fact, the need to localize the Chinese community was realized by the leftists even as far back as the 1940s and early 1950s. For instance, in a debate over the issue, Kuo Mo-lo, a very influential leader in the PRC, had pointed out that Malaysiansation was absolutely correct and natural. Comparing Anglo-American relations with Sino-Malayan rela-

60. For instance, the Bungsar Constituency in Kuala Lumpur was wrested from the Socialist Front by C.V. Devan Nair of the People's Action Party in 1964 election.

61. See note 59.

62. This account is based on reading *Cheng Seng Pao* (陣線報), a party paper of Barisan Socialis, Malaya, from January 1966 to December 1968.

63. Lee Kuan Yew, *The Battle for Merger*, Singapore: A Ministry of Culture Series, no date.

64. Lee Ting Hui, ed. *The History of Malayan Chinese Literatures*, Singapore: Education Publishing Society, no date, passim.

tions, he concluded that it was just as unreasonable to expect the Americans to care only about their ancestral country of England as it would be with the Malayan Chinese.⁶⁵ But before the lesson they learned from the political campaign of Malaysianization in the merger of Malaysia in early 1960s, many leftists still believed the proper attitude Malayan Chinese should have was one of dedication to both China and Malaya. To them, pro-China and pro-Malaya sympathies should be compatible, not incompatible. They believed that every Chinese living in Malaya should be equally concerned about the fate of Malaya and China. The possibility of incompatibility between the choice of pro-China or pro-Malaya never seemed to them a critical choice at all. The Malayan Government and the Chinese Government, however, had never ever come to a point of accommodation in any real political situation from the time of their establishment. Therefore, any possibility of being dedicated to both Malaya and China seemed highly improbable. Perhaps the leftists also underestimated the actual feeling of the Malay community regarding the power of China. Many Malay leaders expressed their fears of having a Fifth Column of Chinese from China in their country. But such fear among Malay leaders had seldom been recognized by the leftists in Malaysia. However, if the issue of Malaysianization had never been brought up by the RAP as a major political campaign in early 1960s, it is probable that the leftists generally would never have been forced to consider the issue as they have. After the establishment of Malaysia, the emphasis on dual dedication to China and Malaya gradually faded from the leftist publications. Instead, dedication to Malaya is often stressed.

Although the MCP was not legally allowed to participate in the political campaign of Malaysia in 1963, its position toward the issue of Malaysianization by no means remained obscure. Through the front organization of the leftist parties, the MCP's position toward the issue of Malaysianization was very clearly expressed.⁶⁶ But it is not quite sure how far this position had been adjusted after the anti-Malaysia political campaign was defeated in the early 1960s. According to the Malaysian Government, the rise of Malaysianization in terms of nationalism is both real and strong within the MCP. One faction even tried to break away from the MCP over the issue of Malaysianization.⁶⁷ If this information is correct, the impact of Malaysianization on the MCP should also be considered as real and solid. They do not seem to have much choice in adjusting to the issue of Malaysianization. There has been no change among the Chinese population of the campaign of Malaysianization that has influenced them; it is more a change of China's attitude toward the issue of

65. *Ibid.*, pp. 266-267.

66. See note 63.

67. This information is obtained from an interview with Lee Ting Hui, an expert in the study of communist parties in Malaysia and Singapore.

Malaysianization which has forced overseas Chinese to adjust accordingly.

After the peak of the Cultural Revolution in the early 1970's, moderate leaders in Peking immediately took the initiative in establishing normal relations with the non-communist governments of Southeast Asia. So far as the Malaysian Government is concerned, they have given their consent to the Malaysian Government in its proposal of neutrality for ASEAN in general and Malaysia in particular.⁶⁸ After the downfall of the Gang of Four in 1976, China's response to ASEAN's neutrality became even more positive. When the Sino-Vietnamese conflict occurred, China even declared openly that, for the sake of regional stability and peace, it would not hesitate to defend the neutral position of ASEAN as a whole and of its members as individuals.⁶⁹ This political situation can certainly be interpreted as a move to allow the Chinese in Malaysia, or in other nations of ASEAN, to remain neutral in international power politics even if, as the Malaysian Government has proposed, China is involved. If this is the case, the issue of dual loyalty to Malaysia and China urged upon the Chinese population abroad would no longer be supported by China. Logically speaking, it is quite reasonable to assume that China had already dropped the demand for national loyalty from its Chinese population in Malaysia in particular and in Southeast Asia in general when it allowed them to stay neutral during an international conflict that involved China with a third party. To date, China has never referred to the issue of loyalty specifically. Yet there is no indication that China has requested the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia to change their current neutral attitude toward the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Rather, positive approval is shown by the fact that the Singapore Government under the leadership of the PAP has received increasing support for its general policy, despite its very cool political attitude toward China and its strong advocacy of a desinicization policy among its Chinese population. During an official reception on his visit to Singapore in 1978, Deng Hsiao-ping was told by Premier Lee Kuan Yew that Singapore would like to be treated as Singaporeans rather as Singaporean Chinese. However, the frank talk given by Premier Lee seemed to give no offense to the Chinese leaders. Lee took the opportunity in his meeting with Deng to raise the issue of overseas Chinese affairs — an issue which has definite implications.⁷⁰ Lee, by fighting for desinicization in Malaysia earlier, and in Singapore for more than two decades, showed more than any other leader in the region his desire for desinicization in order to win the support of the indigenous people. Prompted by his long advocacy for desinicization, Lee probably wanted to put this issue on record for the Chinese leaders,

68. Dick Wilson, *The Neutralization of Southeast Asia*, New York, 1975, passim.

69. Chang Chak Yan, "ASEAN's Proposed Neutrality: China's Response" in *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 1, no. 3, December 1979, pp. 249-267.

70. See *The Mirror*, Singapore, vol. 14, no. 48, November 27, 1978, p. 1 and p. 8.

hoping that public consent, or **implicit understanding**, could be obtained. It is interesting to note that China has so far treated the Singapore Government very warmly, giving Singapore more and more **trade** and **investment** opportunities in China.⁷¹ Unless it approved the overall **policy** — especially the desinicization policy of Singapore — it is highly doubtful that China would give such warm treatment to Singapore.

Judging from the fact that China has given approval to the neutrality proposed by the Malaysian Government, and the consent — **even** an implicit one — to the PAP's desinicization policy, it is quite reasonable to **assume** that China will certainly not contradict itself by granting consent for **Malayanization** of the Chinese on the one hand and giving support to the MCP for anti-Malaysianization on the other. It is also reasonable to assume that, **without** the support of its anti-Malaysianization of Chinese from China itself, it is **impossible** that the MCP would have any ground for opposing desinicization.

2. Malaysian Chinese in China's Policy

Like the issue of the MCP, the Chinese population in Malaysia has also become a very controversial issue in Sino-Malaysian relations. For years, it has been widely speculated among political leaders in Southeast Asia and observers throughout the world that the large percentage of Chinese in Malaysia would provide China with means to manipulate Malaysian politics. The most commonly aired speculation is the so-called "Fifth Column" theory.⁷² This theory points out that Chinese in Southeast Asia generally and in Malaysia particularly are loyal only to China and would voluntarily dedicate themselves as a "Fifth Column" for China in its preparation for communization of the region by force.

