

example, the name Yeli Buhua (top of p. 262, case 18.68) is explained in footnote 22 as a Mongolian name. Yeli 野利, however, was a common Tangut or Hexi 河西 surname, and many Tanguts or people of Hexi origin followed the Yuan fashion of adopting Mongol personal names like Buqa. Birge does not give the Chinese graphs for the name, but the proposed reading of the name as Er-Bukha or El-Bukha seems unnecessary. Neither of these points, however, detracts from the immense value of this work, or the pleasure awaiting a reader who delves into it.

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Confucianism: Its Roots and Global Significance. By Ming-huei Lee. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2017. Pp. xiii + 156. \$58.00.

This slim yet wide-ranging volume consists of eight English-language essays published between 2000 and 2013. The book is divided into three sections: “Classical Confucianism and Its Modern Reinterpretations,” “Neo-Confucianism in China and Korea,” and “Ethics and Politics.” The Introduction is a repurposed version of a 2010 article.¹ After briefly rehearsing Yu Ying-shih’s 余英時 “wandering soul” thesis,² the author presents a potted two-page history of “Confucian traditions in East Asia,” focusing principally on the education and civil examination systems and the notion of Confucianism as “official ideology.” The Introduction concludes with some material ostensibly addressing the “the prospects of Confucianism in the twenty-first century,” in which Lee briefly introduces Jiang Qing’s 蔣慶 notion of “political Confucianism” (a subject he returns to in the last chapter), followed by an eclectic collection of short notes on “inner sagehood and outer kingliness,” Kantian and Hegelian conceptions of *Sittlichkeit* (ethical, social life) and *Moralität* (individual, rational, and reflective morality), the centrality of the family for the Confucian project, the use of Confucian texts in Taiwan, and the role of the modern academy in sustaining “intellectualized Confucianism.”

It is appropriate that “Mou Zongsan’s Interpretation of Confucianism: Some Hermeneutical Reflections” (originally published in 2000) is the opening chapter, given

¹ Ming-huei Lee, “Confucian Traditions in Modern East Asia: Their Destinies and Prospects,” *Oriens Extremus* 49 (2010), pp. 237–47.

² Yu Yingshi (Yu Ying-shih), “Xiandai Ruxue de kunjing” 現代儒學的困境 (The predicament of modern Confucianism), in idem, *Zhongguo wenhua yu xiandai bianqian* 中國文化與現代變遷 (Chinese culture and its modern changes) (Taipei: Sanmin, 1992), pp. 95–102.

that the authoritative voice of Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 is deferred to in each of the subsequent chapters. Indeed, one of the unstated (but hardly concealed) agendas of the volume as a whole is a dogged reiteration of teacher Mou's assertion that the orthodox line or mainstream of Confucian thought and values champions the verities of an objective moral law, which moral agents/subjects self-legislate (自我立法) by rational free will and so are autonomous (自律), in contrast to a wrongheaded collateral line (別子為宗) of Confucians who defend the notion of a moral mind that is externally determined (他律) or heteronomous. This deviant line is associated with Xunzi 荀子, Cheng Yi 程頤, and Zhu Xi 朱熹. The latter two, and in particular Zhu Xi, are singled out for criticism because they subscribe to the view that the nature is principle (性即理) rather than the "mainstream" view that "the mind is principle" (心即理).³ Furthermore, according to Mou, they treated the mind as belonging to the realm of *qi* 氣, not *li* 理. Mou's distinction explicitly draws on Kant's notions of autonomous and heteronomous.

The chapter provides a succinct overview of Mou's appropriation of Kant's philosophical framework of "appearance" and "thing-in-itself," interpreting "thing-in-itself" not as an epistemological concept but as one with what Lee translates as "value-connotation." Mou's most fundamental departure from Kant's metaphysics is his claim that the faculty of intellectual intuition (智的直覺)—which for Kant enables direct intuition of supersensible objects—is not exclusive to God. Thus, unlike Kant, who held that humans have no faculty of intellectual intuition, that noumena, or "things-in-themselves," can only be postulated and not directly intuited, for Mou, noumena can be directly intuited (or "presented" 呈現)—they are not merely epistemological concepts. Humans can apprehend both sides of the coin: the noumenal and phenomenal character of things. As related by Lee, "According to Mou, Confucian metaphysics is founded on *liangzhi* 良知 (original knowing) or *benxin* 本心 (original mind), which is a type of intellectual intuition of the moral and therefore free subject" (p. 15). Whereas for Kant the concept of free will is a postulate, for Mou it is a "presentation": it can be directly intuited by the moral subject. Mou characterizes the moral subject as having an unlimited capacity for moral knowledge because all humans have a moral mind. For Mou, the "thing-in-itself" discloses itself through *liangzhi* and hence his claim that Confucian metaphysics is a "moral metaphysics," unlike Kant's metaphysics of morals, which denies humans the faculty of intellectual intuition.

