

中國近代思想研討會論文專輯

## The Tragic Passage to a New World: Changing Attitudes of the Chinese Intellectuals to the West in the Late Ch'ing Period

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### I. INTRODUCTION

The history of modern China has been a tragic struggle from illusion to disillusion. The schism of ideals, which is an innate quality of human mind, and reality presented by the environment, establishes for not merely the history of an individual but that of the human race. The process of man's awakening from the practicality of ideals which are looked upon as illusions, and his final realization of disillusionment is the theme of this study. My paper is an attempt to illustrate this idea through a critical study of the changing attitude of the Chinese intellectuals towards the West in the nineteenth century.

Why do I choose the intellectual class, the intellectuals in nineteenth-century China in particular, as the subject-figure of my research? First, to be sure, I believe that in the perspective of eternity all men, all classes and all ages possess equal significance. However, speaking in terms of implications and effects upon a race and a time, I believe a certain class and certain individuals are of more importance and therefore should be given more, if not equal, consideration and treatment at the hands of the historian.

The intellectual class, in a broad sense, stands for a group of people who are more educated and distinguished from the ignorant commoners. In nineteenth-century China, it generally referred to the "scholar-official" class (*shih-ta-fu* 士大夫), and in some cases applied to scholars and gentry without official rank, or bureaucrats without scholarly reputation. In my paper, for example, Li Hung-chang fell in the latter category and Wang K'ai-yun, Yu Yueh were in the former.

I have a presupposition that the intellectual has more commitments for his age, is more sensitive to what is happening in his surroundings, and concerns more with intrinsic values of life than material necessities of living. In the pre-Communist era, the Chinese intellectuals assumed the position of the ruler, not the ruled, and the role of the leader, not the follower. In terms of participation, awareness, knowledge and influence in state politics, they definitely over-matched other classes of society. Here I have no intention to deprive other classes, the artisan, the merchant, and especially the peasant, from the making of history which everyone plays a part. Yet in the history of thought, I think, the intellectual surely has a more important and dominant role.

Moreover, considered myself one in the same class, I endeavor to understand the minds of my predecessors and to share their sentiments and feelings in order to find a way of my own. In this respect, my paper involves not only historical research and

imaginative assumption, but also emotional identification.

In my study I am trying to portray the minds and actions of the Chinese intellectuals in the light of Western impact over a century span of time. Needless to say, not every idea and every act are included in the discussion, and the materials and sources are highly selective. My attention is paid to trends of thought, not incidents, and lines, not spots. My foci of interests are: (1) the Chinese intellectuals' world-view; (2) the Chinese intellectuals' attitude towards foreigners in China; and (3) the Chinese attitude towards the introduction of Western learning into China.

All ages, as contemporary historian Geoffrey Barraclough observed, "are ages of change" and "all periods are transitional periods".<sup>1</sup> The nineteenth-century Chinese intellectuals lived in an age of change that led to a revolutionary age of the twentieth century, and we to-day witness ourselves in an age of transformation that leads to another new generation of change. The nineteenth-century Chinese intellectuals inherited older preoccupations from their predecessors, and we to-day inherit assumptions from them. Our duty is to distinguish what kind of their experiences and thoughts will no longer correspond to our living needs and which inherited assumptions will no longer fit the reality we are experiencing. For only by knowing the past more, would we be able to lessen the present from the bondage of historical conditioning. For man is endowed with the abilities and potentialities to adapt, to change and to create new experiences that enrich civilization rather than passively being moulded by the history of his past civilization. Otherwise, we would be retracing the path that leads to the inevitable destiny—the tragedy of disillusionment of illusions.

## II. I-WU 夷務 (BARBARIAN AFFAIRS): PERSISTENCE OF TRADITION, BEFORE 1860

Before the mid-nineteenth century all Chinese maneuvers in dealing with foreign countries sprang from traditional mentality. The Chinese view of their own land was a "Middle Kingdom" meaning that it was central geographically, culturally as well as politically. It was completely sufficient, both in respect of material requirements and from the ideological point of view. Never had any scholar had an idea that beyond the pale of Chinese civilization there would be things to learn and values to follow.

With deep-seated suspicion and misunderstanding of all things foreign, the Chinese regarded foreigners as people difficult to enlighten by means of reason. They called them "barbarians" (*i* 夷), "sheep and dogs" (*ch'üan, yang* 犬羊), and considered their character unpredictable, wicked and vicious. A reading of the Chinese documents concerning foreign affairs in this period we often meet such phrases as "the barbarian nature cannot be fathomed" (*i-ch'ing p'o-ts'e* 夷情叵測) or "the barbarian nature is treacherous and deceitful" (*i-ch'ing kuei-chueh* 夷情詭譎).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Geoffrey Barraclough, "The Historian in a Changing World", quoted from Han Meyerhoff, ed. *The Philosophy of History in Our Time*, (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1959), p. 34.

<sup>2</sup> *Ch'ou-p'an i-wu shih-mo* (The complete account of the management of barbarian affairs, later cited as *IWSM*), Hsien-feng period, 35:40-41; see also John K. Fairbank, *Ch'ing Documents: An Introductory Syllabus*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 59-60.

In practice, the Chinese government only **accepted** diplomatic intercourse under the "tributary system" which meant that any **relation** that existed between China and a foreign country must be of the **suzerain-vassal kind**. Permission to trade was merely granted as a gracious concession, **and not as a natural right**. China had established this tributary system long before the **Ch'ing dynasty**, and it was proved to be an effective device for centuries in dealing with the various "**barbarians**" of her surroundings.<sup>3</sup> The Europeans were sometimes granted **more privileges** than the Asian on the ground that they came from farther places and **therefore should** receive more graces. In short, the conception of foreign relations in the period **prior to the mid-nineteenth century**, meant a total denial of the **Western diplomatic theories**.

This strong sense of cultural **superiority**, **strong** belief in the unity of the Chinese world and all skills and techniques in **maneuvering** foreign affairs were inherited from "history". In other words, how the Chinese intellectuals viewed their past determined how they would act in the **present**. To develop such a statement, we can say the attitude of the Chinese toward **foreigners** was a **result** of their attitude towards history.

### Modular Concept of History

The traditional Chinese scholars tended to look upon history as a guide or as a mirror from which lay the keys to **contemporary problems** and revealed a direction to the future. "History" was a **known quantity** which, they believed, would provide principles, patterns, and methods for the **present government**. In other words, the Chinese tended to solve all **current problems** **either** in domestic affairs or in foreign relations, with references to "history" which **was** usually represented by the Classics (*ching* 經) and in the form of **presentative historical models** such as *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* 資治通鑑 (Comprehensive mirror for aid in government).<sup>4</sup> The Chinese thought that only by following the examples set by **their ancestors** would they be able to transmit the "way" (*tao* 道) of **antiquity to the oncoming generation**. We can see the Ch'ing scholars before the Tao-kuang period **were** deeply devoted to the study and understanding of the Classics and histories of the past rather than the situations of their time.<sup>5</sup> To scholars of that era, history meant "value", "moral principles" rather than "fact" and "incident", and their appeals to historical precedents were no mere perfunctory exercises.

This modular concept of history had been a distinct feature of the traditional Chinese intellectuals and it created a comparatively more stable and less mobile Chinese empire than the restless Europe.<sup>6</sup> Yet, on the other hand, China could hardly develop a deductive technique in inquiry and a hypothetical approach in problem-solving and policy-making because they dared not to challenge the "old" with the

<sup>3</sup> For a detail treatment of the tributary system, see John K. Fairbank and Teng Ssu-yu, "On the Ch'ing Tributary System", *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* (later cited as *HJAS*), 6.2:135-246 (June 1941); also Fairbank, "Tributary Trade and Chinese Relations with the West", *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, 1.2:129-149 (February 1942).

<sup>4</sup> For a discussion of the presentative historical models see Robert M. Hartwell, "Historical Analogism, Public Policy, and Social Science in Eleventh and Twelfth-century China", *American Historical Journal*, 76:699 (June 1971).

<sup>5</sup> T'ang Chien, *Ch'ing hsieh-an hsiao-shih* (Brief accounts on Ch'ing scholarship), 15 chüan, 1845.

<sup>6</sup> Raymond Dawson, *The Chinese Chameleon* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 65.

“new”.<sup>7</sup> Such an attitude toward old values still existed among Chinese scholars after the T’ung-chih period, and remained the hard core principle of the conservatives in value judgements.

The modular concept of history had sunk deeply into the Chinese mind and was reflected clearly in the way that the Chinese trained their rulers who, in the Chinese society, meant the emperor and his officials.

The Manchus followed the Ming’s method of training a prince to become ruler with the exception that he had to learn one more language—the Manchu. They chose the most brilliant Confucian scholars to be instructors and tutors of the emperor or the prince-heir-apparent. From studies on the emperors K’ang-hsi, Ch’ien-lung, and records left by the tutor of Hsien-feng and T’ung-chih,<sup>8</sup> we know that they spent much time studying the Confucian Classics and the “comprehensive mirrors” (*t’ung-chien* 通鑑) or “historical mirrors” (*shih-chien* 史鑑). The rulers were inclined to believe that the Classics provided principles in government administration, and the history, examples and methods.

Before the purchase of official ranks was a general practice as in the late Ch’ing period, the chief way to officialdom was the civil service examination. To get the “hsiu-ts’ai” 秀才 (title of the graduate from district examination), “chü-jen” 舉人 (title of the graduate from provincial examination), and “chin-shih” 進士 (title of the graduate from metropolitan examination) degrees primarily based on memorization of the “Four Classics” (*Szu-shu* 四書) and familiarity of historical examples.<sup>9</sup>

All in all, the values of the old and the “mirror” of the past were generally accepted by all Chinese rulers, officials and scholars. In pre-Western Confucian context, history, as Joseph Levenson observed, “was regarded without ambiguity: it was the form in which absolute wisdom was cast, and not yet the clothing of relativism.”<sup>10</sup>

A question arises here: how did this modular concept of history affect the Chinese attitude toward the West?

In the first place, there was no attempt to initiate new policies to meet an unprecedented environment. The inauguration of new plans or application of new skills which could not be found from historical experience was entirely a line to the history-tied scholars and officials. So, whenever an official presented a proposal or suggested a policy, he had to refer to and justify from examples from history. During the Opium War, both Lin Tse-hsu and Ch’i-ying (Kiyung) had to do the same thing although they suggested different policies. In Lin’s memorial to the emperor Tao-kuang, he advocated the “i-i chi-i” 以夷制夷 (use barbarians to check barbarians) policy by referring to the Han dynasty.<sup>11</sup> Ch’i-ying, the advocate of the “chi-mi” 羈縻 (appeasement) policy, cited

<sup>7</sup> Robert Hartwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 722-723.