In addition to the "Fifth Column" theory, popular speculation also makes the point that competition between the Chinese communists and the Kuomintang for the loyalty of Chinese communities in the region is inevitable.⁷³ Such an intention on the part of communist China would make China unable to keep out of the affairs of overseas Chinese communities. Furthermore, some observers have speculated that the significant Chinese population and its economic strength would certainly give China leverage to press for better diplomatic relations in the campaign against its vital enemies.⁷⁴ Again, some observers have said that the economic success of over-

71. This information is obtained from the office of the High Commission of Singapore in Hong Kong. Generally China has increased trade and financial relations with Singapore in the last 14 months since 1978.

72. See note 4.

73. See Garth Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-194.

74. See M.A. Andreyev, *Chinese Capital in the Economy of Southeast Asia*, *passim*.

seas Chinese communities would certainly tempt China to lure these communities into its political orbit in order to secure economic ties. Accordingly, a dirty political game by China could not be ruled out. It is undeniable that some of these speculations have a certain validity. But many of their arguments are illusory rather than realistic.

A. Fifth Column: A Speculation Is a Speculation

Let us first deal with the theory of a "Fifth Column." To substantiate this theory, an assumption has to be established: that China has the plan, or the intention, to communize the non-communist countries in the region, and that it has both the plan and determination to do so by force if necessary. Secondly, it must also be assumed that Chinese communities are generally willing to become "Fifth Column" for China, even if such actions jeopardize their lives and their families.

So far as the first assumption is concerned, no documents have been disclosed, either within China or outside China, to prove that since the Chinese communist regime was established in 1949, China has had any plans, or even the intention, to communize any non-communist nations in Southeast Asia by force or by any other means. Some observers argue that the success of the communist revolution in Vietnam was greatly assisted by the Chinese Communist Party.⁷⁵ But the communist revolution in Vietnam was an initiative taken by the Vietnamese people themselves rather than by overseas Chinese communities working in Vietnam for the CCP. No doubt, some Chinese residents did participate in this communist revolution; but they did so on their own initiatives, rather than with organizational instruction from China. It was also true that some Chinese participated in the anti-communist revolution in Vietnam. Therefore, it is quite unreasonable to use Vietnam events to substantiate the theory of a Chinese "Fifth Column."

To those who have watched closely China's policy toward overseas Chinese and its development in the last three decades, it should be clear that there have been two basic differences in the strategy of implementing overseas Chinese policy. One is represented by moderate leaders—Chou En-lai, Liao Cheng-chih, Li Hsien-nien, and Deng Hsiao-ping. The other is represented by radical leaders such as Lin Piao and the Gang of Four. The moderates looked upon overseas Chinese as "friendship envoys" rather than as "communist revolutionaries." The radicals maintained the reverse. But the radicals' position was not the orthodox one in the last three decades, except during the period of 1965 to 1969, the period which was also the high peak of the Cultural Revolution. During the turbulent years of the Cultural Revolution, the moderate policy toward overseas Chinese was harshly criticized and effectively

75. Goh Keng Swee, *Communism in Non-Communist Asian Countries*, Singapore: Ministry of Culture.

interrupted. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission was dissolved and its officials and staff were mostly purged or discharged.⁷⁶ In a document called "Criticize Liao Combat Bulletin" (批廖戰報), the radicals accused Liao Cheng-chih, then in charge of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, of several instances of misconduct of overseas Chinese policy, such as discouraging the study of Mao's work among overseas Chinese organizations to avoid irritating the governments concerned and also "impairing diplomatic relations." Overseas Chinese were reminded by Liao "to obey the local laws and respect the local customs and habits." He was also reported to have said "overseas Chinese shall not make revolution. They will not succeed even if they make revolution." The radicals charged that Liao had abandoned the policy of class struggle for the sake of "survival."⁷⁷

Judging from such criticisms, one might think that the radicals had tried to make the overseas Chinese an active force for communist revolution. But this inference is quite wrong. In fact, throughout the history of the PRC, the radicals' overseas Chinese policy proved to be most hostile towards overseas Chinese communities and returned overseas Chinese at home. At home, they accused the returned overseas Chinese of being most untrustworthy under the socialist system because of their foreign connections and slow communization.⁷⁸ In the campaign against the anti-revolutionary during the Cultural Revolution, many returned overseas Chinese and their relatives were purged from party posts, lost their jobs, or were physically assaulted. All communication between returned overseas Chinese and their relatives abroad was stamped as undesirable, if not illegal.⁷⁹ Overseas Chinese remaining abroad were not treated well either. Because, in the radical approach to the communist revolution, the former "united front" tactic was criticized as being revisionist. What the radicals wanted was to rely heavily on direct communist revolution. People who would not make a strong commitment to the communist party would not be considered as trustworthy. Also, while relying heavily on the communist party for a communist revolution, the radicals treated the national governments in Southeast Asia as reactionaries.⁸⁰ This attitude was bound to be antagonistic to overseas Chinese and those of Chinese descent simply because, as a group, they were considerably independent from communist influence. Although most of the overseas Chinese are of the working class, experience shows, for instance in Malaysia and

76. Chang Chak Yan, "Overseas Chinese in China's Policy," *The China Quarterly*, June 1980, no. 82, pp. 281-303.

77. See *Survey of China Mainland Press*, American Consulate General of Hong Kong, no. 4013 (September 1, 1967), pp. 5-11.

78. See note 76.

79. *Ta Kung Pao*, 17 February 1978, p. 3.

80. Winberg Chai, ed. *The Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, New York: Capricorn Books, 1972, pp. 346-354.

Singapore, that they tend to be supportive of non-communist or anti-communist political parties such as the People's Action Party of Singapore and the Malayan Chinese Association of Malaysia. Both parties were considered reactionary during the Cultural Revolution when Peking, under the control of radicals gave strong support only to the revolutionary communist party at the expense of the non-communist parties.⁸¹ The governmental leaders of Malaysia and Singapore, such as Tengku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew, were denounced as Rahman-Lee Cliques. Furthermore, even the moderate leaders in leftist parties such as the Barisan Socialists were purged from their party.⁸² As a result of the abandonment of the united front tactic, almost all leftist oriented parties were called upon to boycott the "parliamentary struggle."

The radical campaign as such actually alienated support for the leftist parties and their alliance—the communist party in general and the MCP in particular—simply because many of these Chinese communities were quite settled in their resident nations. They could not see how the communist revolution would bring them a better life. In Malaysia, in particular, many Chinese doubted that the communist party would really be able to succeed with a communist revolution while the Malay community remained very suspicious, if not hostile, to this revolution because of their Islamic faith. It was quite significant to see that while the radical political campaign was proceeding, many supporters of the leftist Barisan Socialist and Party Rayat were by then shifting their support to the Democratic Action Party and other moderate political parties. This trend is revealed in national elections since 1969.