³ Mou actually translates the term *li* 理 in this context as "reason." See, for example, *Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang* 中國哲學十九講 (Nineteen lectures on Chinese philosophy), vol. 29 of *Mou Zongsan quanji* 牟宗三全集 (The complete works of Mou Zongsan) (Taipei: Lianjing, 2003), p. 399. Jason Clower maintains that this translation choice is because of the common ground that Mou thinks the Song-Ming Confucians share with Kant. See Clower, trans. and ed., *Late Works of Mou Zongsan: Selected Essays on Chinese Philosophy* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014), p. 130, n. 15.

This chapter also introduces some of Mou's critics, who variously charge him with distorting Kant and reading too much Kant into Confucianism. This section develops an extended critique of Feng Yaoming's 馮耀明 account of conceptual relativism, which Feng used as a basis on which to argue that Confucian metaphysics is closer to that of Plato rather than that of Kant, which Lee takes to be a criticism levelled at Mou. The last part of the chapter concerns Mou's hermeneutical views, even though Mou never articulated a system of philosophical hermeneutics or showed any real interest in it. We are told that Mou's hermeneutical views amount to drawing a distinction between philosophical and philological interpretation. Lee in turn takes Mou's dictum to "rely on the spirit, not the letter" (p. 24) as evidencing Mou's philosophical creativity, and concludes somewhat gnomically, "it seems safe to defend Mou's philosophical interpretation of Confucianism, especially in spirit, and not by the letter" (p. 25).

The second chapter, "Modern New Confucians on the Religiousness of Confucianism" (originally published in 2011), begins with a brief historical overview of the question of Confucianism and religion, featuring the views of Jesuits Matteo Ricci and Nicholas Longobardi, and then the views of early Republican figures, Liang Qichao 梁啟超, Kang Youwei 康有為, Wang Guowei 王國維, and Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培. The coverage of New Confucian views begins with "first generation" New Confucians, Xiong Shili 熊十力 and Liang Shuming 梁漱溟, who did not deem Confucianism to be a religion. In contrast, the 1958 "Declaration on Behalf of Chinese Culture Respectfully Announced to the People of the World" (為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言), cosigned by "second generation" New Confucians, Tang Junyi 唐君毅, Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, and Zhang Junmai 張君勱, emphasized "the oneness of morality and the religious spirit," or "[t]o put it most directly, culture is nothing other than religion" (pp. 29–30). Lee relates that Mou Zongsan viewed Confucianism as a humanistic religion, even characterizing Song and Ming period Confucian "learning of moral human nature" (性理之學) as "both morality and religion; that is, morality is religion" (p. 30). Xu Fuguan, however, "discerned the fundamental direction of Confucianism in the transformation from religious consciousness to humanistic consciousness" (p. 31). Lee traces this difference in understanding among the second-generation New Confucians to their different interpretation of pre-Qin Confucian thought. For Xu, that history is a "process of humanization, and the essence of Confucianism lies in its substituting humanistic spirit for religious consciousness" (p. 36). Lee characterizes this view by invoking Mou Zongsan's notion of "headless humanism," and criticizes it for being unable to provide an explanation "of the ultimate reality of the cosmos," unlike the religiousness thesis upheld by Tang and Mou, which is better able to elucidate the "constituted essence" (*sic*) of Confucianism (p. 37).