<sup>8</sup> Studies on the emperor K’ang-hsi, see Johnathan Spence, *Emperor of China: Self-portrait of K’ang-hsi*, (N. Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1974). For an excellent treatment of the emperor Ch’ien-lung, see Harold Kahn, *Monarchy in the emperor’s eyes: Image and Reality in the Ch’ien-lung Reign*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). For education of Hsien-feng and T’ung-chih, see *Weng T’ung-ho Jih-chi* (Diary of Weng T’ung-ho), I, 429.

<sup>9</sup> For the civil service examination, see Shang Yen-liu, *Ch’ing-tai k’o-chu k’ao-shih shu-lu* (Account on Ch’ing examination system), (Peking, 1958).

<sup>10</sup> Joseph Levenson, “‘History’ and ‘Value’: the Tensions of Intellectual Choice in Modern China,” in Arthur Wright, ed., *Studies in Chinese Thought*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 402.

examples from the Sung period.<sup>12</sup> Even two decades after the Opium War, Prince Kung (I-hsin) in his memorial to the throne asking for the establishment of a centralized foreign office, the Tsungli Yamen, which China never had before, he viewed the present misfortunes in the light of history and saw that the solution, therefore, should also be found in the past. Then he gave many historical examples to justify the establishment of the Tsungli Yamen that it was an application of historical experience rather than a new creation of his own.<sup>13</sup>

Secondly, the modular concept of history resulted in the prevalence of a negative attitude toward "change". As the Chinese saw the ancient Classics were eternal principles "made manifest",<sup>14</sup> and the Three Dynasties (*san-tai* 三代) were historical models "made follow", they tended to look upon "change" as a declining process and "changelessness" a virtue. With this in mind, the Chinese were reluctant to make new methods in dealing with the West and any reform based on non-Confucian grounds would certainly be rejected and criticized.

In short, the idea that Chinese history was a universal guide-line, the Classics were moral codes, and the Chinese were "selected people", was the conviction of the early nineteenth-century Chinese intellectuals.

### Tradition in Transition

The early contact between China and the West had never been a challenge to Sino-centricism. The diplomatic missions of Lord Macartney (1793), Amherst (1816) and Napier (1834), or the trades on the south-eastern coasts, did not change the attitude and policy of the Chinese government toward the West. Despite the overwhelming British power displayed in the Opium War of 1840-42, the Ch'ing rulers took little steps to seek knowledge about the outside world and from the outside world; the intellectuals did not sense the crisis of cultural identity nor did they doubt on traditional values. The Opium War was considered by many historians a turning point of Chinese modern history as the Nanking Treaty "destroyed the legal basis for China's pretense to superiority and paved the way for far-reaching changes in China's relations with the West."<sup>15</sup> However, from the ideological point of view, the Opium War was a turning point which failed to turn. The intellectual impact the West was very superficial, and the scholars of that time were inclined to look upon the Nanking Treaty not as a new practice of international relations but somewhat as a temporary expedient necessary for keeping the "barbarians" in check (*ch'üan-i chih-chi* 權宜之計).<sup>16</sup> They considered the opening of treaty-ports a treatment and a gracious act to people from

<sup>11</sup> Wu Hung-chu, "China's Attitude Towards Foreign Nations and Nationals Historically Considered," *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. 10, (Jan. 1926), p. 36.

<sup>12</sup> IWSM, Tao-kuang period, 37:23-28. Also Wang Erh-min, "Ch'i-ying wai-chiao" (The diplomacy of Ch'i-ying), in *Ta-lu cha-chih shih-hsueh tsung-shu*, ser. 2, (Taipei, 1967), vol. 5:7-17.

<sup>13</sup> Meng Ssu-ming, *The Tsungli-Yamen: its Organization and Functions*, (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1962), p. 26.

<sup>14</sup> Joseph Levenson, "'History' and 'Value': the Tensions of Intellectual Choice in Modern China", *op. cit.*, p. 401.

<sup>15</sup> Knight Biggerstaff, "The Secret Correspondence of 1867-1868: Views of Leading Chinese Statesman regarding the further opening of China to Western Influence", *The Journal of Modern History*, XXII.2:123 (June, 1950).

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

afar (*kuang-i* 款夷, *jou-yüan-jên* 柔遠人), and regarded the paying of indemnity to the British in terms of giving relief (*fu-hsiü* 撫卹).<sup>17</sup> It was not until the end of the Second Anglo-Chinese War that there was a fuller awakening among at least a certain number of scholar-officials to the implications of Western encroachment.<sup>18</sup>

Then, one may ask: Is it true that China's history prior to 1860 was stagnant and immobile, and her society existed at that time as she had been in ancient times?<sup>19</sup>

This was not the case. Merely from the early Ch'ing to the eve of the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion, China had undergone many changes in social and economic conditions as well as in the intellectual world. Nevertheless, these were indigenous trends inspired from Confucian teachings rather than stimulated from without—the modern West.

The most notable trend of intellectual transition was a reassertion of the Confucian ideal of practical statesmanship which was usually known as the "Ching-shih P'ai" 經世派 (School of Statecraft). This school of thought affected the Chinese attitude toward the West very much in a sense that it provided much membership to the "Yang-wu P'ai" 洋務派 (Self-strengthening Group) and the "Wei-hsin Tang" 維新黨 (Reformist Group) in the later period.

The "Ching-shih School" had come into existence in the late 1820s when Ho Ch'ang-ling's *Huang-ch'ao ching-shih-wen p'ien* 皇朝經世文編 (A compilation of essays on statecraft of the reigning dynasty) first came out.<sup>20</sup> The main theme of this school of thought, in Kung Tzu-ch'en's words, was that "it is the duty for man of learning to use his ability to serve the state, the ruler and the people."<sup>21</sup> They reaffirmed the early Ch'ing philosopher Ku Yen-wu's idea on "practical use in administering society" (*ching-shih chih-yung* 經世致用) and denounced those scholars who indulged in literary research, artistic writing, calligraphy and empty talks. Such men included: Huang Ch'ieh-chih, Hsü Pao-shan, Chu Chi, Su T'ing-hui, Ch'en T'ing-yung, Wu Chia-pin, Mei Tseng-liang, Chuang Yu-ch'ing, Chang Chih-liang, Ch'iang K'ai, Pao Shih-ch'en, Kung Tzu-ch'en, Lin Tse-hsü, Wei Yuan and Yao Ying.<sup>22</sup> Later, men like Feng Kuei-fen and Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng who participated in the "yang-wu" movement were also members of this school. Their deep concern for China's prosperity and people's living lay the foundation for a genuine pursuit among Chinese scholars for the "fu-ch'iang" 富强 (wealth and power) ideal by means of westernization in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Parallel to the growing concern in statecraft, there arose in the intellectual circle a profound interest in the study of contemporary history and a revival movement of historical analogism.<sup>23</sup> The study of contemporary history was suppressed in the early

<sup>17</sup> Hsu K'o, *Ch'ing pei lei-ch'ou* (A classified compilation of Ch'ing anecdotal materials), chuan 6:2.

<sup>18</sup> Liu Kwang-ching, "Nineteenth-century China: The Disintegration of the Old Order and the Impact of the West", in Ho Ping-ti, ed., *China in Crisis*, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 126.

<sup>19</sup> Hegal and Tawney had expressed the idea that China had no history because the present and the past were alike. See Raymond Dawson, *The Chinese Chameleon*, op. cit., p. 60, 70.

<sup>20</sup> Liu Kwang-ching, "Nineteenth-century China", p. 122.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> For essays written by these "ching-shih" scholars, see *Ya-p'ien chan-cheng shih-chi ssu-sheng-shih tzu-liao hsüan-chi* (Selected materials on the history of thought during the Opium War), (Peking, 1963), Ch'i Ssu-ho, "Wei Yüan yü wan-Ch'ing hsüeh-feng" (Wei Yüan and the new trends in the late Ch'ing scholarship), *The Yenching Journal of Chinese Studies*, 39:177-226, (1950).

<sup>23</sup> Robert Hartwell, op. cit., p. 727.

Ch'ing period as it might arouse the anti-Manchu spirit and remind the Chinese of national sentiments. However, as time passed and the Manchu power had been consolidated, the "literary inquisitions" which aimed at keeping scholars away from talking about politics and government policies, became less frequent. Again, the study of contemporary history and discussions on geography and frontier development became popular. Wei Yüan's *Sheng-wu chi* 聖武記 (Account of the imperial military exploits) and *Hai-kuo t'u-chih* 海國圖志 (Illustrated gazetteer of the maritime countries), Chang Mu's *Meng-ku yu-mu chi* 蒙古遊牧記 (Account of the adventures in Mongolia), Hsü Chi-yü's *Ying-huan chih-lüeh* 瀛寰志略 (Brief account on countries of the world), and Ho Ch'iu-t'ao's *Shuo-fang pei-ch'eng* 朔方備乘 (References on northern areas) were books of this kind.<sup>24</sup>

A reading of these books will give one an impression that the Chinese scholars had not changed their world-view, nor had they made any attempts to employ new approaches to deal with foreign countries. They stressed the importance of cultivating the "men of talent" (*jen-ts'ai* 人才) by Confucian ethics, and showed a preoccupation with "applying the Classics to practical affairs" (*t'ung-ching chih-yung* 通經致用).<sup>25</sup> They maintained the modular concept of history, seeking to apply historical experiences to current situations. Eric Widmer points out that in 1858 this attitude had not yet changed. The Ch'ing regime, he says, "seldom faced the question of what baggage among its tributary traditions might be better discarded. Foreign relations were maintained on the hoary premise that barbarians were manageable, and most Ch'ing diplomats behaved as if their Chinese heritage were quite adequate to that task."<sup>26</sup>

It was not until the late 1850s that a realization of the inadequacy of traditional theories and practices had emerged out of the sense of insecurity created by the internal disturbances and external threats. Some progressive-minded officials, though painful-takingly and half-heartedly, turned to the West for alternatives. Thus, an unprecedented concept of change and a new perspective on the outside world began to take shape.

### III. YANG-WU 洋務 (FOREIGN AFFAIRS): POLARIZED APPROACHES, 1860-1884

The Westerners were very much displeased and felt it intolerable to hear that they were called "barbarians" (*i*), "rebels" (*ni* 逆), "robbers" (*fei* 匪) and "ugly men" (*ch'ou* 醜) by the Chinese.<sup>27</sup> So after the Arrow War, they put into the Treaty of T'ientsin (1858) the following article: "It is agreed that, henceforward, the character 'I' (barbarian), shall not be applied to the Government or subjects of the Britannic Majesty in

<sup>24</sup> *Ya-p'ien chan-cheng shih-chi ssu-sheng-shih tzu-liao hsüan-chi*, *op. cit.*, p. 14. Also Chao Tzu-heng, "Ch'ing-chi ko-hsin yun-tung k'ai-kuan" (A brief view on the Reform Movement in the late Ch'ing period), in *Chung-kuo hsüeh-pao* (Journal of Chinese Studies), I.6, (August, 1944), p. 62.