There were, no doubt, some Chinese in Malaysia who responded favourably to the radical political campaign. But whether this fact is sufficient proof that China at this time, during the Cultural Revolution, really planned to make overseas Chinese their "Fifth Column" remains in doubt. Some observers, like Stephen FitzGerald, believe it more likely that overseas Chinese spontaneously reacted to the call for more revolutionary action. Therefore, to FitzGerald, it was unlikely that revolutionaries in Peking had to instruct overseas Chinese directly to start anti-government campaigns in Southeast Asia.⁸³ However, contradicting observations were made by other observers, like Jay Taylor, who believes that the radicals in Peking had direct connection with anti-government incidents in Southeast Asia in 1967. Taylor's conclusion was drawn from his study of the incident of 1967 in Burma. He points out that staff from the Chinese Embassy were involved in the anti-government political campaign. Many of those staff had recently returned from China, freshly oriented

81. See note 76.

82. *Ibid.*

83. See Stephen FitzGerald, "Overseas Chinese Affairs and the Cultural Revolution" in the *China Quarterly*, no. 40 (1969), p. 121.

with more outward revolutionary diplomacy after several months of indoctrination in the Cultural Revolution.⁸⁴

Of course, it is difficult to judge whether Taylor is more nearly correct than FitzGerald. However, it is quite certain that both Taylor and FitzGerald were right to a certain extent in their studies. In certain countries, such as Burma and Cambodia, the outburst of anti-government incidents had some connection with the Chinese embassies.⁸⁵ But in other cases, such as Thailand, the anti-government campaign occurred even without the existence of a Chinese embassy. Clearly there was spontaneous action by some Chinese who were self-indoctrinated in the zeal of the Cultural Revolution.

Even so, to claim that overseas Chinese were the "Fifth Column" of China cannot be justified from the evidence of these anti-government incidents. Firstly, the radical campaign evident in these incidents was not triggered for the purpose of making way for China to invade the countries involved. It was rather a campaign to give support to local communist parties in the hope that such support would help them to seize power. In addition, the fact that China has consistently maintained an equal status of party-to-party relationship gives a basis for arguing that the call by the radicals for overseas Chinese to give support to the communist party originated from the good will of international comradeship rather than attempted hegemonism.⁸⁶

Again, the case developing in Malaysia about this time illustrates a very interesting point. According to FitzGerald, what happened in Burma, Hong Kong, Macao, Cambodia, and Thailand, should also have occurred in Malaysia, because "there have been also a number of situations involving overseas Chinese which a new militant overseas Chinese policy would certainly have sought to exploit, but which have passed unnoticed or with perfunctory protest. The Malaysia riots, for example, were almost ignored."⁸⁷ It is quite true that there had been a number of situations involving overseas Chinese which occurred on a scale similar to the incidents in Burma, Thailand, Macao, Hong Kong and Cambodia. But no incidents occurred in 1967 while those places were being dragged into an overseas Chinese crisis. It does not mean that radical revolutionaries, both in Peking and in Malaysia, had not been trying to exploit the situation. In fact, as elsewhere, all leftist political parties and their front organizations in Malaysia which were dominated by Chinese had become very militant because of the influence of Maoist indoctrination during this period. Most of their publications were very outspoken in hailing Maoist revolution as the rebel faction

84. See Jay Taylor, *China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975, p. 210.

85. See note 83.

86. See note 80.

87. See note 83, p. 123.

desired.⁸⁸ Still, no large scale anti-government campaign ever came about. Why? Apparently, the only reason which can be given is that the overwhelming majority of overseas Chinese never responded to the radical call for an anti-government campaign. Unlike the places mentioned above, Malaysia has a population balance between Malay and Chinese; and the balance has given the Chinese communities both confidence and caution about their future in the country. They knew that, if they made a radical move, the equilibrium between Malay and Chinese would be disturbed one way or another. It was this concern that discouraged most of the Chinese reaction to the militant overseas Chinese policy. Under such circumstances, the small number of radicals failed to create the crisis they desired.

This provides us with a case for understanding better the nature of the overseas Chinese problem in Southeast Asia. Unlike Malaysia, most of the overseas Chinese communities in the region were no challenge in size to the indigenous population. In their day-to-day experiences, they often felt discriminated against. It is understandable that they responded to the radical call for an anti-government campaign when they were called upon to do so. It was action expressing their grievances rather than their patriotism for China.

Again, some might wonder how the majority of the Chinese could have reacted so unanimously and so passively to the radical anti-government campaigns at this time in Malaysia. By coincidence the issue of Malaysianization, or de-sinicization, was then being hotly debated in Malaysia.⁸⁹ The issue of the separation of Singapore from Malaysia was also fresh in all Chinese minds. All of them knew the reason that Singapore was told to leave Malaysia was that the large number of Chinese in Singapore disturbed the racial balance with the Malay community so long as Singapore remained part of Malaysia.⁹⁰ When Singapore leaders pressed untiringly for the issue of "Malaysian Malaysia," the Malay community was fearful that their political power would be reduced in the parliament if the issue of "Malaysian Malaysia" provided unity for the Chinese community under the leadership of Singapore. When Chinese leaders from Singapore had come to Malaysia for the election campaign in 1965, the Malayan Chinese Association — a partner of the ruling party of the United Malay National Organization — had lost its support from Chinese communities in big towns like Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Malacca, and Jahore Bahru. The Malay leaders had, of course, perceived this sign uncomfortably.⁹¹ Their solution to this

88. This account is based on several papers published by leftist parties such as Partai Rakyat's *People's Tribune*, October 15, 1968, p. 1.

89. See note 59.

90. John Bastin and Robin W. Winks, Malaysia: *Selected Historical Reading*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 433-448.

91. See *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, April 5, 1970, p. 5 and *The Asia Magazine*, August 1964.

new threat from Singapore was to force Singapore out of Malaysia. This reaction from Malay leaders frightened Chinese communities in both Singapore and Malaysia. The issue of racial balance was thus deeply embedded in their minds. Any radical moves that held potential for upsetting feelings over the issue of racial power balance would certainly be approached with hesitation and caution.

One might argue that, although there was no large scale anti-government campaign in 1967, a racial conflict did involve the Chinese community in Kuala Lumpur in 1969. It is also true that the incident of May 13, 1969, was closely related to the leftist militant overseas Chinese campaign. From the New China News Agency's own account, the riot of May 13 was the immediate result of a demonstration organized by the leftist Barisan Socialist Party protesting the death of Lim Sung Seng, killed by police shots as he was putting up huge posters on May 4 calling on the people to boycott the parliamentary system. The leftist demonstrators carried Lim's coffin and shouted indignant slogans demanding payment for the blood debt.⁹²

Yet it should be pointed out that the incident of May 13 was not directly caused by the protest over the death of Lim Sung Seng. As was pointed out by G. Alexandar in his book called *The Silent Invasion*, the major cause of the incident was really the election outcome, which upset the Malay radicals who felt that their political power had already been challenged by the opposition parties, which were made up mainly of Chinese. The immediate cause of violence was a group of armed Malays organized by a few radical leaders under the overall leadership of Harun.⁹³ When the opposition Democratic Action Party celebrating an electoral victory in Kuala Lumpur passed in front of the House of Harun, armed Malays grouped there attacked the demonstrators and also attacked the Chinese quarters nearby. Very quickly the violence spread and ran out of control for several days. Several hundred people were killed or wounded.⁹⁴ But the nature of this incident was not the same as those which occurred in 1967 in Burma, Thailand, and elsewhere. In fact, by 1969, the radical political campaign against the governments of imperialist lackeys had already been toned down from its peak in Peking in 1967. As one Chinese source indicates, the radical political campaign against the united front tactic of moderate approach to the governments in Southeast Asia lasted only from those few months when the regular functions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were totally disrupted and were sometimes even under the management of the rebel faction. At this time

92. New China News Agency, Peking International Service in English 0352 GMT, May 20, 1969 B.

93. *The Times*, London, June 6, 1969, p. 11; and *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 12, 1969, pp. 598-599.