The third chapter, "The Debate on *Ren* between Zhu Xi and the Huxiang Scholars" (originally published in 2005), is essentially a defensive reiteration of Mou

Zongsan's views on the matter. Thus, on Zhu Xi's former and later views on *zhong* 中 and *he* 和, we are informed that there is no need to go into the detail "because Mou Zongsan studied this difference in detail" (p. 43). On Mou's assessment, the philosophical implications of this change is represented in Zhu Xi's essay, "Ren shuo" 仁說 (On humaneness). Focusing on Zhu Xi's gloss of *ren* as "the character of the mind and the principle of love" (心之德, 愛之理), Lee (following Mou) maintains that one of the key features of Zhu's mature position is that Zhu viewed *ren* (qua *xing* 性, the nature) "as the metaphysical ground for the activities of *xin* (heart-mind) as moral agency" with *xin* being relegated to the "lower concrete realm of *qi*" (p. 45). After comparing Zhu's views with those of Zhang Shi 張栻, Lee maintains that Zhang Shi did not treat the principle of love as an "abstract, static principle (as in Zhu Xi), but a dynamic entity with creative force that can penetrate all things." He concludes that whereas for Zhang, "love as a function of *ren* pertains to the same ontological level as *ren*," Zhu regarded them as pertaining to two different ontological levels (pp. 46, 47). The following discussion of "*ren* and the principle of love" is unfortunately confusing because the substantive discussion (on p. 48) is repeatedly framed in terms of *xin* and *qing* 情, yet for the argument to make any sense this should be *xing* and *qing*. (The same problem occurs in the original 2005 published version of this essay.)

In the concluding discussion of *zhijue* 知覺 we return once again to Mou. As related by Lee, for Cheng Hao 程顥, Xie Liangzuo 謝良佐, and the Huxiang 湖湘 scholars:

[*J*]ue or *zhijue* as moral consciousness also possesses an ontological meaning. This is the case because *ren* is at the same time a creative force, which belongs to the same level as its substance [JM: presumably a rendering of *ti* 體], namely, the "mind of Heaven and Earth." For this reason, Mou Zongsan calls it "ontological feeling." . . . For Mencius, the "original mind" (*benxin* 本心) of humans has an ontological dimension. As a moral agent the original mind possesses the capacity for self-realization and thereby for creating a world of values wherein the essential meaning of "Heaven" resides. For Zhu Xi, however, *jue* has no ontological connotation in itself; just like love, it belongs to the realm of *qi* (material force) and thus to a lower level than *li* (principle). In other words, for Zhu Xi, all kinds of *jue* are homogeneous. (p. 52)

Lee readily endorses Mou's assessment that for Zhu Xi the mind is nothing other than a cognitive faculty devoid of an "ontological dimension," the "ontological" presumably referring to "what is above form" (形而上). I will return to this issue later in this review, although I will note here it is anomalous that no mention is made of Zhu Xi's "mind of the way" (道心) / human mind (人心) distinction.

"The Four-Seven Debate between Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong and Its Philosophical Purport" (originally published in 2008) is the longest chapter in the book.

“Four-Seven” refers to the four shoots or sprouts (四端; *Mencius* 2A.6) and the seven emotions (七情; from the “Liyun” 禮運 chapter of *Liji* 禮記), which Lee translates as the “four buddings” and the “seven feelings,” a key topic of debate in Korean Confucianism from the fourteenth century onwards, with its most important phase in the sixteenth century. He maintains that a major impetus for the debate was that the Korean Confucians had to deal with two layers of textual authority: on the one hand, *Liji* and *Mencius*, and on the other, texts by Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi. According to Lee, whereas Gi Gobong 奇高峰 (1527–1572) largely adhered to Zhu Xi’s view, Yi Toegye 李退溪 (1501–1571) wavered between Mencius and Zhu Xi. Later, Yi Yulgok 李栗谷 (1536–1584) sided with Gi Gobong, and Seong Ugye 成牛溪 (1535–1598) defended Yi Toegye. This second phase of the debate is treated only in passing.⁴