<sup>25</sup> Liu Kwang-ching, "Nineteenth-century China", p. 126.

<sup>26</sup> Eric Widmer, "Archimandite Palladius and Chinese Control of barbarians in 1858", *Papers on China*, 19:55, (December, 1965).

<sup>27</sup> See Chang Hsi, *Fu-i jih-chi* (Diary in the days of pacifying the barbarians).

any Chinese official documents issued by the Chinese authorities either in the Capital or in the Provinces."<sup>28</sup>

Meanwhile, with the opening of more treaty-ports, the establishment of a foreign office—the Tsungli Yamen, and permission granted to foreign ministers to reside permanently in Peking, one perceived a different scene in the 1860s of China's relation with the West. However, the prohibition of using the character "I" for foreigners and the creation of machinery for dealing with international affairs by no means indicated a fundamental change of mind on the part of Chinese intellectuals, nor a general acceptance of Western ideas and new values. Large function of the intelligentsia remained conservative: they perceived the Tsungli Yamen as a temporary organ rather than a permanent office of the government,<sup>29</sup> and in their diaries and letters they continued to use "barbarians" and "rebels" for Westerners. Even the government's secret documents kept the title as *Ch'ou-p'an i-wu shih-mo* 籌辦夷務始末 (Complete account on the management of barbarian affairs) until 1880.<sup>30</sup> This may indicate that the government's attitude toward foreign relations was, though not openly, anti-foreign. Yet, despite the fact that most of the Chinese scholar-officials were conservative and anti-foreign, the decade after the Second Anglo-Chinese War marked an unprecedented challenge to Confucian traditionalism as a certain number of intellectuals came to realize the inadequacies of traditional diplomatic techniques and systems and dared to learn from the West in military, commercial and other areas. With the appearance of this "progressive" group, the intellectual circle in this period was thus divided into two distinct factions—the "conservatives" on one hand and the "progressives" on the other—different in both ideologies and political interests.

### Virtue versus Power: the Ideological Conflict

The dissension of the two factions can be viewed from their conceptions of culture, nation, man and government.

#### *Tao: changeable or unchangeable?*

The conservative scholars deeply believed that the antiquity was the main criterion of value and the historical path from the "Three Dynasties" to the later dynasties was a declining process, a "downward flow of change".<sup>31</sup> However, as long as China did not communicate with the outside world, she could still remain her identity as the "Central Nation" and the essence of her culture—*tao* or *tao-t'ung* 道統—could be transmitted through the dynastic cycle. That the letting in of foreign ideas, they were afraid, would result in undermining and eventually destroying Chinese culture that the wholeness

<sup>28</sup> Harley MacNair, *Modern Chinese History: Selected Readings*, vol. 1, (Shanghai: The Commercial Press), p. 290.

<sup>29</sup> Meng Ssu-ming, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>30</sup> *IWSM* consists of three volumes: (1) Tao-kuang period: 1836-1850, 80 *chüan*, presented to the throne in 1856; (2) Hsien-feng period: 1851-1860, 80 *chüan*, presented to the throne in 1867; and (3) T'ung-chih period: 1861-1874, presented to the throne in 1880, 100 *chüan*. For a detail description see T. F. Tsiang, "New Light on Chinese Diplomacy, 1836-1849", in *The Journal of Modern History*, III, 4:578-591 (December, 1931).

<sup>31</sup> Paul A. Cohen, *Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and Reform in Late Ch'ing China*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 110. Also Feng Yu-lan, "Chinese Political Philosophy and Politics in Chinese History", in *Tsing-hua Journal*, XIII:99.



would be raptured and the universe and harmony would cease to exist.<sup>32</sup>

This anti-foreign attitude did not stem from a blind inertia or "xenophobia". Rather, it stemmed from their self-exalted Confucianism and self-centered traditionalism in addition to their stronger sensitivity to history and responsibility for history than that of the "progressives". As they regarded Chinese culture as an indivisible entity, they did not want to make any concessions to the infiltration of Western learning. Their argument was: if part of the Chinese culture changed, the wholeness of it would not be able to maintain. In other words, Chinese culture itself was a compound in which their emotions and values were wielded together. Many of the conservative scholars were of neo-Confucian background. They liked to apply the "li-ch'i" 理氣 formula to illustrate culture. By this they meant that culture was an integral whole composed to two parts: *li* (metaphysical substance) and *ch'i* (physical substance). Yet the two were indivisible and interconnected, thus changing a part would impair the balance and integrity of the whole. Imitating the West in the technological level would contaminate the Chinese. Wo-jen was a concrete example. He emphasized the distinction, the incompatibility between the Chinese ideal of the "human heart" and the Western ideal of "technology" explicitly by disavowed any effort to bring them together as "complementary partners". For if the Western learnings were let loose in China, the Chinese learnings would not stay softly screened off and unsullied. So, he did not accept Western learning as a complement to Chinese culture (a *yung* 用 to a *t'i* 體) but rejected completely the Western culture as a rival—an alternative *t'i* to the traditional one.<sup>33</sup>

Their view of an indivisible Chinese culture resulted in a plea for a cultural as well as physical seclusion. Why China should adopt such a policy? Yü Yüeh took the family as an example, saying, "Within the wall and inside the gate are the members of one family where the parents, through teaching and discipline, raise their children in the most proper manner. If neighbors or strangers can come into the house at any time they want to and make noise and cause disturbance whenever they please, the family is no longer a family in the truest sense of that word."<sup>34</sup>

On the other hand, the progressive (only in a relative sense), tended to think Chinese culture as a divisible mixture. In view of the phrases and terms they used in their arguments, one perceived that there was a particular analogy between the conservatives and the progressives for both analysed culture in dichotomic terms such as "li" and "ch'i", "nei" 內 and "wai" 外 (inner and outer), "pen" 本 and "mo" 末 (ends and means), and "t'i" and "yung" (substance and function). Nevertheless, these progressive scholar-officials thought that change in the physical level would not blur or jeopardize the metaphysical level but to help in preserving and strengthening it. They divided culture into two realms: the changeable and the unchangeable. The latter concerned with moral principles, ethics and human relationships, and the former included the military sphere, the fields of navigation, transportation and technology.

<sup>32</sup> Yü Yüeh, "My Three Fears", in Dun J. Li, ed., *China in Transition: 1517-1911* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1969), p. 164.

<sup>33</sup> Joseph Levenson, *Confucian China and its Modern Fate: A Trilogy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 69-70.

<sup>34</sup> Yü Yüeh, "My Three Fears" in *China in Transition*, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

"When I speak of change," Wang T'ao said, "I mean changing the outer, not the inner; changing what it is proper to change, not what cannot be change. In the military sphere we should make a complete conversion from swords and spears to firearms; in the field of navigation we should make a complete conversion from boats to steamships. . ."<sup>35</sup> Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng and Cheng Kuan-ying shared the same idea that Chinese learning (*Chung-hsüeh* 中學) in its moral sense was unchangeable, but Western learning (*hsi-hsüeh* 西學) could be adopted without affecting the former realm.<sup>36</sup>

*China: t'ien-hsia or kuo-chia?*

The traditionalists saw China as a universal empire—a "t'ien-hsia" 天下—in which Confucian values and Chinese tradition claimed authority. "T'ien-hsia" (literally translated as 'under-Heaven') signified the whole world rather than the state alone. It does not necessary mean that China had to extend her direct control over corners of the world, but had presumably the suzerainty over all vassal states. The emperor of China claimed to be "the Son of Heaven" (*t'ien-tzu* 天子) and according to the Classics, "under the wide heaven, there is no land that is not the emperor's; within the sea-boundaries of the land, there is none who is not a subject of the emperor."<sup>37</sup>

The "t'ien-hsia" concept represented a kind of Sino-centricism that no other high culture existed besides the Chinese. Thus, China had nothing to learn from the outside world as all values and ideals lay within the "t'ien-hsia"—a world of perfect. This gives an explanation for why Wo- jen was reluctant to offer tutorship to foreigners during the T'ung-wen Kuan controversy of 1866-68.<sup>38</sup>

To the "yang-wu" leaders, China was a nation—a "kuo-chia" 國家—rather than a universal empire. They got a new perception of the world through their practical experiences in dealing with foreign affairs. First of all, they realized there was a distinction between the "barbarians" in China's past history and the Westerners of the present time. In Kuo Sung-tao's words: "The Western nations had also a civilization of two thousand years' antiquity . . . they were totally different from the ephemeral, powerful tribes known in Chinese history."<sup>39</sup>

Inasmuch as that the present situation was an unprecedented outcome, Li Hung-chang, Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng, Kuo Sung-t'ao, Wang T'ao and others urged for change. In a letter to Tsungli Yamen in 1784, Li Hung-chang wrote, "I believe that changes must be made when the old ways are no longer adequate to serve our purpose and that only through changes can there be found new alternatives to meet our present need."<sup>40</sup> Wang T'ao justified change with the reason that China in ancient times had also undergone sweeping changes and that if Confucius himself were still alive, he would

<sup>35</sup> Wang T'ao, *T'ao-yüan wen-lu wat-p'ien* (Collection of Wang T'ao's essays), quoted from Paul Cohen, *Between Tradition and Modernity*, p. 146.

<sup>36</sup> Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng's idea of "change" is best manifested in the *Ch'ou-yang chu-i* (Discussions on foreign affairs), 1 *chüan*, in *Yung-an chüan-chi* (Complete works of Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng), ser. 3.

<sup>37</sup> The Book of Odes (*shih-ching*) "Hsiao-ya: pei-shan", quoted from Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 6.

<sup>38</sup> For Wo- jen's idea, see Fairbank and Teng, ed., *China's Response to the West*, p. 76. Also Chang Hao, "The Antiforeignist Role of Wo- jen, 1804-1871", *Papers on China*, 14:1-29 (1960).

<sup>39</sup> Immanuel Hsü, *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations*, p. 188.

<sup>40</sup> *IWSM*, T'ung-chih period, 25:9-10. Li Hung-chang's idea on change also found in *Li Wen-chung-kung chuan-chi* (Complete works of Li Hung-chang): *p'eng-liao han-kao* (Letters to friends and colleagues), *chüan* 11:27.

certainly “not cling rigidly to antiquity and oppose making the changes required by circumstances.”<sup>41</sup>

Change, in practice, meant to learn Western technology and military strategy; in theory, meant to adopt a nation-state world-view. The creation of the Tsungli Yamen in 1861, the translation and practice of international law after 1864, the granting of audience without the “kowtow” ceremony by the T’ung-chih emperor to all foreign envoys in 1873, and the appointment of permanent envoys abroad in 1876, marked the gradual steps of the “yang-wu” leaders to an acceptance of Western diplomatic theories and a recognition of China’s “kuo-chia” status.