94. *Ibid.*

many moderate officers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were also being purged. Even Chou En-lai was brushed aside by the rebel faction, demoted to doing something insignificant like checking statements and important news releases prepared by radical revolutionary committees. The most that Chou could do was to restore some sentimental wording to avoid further disturbing the relations between China and the nationalist governments of Southeast Asia. The Chinese source points out that during the period of incidents in 1967, Chou was no longer in the position to make decisions as he once had been. It was under these circumstances that a series of incidents thus occurred.⁹⁵

But Chou had apparently regained control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the rebel faction in 1969, when the cooperation of the governments in the region was solicited once again under a new threat from the Soviet Union. This threat, indicated by the proposal of the Asian Collective Security System, was regarded by China as a device in the containment policy against China.⁹⁶ It was for this reason that China began a more moderate policy in approaching governments in Southeast Asia one or two years later. Along with this development for moderation, Lin Piao and many of his radical gang were purged in the early 1970s. Despite official statements with strongly worded news-texts condemning the Malaysian Government as a "fascist atrocity," "lackeys of imperialism," "anti-people, anti-communist and anti-China," released by New China News Agency over the issue of the May 13 incidents,⁹⁷ general relations between Malaysia and China had already improved as compared with relations in 1967. For instance, the term "clique" referring to Malaysian governmental leaders was already being replaced with "enemy" in Chinese official statements. (The term "enemy" was supposedly more respectable than "clique" because the latter referred to a regime with no legitimacy while the former referred to a regime with legitimacy but with whom China had a poor diplomatic relationship.) But the term "enemy" was later replaced by the even more friendly term "government," and a series of informal cultural exchanges took place in 1973 between the two countries. Finally, diplomatic relations were established in 1974, bringing to an end the era of hostility which had started at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. In the communique issued upon the establishment of diplomatic relations, China agreed to take a position of no interference in overseas Chinese affairs in Malaysia, accepting the fact that overseas Chinese affairs were internal affairs of Malaysia. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1974, its mission in Kuala Lumpur seems to have kept its promise of no interference quite consistently.

95. *Cheng Ming Monthly*, Hong Kong, no. 12, October 1978, p. 7.

96. See Sudershan Chawla Melvin Gurtov and Alain-Gerald Marsor, *Southeast Asia Under the New Balance of Power*, New York, 1974, Appendix.

97. See note 92.

To date, the mission in Kuala Lumpur has witnessed several serious issues concerning Chinese affairs but has remained uninvolved. The most serious issue was the establishment of a Chinese "Independent University." Over four thousand Chinese associations signed a petition appealing to the King for a permit to establish a Chinese University mainly for Chinese students. The Chinese signatories claimed it was their constitutional right to receive education in their mother tongue.⁹⁸ As yet the government has not granted permission, but the Chinese communities never cease in pressing the issue. Several times the issue has almost inflamed the sensitive nerves of all parties concerned, but there is no evidence that the Chinese mission has become involved. Issues of such an explosive nature are not difficult to find in Malaysia. And if China at any time became involved in an explosive issue, it could easily throw all parties concerned into serious turmoil. This neutralized attitude regarding Chinese issues in Malaysia indicates a growing desire in China for ease in overseas Chinese affairs. As militant overseas Chinese policy makers pointed out at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, current leaders, like Liao Cheng-chih — who is in charge of overseas Chinese affairs in Peking now — would probably accept no alternative to continuation of their moderate approach to overseas Chinese affairs, continuing a policy established before the Cultural Revolution.

Judging from the events discussed above, it can be concluded that the standard overseas Chinese policy is a rather moderate one. It has never tried to make overseas Chinese a "Fifth Column." Even when the moderate overseas Chinese policy was interrupted and replaced with a militant overseas Chinese policy around 1967 in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution it was still not a policy of making a "Fifth Column" from the overseas Chinese communities. The militant policy was oriented strongly on the basis of the revolutionary interests of local communist parties rather than on the basis of Chinese national interest. Again, as a result of the militant overseas Chinese policy, even the moderate overseas Chinese became a target in the anti-reactionary political campaign. Therefore, it is quite groundless to charge that the overseas Chinese policy, at any time in the last three decades, has aimed at making a "Fifth Column." Since the policy itself embodies no such intention it is also pointless to claim that overseas Chinese constitute a "Fifth Column" either potentially or actually.

B. CCP vs Kuomintang: An Unending Issue of Chinese Connection?

Observers like Alexander believe the competition between Peking and Taiwan for the loyalty of overseas Chinese has become an enduring factor that has prolonged

98. See Memorandum submitted by the All Malaysian Chinese Guilds and Associations to the Cabinet Review Committee on Education, Kuala Lumpur: Associations of the Federation of Malaysia, 1975.

the Chinese identification among overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia.⁹⁹ This is not because the Chinese in Southeast Asia have taken the initiative in associating themselves with the power struggle between Peking and Taiwan. Rather, it is because neither Peking nor Taiwan would ever give up cultivation of the loyalty of overseas Chinese. Politically alone the loyalty of the overseas Chinese would strengthen, or secure, the mandate of ruling power for the group which has the faith of overseas Chinese. Economically, whoever secured the loyalty of overseas Chinese would also secure their support financially: history shows that overseas Chinese contributed a large amount of money for Sun Yat-sen in his attempt to overthrow the Ching dynasty.

To a certain extent, the observation about competition for the loyalty of overseas Chinese is quite justified. It is undeniable that, in the early stages of power struggle, the loyalty of the overseas Chinese appeared to be quite important to both Peking and Taiwan. Because, to both in their attempt to obtain, or to secure, the mandate of ruling power, to secure, or to obtain, the faith of overseas Chinese would be a factor that could not be neglected in their power struggle. But, once the power has finally settled, the faith of overseas Chinese would no longer be a key factor. The importance of the loyalty of overseas Chinese would then be reduced to an insignificant level, although the loser in the power struggle might continue to cultivate this loyalty hoping that it would help them to reestablish its mandate in China one day. The winner would probably come to disregard the importance of this cultivation as its power strengthened. This tendency explains Peking's willingness to have an overseas Chinese policy that encourages the Chinese in Southeast Asia to be naturalized, while Taiwan remains unwilling to recognize the legitimacy of this practice by Peking. In any case, it is not justified to say that competition for the loyalty of overseas Chinese is a game that both Taiwan and Peking would never fail to play. Empirical observation shows that in recent years Peking has largely lost interest in playing this game with Taiwan.

Take Malaysia as a case. It is quite true that both Peking and Taiwan tried for years to establish a close association with overseas Chinese for the purpose of obtaining their support politically and economically. As pointed out earlier in this paper, in its early stage, before the mid-1950's, when the MCP was still very much under Moscow's control, most of its activities were centered around the urban working class, mining and rubber plantation workers. As a result of this ideological bias, the business and professional groups throughout Malaya became alienated from, if not hostile to, the communist party. After the establishment of the communist regime in Peking in 1949, the governmental policy toward the Chinese communities mainly

99. See note 73.

focused on protecting the interests of Chinese who were forced to resettle to strategic hamlets, detained in concentration camps, or even deported back to China because of alleged communist sympathies.¹⁰⁰ On at least one occasion, Peking delivered a protest to London and asked for a permission to send a fact-finding team to Malaya. Peking's request was turned down.¹⁰¹ This protective attempt was quite non-ideological in basis. The people who were deported were all accepted by Peking without any questioning of their ideological or class base. In fact, what Peking did at the time was quite complementary to the protective attempts by businessmen's associations like the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, whose leaders were later to be told by the British colonial authority to organize the political party of Malayan Chinese Association. Both Peking and local leaders of Chinese business groups had the same goal: to prevent Chinese from being deported and suffering further hardships.