Lee again introduces Mou Zongsan’s claim that the Cheng-Zhu line was a separate lineage from the orthodox line of Mencius because “Zhu Xi premised his explanation of Mencius’ ‘heart of the four buddings’ on his framework of the learning of the nature and principle, which consists of the twofold division between principle (*li* 理) and material force (*qi* 氣) and the threefold division between the mind-heart (*xin* 心), the nature (*xing* 性), and the feelings (*qing* 情)” (p. 56). Thus, to follow Zhu Xi amounts to deviating from Mencius. Continuing to invoke Mou, Lee proceeds to argue that for Zhu Xi, when discussed in reference to principle at the level of *xing er shang* 形而上 (what is beyond form)—or what Lee refers to as the “abstract” level—principle is not active. According to Lee, the relevance of this to the Four-Seven debate is that a fundamental issue of contention is whether principle can give rise to the four shoots or “buddings.”⁵

It is also here that the significance of the mind or heart-mind⁶ comes into play. According to Lee, “Although in his [Zhu Xi’s] ontological system he bestowed the mind-heart with a mediating and combining function, it ultimately pertains to the side of material force even if it is ‘the subtlest of material force’ (*qi zhi ling* 氣之靈) and ‘the numinous of material force’ (*qi zhi jingshuang* 氣之精爽)” (p. 57). Here “mediating function” refers to what Lee understands to be a mediating role that the mind plays between the nature and the emotions (or feelings in Lee’s rendering). The “combining function” refers to the combination of the nature and the emotions, which “are combined together in the mind-heart.” Because Lee insists that for Zhu Xi the

⁴ For a slightly more extended account in English, see Philip J. Ivanhoe, *Three Streams: Confucian Reflections on Learning and the Moral Heart-Mind in China, Korea, and Japan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 83–85.

⁵ This is not dissimilar to the old Sinitic Buddhist issue of whether unconditioned dharmas can give rise to conditioned dharmas.

⁶ Lee variously uses mind-heart and heart-mind.

mind is exclusively *qi* in its constitution, one can only conclude that he dismisses the significance of *li*'s role in phenomenal reality. This then enables him to maintain (following Mou) that Zhu Xi's understanding of *qing*, *xin*, and *li* posits a clear demarcation between each, which "absolutely [does] not allow for commingling" (p. 57); Li concludes that in Zhu Xi's interpretation of Mencius 2A.6, humaneness (*li*, *xing*) and the "heart of commiseration" (*xin*, *qing*) are ontologically separated, the former being assigned to the "ontological level" of *li* and the latter to the phenomenal level of *qi*.

Lee relates that Gi Gobong, like Zhu Xi, upheld the view that principle (in its *xing er shang* mode) is not active, whereas Yi Toegye vacillated between Mencius's position and Zhu's position. (Mou Zongsan characterizes Mencius as representative of the view that innate moral knowing is both activity and being. See my discussion below.) According to Lee, it is this distinction that informed Toegye's and Gobong's theoretical presuppositions, leading Toegye to emphasize what Lee calls "the heterogeneity" of the four buddings and the seven feelings, and Gobong to insist on their homogeneity. For Toegye they are heterogeneous because the four buddings derive from the "original nature" and so "inherently possess spontaneity," whereas the seven feelings issue from the mind (which is associated with *qi*) when stimulated by external things. For Gobong, Lee explains, the four and seven are homogeneous because both "are based in internal principle and respond to external objects and situations" (p. 65), both operating at the phenomenal level of *qi*. Other fault lines also opened up because of these different perspectives. Thus, Gobong maintained that the seven feelings contain the four buddings within them, consequently it is possible for the four buddings to lose their proper measure and hence they are not always good. Toegye denied both claims.

Lee also posits a conceptual parallel between Zhu Xi's distinction between, on the one hand, the original nature (本然之性) or heavenly ordained nature (天命之性) and the psychophysical nature (氣質之性) and, on the other, the four buddings and the seven feelings. Thus, in the context of the Four-Seven debate, Lee unravels the details of how this was played out in Toegye's and Gobong's differing interpretations—and the implications of those differing interpretations—of a line inscribed on Jeong Chuman's 鄭秋巒 (1509–1561) Heavenly Mandate Diagram (*Cheonmyeong do* 天命圖): "The four buddings issue from principle; the seven feelings issue from material force (四端發於理，七情發於氣)" (p. 59). Lee proceeds, at length, to take Gobong to task for some of the implications that flow from "faithfully" representing Zhu Xi's view in treating the four and seven as "both belonging to the level of material force and are thus homogeneous" (p. 66).