*Man: of conduct or of ability?*

Both conservatives and progressives paid great attention to the search for “man of talents” (*jen-ts’ai* 人才).<sup>42</sup> Their conflict lay in the twofold question—what is a “talented man” and how to become such a person?

The ideal-type of the conservatives was a man of conduct, a scholar of general knowledge (*t’ung-jen* 通人). While the progressives’ admiration gave to the man of ability who was skillful in handling practical problems rather than good in behavior. Most of the “mu-fu” 幕府 (personal staff) recruited by Li Hung-chang were professionals and experts of specific knowledge in various fields rather than scholars of philosophy and literature. Wo-jen and Li Hung-chang could typify these two groups in theory as well as in practice.

Wo-jen reiterately emphasized the moral cultivation and self-realization of an individual in “rectification of heart and sincerity of thought” (*cheng-hsin ch’eng-i* 誠心正意).<sup>43</sup> Even in times of foreign threat and internal chaos, he still proclaimed that “the only thing the nation can rely on for its survival is the rectitude of its intelligentsia.”<sup>44</sup> The “gentleman” (*chün-tzu* 君子)’s serious concern, he said, “was not to pursue a small and insignificant skill but to pursue virtue such as righteousness and propriety.”<sup>45</sup>

Li Hung-chang, a hard-headed realist and pragmatist, saw China’s survival in the modern world where might made right should rely upon men of ability rather than men of conduct. In a letter to Tseng Kuo-ch’uan in 1863, he wrote, “. . . to manage state affairs does not depend on how many books you have read.”<sup>46</sup> He criticized the traditional scholars that “(they) had been indulging in the practice of writing in fancy

<sup>41</sup> Paul Cohen, *Between Tradition and Modernity*, p. 136.

<sup>42</sup> Li Hung-chang said, “Military victories depend on men and not weapons.” in “Letters to Friends and Colleagues”, *chüan* 2:46b. For Tseng Kuo-fan’s “yung-jen” idea, see Kenneth Folsom, *Friends, Guests, and Colleagues*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 75. For Wang T’ao’s idea, see Paul Cohen, “Wang T’ao and his new perspective on the world”, in Albert Feuerwerker (ed.) *Approaches of Modern Chinese History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 152.

<sup>43</sup> Chang Hao, “The Anti-foreignist Role of Wo-jen”, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

<sup>44</sup> Wo-jen, “No Need for Western Learning”, in *IWSM*, T’ung-chih period, 47:24-25, quoted from Dun J. Li, *China in Transition*, p. 161.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. p. 162.

<sup>46</sup> Li Hung-chang, *Chüan-chi*: “Letters to Friends and Colleagues”, *chüan* 3:30b.

and flowery language and are ignorant of immense changes that have come about."<sup>47</sup>  
"Their learning has in fact been completely separated from utility."<sup>48</sup>

In actuality, the two men themselves represented a contrast. Wo- jen was a virtuous scholar and a loyal Confucian in the eyes of his contemporaries.<sup>49</sup> While Li Hung-chang was an official who relied on power (*ch'üan-ch'en* 權臣).<sup>50</sup>

Li Hung-chang had also the ambition to become a scholar in his early twenties. But later he changed his attitude toward scholarship because "(he found himself) in a very chaotic age and was led by Lu Wen-chieh to join the army."<sup>51</sup> Through his military experiences and achievements he got to the top of officialdom with great success.<sup>52</sup>

It is worth noting that Li Hung-chang took the first step in the process of the development in China from an elite of scholars to an elite of professionals putting away the ideal of Confucian amateurism.<sup>53</sup> A study of his "mu-fu"'s background proves the fact that Li liked to employ treaty-port experts than those men of learning. Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng, Ting Jih-ch'ang, Cheng Yü-hsien, Tang Ching-hsing (Tong King-sing), Hsü Jen, Cheng Kuan-ying, Ma Chien-chung, Ling Shao-lan, Chu Ch'i-ang, Feng Chun-kuang, Wang T'ao, Jung Hung (Yung Wing) and Ho Ch'i (Ho K'ai) had either been living in treaty-ports for years or actually come from a merchant or comprador background, and none of them got an examination degree higher than "chü-jen".<sup>54</sup>

Most of the conservatives were successful graduates of the civil service examination system (*k'o-chü* 科舉). They claimed themselves "right men" (*cheng-shih* 正士) and looked down upon military positions as well as the "yang-wu" specialists.<sup>55</sup> Wo- jen said, "In the pursuit of knowledge, a Confucian scholar should not concentrate on one field to the exclusion of all others."<sup>56</sup>

#### *Government: virtuous or powerful?*

On the issue of how to regulate governmental affairs, the conservatives' primary concerns were the conduct of the rulers and the sentiments of the people. Neither institutional changes nor technological innovations could reach the goal of good

<sup>47</sup> Quoted from Kenneth Folsom, *Friends, Guests and Colleagues: the Mufu System in the Late Ch'ing period*, p. 191.

<sup>48</sup> *JWSM*, T'ung-chih period, 25:9-10. Also Dun J. Li, *China in Transition*, p. 141.

<sup>49</sup> *Kuo-ch'ao shih-lüeh* (Brief history of our imperial dynasty), (Nanking, 1909), p. 194. Also *Weng T'ung-ho jih-chih*, I:17, 21.

<sup>50</sup> *Weng T'ung-ho jih-chi*, I:6, 25. Also Chin Liang, *Chin-shih jen-wu chih* (Men of Modern Times), (Peking, 1934), p. 82.

<sup>51</sup> Li Hung-chang, *Chüan-ch'*: "Letters to Friends and Colleagues", *chüan* 4:216; Folsom, p. 98.

<sup>52</sup> See his letter to Tseng Chi-tse, "Letters to Friends and Colleagues", *chüan* 12:35.

<sup>53</sup> Folsom, *Friends, Guests and Colleagues*, pp. 150-151.

<sup>54</sup> For these men's background, see Paul Cohen, *Between Tradition and Modernity*, p. 242. Also "Littoral and Hinterland in Nineteenth-century China: the 'Christian Reformers'", in Fairbank, ed., *The Missionary Enterprises in China and America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 197-225. Li Hung-chang, "Letters to friends and colleagues", *chüan* 12:3, 13, 19, 33, *chüan* 13:9, *chüan* 17:10b, 12; Folsom, 137-138; and Stanley Spector, *Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), table 17, pp. 288-296.

<sup>55</sup> Schuyler Cammann, "The Development of the Mandarin Square", *HJAS*, VII.1:88 (1944) and Immanuel Hsü, *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations*, p. 202.

<sup>56</sup> Dun J. Li, *China in Transition*, p. 101.

government. In Wo-jen's memorial to T'ung-chih emperor, he said, "Your slave has learned that the way to establish a nation is to lay emphasis on propriety and righteousness, not on power and plotting. The fundamental effort lies in the minds of the people, not in technology."<sup>57</sup>

Their ideal-type government was the halcyon days of Yao and Shun: the personality of the sage kings, the structure of the government and the social life of the people. Only when the rulers were virtuous and patterned after the Golden Age, then the country could be a strong country. And no military power nor material wealth could bring about peace and prestige.

The self-strengtheners did not really believe in international law, but they realized that the modern world was a "Darwinian jungle." They urged China not to isolate herself from the "family of nations" but to enter it as a competitor to other nations. They saw "fu-ch'iang" 富强 the goal of strengthening, military and economic innovations prior to moral cultivation.

Some historians tend to view this "virtue vs. power" controversy between the conservatives and the "yang-wu" leaders as a thousand-year-old "wang-pa" 王霸 conflict between the Confucians and the Legalists.<sup>58</sup> However, such a view would disparage the role of Western impact which stimulated the transvaluation process and provided ideals and values as alternatives. The "fu-ch'iang" ideal—a wealthy and powerful government—though not completely alien to the Chinese, was formed in the light of Western impact after a recognition of the inadequacy of moral practices, rather than inspired by the Legalist thought.

### Conservatives versus Progressives: the Power Struggle

Besides their ideological dissensions, the conflict between the conservative scholars and progressive officials in the 1860s and 1870s also sprang from the practical actuality: the struggle for political power and personal interests.

Most of the vociferous conservatives were from three places, namely the Hanlin Academy, the censorate and the Board of Rites. One similar feature of members of these three offices was that their intellectual and professional considerations attached closely to Confucian traditionalism. They represented the special privileges and interests of those who got up the bureaucratic hierarchy by passing through the regular channel of the educational system. While the progressives represented a nouveau elite who acquired power and wealth from the unorthodox way (*fei-cheng-t'u* 非正途) either through "yang-wu" or "chün-kung" 軍功 (military accomplishment). The following table shows the backgrounds of these two groups.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>57</sup> Fairbank and Teng, ed., *China's Response to the West*, p. 76.

<sup>58</sup> See Paul Cohen, *Between Tradition and Modernity*, chapter 2.

<sup>59</sup> These tables are based on the sources provided by Arthur Hummel, *Eminent Chinese in the Ch'ing Period*, Chin Liang, *Kuang-Hsüan lieh-chuan* (Biographies of the Chinese officials in the Kuang-Hsüan period), *Ch'ing-shih Kao* (Draft History of the Ch'ing) and Stanley Spector's tables in *Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army*.