It is also revealing to learn that the poor relationship between the MCA and Peking developed in an unexpected way, not resulting naturally as was widely believed, from ideological differences. Nor was it a result of the competition between Peking and Taiwan. In reviewing the private papers of Tan Cheng-lock, one will find that Tan held a very moderate view about the Communist Party of Malaya. Even when he was encouraged by the British Colonial Authority to form the MCA in early 1949, his attitude toward the Communist Party of Malaya was still very cautious and reserved.¹⁰² His original idea in organizing the MCA was not to combat communism but rather to work to protect Chinese interests as he had been doing for the overseas Chinese community. The organization of the MCA might bring about some changes in the Communist Party of Malaya; but this was not part of the original thinking of Tan. Tan had realized also that what he attempted to do was being caught in the crossfire between the British Colonial Authority on the one hand and the Communist Party of Malaya on the other.¹⁰³ He had no alternative, therefore, but going ahead in convincing all parties concerned that not all Chinese had made way for communism and that communism was not the only solution for the Chinese in Malaya. But the communist party of Malaya could not tolerate him and accepted him as an enemy. In April, 1949, when he was addressing a public meeting in Ipoh, a hand grenade was thrown at him, injuring him and several other leaders of the MCA. Although the assassin escaped, it was suspected at least by Tan and his party, that the communist party of Malaya was responsible

100. See *Ta Kung Pao*, March 11, 1951, p. 1.

101. See Tan Cheng Lock papers and *ibid.*

102. This account is based on Tan's book, *Malayan Problems*.

103. See Tan Siew Sim, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-236 and *passim*.

for this assassination attempt.¹⁰⁴ Immediately after this incident, Tan was visited by a special envoy sent directly by the Commission on Overseas Chinese of China, which had now retreated to Taiwan after suffering a definite defeat by the CCP on the mainland. The visitor was named as Tan Liat Poo. He brought personal regards from the Commissioner to Tan. Of course, the communist party was charged as the responsible assassin.¹⁰⁵ After the recovery from this incident, Tan went back to politics even more energetically than before. But his attitude toward communists, both in Malaya and in mainland China, had become very antagonistic. In one of his letters to Dean Rusk in June 29, 1951,¹⁰⁶ Tan seriously attacked communism in China in particular and in the world in general. He even called on the U.S. to provide the leadership in the containment of communism.

Had this incident not occurred, it is doubtful that Tan would have changed from friendly to hostile toward the Communists so decisively. In fact, even in 1949, the year in which the communists established the regime in Peking, his private papers indicate that he had treated a leftist journalist sent to interview him by *Ta Kung Pao* of Shanghai in a friendly way and had corresponded with him as late as three months before the incident.¹⁰⁷ In the same way, the leftists had also treated him with high respect at the time. Even in May, 1950, when a document about Chinese affairs in Malaya was edited and published in Peking by Ho Hsing-gee, Tan's view on the Constitutional Proposal for Malaya was appreciated and cited in this book. In late 1955, when the Balin Peace talks were held to end the communist insurgency war in Malaya between the Communist Party of Malaya and the governmental leaders from MCA-UMNO and Singapore, Peking gave an endorsement of the attempt, indicating that Peking at this time had still not treated Tan and his party as he had treated Peking. The period from 1957 to 1965 also reveals no strong indications that Peking had taken any significant steps to worsen its relationship with the MCA and its leadership. Conversely, however, the MCA had taken the MCP as an agent of the CCP, and thus had taken the initiative to ally itself with the Kuomintang in Taiwan. Its leaders, like T.H. Tan, had even gone often to Taiwan to participate in international anti-communist conferences.¹⁰⁸ But Peking seemed to tolerate such behaviour and kept pressing its moderate overseas Chinese policy in the years between 1957 and 1965 under the tactic of the united front, hoping that all Chinese, whether bourgeois or proletariat, would work for the interest of China

104. See Tan Cheng Lock papers, TCL/111/128.

105. *Ibid.*

106. *Ibid.*, TCL/V/99e.

107. *Ibid.*, TCL/111/101.

108. This issue was raised by Lim Kit Siong in the parliament. See *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, March 24, 1969.

in the suggested role of "friendship envoys" as Peking called the overseas Chinese.

But, when the moderate policy in dealing with overseas Chinese affairs was replaced with a militant policy during the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, the MCA was openly condemned by Peking as "reactionary" or "clique." The broadcasts from Peking had, by then, begun direct attacks on the MCA. Before this, most of the attacks broadcast from Peking were quoted from the MCP rather than being officially made by Peking itself. After the radical peak passed in the early 1970s and the moderates took over the leadership in Peking, the attitude toward the MCA came back to the pre-Cultural Revolutionary stage. In the three years since 1977, when the Four Modernizations were made the first priority in national development, Peking has again expressed appreciation of the help that overseas Chinese could, and would, possibly contribute.¹⁰⁹ Since then reports of communist activities in Malaysia or in non-communist countries of Southeast Asia have totally disappeared from *the People's Daily* and other major papers of China. So has criticism of the MCA, either direct or indirect. An even more favourable relationship has emerged since active individual members of the MCA were invited to meet Chinese officials while they were on business trips to Canton.¹¹⁰ Developments of this sort have come about for the first time since 1949. If this trend persists, it can be expected that relations between the MCA and Peking will become more normalized. In the campaign for the Four Modernizations, the most helpful overseas Chinese will be business and professional groups, strongly representing MCA grouping. Also, it is unlikely that China could lure a significant amount of investments or business interests from Chinese businessmen in Malaysia if its relationship with the MCA could not reach an understanding. For the MCA in its membership represents business and professional sectors and a close association with Malay leaders in the government. Judging from the heavy emphasis on the importance of foreign investment, especially investments from Hong Kong and the Southeast Asian Chinese, it seems that China would make every effort to improve its relationship with the MCA in order to get overseas Chinese investments from Malaysia.