Following this, Lee examines Toegye's theory that the relation between the original nature and the psychophysical nature is one involving "the mutual dependence and issuing together" of *li* and *qi*, which in turn informs Toegye's account of the

heterogeneity of the four and seven, as opposed to Gobong's thesis. Lee argues that Toegye's position is derived from Cheng Yi and Zhang Zai 張載 rather than from Zhu Xi because Zhu Xi held that both the original nature and the psychophysical nature are principle, and that the only difference between these two modes of the nature is that the psychophysical nature is tainted by physical matter. Lee again makes the case that the underlying theoretical issue animating the different views of Toegye and Gobong is the metaphysical question of whether principle is deemed to be active or inactive.

In concluding the chapter, Lee invokes Kant's distinction between moral feelings and physical feelings—"Moral feeling does not pertain to the giving of laws, but is the basis of their execution"—maintaining that the distinction serves to illuminate what was of concern to the participants in this debate. Thus, as with Zhu Xi, "Gi Gobong attributed both the four buddings and the seven feelings to the level of material force, just as Kant had attributed both moral feeling and physical feeling to the sensible level." Where Zhu diverged from Kant, however, is that "in Zhu Xi's philosophical anthropology, the nature is mere principle; though the mind-heart is able to recognize principle, it is not the giver of principle," hence Zhu's is an "ethics of heteronomy." Gi Gobong is thus tarred by association. In contrast, when Yi Toegye "bestowed principle with the capacity of activity, it was not different from acknowledging that principle issues from the original mind and that the four buddings are the activity of the original mind." In this respect, Lee concludes, Toegye is fundamentally consistent with Mencius's elevation of the four buddings to the level of the original mind. "As a result, in Mencius' ethics, the four buddings are nothing but what Mou Zongsan called 'ontological feeling'" (pp. 74–75).

The question animating Chapter 5, "Wang Yangming's Philosophy and Modern Theories of Democracy: A Reconstructive Interpretation" (originally published in 2008), is whether the Confucian tradition has the intellectual resources to facilitate the implementation of modern democracy. The chapter opens with a summary account of Liu Shipei's 劉師培 interpretation of Wang Yangming's 王陽明 concept of *liangzhi* (innate moral knowing), which Lee renders as "original knowing." For Liu Shipei, Wang Yangming's notion of *liangzhi* contains the essentials of liberty, equality, and civil rights, a point that Lee returns to at the end of the chapter. Next he provides a summary account of the 1950s debate between Taiwanese liberals, represented by Yin Haiguang 殷海光 and Zhang Foquan 張佛泉, and second-generation New Confucians, represented by Xu Fuguan, Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, and Zhang Junmai, on the issue of Confucianism and democracy. The liberal critics argued that Confucianism had not only failed to develop democratic institutions but had also actively obstructed the emergence of the concept of democracy. In response, Zhang Junmai claimed that since Qin and Han times the Confucian spirit had been corrupted and unable to be properly developed and was not in a position to obstruct. Lee then explains that Mou

developed his doctrine of the “self-negation of innate moral consciousness” (*liangzhi ziwo kanxian* 良知自我坎陷)⁷ to show how democracy could be developed from Confucian resources by taking “moral knowledge” as the foundation for democracy. The narrative then moves into a discussion of Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between positive liberty and negative liberty. Lee closes this section by arguing that whereas the liberals used negative liberty to oppose positive liberty, “the New Confucians believed that the moral implications inherent in positive liberty could serve as an effective instrument for dealing with totalitarianism” (p. 88). The chapter concludes by identifying some points of agreement between communitarianism and Wang Yang-ming’s philosophy, focusing on the claim that “traditional Confucians would neither adopt the modern Western viewpoint of ‘individualism’ nor discard individual autonomy and follow collective values.” Lee finds evidence of this autonomy in Wang Yang-ming’s view that “an individual’s moral autonomy and the universal connectivity of the original knowing represent two sides of the same coin” (p. 90).