TABLE A  
Conservative Scholar-officials (1861-84)

Name	Birth Place	Background	Career & Function
Chang Sheng-tsao		chin-shih	Censor of Shangtung
Ch'i Chün-tsao (1793-1866)	Shansi	chin-shih	Served in the Imperial Study (1821); Associate examiner of the metro. exam. (1822), chief examiner of provincial exam.; Director of education of Hunan (1823-26); Vice-pres. of the Board of War (1837), President of the Board of Works (1841); Grand Secretary (1852); Tutor of T'ung-chih (1861-64)
Hsü T'ung (1819-1900)		chin-shih Neo-Confucian	Tutor of T'ung-chih (1861); Grand Secretary
Wen-pin (1825-1880)		chin-shih	Financial commissioner of Shangtung
Wo-jen (1806-1871)	Honan	chin-shih Mongol of Plain Red Banner Hanlin compiler	Examiner of metro. exam. (1836) Tutor of Hsien-feng (1855); Vice-pres. of Board of Rites (1866), Pres. of the censorate (1861), Tutor of T'ung-chih (1862)
Yang T'ing-hsi			District Magistrate of Chihli
Weng T'ung-ho (1830-1904)	Kiangsu	chin-shih Halin compiler	Provincial exam. director (1858); Tutor of T'ung-chih (1865); Libationer of the Imperial Academy (1868-71); Sub-chancellor of the Grand Secretariat (1871-76); Tutor of Kuang-hsü (1876)
Li Hung-tsao (1820-1897)	Chihli	chin-shih Hanlin compiler	Commissioner of education of Hunan (1857-60); Teacher in the Palace School of Princes; Tutor of T'ung-chih (1861); Libationer of the Imperial Academy (1863); Grand Secretary & Grand Councilor
Chang Chih-tung (1837-1909)	Chihli	chin-shih (t'an-hua)	Director of education in Szechwan (1873-77); Tutor in the Imperial Acad. (1879-81); Governor Shansi (1882); Governor-general of Kwangtung and Kwangsi (1884-89)
Chang P'ei-lun (1848-1903)	Chihli	chin-shih Hanlin	Acting Vice-pres. of the censorate (1882); Commander-in-chief of the Foochow Squadron
Teng Ch'eng-hsiao (1841-1891)	Chihli	chin-shih Hanlin	Censor
Ch'en Pao-chen (1848-1935)		chin-shih Hanlin	Censor; Member of the <i>Ch'ing-liu</i> ; Commissioner of education of Kiangsi (1883)

TABLE A

(Continued)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Birth Place</i>	<i>Background</i>	<i>Career &amp; Function</i>
Wang T'i-fang (1832-1899)	Chekiang	chin-shih Hanlin	Served in the Hanlin Acad. for 15 years; One of the "4 Admonishing officials"; Educational commissioner of Kiangsu (1880-85); Vice-pres. of Board of War (1882); Established Nan-ch'ing Shu-yüan (1884)
Pao-t'ing (1840-1890)	Peking	chin-shih Member or Imperial clan Hanlin	Served in the Hanlin Acad. (1868-75); One of the "4 Admonishing officials"; Junior vice-pres. of the Board of Rites (1881); Chief examiner of Fukien Provincial exam. (1882)
Sheng-yü (1850-1900)	Peking	chin-shih Member of Imperial clan Hanlin Compiler	Secretary of the Supervisorate of Imperial Instruction (1881); Sub-expositor of the Hanlin Academy (1881-83); Sub-reader of the Hanlin Academy (1883); Deputy Supervisor of Imperial Instruction (1883); Libationer of the Imperial Academy (1884)

TABLE B

"Yang-wu" Oriented Scholar-officials (1861-84)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Birth Place</i>	<i>Background</i>	<i>Career &amp; Function</i>
Prince Kung (1833-1898)	Peking	6th son of emp. Hsien-feng	Price Counselor; In charge of Grand Council; Established & supervised the Tsungli Yamen
Wen-hsiang (1818-1876)	Mukden	Manchu of Plain Red Banner Purchased rank of student of the Imp. Academy chin-shih	Inspector of the armories (1853); Intendant of a circuit (1855); Junior vice-pres. of the Board of Rites (1858); Grand Councilor (1859); Pres. of the censorate (1862); Grand Secretary (1872)
Tseng Kuo-fan	Hunan	chin-shih Hanlin Scholar & military leader	Vice-pres. of the Board of Rites (1849); Served as military commander during the Taiping Rebellion; Grand Secretary (1867); Governor of Chihli (1868)
Tso Tsung-t'ang (1812-1885)	Hunan	chü-jen	Tseng Kuo-fan's "mu-fu" operating military activities against Taipings, Nien, and Muslims of the west; Governor-general of Fukien & Chekiang; Governor-general of Shensi & Kansu

TABLE B

(Continued)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Birth Place</i>	<i>Background</i>	<i>Career &amp; Function</i>
Li Hung-chang (1823-1901)	Anhwei	chin-shih Hanlin	Served in the army after 1853, Tseng's "mu-fu"; Governor of Kiangsu; Governor-general of Hunan & Hupeh (1868); Governor-general of Chihli (1870), Grand Secretary
Shen Pao-chen (1820-1891)	Fukien	chin-shih Hanlin	Censor (1854); Intendant of Kiangsi (1857-59); Governor of Kiangsi (1862); Director-general of Arsenal (1867)
Kuo Sung-t'ao (1818-1891)	Hunan	chin-shih Hanlin	Assisted Tseng & Chiang Chung-yüan in combating the Taipings; Salt controller (1862); Minister to England (1876)
Ting Jih-ch'ang (1823-1882)	Kwangtung	hsiu-ts'ai Purchased title of student of the Imp. Academy Purchased rank of expectant director of schools	Tseng's "mu-fu"; Li Hung-chang's "mu-fu"; Salt Controller of Liang-huai region (1865); Governor of Kiangsu (1867)
Tseng Chi-tse (1839-1890)	Hunan	Elder son of Tseng Kuo-fan Inherited rank of "hou" (Marquis)	Secretary of the Board of Revenue; Minister to Eng. & France (1878)
Hsieh Fu-ch'eng (1838-1894)	Chekiang	hsiu-ts'ai kung-sheng	Tseng's "mu-fu"; Li's "mu-fu"; Senior licentiate (1867); Minister to Eng., Fr., Italy & Belgium (1889)
Li Shu-ch'ang (1837-1897)	Kweichow	ling-kung-sheng	Tseng's "mu-fu"; Associate with Kuo's legation to England (1876); Minister to Japan (1881)
Hung Chün (1840-1893)	Kiangsu	chin-shih (chuang-yuan) Hanlin	Education examiner (1870-74), (1880-82); Minister to Germany, Russia, Austria & Holland (1887)
Ch'eng Lan-pin	Kwangtung	chin-shih	Assistant Secretary of the Board of Punishments; Supervised students in America (1872); Minister to U.S., Spain, & Peru (1876)
Cheng Tsao-ju (d. 1894)	Kwangtung	chü-jen	Served in the Customs, machinery bureau; Minister to U.S., Spain & Peru (1880)
Yung Wing (1828-1912)	Kwangtung	studied in U.S. Purchased title of expectant	Interpreter; Li's "mu-fu"; Supervised students in U.S.; Railway financier; Industrialist
Li Feng-pao (d. 1887)	Kiangsu	hsiu-ts'ai Student of Kiangnan Arsenal	Tutor of Kiangnan Arsenal; Circuit Intendant; Minister to Germany (1878)



TABLE B

(Continued)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Birth Place</i>	<i>Background</i>	<i>Career &amp; Function</i>
Chang Yin-huan (1837-1900)	Kwangtung	Failed in district exam. Purchased title of student of Imp. Academy	Expectant Magistrate (1864); Circuit intendant at Chefoo; Minister to U.S. (1885)

Table A shows that (1) most of the conservatives had obtained the "chin-shih" degree. This indicates that they were the most successful candidates in the civil service examination; (2) this group is composed largely by three kinds of officials: the "hanlins", the censors (*yü-shih* 御史) and the examination commissioners or directors (*kao-kuan* 考官); (3) they were mainly officials in the Capital (*ching-kuan* 京官).

Table B is a list of progressive-minded officials with their background information provided. It shows that: (1) except those big-names such as Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang, Shen Pao-chen and Kuo Sung-t'ao, most of the "yang-wu p'ai" held a relatively lower degree than their opponents. Many got only the "hsiu-ts'ai" degree or a "kung-sheng" title which were much lower in position and in prestige comparing with the "chin-shih"; (2) many of these officials obtained official ranks through purchase in their early years which was an act looked down upon by the traditional scholars, and (3) many of them were provincial authorities or envoys abroad.

A comparison of the two groups will give one an impression that the conflict between the conservatives and the progressives did not only mean a dissension of ideology but also indicated power struggles in real politics between (1) the officials through the examination channel and those through other ways, and (2) the central officials and the provincial officials.

The conflict became more acute after the year 1870 when Li Hung-chang was appointed the governor-general of Chihli. Chihli was a "central district" (*fu-hsin chih-ti* 腹心之地) and within it situated the imperial Capital—Peking. Seeing that Li Hung-chang might trespass their power and interests at court, the conservatives, formed a group called the "ch'ing-liu tang" 清流黨 (Purification Party), tried to deprive Li from power by memorializing repeatedly to the throne and through the influence of "ch'ing-i" 清議 (pure discussions).<sup>60</sup> Li Hung-chang's settlement of the T'ientsin massacre of 1870 in favour of the foreigners and missionaries irritated the conservatives very much that they labelled him a traitor to Chinese culture (*han-chien* 漢奸) and likened him to Ch'in Kuei, one of the most notorious appeasers in Chinese history.<sup>61</sup> Li, in turn, ridiculed the scholars as blind bookworms who "wanted to cure all diseases with the same prescription." He accused the "central officials" for knowing nothing about foreign affairs and yet pretending to know everything about the world. "They talk in flowery languages," he said, "however, they never have any good ideas."<sup>62</sup>

<sup>60</sup> For a study of the "ch'ing-i", see Lloyd Eastman, *Throne and Mandarin: China's Search for a Policy during the Sino-French Controversy, 1880-1885* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), last chapter.

<sup>61</sup> Immanuel Hsü, *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations*, pp. 201-202.

<sup>62</sup> Li Hung-chang, "Letters to friends and colleagues", *chüan* 12:33.

The central officials opposed to the self-strengthening movement for they gained no benefits from the "yang-wu" programs. Take the construction of railroads and the use of steamboats as examples, they did not share with the provincial authorities the advantages, especially economic benefits. The provincial officials, those in commercial areas in particular, seeing that transport by waterway in steamships and by land in railway lines had proved less expensive and a save of time,<sup>63</sup> pushed hard for reforms because they were partly or indirectly involved in such kind of commercial activities or industrial enterprises. Li Hung-chang was again the best example. During the latter half of the nineteenth century in which China made her first important strides towards industrialization, linked with Li's name were such enterprises as the Soochow, Shanghai and Nanking arsenals; the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company (1872); the development of coal and iron mines in Luan-chou, Chihli (1877); the construction of a three-mile railroad at the K'ai-p'ing mines (1878); the construction of telegraph lines from T'ientsin to Taku (1879), from T'ientsin to Shanghai (1880), and from Shanghai to Canton (1882); the formation of a modern textile company in Shanghai (1882); the opening of Mo-ho gold mines in Heilungkiang (1887); the opening of Shanghai Weaving Mills (1893); the extension of the K'ai-ping railway 175 miles, from T'ientsin to Tangshan, Shanhaikuan, and Peitaiho (1894); and the founding of the T'ientsin Military Academy, the Torpedo School and numerous arsenals.<sup>64</sup> Under the name of "kuan-tu shang-pan" 官督商辦 (official supervision and merchant management)<sup>65</sup> Li exerted great power and influence upon these industrial and commercial enterprises as a supervisor as well as the chief shareholder. The capital that he had invested in these new enterprises amounted to some million taels.<sup>66</sup>

Through the "yang-wu" movement Li Hung-chang did acquire much personal wealth and power. However, his discretion was limited concerning policies on the national scope. The imperial court which, in the last analysis, was the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi herself, was the center of power and the implementation of any policy depended on her support.

The Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi rose up to power after the death of the Emperor Hsien-feng in 1860. With the help from Prince Kung (I-hsin), she deprived the "three princes"—Ts'ai-hsüan, Tuan-hua and Su-shun—from power, and made herself a co-regent with the gentle-minded Dowager Tz'u-an.

Tz'u-hsi, in the purpose of securing her personal power, played the intricate game of the balance of weakness between the conservatives and the progressives. In the sixties she allowed Wo-jen and his associates to remain in high posts, despite their vicious attack on Western learning, while at the same time she allowed Prince Kung, Tseng Kuo-fan and other provincial authorities to launch the self-strengthening movement.<sup>67</sup> In the following decade, she also played a dual policy between the

<sup>63</sup> Dwight Perkins, "Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: the case of Nineteenth-century China", in *Journal of Economic History*, 27:487 (1967).

<sup>64</sup> Stanley Spector, *Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army*, pp. 234-235.

<sup>65</sup> For the "kuan-tu shang-pan" system, see Albert Feuerwerker, *China's Early Industrialization*, chapter one.

<sup>66</sup> Chia Chih-fang, *Chung-kuo chin-tai chin-chi she-hui* (Economic and Social History of Modern China), (Shanghai, 1949), p. 161.

<sup>67</sup> Immanuel Hsü, *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations*, p. 205.

“ch’ing-liu tang” and Li Hung-chang. Her objective was two-fold: to check the growing power of the “yang-wu” group by means of “ch’ing-i”, and conversely to divert the attack of traditional scholars from her illegitimate rule to the “yang-wu” movement. She swayed between the two groups, sometimes listened to the conservatives’ memorials and dismissed a progressive official from office, while at times she punished the conservatives in the favour of the self-strengtheners. As her accession to regency was antithetic to the ideal of Confucianism and also a violation to the house laws of the imperial Manchu family, she was challenged and annoyed by the principle of “li” 禮 (rites), the basic foundation of traditionalism.<sup>68</sup> Although at heart she sided with the conservatives, she said to Wo-jen, “Why you never consider my bitter situation? If you must adhere to house laws, then is ‘ch’ui-lien’ (ruling behind the screen) not a violation to it?”<sup>69</sup>

She made great effort to justify her rule with the Confucian tradition and from historical examples. She secretly ordered Ch’ou Tzu-pei and Li Tz’u-ming to compile a book titled *Lin-ch’ao pei-kao lu* 臨朝備考錄 (References for audience) which praised women’s rule in the past dynasties.<sup>70</sup> Yet she hardly won the esteem of the arch-Confucians who were self-appointed keepers of the intellectual orthodoxy. Wang K’ai-yun’s poem represented some conservative scholars’ response to the Dowager’s rule. It reads, “To rule with the aid of Counselor is our tradition, Chiang-hzu (the favorite concubine of the Emperor Hsuan) did nothing good to the Ch’ou dynasty.” (*chu-chih chung kung-ming, Chiang-hzu pu-tso Ch’ou* 祖制重顧命，姜媿不佐周).<sup>71</sup>

The aversion of Confucian scholars toward Tz’u-hsi reached a high point after the sudden death of the young emperor T’ung-chih in 1874. In order to consolidate her power, Tz’u-hsi chose the three-year-old son of Prince Chun (I-huan) to succeed to the throne. The new emperor Kuang-hsi was a cousin of T’ung-chih, therefore, his succession again aroused the question of legitimacy because the succession by the same generation (*hsiung-chung ti-chi* 兄終弟及) was not a family rule. In 1879, Wu K’o-tu, a censor and a scholar, committed suicide as an expression of protest against the Dowager’s arrangements.<sup>72</sup> He left a memorial in which there was such a plea—“please do not implement something that our ancestors have not implemented.” (*wu-ch’uang chu-tsung so wei-ch’uang* 毋創祖宗所未創).<sup>73</sup> Other censors such as Chu I-hsin, T’u Jen-shou and Wu Chao-t’ai also expressed their opposition and grievances indirectly either by launching attack upon the Dowager’s favorite eunuch An Te-hai and Li Lien-ying, or by denouncing the construction of the Imperial Palaces (*I-ho yüan* 頤和園) as a wasteful and extravagant project.<sup>74</sup> There were rumors that Tz’u-hsi had murdered the young emperor T’ung-chih and her co-regent Tz’u-an, and stories of her intimacies with the

<sup>68</sup> See Tse Lien-t’ang, *Ch’ing-tai shih-lun* (A Critical History of the Ch’ing) (Shanghai, 1935), pp. 3-6. Also Teng Chih-ch’eng, *Chung-hua erh-ch’ien-nien shih* (A Two-thousand year History of China) (Hong Kong, 1963), *chüan* 5, vol. 2:108.

<sup>69</sup> Tse Lien-t’ang, *Ch’ing-tai shih-lun*, p. 50.

<sup>70</sup> Wu Hsiang-hsiang, *Wen-Ch’ing kung-t’ing chi-shih* (Veritable accounts of the palaces in the late Ch’ing) (Taipei, 1957), vol. 1, p. 86.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 89.

<sup>72</sup> Arthur Hummel, II, p. 875; and Lloyd Eastman, *Throne and Mandarin*, p. 215, footnote.

<sup>73</sup> Chin Liang, *Kuan-hsian lieh-chuan*, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.* Also Lloyd Eastman, *Throne and Mandarin*, p. 215.

Manchu young nobleman Jung-lu.<sup>75</sup>

Inasmuch as that the Confucian scholars' enmity toward "the foreign matters" was even greater than that toward her illegitimate rule, Tz'u-hsi demonstrated her astuteness in diverting the scholars' attention from internal politics to external affairs. She encouraged the "ch'ing-liu" on one hand, and at the same time sided with the "yang-wu" group in many respects. She saw the strife between the two an ingenious way to extricate herself from the trouble waters and provided her an excellent opportunity to consolidate her personal power.

The Empress Tz'u-hsi's dual policy worked out successfully and thus made her the unmatched "Old Buddha" of China in terms of power. However, her inconsistent attitude also resulted in a vacillation of domestic as well as foreign policies which retarded the modernization programs of the "yang-wu" group and created a distrustful feeling among the foreign powers.

In conclusion, the period from 1861 to 1884 signifies two different attitudes of the Chinese intellectuals toward the Western challenge. The progressives, with Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang in Peking, and mostly from coastal provinces, began to realize the inadequacies of tradition, turned to the West for means to "wealth" and "power". Concurrently there existed a group whose illusion was not "sturdy ships and effective weapons" but the good government of the antiquity. The former tried to uphold China's position as a member in the "family of the nations" while the latter tried to preserve China as a civilization. Between the two horns was the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi who manipulated the balance with her aim at maintaining the Ch'ing dynasty and her personal rule.

#### IV. SHIH-WU 時務 (CURRENT AFFAIRS): PROCESS OF SYNTHESIS, 1885-1898

With passing of the time and changing of the circumstances, the Chinese intellectuals' ideas on "foreign matters" changed, and so did their attitude toward the West. The process of change speeded up in the aftermath of the Sino-French War of 1884-1885. Heretofore, the conservatives constituted the major faction of the intelligentsia. The modernizers were much fewer in number and could have maintained an equilibrium mainly because they had stronger power in military and economic areas.

The Sino-French War brought about a shift of balance among the intellectuals. Seeing that the Confucian scholars were no competent than the "yang-wu" group in dealing with foreign relations, many uncertain young intellectuals turned to the latter's side. Even some conservatives gave up their illusions in antiquity and morality and became reform advocates. The main stream of Chinese attitude toward "yang-wu" shifted from "con" to "pro". In the literature of time, those new enterprises such as railroad construction, ship building, telegraph, mining, etc. were categorized as "shih-wu" 時務 (current affairs) in order to be distinguished from the term "yang-wu" which now

<sup>75</sup> Eastman, *Throne and Mandarin*, 215.

came to mean only the diplomatic relations with foreign countries.<sup>76</sup> The Chinese term “shih-wu” means something ought to be done or something which can meet the present need of the country. It implies a positive valuation on those new enterprises and thus shows that Western learning and new values had gradually gained acceptance among the Chinese intellectuals.

### Transformation of the Conservatives' Position

There were not many conservative scholars as uncompromising and consistent as Wo- jen who had never made any concessions to “yang-wu” or “hsi-hsüeh”. He was a “Don Quixote” in modern Chinese history who insisted to preserve his ideals—by staying in all aspects Chinese—even at the expense of his physical health.<sup>77</sup> As time trodded on, many of his colleagues and junior, in the long-term anti-foreign struggle, became concessionaries or turned Westernizers. Weng T'ung-ho, his friend as well as follower, was a remarkable example. In Weng's early years, he distained all self-strengthening programs; he was sore to see steamships sailing in Chinese waters,<sup>78</sup> and grieved at the fact that the “jackals and wolves” (foreign missionaries and Chinese converts) had stained and infested the Capital.<sup>79</sup> In 1870, he joined the “ch'ing-i” in launching attacks upon Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang for the T'ientsin massacre settlement. His profound contempt for foreigners could be best illustrated by a remark which he made in 1880: as a member of high officialdom he attended the New Year reception in the Tsungli Yamen where the foreign diplomatic corps went to extend their greetings. Weng wrote in his diary that these foreigners whom he met at the Tsungli Yamen were no better than “a confused flock of geese and ducks.”<sup>80</sup>

Weng's change in attitude and in thought took place during the tortuous days of negotiating the treaty with Russia in the following year. He gained a considerable knowledge of international diplomacy and Western knowledge from his personal involvement in foreign affairs. From a memorial he presented to the Dowager in 1881 we know that he began to advocate military and economic modernization. In this memorial he proposed a five-point program to strengthen the country by (1) drilling troops in the Western way, (2) using modern weapons, (3) opening coal and iron mines, (4) building steamboats, and (5) raising funds.<sup>81</sup> After the Sino-French War, Weng exhibited a more clear change of attitude toward “yang-wu”. In 1889, he declared that it was unnecessary to apply all the methods of government formulated by the sages of

<sup>76</sup> K'o Shih-chun in his *Huang-ch'ao ching-shih-wen hsü-p'ien* first divided the essays concerning foreign matters into the “yang-wu” and “shih-wu” categories. Later Wang T'ing-hsi's *Huang-ch'ao Tao-hsien-t'ung-kuang ch'ou-i* followed these categories but referred “yang-wu” only to diplomatic relations. See Ho Lieh, “Huang-ch'ao Tao-hsien-t'ung-kuang ch'ou-i p'ing-chieh” (Memorials in the late Ch'ing dynasty: a review), in *Thought and Word*, vol. 8, no. 1 (May, 1970), p. 48.

<sup>77</sup> Chang Hao, “The Anti-foreignist Role of Wo- jen”, *Papers on China*, op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>78</sup> See *Weng T'ung-ho jih-chi*, I:359, 386.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 418.