Based on the discussion presented above, an argument can be made that the poor relationship which developed in the last two decades or so between the MCA and Peking should not be considered a direct result of the competition for loyalty between Peking and Taiwan. Taiwan had, and still does, court the MCA in an attempt for a closely united force against Peking; but Peking has avoided a direct confrontation with the MCA except in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, around 1967. The antagonism toward Peking among the MCA leaders was partly

109. Liao Cheng-chih, *op. cit.*

110. This information is obtained through an interview given by an officer of the Malayan Chinese Association.

caused by the MCP in its hostility against the MCA. Most of the leaders in the MCA held, and still hold, the belief that the MCP was an agent of the CCP. When they learn that the MCP was not really an agent of the CCP, as more and more leaders in the MCA have learned, they will probably change their hostile attitude and become more friendly and understanding toward Peking. It is clear that the way the MCA had drifted to the side of Taiwan was not primarily because of loyalty to Taiwan. The MCA had a particular purpose. It did so for its own interests rather than for the interests of the Kuomintang in Taiwan. Since they took the initiative to associate with Taiwan, they could also take the initiative to dissociate if they wish. In their relationship with Taiwan, the MCA has actually had no moral obligation of loyalty to Taiwan. The MCA, like its individual leaders, could choose not to respond to the call for loyalty either from Taiwan or from Peking. In fact, MCA leaders—both Tan Cheng-lock and his successor Tan Siew-sin—have reminded their supporters that Malaysian Chinese must be loyal to Malaysia, not to China or Taiwan. Tan Siew-sin specifically reminded Taiwan “not to do anything to indicate that it regards Malaysians of Chinese origin as its own nationals.”¹¹¹ He also declared that he had discussed this matter with the Consul-General from Taiwan in Kuala Lumpur and suggested to him that “a policy which regards Malaysian citizens of Chinese origin as Chinese citizens residing overseas can only harm all parties concerned.” He further pointed out, “such a policy could only sour relations between Malaysia and Taiwan and cast doubts on the loyalty of Malaysians of Chinese origin who are citizens of this country and who live here.”

From this comment on the issue of loyalty made directly by MCA leaders, it is quite obvious that it is no longer an unavoidable issue that overseas Chinese must choose between Peking and Taiwan in their loyalty. It is also quite out-dated to assume that neither Peking nor Taiwan can give up cultivation of the loyalty of overseas Chinese when they appear to be so remote from identifying themselves as Chinese nationals. It is also quite wrong to say that Peking would never give up cultivating the loyalty of overseas Chinese in Malaysia simply because of its anxiety to compete with Taiwan. After examining all the data available, this author is quite convinced that after the establishment of its mandate in Peking, the PRC quickly abandoned the traditional approach of *jus sanguinis*. The idea of abandoning dual citizenship is to propose a new principle of *jus soli* for the first time in Chinese history.

Empirical observation of the case in Malaysia shows that by and large Peking has tried not to intervene in the internal politics of Malaysia, even when overseas Chinese affairs were involved. They have tried never to side directly with any political parties in Malaysia, although it is probable that some political parties have

111. Tan Siew Sin, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

a political preference for Peking. But such preference is not substantial proof that they have any direct political connection with Peking. And following the establishment of the foreign service in Kuala Lumpur, there is still no proof that Peking is physically involved in interference with those parties predominantly supported by the Chinese population.

C. The Economic Impact of Malaysian Chinese on China's Policy

In their recent studies on overseas Chinese affairs, Soviet scholars have paid much attention to the economic power of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Their findings tend to point out that the continuing growth in economic power of Chinese communities in the region could lead to an eventual Chinese hegemonism against the indigenous peoples. This economic power of the Chinese would thus provide a means for China to extend its control over the indigenous people and their nations. Similar studies were conducted by Western scholars, especially Americans, in the 1950s and 1960s when the West generally believed that the greatest threat to Southeast Asia would probably come from a communized China. Both Soviet and Western scholars substantiated their arguments concerning economic domination of indigenous peoples with two major points: money remittances sent home to China by overseas Chinese and investments brought home to China by overseas Chinese.

Politically, both points are often interpreted as proof that overseas Chinese are loyal to China at the expense of their resident countries. Some observers even consider this politically to be a pattern of exploitation that China has practiced on the nations of Southeast Asia. For instance, M.A. Andreyev argues that the bulk of mobile capital has gone and still goes to China, whose present leaders are pursuing a policy aimed at boosting China's unilateral revenues at the expense of the Southeast Asian countries. In the final analysis, the source of these unilateral revenues constitutes exploitation of the Southeast Asian peoples by an overseas Chinese bourgeoisie. Thus indirectly, through members of the Chinese bourgeoisie favourably oriented towards it, Peking takes part in exploiting the peoples of the Southeast Asian countries.¹¹²

In the following pages this study considers Malaysian Chinese economic power and its influence on the PRC to illustrate the fact that China has been using the economic power of Chinese communities as a means of extending its control over the nations of Southeast Asia in general and Malaysia in particular. The relatively more stabilized and secure Chinese communities in Malaysia provide a better example for understanding the nature of the issue than can be found in the other ASEAN nations. Under unstable and unsecured socio-political conditions,

112. M.A. Andreyev, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

export of capital is liable to occur. It is simply a human instinct for one to protect his own property.

But before we examine the situation in Malaysia, let us first consider the general policy of the PRC in its handling of remittances and investments since the establishment of its regime in Peking in 1949. As far as the remittances are concerned, no doubt, China, either under the regime of the PRC or the Kuomintang, has encouraged overseas Chinese to send money home. The reason for the regimes doing so has been mainly because of concern for the welfare of the immigrants, families, particularly in the provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, Kwangsi, and Yunnan. It might be argued that the practice of sending back remittances was actually done at the expenses of the resident nations concerned. However, it should first be pointed out that such a consequence of the practice was not the intention of the overseas Chinese; they have no wish to damage their resident nations. Secondly, as everyone knows, the remittances are only a very insignificant portion of the total economic contributions made by overseas Chinese in their resident countries. It is doubtful that any families in the region would beggar themselves in order to send remittances to their relatives in China. Therefore, it is unfair — or even absurd — to claim that they have sent all their money home and left nothing in their resident nations. It is even more of a distortion to claim that they are not loyal to their resident nations because of their practice of occasionally sending a remittance home to their relatives. Third, as Tan Siew-sin, former chairman of the Malayan Chinese Association, pointed out, many Chinese in Malaysia have actually been concerned about the welfare of their Malay communities and have made significant contributions to Malay communities that needed such help.¹¹³ Fourth, it is only fair to point out that the overwhelming and major financial contributions that overseas Chinese have made are taking root in their resident countries in Southeast Asia under normal political, social, and economic conditions. Fifth, the practice of sending remittances home is not new but goes back to colonial times when Chinese left their homeland without their families. They had to work and send some of their savings back home to assist their families. It was done because of their love for their families rather than for love their nation. Chinese governments have encouraged them to do so simply for the maintenance of the sociopolitical and economic order in those provinces which lost many able bodies through emigration. Therefore, there is no political reason for encouraging remittances to China: it is done for internal concern rather than concern for the politics of those nations from which the remittances were sent.