In Chapter 6, “Confucianism, Kant, and Virtue Ethics” (originally published in 2013), Lee regrets that in the recent resurgence of interest in virtue ethics in the English-speaking world, little attention has been paid to (1) an intellectual trend in modern German philosophy known as the “rehabilitation of practical philosophy,” and (2) Mou Zongsan’s interpretation of Confucianism by means of Kantian philosophy and its contrast with virtue ethics. He maintains that just as Kant’s system of ethics is deontological, Confucian ethics too, in the light of Mou’s interpretation, also emerges as a system of deontological ethics. After comparing and contrasting the categories of deontological ethics and teleological ethics, Lee declares that because they are “exhaustive and mutually exclusive,” this precludes there being a third kind of ethics and that virtue ethics should be viewed as a subtype of teleological ethics, according to which good in the moral sense is reduced to good in a non-moral sense. Taking Kant’s ethics as the major representative of deontological ethics, he argues that it is meaningless to distinguish between deontological and virtue ethics on the basis of a contrast between duty and virtue, and problematic to claim that Kant’s ethics

⁷ Lee renders the term as “self-negation of original knowing.” Mou glosses *ziwo kanxian* 自我坎陷 as *ziwo fouding* 自我否定. David Elstein makes an attractive case for translating *kanxian* as “self-restriction.” See his “Mou Zongsan’s New Confucian Democracy,” *Contemporary Political Theory* 11, no. 2 (May 2012), pp. 198–99; see also Stephen C. Angle’s discussion, in Chapter 2 of his *Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy: Toward Progressive Confucianism* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012). As I argue in a forthcoming publication, however, given that Mou’s *ziwo kanxian* thesis seems to have been inspired by Xiong Shili’s notion of “contradiction” (矛盾), I think that “self-negation of innate moral consciousness” is the more felicitous translation.

disregards “character” and “agents,” concluding: “Given that ‘virtue ethics’ is such an ambiguous term, the strategy to interpret Confucianism under its aegis can only make things go from bad to worse” (p. 98).

The concluding chapter of the volume, “A Critique of Jiang Qing’s ‘Political Confucianism’” (originally published in 2013), is a surprisingly constrained critique of the views of the contemporary mainland Confucian revivalist, Jiang Qing, even though Lee finds Jiang’s notion of “political Confucianism” to be “mired in theoretical and practical difficulties” (p. 102).⁸ Lee’s criticisms focus first on theoretical problems in Jiang’s political Confucianism and second on the structure and feasibility of Jiang’s Confucian constitutionalism or Kingly Way of Politics. After elaborating on the content of Jiang’s *Gongyangxue yinlun* 公羊學引論 (Introduction to Gongyang learning),⁹ he finds Jiang’s account of the distinction between so-called mind-and-nature Confucianism and political Confucianism to be problematic. This is because although Jiang maintains that each reflects one aspect of Confucius’s teachings, Jiang fails to show how an ethics of responsibility and an ethics of conviction can be united in theory and treats them as incompatible. “It is for this reason that he completely rejects the possibility of deriving political Confucianism from life Confucianism [aka mind-and-nature Confucianism]. This represents the biggest theoretical shortcoming in Jiang’s political Confucianism” (p. 108). To address the second topic, Lee introduces Jiang’s notion of constitutional Confucianism, swiftly dismissing the idea of attempting to restore Confucianism to the status of national ideology as a utopian fantasy and as consisting of “abstract principles with no specific content” (p. 111). For good measure, Lee concludes the chapter by identifying Jiang’s critique of Mou Zongsan’s notion of *liangzhi ziwo kanxian* on the grounds that it violates Wang Yangming’s notion of *liangzhi*, as further evidence of the utopian nature of Jiang’s political Confucianism.

My comments above regularly draw attention to Lee’s endorsement of Mou Zongsan’s critical assessment of several closely related, and indeed overlapping, topics in Zhu Xi’s metaphysics: that Zhu Xi viewed *ren* (qua *xing*, the nature) “as the metaphysical ground for the activities of the *xin* (heart-mind) as moral agency” with *xin* being relegated to the “lower concrete realm of *qi*”; that Zhu Xi posited a “twofold division between principle (*li* 理) and material force (*qi* 氣)” and a “threefold division between the mind-heart (*xin* 心), the nature (*xing* 性), and the feelings (*qing* 情)”; and that in Zhu Xi’s interpretation of *Mencius* 2A.6, humaneness (*li*, *xing*) and the “heart

⁸ For my own account of Jiang Qing’s political Confucianism, see *Lost Soul: “Confucianism” in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008), pp. 261–76.