<sup>80</sup> Hsiao Kung-chuan, “Weng T'ung-ho and the Reform Movement of 1898”, quoted from Immanuel Hsü, ed., *Readings in Modern Chinese History*, pp. 322-323.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 323. For more about Weng's hostile attitude toward foreigners, see *Weng T'ung-ho jih-chi*, I:260, 290, 321, 329, 370, 372, 436, 475, 510.

the past.<sup>82</sup> The same year he presented to the young emperor Kuang-hsi a copy of *Chiao-pin-lu k'ang-i* 校邠廬抗議 (Essays on reform from the Chiao-pin studio) written by the "yang-wu" theorist Feng Kuei-fen. He recommended Kuang-hsi to read it carefully saying that this book was essential in government administration.<sup>83</sup>

Parallel with his growing interest in "yang-wu", Weng's attitude toward the foreigners was becoming more and more friendly. In fact, men like Robert Hart and Timothy Richard whom called by him "jackal" or "geese" before the 1880s, now became his close consultants, if not intimate friends.<sup>84</sup> From then on, Weng moved rapidly along the road to reformism although he had never gone far enough to be a reformer like K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao.

Another example manifested the shift of balance and abating conservative force was the transformation of the "ch'ing-liu tang" whose members were supposed to be the most outspoken officials for a bellicose foreign policy and the most ardent scholars for a Confucian ideal. Many of them were dispatched to the front line in the eve of the Sino-French War. For instance, Chang P'ei-lun was appointed commander-in-chief of the Foochow squadron; Chang Chih-tung was appointed governor-general of Kwang-tung and Kwangsi; Ch'en Pao-chen and Teng Ch'eng-hsiu were assigned offices in the Tsungli Yamen.<sup>85</sup> Whether the Dowager's motivation of sending out these young conservatives from the Capital was to give them a chance to practice their theories or to get rid of these Confucianism-oriented "speech officials" (*yen-kuan* 言官) after her power had been consolidated, or, a combination of both, we can hardly know. But the fact was that the practical experiences in dealing with Western powers led to change in thought and in attitude among the young idealists. Chang Chih-tung and Chang P'ei-lun were best examples:

Chang Chih-tung, a "t'an-hua" (title of the third graduate in the metropolitan examination), was at first a die-hard conservative who despised Western learnings. In one of his early books, *Yu-hsuan yu* 輿軒語 (Words on the carriage), he wrote, "Within the thirteen Confucian Classics, all teachings are included. . . One does not have to seek prosperity from any other way."<sup>86</sup> Also in the *Shu-mu ta-wen* 書目答問 (Selected bibliography for scholars) in which he listed more than two thousand books that he thought were worth reading, only nine of them related with Western learning; eight in geography and one in the military sphere.<sup>87</sup> Thus, we know Chang was not much concerned with if not strongly opposed to, the introduction of Western knowledge. In 1881, he still maintained a conservative outlook and accused Li Hung-chang's military and economic reform programs as lavish and wasteful schemes that "cost million

<sup>82</sup> P'an Chu-nien, *P'an Chu-yin nien-p'u* (Life chronicles of P'an Chu-yin), p. 48.

<sup>83</sup> Hsiao Kung-ch'uan, "Weng T'ung-ho and the Reform Movement of 1898", in Hsü, *Readings in Modern Chinese History*, p. 325.

<sup>84</sup> Chu Shang-wen, *Weng T'ung-ho hshen-sheng nien-p'u* (Life chronicles of Weng T'ung-ho) (Taipei, 1971), p. 64.

<sup>85</sup> See their biographies in Arthur Hummel, *Eminent Chinese in the Ch'ing Period*.

<sup>86</sup> Chang Chih-tung, *Chang Wen-hsiang-kung chüan-chi* (Complete works of Chang Chih-tung), *chüan* 104 (Taipei, 1963), p. 9.

<sup>87</sup> Li Kuo-chi, *Chang Chih-tung ti wai-chiao cheng-che* (The foreign policy of Chang Chih-tung) (Taipei, 1970), p. 5.

tales of money every year and achieved nothing."<sup>88</sup>

In the late 1880s Chang Chih-tung showed a dramatic change in his attitude toward "yang-wu" and emerged as an influential leader in the self-strengthening movement, matching up the position of Li Hung-chang. He recommended the founding of numerous arsenals and military academies, established textile companies and cotten mills, opened mints, foundries and mines. The Han-yeh-p'ing 漢冶萍 iron and steal company and the Han-yang Arsenal were not only famous in China but also well-known in the Western world.<sup>89</sup>

Another "ch'ing-liu" turned reformer was Chang P'ei-lun who was formerly known as one of the most literary-talented scholars and the most vociferous among the "Four Admonishing Officials".<sup>90</sup> After the defeat at Foochow, he was banished to the northern frontier of China for three years. When he returned to Peking he was invited by Li Hung-chang to join his "mu-fu", to assist him in various political reforms. He then married Li's daughter and became an ardent modernizer. His fervor in "yang-wu" gained him the title "hsin-cheng san-Chang" 新政三張 (Three Reformers with the surname Chang; the others being Chang Chih-tung and Chang Yin-huan).<sup>91</sup>

The transformation of the intellectual mind took place in a larger scope and in a more rapid speed when came into the 1890s especially after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. The die-hard conservatives now became a smaller faction in the scholar-official world. Even the headquarters of this group—the censorate and the Hanlin Academy—were occupied by reformers and modernizers. Censors and hanlins like Ch'en Chao-wen, Sun Fu-chien, Wang P'ang-yun, Ch'en Chih, Hua-hui, T'ang Chen, and others advocated both military and institutional reforms modeling on Western examples.<sup>92</sup>

Such a drastic change in the late nineteenth century due mainly to the psychological effects of the two wars especially the defeat by the "Eastern islanders" in 1894. In the threat of foreign encroachments, there arose a sense of national crisis. It was the improvement of the communication system that facilitated the growth of national consciousness. Transport by steamships and railroads had not only saved time and money, it also made the Western world and the treaty-port life known to the people of hinterland. Moreover, the popularization of newspapers such as *Shen Pao* 申報 and *Wan-kuo kung-pao* 萬國公報 (The Globe Magazine, Review of the Times) and the improvement of printing methods provided more opportunities for the Chinese to obtain a better knowledge of the West.<sup>93</sup> Also thanks to the rise of a school of thought

<sup>88</sup> Chang Chih-tung, *chuan-chi*: "wen-chi" (essays), *chüan* 2. Quoted from Ch'en Hui, "Tsong ch'ing-liu tang tou yang-wu-p'ai" (The transformation of a ch'ing-liu member to yang-wu leader), in Ch'ou Kang-hsieh, ed., *Yang-wu yun-tung yen-chiu lun-chi* (A collection of research articles on the "yang-wu" movement), (Hong Kong, 1969), p. 139.

<sup>89</sup> For a detail description of Chang's career, see Meribeth Cameron, "The Public Career of Chang Chih-tung, 1837-1909", in *Pacific Review*, VII:187-210.

<sup>90</sup> Hummel, vol. 1, p. 48; *Ch'ing-jen shuo-kuei* (Stories spread among the Ch'ing people), pp. 460-461.

<sup>91</sup> Hummel, vol. 1, p. 48.

<sup>92</sup> Lin Le-chih (Young J. Allen), ed., *Chung-tung chan-chi pen-mo* (A collection of essays on the Sino-Japanese War) (Shanghai, 1896), *chüan* 1:13-21; Chu Li-he, *Ch'ing-chi hsi-t'iao-yü ssu-ch'ao* (Trends of thought concerning Western technological education in the late Ch'ing) (Taipei, 1971), pp. 133-134.

<sup>93</sup> Liu Kwang-ching, "Nineteenth-century China", *China in Crisis*, p. 139.

which claimed all Western sciences were of Chinese origin, for this provided a psychological shield for the Chinese to learn foreign things.<sup>94</sup> As a matter of course, many scholars in the 1880s and the 1890s turned to “yang-wu” because it was a shorter ladder to higher officialdom. Wang T’ao said, “All officials who have knowledge of ‘yang-wu’, at present can obtain a good position (*yu-ch’üeh* 優缺) easily, and get promoted to high ranks in a short period of time.”<sup>95</sup>

All in all, in the aftermath of the Sino-French War, the progressives over-matched the conservatives in power and in numbers. However, in the political arena we still perceive two factions of scholar-officials competing and struggling with each other—the “radical” reformers against the “reactionary” self-strengthening leaders—maintaining a balance which hindered China’s modernization from a joint effort of all intellectuals.

### Changing Role of the “China Helpers”

Parallel with the shrinking of the conservative force, we see a growing influence of the foreigners upon China’s politics in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

Early in the 1850s and 1860s, foreigners had been recruited, though in a very limited number, by the Chinese military commanders such as Tseng Kuo-fan, Tso Tsung-t’ang and Li Hung-chang, to assist them in combating the T’aipings. Most of these foreigners worked under Tseng, Tso and Li were “adventurers” who “roamed the world to take what it would give”, and “had a love of travel and excitement in their bones.”<sup>96</sup> Had China not been at stake under the threat of the T’aping Rebellion, they could have had no chance to get into the Chinese official hierarchy. In the first phase of the self-strengthening movement, these foreign helpers, though were given Chinese official ranks and considered by their Chinese patrons capable men in battlefields, they did not win trust and respect from them. In Li Hung-chang’s mind, even Charles George “Chinese” Gorden could not be relied upon and provided with discretion of military power. “Although yesterday Gorden was glad to volunteer, and was commanded to assist Kuo Sung-lin and others in an attack on I-hsing,” Li wrote in 1864, “he can only be treated as partisan officer, not as a regular. Gorden is brave enough, but not sufficient patient. As his bad temper suddenly comes and goes, I do not know whether there will be any change later on.”<sup>97</sup>

Besides military assistance to Ch’ing government against internal rebels, the foreigners also entered the educational sector and aided in economic reforms. Among the popularly known were W.A.P. Martin, John Fryer, and Robert Hart. Martin and Fryer were of missionary background and both worked in the Translation Bureau of Kiangnan Arsenal in the 1860s. Robert Hart was more important than the first two in

<sup>94</sup> See Chuan Han-sheng, “Ch’ing-mo ti hsi-hsieh yüan-chu chung-kuo shuo” (The late Ch’ing theory that “Western learning originated in China”), in Li Ting-i, et al., eds., *Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih lun-tsun* (Collection of essays on the history of modern China), ser. 1 (Taipei, 1963), vol. 5, pp. 218-258.

<sup>95</sup> Wang T’ao, *Wen-lu wai-p’ien, chüan 2 (yang-wu)*.