As far as the PRC is concerned, it is true that before the Cultural Revolution

113. Tan Siew Sin, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

in the mid-1960s, Peking had generally encouraged remittances.¹¹⁴ But from the start of the Cultural Revolution until 1978, these encouragements were dropped, mainly because it was believed among the radicals that the remittances had demoralized the revolutionary spirit among the returned overseas Chinese and their relatives in those provinces with many overseas Chinese (Chiao Hsian — 僑鄉).¹¹⁵ From the end of the Cultural Revolution, in 1978, the remittances have again been tolerated. Throughout the last three decades, it is generally believed that the rate of remittances sent to China is declining, partly due to restrictions set by resident nations of overseas Chinese and partly due to declining family ties between overseas Chinese and their relatives. The older generations of overseas Chinese pass away and the younger generations fail to keep family ties because of remoteness. The Central Intelligence Agency has estimated the decline as a reduction from US\$133 million in 1950 to only US\$62 million in 1964. The remittances accounted for 4.8 per cent of total international receipts for the period 1950-64.¹¹⁶

For years, it has been argued by some observers that the main reason for China's encouraging remittances is for the benefit of foreign exchange. For instance, as M.A. Andreyev observed, the pursuing of remittances is motivated by the desire to improve foreign exchange at the expense of the Southeast Asian countries.¹¹⁷ Some observers, like Stephen FitzGerald, believed it might be true that Peking took remittances as an important practice in its increasing foreign exchange; but this attitude was held only for the period from 1954 to 1957. FitzGerald suggests that by 1957 the returns from remittances "were not considered sufficient to warrant continued cultivation of the overseas Chinese, and that the fall in remittances and their diminished importance in relation to total foreign exchange earnings was a most significant factor in the Party's decision to sever the traditional relationship."¹¹⁸ It should be pointed out that, politically, Peking had become aware of uncomfortable feelings of the newly independent governments about the loss of foreign exchange through the remittances sent out by overseas Chinese. In order to cultivate the friendships of those governments as Chou had tried to do in the united front tactic, Peking probably considered the need to lessen the emphasis on family ties between overseas Chinese and their relatives in China. Correspondingly, a policy to encourage the nationalization of Chinese abroad was also asserted at this time. Consequently, it was natural for Peking to sever the traditional relationships, especially where remittances were concerned. Since 1978, although remittances have not been

114. This account is based on the research done by Stephen FitzGerald in his book, *China and the Overseas Chinese*.

115. *Ibid.*

116. Stephen FitzGerald, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

117. See note 112.

118. Stephen FitzGerald, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

subject to the restrictions of the Cultural Revolution, there is no evidence that China would go back to the 1954-1957 level of encouragement of remittances, even though funds for foreign exchange are as greatly needed as they were in the mid-1950s. Therefore, so far as remittances are concerned, it is unfair to claim that the PRC has acted simply to build up foreign exchange and that the interests of the nations concerned have been totally disregarded.

The ways Peking has dealt with home-bound investments from overseas Chinese is more or less similar to the way it has dealt with the remittances. Although home-bound investments from overseas Chinese were in practice before the communist regime was established in Peking, PRC Peking, compared with prior regimes, is much more sensitive in handling the issue of investments from overseas Chinese. Unlike the regimes before PRC, Peking has indicated that when investments from overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia are encouraged, it should be on the basis of mutual understanding and mutual benefit from China and the nations concerned.¹¹⁹ It is true that before 1957 the call for home-bound investments from overseas Chinese was justified by patriotism. Overseas Chinese were encouraged to act for patriotism rather than for financial gain. Peking also let it be known that it would try to convince overseas Chinese to transfer ownership to the mother country totally on the justification of patriotism.¹²⁰ But this practice was played down in 1957 when an ordinance was enacted to provide proper guidance in the practice of overseas Chinese investments. It was indicated in this law that overseas Chinese investments would still be permitted as private ownership even when the stage of socialism had been reached. After twelve years of business in China, the total investments could be refunded. Dividends were set up and paid on the rate of 8% annually. However, it was not permitted to remove all the dividends out of China. Fifty per cent could be taken out, provided a permit was granted by the Foreign Exchange Control Office.¹²¹ But this practice was badly interrupted during the Cultural Revolution. Although advertisements for overseas Chinese investments were circulated by the Bank of China in Hong Kong at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, the political atmosphere for investment from overseas was simply not encouraging for most people abroad.¹²² In fact, the radicals generally condemned the practice as an undesirable capitalist threat to the success of the socialist system. After the Cultural Revolution, in 1978, investments from abroad in general and from overseas Chinese in particular have been encouraged again in China. But unlike the 1950s and 1960s, this time the practice of making investments in China is

119. See *Collected Works of Overseas Chinese Policy*, Peking: People's Publishing Society, 1957, p. 105.

120. *Ibid.*, passim.

121. *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101.

122. See *Chou Mo Pao* (僑務報), no. 47, November 18, 1967.

better defined. Overseas Chinese who have been naturalized for foreign citizenship are no longer welcomed as Chinese compatriots, but as ethnic Chinese of foreign nationality. It is important to make this distinction because investments of a Chinese compatriot are obliged to comply with the national interest of the socialist system. Such a policy means that if necessary the investments could be forced into nationalization with or without consent of the investors. To a certain extent, the present practice can be considered an example of foreign investments which are permitted and made for the mutual benefit of the nations concerned.¹²³ This is not like the practice of the early 1950s, when the investments were considered more of a temporary function and would be integrated into public property under the socialist system.¹²⁴ For the present system asserts that the investments may be withdrawn anytime according to contract. It is also legally assured that the foreign investments of overseas Chinese are not to be subject to risk of political turmoil; otherwise the investments will be compensated totally. In order to assure the success of this practice of foreign investments, Peking has gone even further, making the provinces of overseas Chinese like Kwangtung, Fukien, and Kwangsi, a special economic zone which is authorized to give privilege to the practice of foreign investments not enjoyed in non-special economic zones. Privileges given to foreign investors in the special economic zones include joint management with a Chinese counterpart, freedom to move in and out of the zone, and a free market for products made in the zone.¹²⁵ In short, even officers from Peking have confessed that the device of the special economic zone is very liberal to the extent that certain non-socialist economic practices might be tolerated.¹²⁶

After considering the general policy of the PRC in its handling of remittances and investments from overseas Chinese, we come to the point of understanding more clearly that in its overseas Chinese policy Peking has never tried to make use of the economic power of overseas Chinese against the interests of any nations concerned either economically or politically. However, Peking has often tried to defend overseas Chinese communities as a whole whenever they are charged as an exploiting class in Southeast Asia.¹²⁷ But this defense cannot be interpreted as a policy to protect the bourgeoisie class of overseas Chinese at the expense of the indigenous people on the basis of race. In fact, Peking has often reminded the

123. See Sun Ru, "The Concept and Prospects of Guangdong Special Economic Zone," a paper presented in a Conference on Investment in China in the 1980s, sponsored by the *Economic Reporter* in February 1980.

124. See note 119, passim.

125. See note 123.

126. This information is based on the Seminar on Investment in China in the 1980s, sponsored by the *Economic Reporter* in February 1980.

127. See Liao Cheng-chih, *op. cit.*

have-class of overseas Chinese to help develop successfully the national economy of their resident nation. It has also reminded them to do this out of goodwill, acting as a "friendship envoy." Peking has no doubt realized that certain bad elements of the bourgeoisie class have carried out merciless exploitation of indigenous people as well as overseas Chinese themselves.¹²⁸ There is likewise no doubt that Peking would have no reservation on curbing such exploiting elements. Peking would only disagree when all overseas Chinese, rich or poor, are charged as bourgeoisie; because, as it points out, more than ninety per cent of overseas Chinese are proletariats, who are not exploiting but being exploited. They therefore deserve good treatment from both indigenous people and the local governments.

