

The Delicate Tradeoffs in BT-like Protocol Design: Performance VS Fairness

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Outline

- Background
- Mathematical Model
- Design Knob
- Simulation
- Conclusion

BitTorrent (BT) System


- A Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file distribution application, created by Bram Cohen.
- Designed to distribute large content (Linux distribution) without saturating servers and bandwidth resources.
- BitTorrent traffic accounts for ~35% of all traffic on the Internet today.
- Key idea of BT:
 - File is divided into small pieces
 - Choking algorithm to make peers cooperative

Characterizing Peers


- Peers in the system are *heterogeneous*
 - “*Resourceful peers*”: peers with higher up/down link bandwidth
 - “*Thin peers*”: peers with lower up/down link bandwidth
- Peers in the system are *selfish*
 - Incentive Mechanism is necessary to prevent free-riding

Dilemma of Protocol Design



Dilemma of Protocol Design




Resourceful Peer



Thin Peer




Thin Peer




Thin Peer


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
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


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


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

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
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


Thin Peer




Thin Peer


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
Dilemma of Protocol Design



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Design Object?



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To encourage resourceful peers so that they can obtain higher download rate



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Versus

To make resourceful peers stay in system to improve the downloading of others



Mathematical Model

- N types of peers, for type- i :
 - Uploading capacity: U_i
 - Downloading capacity: D_i
 - Feasible uploading rate: $u_i \leq U_i$
 - Feasible downloading rate: $d_i \leq D_i$
 - Probability of a new peer to be type- i : P_i

Uplink Sharing^[1]

- Limitation of system throughput is uploading
- Bottleneck is assumed not the network
- Lower bound to disseminate a file is studied in [1]
- Arrival and departure of peers are considered in our model

[1] J. Munding and et al, Analysis of Peer-to-Peer File Dissemination amongst users of different upload capacities.

Fairness Metrics

□ “share ratio” of type-i peer:

$$c_i = \frac{u_i}{d_i}$$

- When share ratio = 1, type-i peer provides as much service as it receives
- When share ratio = 0, free riding

□ Fairness Index to measure share ratios of all peers:

$$\mathcal{F} = \frac{(p_1 c_1 + \dots + p_n c_n)^2}{p_1 c_1^2 + \dots + p_n c_n^2} = \frac{1}{p_1 c_1^2 + \dots + p_n c_n^2}$$

Performance Metric:

- In a P2P system, throughput is related to the peers staying in the system
- The service differentiation policy will affect the average downloading time.
- Average downloading time:

$$T = \frac{N_1 + \dots + N_n}{\lambda} = \frac{p_1}{d_1} + \dots + \frac{p_n}{d_n}.$$

To Achieve Optimal Average Downloading Time

- Solve the optimization problem:

$$\text{Min } T = \frac{p_1}{d_1} + \dots + \frac{p_n}{d_n} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad p_1 \frac{U_1}{d_1} + \dots + p_n \frac{U_n}{d_n} = 1,$$
$$0 \leq d_i \leq D_i, i = 1, \dots, n$$

- The Solution:

- Type-1:

$$d_1 = \frac{p_1 U_1}{1 - \sum_{i=2}^n p_i \frac{U_i}{D_i}},$$

- Type-i:

$$d_i = D_i, \quad i = 2, \dots, n.$$

- Insights:

- First serve less resourceful peers as much as possible
- Then serve most resourceful peers

To Achieve Optimal Fairness

- All peers have the same share ratio
- Rate assignment:

Type-i peer: $d_i = u_i = U_i.$

- Insights:
 - Every peer just gets as much as it contributes

To Achieve Max-min Fairness

□ Rate assignment:

Type i peer: $d_i = d \equiv p_1 U_1 + \dots + p_n U_n.$

□ Insights:

- Every peer receives the same service

Three Rate Assignments

	Fairness Index	Av. Download Time
Optimal Performance	$\frac{1}{p_1 \left(\frac{1 - \sum_{i=2}^n p_i U_i / D_i}{p_1} \right)^2 + \sum_{i=2}^n p_i \left(\frac{U_i}{D_i} \right)^2}$	$\frac{1}{U_1} + \sum_{i=2}^n \frac{p_i}{D_i} \frac{U_1 - U_i}{U_1}$
Max-min	$\frac{\left(\sum_{i=1}^n p_i U_i \right)^2}{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i U_i^2}$	$\frac{1}{p_1 U_1 + \dots + p_n U_n}$
Optimal Fairness	1	$\frac{p_1}{U_1} + \dots + \frac{p_n}{U_n}$

Trade-off:

- In terms of average downloading time:

$$T_{opt} < T_{mm} < T_{fair}$$


- In terms of fairness

$$\mathcal{F}_{opt} < \mathcal{F}_{mm} < \mathcal{F}_{fair}$$

Numerical Illustration

□ 2-Types of peers:

	Resourc eful Peer	Thin Peer
U	4	2
D	5	6
p	0.4	0.6



Implementation

- Feasible rate assignment can be realized by centralized algorithm
 - Require global knowledge
 - Require centralized scheduler
- Distributed algorithm?
 - Easy to implement
 - Easy to adjust fairness/performance

Two Uploading Strategies

- Selective uploading
 - Provide uploading service to the top n_s peers based on their downloading rates
 - Similar to 'tit-for-tat' used by BT
- Non-discriminative uploading
 - Randomly choose n_a peers to provide uploading
 - Similar to 'optimistic-unchoking' in BT

Selective Uploading

- Formulate the peer selection as a game.
- In Nash equilibrium, downloading rate of peer i :

$$d_i \approx u_i.$$

- the optimal fairness is achieved!

Non-discriminative Uploading

- Every peer randomly chooses n_a peers to serve
- The downloading rate of peer i :

$$d_i \approx \frac{\sum_{j \in N} u_j}{n} = \bar{u}$$

- Max-min fairness is achieved

Design Knob

- Use (n_s, n_a) as the design knob

$$d_i = \frac{n_s}{n_s + n_a} u_i + \frac{n_a}{n_s + n_a} \bar{u}.$$

- Official BT protocol:


$$n_s = 4, n_a = 1$$

- Official BT emphasis on fairness


Revisit Optimistic-unchoking

- Optimistic-unchoking (OU) is more than the complement of 'tit-for-tat' to find potential connections
- OU is also an approach to improve the system performance

Performance Evaluation 1: Nash Equilibrium




(a) Simulation




(b) Real BT's Measurements

Performance Evaluation: Design Knob



(a) n_a vs T



(b) n_a vs F

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- ❑ Deeper understanding of “tit-for-tat” and “optimistic-unchoking” used by BT

Conclusion

- ❑ The trade-off between performance and fairness for a BT-like file sharing protocol
 - ❑ BT protocol is only one particular point in the whole design space
 - ❑ Deeper understanding of “tit-for-tat” and “optimistic-unchoking” used by BT
 - ❑ Design knob to adjust performance and fairness of the system
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The End...



Q & A