<sup>96</sup> Jonathan Spence, *Western Advisers in China* (London: The Bodley Head Ltd., 1969), p. 57.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 90.



terms of influence upon China's diplomatic and economic history. He took over the post of Inspector-general of the Chinese Customs from Nelson Horatia Lay in 1864 and had remained in the position, except for some home leaves, until his retirement in 1908.<sup>98</sup>

Let me sum up the Chinese attitude toward the foreigners in several steps: In the "i-wu" period, they looked down upon all foreigners as "barbarians" and tried to drive them out from China (*p'ai-yang* 排洋). In the "yang-wu" period, the conservatives surely treated them with contempt, while the progressives looked upon them as instrument and tried to use their skills and techniques (*yung-yang* 用洋). During the "shih-wu" period, the Chinese attitude became *chung-yang* 重洋 (respect the foreigners) and some even went further to become *ch'ung-yang* 崇洋 (adore the foreigners) and *mei-yang* 媚洋 (toady to the foreigners). Many Chinese of this time thought that the ability of their fellow countrymen was inferior compared to that of the Westerners.<sup>99</sup> Ch'en Chih in his *Yung-shu* 庸書 (The book of utility) lamented at the phenomenon that the Chinese lacked self-respect and over-esteemed the foreigners. He pointed out many officials at his time regarded themselves as "jade" (*hsia-szu* 下駟) and foreigners as "steed" (*shang-szu* 上駟).<sup>100</sup>

The foreigners exerted influence upon China's policies mainly through two channels: by being "mu-fu" of the Chinese authorities, and by means of their "ch'ing-i".

Li Hung-chang was the first one who brought in foreigners into the Chinese "mu-fu" system. In the beginning of the self-strengthening movement, he shared the traditional idea that the foreigners were deceitful and inferior in culture, but some years later he found out these foreigners were more helpful than his Chinese "mu-fu" in increasing his wealth and in extending his power. From a reading of his later letters and memorials, we get an impression that he often praised William N. Pethich, Gustav Detring and Constantin von Hanneken who aided him in various "yang-wu" programs.<sup>101</sup> Other than Li, provincial authorities like Chang Chih-tung, Liu Kun-i, Sheng Hsuan-huai . . . all patronized a number of foreigners who acted as advisors, teachers, naval officers, ship captains, ware housers, directors of arsenals, military instructors and diplomatic representatives. These "China helpers" enjoyed more privileges and received higher salaries than their Chinese counterparts.

What does the term "ch'ing-i" mean and how the foreigners exerted their influence through it? "Ch'ing-i", in its original sense, meant "pure discussions" or "gossip criticism" of the educational class through such media as official impeachments, social gatherings, poems, folk songs, scrolls, ballads and gossip. According to Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, the term may well be accepted as the Chinese counterpart of Western public opinion though it was not expressed through newspapers or public speaking.<sup>102</sup> It is worth noting that that before the last decade of the nineteenth century, "ch'ing-i"—the opinion of the educated class—represented an antiforeign attitude. But after the

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>99</sup> Chu Li-he, *Ch'ing-chi hsi-i chao-yü ssu-ch'ao*, p. 70.

<sup>100</sup> Ch'en Chih, *Yung-shu* (The book of utility), "chi-li p'ien", cited from *Ch'ing-t'ing chih kai-ko yü fan-tung* (The reform and reactionary activities of the Ch'ing court) (Taipei, 1965), I:303.

<sup>101</sup> Folsom, *Friends, Guests and Colleagues*, pp. 153-157.

<sup>102</sup> Immanuel Hsü, *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations*, p. 200.

Sino-Japanese War, it signified the educated class demand for reforms. The term was generally applied to mean the "yang-wu" opinions and treatises. For instance, the articles and essays written by Young J. Allen in the *Wan-kuo kung-pao* were called "ch'ing-i" by Ts'ai Erh-k'ang.<sup>103</sup> Also, when Liang Ch'i-ch'ao published a newspaper urging for reform, he entitled it as *Ch'ing-i-pao* 清議報. Thus "ch'ing-i" stood for a pro-foreign attitude in the years after the Sino-Japanese War.

The foreigners' "ch'ing-i" brought into the intellectual mind more alternatives and created greater pressure in government policy-making after 1887 when the Society for the Diffusion of General Knowledge among the Chinese (S.D.K. Kuang-hstieh hui 廣學會) came into existence. The S.D.K., first under the leadership of Alexander Williamson, then Timothy Richard, exemplified a joint effort of the foreign missionaries, merchants, and diplomats to "help" China. They introduced Western science, geography, history, political and economic theories through publications, newspapers and public lectures.<sup>104</sup> The rapid increase of the book sales of the S.D.K. might indicate the growing interest of the Chinese intellectual in the introduction of Western learning into China.

TABLE C  
Book Sales of S.D.K. (1893-98)<sup>105</sup>

Year	Income from Book Sales (Mex dollar)
1893	800
1894	1,600
1895	2,000
1896	5,000
1897	12,000
1898	18,000

From reading the political treatises of the late Ch'ing reformers such as Cheng Kuan-ying (*Sheng-shih wei-yen* 盛世危言), Ch'en Ch'iu (*Pien-fa t'ung-i* 變法通議), T'ang Chen (*Wei-yen* 危言), Ch'en Chih (*Yung-shu* 庸書) and the works of K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and T'an Ssu-t'ung, we can trace some imprints of the foreigners' "ch'ing-i". The most notable fact was the "Ch'iang-hsüeh Hui" 強學會 (Society for the Propagation of Learning) formed by the reformists in 1896 named their organizational magazine after the title of Young J. Allen's newspaper, *Wan-kuo kung-pao*. Later at the advice of Timothy Richard they changed the name to *Chung-wai chi-wen* 中外紀聞 (International Gazette).<sup>106</sup>

<sup>103</sup> Lin Le-chih, ed., *Chung-tung chan-chi pen-mo* (san-p'ien), *chüan* 4, p. 88.

<sup>104</sup> For a detail description of the work of S.D.K., see Wang Shu-huai, *Wai-jen yü wu-hsü pien-fa* (Foreigners and the Reform Movement of 1898) (Taipei, 1965), pp. 33-70. Also Leung Yuen-sang, "Young J. Allen: His Careers in China and the 'Wan-kuo kung-pao' ". M.Ph. thesis, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1974.

<sup>105</sup> Wang Shu-huai, *Wai-jen yü wu-hsü pien-fa*, pp. 40-41.

<sup>106</sup> Timothy Richard, *My Forty-five Years in China*, (London: T. Fisher Urwin Ltd., 1916), p. 263.

In short, in the period after the Sino-French War, the foreigners, either directly got involved in China's politics as "mu-fu" and officials, or indirectly gave advices and proposals as spectators (*chü-wai-jen* 局外人 *ko-ching* 客卿) through "ch'ing-i", played an important role in China's policy-making. The Chinese intellectuals no longer doubted the values of Western learning and were inclined to accept an evolutionary concept of change. Talking about "hsin-hsüeh" 新學 (New learning) became a fad, and "Ku-hsüeh" 古學 (Ancient learning) or "chiu-hsüeh" 舊學 (Old learning) could no longer claim authority.

We notice that both K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao were dissatisfied with change in the technological level and urged for changes in the institutional level and behavioral level. Nevertheless they remained in the "Great Tradition" attempting to incorporate Western ideas in a Confucian theoretical framework—an illusion of the Chinese intellectuals which continued to exist until the rise of Maoism in the present era.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

The above study attempts to show:

(1) that the attitude of the Chinese intellectuals toward foreigners in the nineteenth century changed in this direction: first, "p'ai-yang" 排洋 (expel the foreigner), then "yung-yang" 用洋 (use the foreigner), "chung-yang" 重洋 (respect the foreigner), and finally "ch'ung-yang" 崇洋 and "mei-yang" 媚洋 (toady to the foreigner);

(2) that the attitude of the Chinese intellectuals toward foreign affairs and modern enterprises brought in from the West changed in this direction: first, looked upon them as "i-wu" 夷務 (barbarian affairs), then "yang-wu" 洋務 (foreign affairs), and finally "shih-wu" 時務 (current affairs) and "chi-wu" 急務 (urgent affairs);

(3) that the attitude of the Chinese intellectuals toward the introduction of Western culture to China changed in this direction: first, accepted nothing, then accepted "hsi-i" 西藝 (Western technology), "hsi-hsüeh" 西學 (Western learning, i.e. Western science), and finally accepted "hsi-cheng" 西政 (Western institution).


Some remarkable features in this century that we can see:

(1) the "breakdowns" of the thousand-year-old tradition: the disintegration of the tributary system, the inadequacy of the modular concept of history, the transmutation of the educational system and the abandonment of a declining and involutory concept of change.


(2) the "breakthroughs" from the linear development of Chinese history: the adoption of a nation-state world view, the recognition of another culture with high value, the emergence of the "public opinion" through Western media such as newspapers, study societies (*hsüeh-hui* 學會) and party groups, and the acceptance of a progressive and evolutionary concept of change.

Some of my subjective views are:

(1) despite the fact that some individuals were concerned only with personal wealth and power, the Chinese intellectual class as a whole, was genuinely and sincerely seeking a way to preserve and strengthen China as a civilization and as a nation;



(2) the Chinese intellectuals confronted a two-fold question—how to meet the challenge of the West and how to fulfill their obligation to the past. In the process of learning the new and forsaking the old, these intellectuals felt oppressed and depressed rather than grateful and content. This sense of oppression and suffering may demonstrate the fact that the nineteenth-century Chinese intellectuals had greater responsibility and passion to the dead rather to the living. Not that they concerned the present needs less but that they loved the past glories more made the modern history of China a tragic episode.






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## 清末知識分子對西方的認識及其態度的轉變

( 中文摘要 )


梁 元 生



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本文旨在探討十九世紀中國知識分子對西方之認識及其對「洋務」所持態度之轉變。本文之重點在分析：從「夷務」到「洋務」，再轉變為「時務」及「急務」這些觀念之轉變過程所代表之意義。簡言之，從「夷」到「洋」，代表了天朝主義的沒落，然而卻仍存在着中外之防的畛域之見；從「洋」到「時」，則代表着由「西化」(Westernization) 到「現代化」(Modernization) 觀念過渡的歷程；最後由「時務」至「急務」，則幾乎完全肯定了現代化的價值。本文從十九世紀各時期的代表人物的對外態度出發，去探討這些觀念轉變的過程，及由此而引起之影響，特別是對於政治家辦理洋務和外交時所發揮之作用。

本文之總結，以為十九世紀之中國知識分子已經嘗試用不同的方法求變，但皆未能使中國富強，不論是守舊派、維新派、改革派，都提出了方案而不能達到其目的，都是屬於悲劇式的政治人物，而十九世紀中國對西方所作出的應變態度，雖數變而不免受欺凌之辱，也是一段歷史的悲劇。



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