Peking is also often charged with the responsibility of capital transferences from nations in Southeast Asia to China or elsewhere by the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie.¹²⁹ As far as the investments from overseas Chinese in China are concerned, it is generally believed that the amount is quite insignificant, although the real figures are not known due to the inaccessibility of official data on China. Yet, according to one Chinese source in 1957, overseas Chinese investments were reported to have accounted for only ten per cent or forty-four factories and enterprises of the total local industrial investment in Kwangtung and Fukien from 1949 to 1956.¹³⁰ Compared with the total economic capacity of overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, this figure is simply peanuts. Yet Peking is still alleged to have been involved in the export, even flight, of Chinese capital from Southeast Asian countries to foreign investment centres, namely, Hong Kong, Singapore, and — more recently — Taiwan.¹³¹

A review of the history of this export of capital from Southeast Asia to whenever it goes reveals an interesting point: the peak of exports was in the 1950s and diminished consistently and significantly in the 1960s. In 1967, when Hong Kong was in the crisis of turmoil, the flow of capital was reversed back to Southeast Asia, namely, Singapore and Malaysia, where political and economic developments were thought to be much more stabilized. In 1965, when Indonesia had a political coup and anti-Chinese riots, the impact on the export of Chinese capital from Indonesia was shown immediately. The same export occurred in Vietnam in 1975 and again in 1978. It is quite clear that the export of capital takes place only when political stability is upset in general and when anti-Chinese political riots occur in particular. Therefore, the contributing factor to this outflow of Chinese capital from Southeast Asia has to do with internal political-economic environment. It has nothing

128. *Ibid.*

129. M.A. Andreyev, *op. cit.*

130. See note 119, p. 106.

131. M.A. Andreyev, *op. cit.*

to do with Peking and its overseas Chinese policy.

Taking Malaysia as a case, one can see the nature of the problem even better. Because of the racial balance between Malay and Chinese, political security was, and still is, considered quite stable for Chinese, despite occasional racial riots. This confidence is the key for Chinese capital's remaining in the country. Lately, since the 1970s, Malaysia has even become an investment centre for overseas Chinese capital, just as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan have long been.

It is true there have been overseas Chinese like Tan Kah-kee (陳嘉庚), who took most of his wealth back to China from Malaya in the early 1950s.¹³² But these examples occurred before Malaya was independent and also before the communist regime was established in Peking in 1949. Tan acted, no doubt, without loyalty to Malaya. But since Malaya was not independent at the time, Tan can hardly be blamed for being without loyalty for Malaya: he was a citizen of China, not of Malaya. He had not committed himself as a loyal national of Malaya; Malaya was still under the rule of the British Empire.

It is also true that Peking has often used Tan as an example to encourage home-bound investment from overseas Chinese. Unlike Tan, however, Malayan Chinese bourgeoisie generally turned a deaf ear to the call for investments from Peking. The lack of response to such calls for home-bound investment among Malayan business groups was even expressed as a point of frustration for Tan Kah-kee in his book *Memo of Tan Kah-kee*.¹³³ To Tan, experience showed that it was a tremendous frustration for any one who attempted to convince overseas Chinese in Malaya, and Indonesia as well, to invest their capital in China merely for the sake of loyalty to China. He said, when he was assigned for this patriotic work, he often ended up being the only player while everyone else stayed cool. Yet to the end, he exhausted all his wealth making contributions for the construction of schools, and other businesses for China.

Tan's experience illustrates the attitude of overseas Chinese business groups toward China. But another well-known leader of overseas Chinese communities in Malaya, called Tan Cheng-lock, had a more pleasant experience in dealing with the same groups of businessmen. Instead of telling them to help construct China, Tan told them to stay and to become Malayan.¹³⁴ This time, the response was much better. It ended with his success in organizing a nation-wide political organization call the Malayan Chinese Association. With the hope that the MCA would strengthen their economic and political powers in Malaya, many businessmen and professional people have given, and still give, their support to Tan and the MCA. For years,

132. See Tan Kah-kee, *Memo*, passim.

133. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

134. See Tan Cheng Lock, *op. cit.*, passim.

under the MCA, the hard-core of business groups has been a real force for Malaysiani- zation, or de-sinicization. It is well-known in Malaysia today that they are the ones who would be the last to listen sympathetically to Peking.

Tan said his secret for success in handling these people in Malaya was as follows:

“This number of Malayan-born Chinese enumerated at the 1931 census was 534,000 and was more than doubled since 1921. By the effluxion of time many of them have lost all touch with China and have been strength- ening and consolidating their attachment to this country. If accorded fair, equitable and equal treatment and made to feel that this country is their home the Malayan-born Chinese, as experience has proved in the case of the Strait-born Chinese in Malacca, Singapore and Penang, will become true Sons of the Soil, identify themselves completely and absolutely with the interest of this country and the Empire and give undivided allegiance to it. If their loyalty is doubted and they are distrusted and made to feel they are regarded as semi-aliens and not wanted, they will lose hope in this country and in their despair will naturally turn their eyes to China. They will then incur the charge (already used as a weapon against them) of bear- ing a dual allegiance, which will not only do infinite damage and injury to their interests and welfare here but will certainly not be to the good of Malaya as a whole.”¹³⁵

This citation, though written in the early 1930's, expressed the real nature of the problem in Malaya in particular and Southeast Asia in general. It remains appropriate in Malaysia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

To conclude: it is clear that the so-called dual allegiance and export of capital by overseas Chinese from resident nations would not occur if they were treated equally as “Sons of the Soil.” It does not matter how Peking appeals to them; it does matter how they are treated by their resident governments.

135. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

從馬來西亞個案研究看中共的僑務政策

(中文摘要)

鄭赤瑛

有關中華人民共和國的僑務政策的**存在及其目的**，三十多年來一直為學者所研究，也引起過不少爭論。其中被討論得最多的問題是：**中共是不是在利用「華僑」作為其「第五縱隊」？中共是不是在利用「華僑」作為其政治武器以制裁任何敢對中共進行敵視的政府？**

本文用馬來西亞作為一個個案以進行研究這些問題，由於馬來西亞在人口的比例上，「華僑」佔了幾乎近百分之四十，在經濟上更是佔了舉足輕重的地位，如果中共當真想利用「華僑」作為其政治武器以制裁敵視的政府，馬來西亞便是最好的一個政策嘗試地點。可是，根據本文的研究，證明事實剛好相反。這三十多年來，中共在馬來西亞實踐的僑務政策，可以說是處處小心行事，不但不會利用「華僑」作為其政治武器以制裁馬來西亞政府（儘管馬政府盡量與中共保持相當的距離），而且在很多主要的政治關鍵問題，中共都與馬政府採取合作的政策。

本文通過研究中共與馬來西亞共產黨的關係發展及在各階段的僑務政策上互相矛盾的現象，發現中共在一個極具關鍵性的僑務問題，即公民權問題，很明顯地支持了馬政府與其**主要政黨馬華公會**的立場，而與馬共的立場相違。馬共號召當地所有華裔杯葛申請公民權，所持的理由是馬獨立是虛假的，而獨立政府也是虛假的；馬政府則全面進行華人登記公民權的運動，而中共也在這時把馬政府與其領袖當作合法對象來稱呼與交往。此外本文也列舉了不少事例來透視中共僑務政策的本質是合作性的，而不是對抗性的。

總的來說，本文既透過中共與馬各華人政黨的**關係**來討論中共僑務政策的本質，同時也透過馬來西亞各華人社團與個人的趨向地認同來探討中共僑務政策，并指出這政策已在順應事實的發展：**即承認華僑對其居留地方的認同**。既如此，則控制「華僑」作為其政治武器的說法便不能成立了。