⁹ Shenyang: Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995.

of commiseration” (*xin, qing*) are ontologically separated, the former being assigned to the “ontological level” of *li* and the latter to the phenomenal level of *qi*. In what follows, I will propose some alternative interpretative considerations.

On the one hand, Lee acknowledges that for Zhu Xi, “all things existing in reality are necessarily composed of a combination of principle and material force” (p. 56). Yet on the other hand, he claims that Zhu Xi regarded the mind to be nothing other than a cognitive faculty devoid of an “ontological dimension,” having been relegated to the “lower concrete realm of *qi*.” *Li*, of course, represents the “ontological” in Lee’s/Mou’s parlance. If Zhu Xi’s concept of the mind is exclusively *qi* in its constitution, then how is discerning (*zhijue*) possible?¹⁰ Zhu Xi himself is explicit: the mind’s numinous intelligence (*ling* 靈) enables it to discern only when both *li* and *qi* are combined.¹¹

How does Zhu Xi understand the mind and its relation to *li*? Considering his thesis that “The mind combines/controls the nature and the emotions” (心統性情),¹² I would argue that for Zhu Xi, the mind *is* both the nature (= *li*) and the emotions; it is both the nature *as* intrinsic reality (體) *and* the emotions *as* function (用); it simultaneously comprises a *xing er shang* aspect and a *xing er xia* 形而下 aspect. The following passages support this interpretation:

“The mind combines/controls the nature and the emotions.” It is because of the mind that the nature and emotions are both subsequently manifest. The mind is intrinsic reality. When expressed outwardly this is called [the mind as] function. Mencius said: “The human mind is humaneness.” He also talked of “the mind of pity and compassion.” He thus applied the term “the mind” to both the nature and to the emotions. “The human mind is humaneness” is referring to the mind as intrinsic reality; “the mind of pity and compassion” is referring to the mind as function. There must be intrinsic reality for there subsequently to be function. From this explanation we can see the meaning of “The mind combines/controls the nature and the emotions.”

「心統性情。」性情皆因心而後見。心是體，發於外謂之用。孟子曰：「仁，人心也。」又曰：「惻隱之心。」性情上都下箇「心」字。「仁人心也」，是說體；「惻隱之心」，是說用。必有體而後有用，可見「心統性情」之義。¹³

¹⁰ Following Stephen Angle’s rendering of *zhijue*. See his chapter, “Buddhism and Zhu Xi’s Epistemology of Discernment,” in *The Buddhist Roots of Zhu Xi’s Philosophical Thought*, ed. John Makeham (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 156–92.

¹¹ *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類 (Topically arranged conversations of Master Zhu), comp. Li Jingde 黎靖德 (fl. 1263) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), *juan* 5, p. 85.

¹² Zhu variously glosses *tong* 統 in this context as “to combine” (兼) and “to control” (主).

¹³ *Zhuzi yulei*, *juan* 98, p. 2513.

The nature is [the mind] before it is active and the emotions [are the mind] once it has become active. The mind embraces both the not yet active and the already active. This is because before the mind is active then it is the nature and after it is active it is emotions. This is what meant by “the mind unites/controls the nature and the emotions.” Desires are expressed through the emotions. The mind is like water, the nature is like still water, and the emotions are the flows of the water. As for desires, they are waves of water, although there are both good and bad waves.

性是未動，情是已動，心包得已動未動。蓋心之未動則為性，已動則為情，所謂「心統性情」也。欲是情發出來底。心如水，性猶水之靜，情則水之流，欲則水之波瀾，但波瀾有好底，有不好底。¹⁴

The mind controls the person. As intrinsic reality, the mind is the nature; as function, the mind is the emotions.

心主於身，其所以為體者，性也；所以為用者，情也。¹⁵

The mind has both an intrinsic reality aspect and a function aspect. Before it is outwardly expressed, this is the intrinsic reality aspect of the mind. Once it has been outwardly expressed then this is the function aspect of the mind. How could the mind possibly have a reference fixed exclusively to one or to the other?

心有體用。未發之前是心之體，已發之際乃心之用，如何指定說得！¹⁶

The mind comprehensively penetrates what is above [form] and what is in within [form] and cannot be sought only in one locus!

心是貫徹上下，不可只於一處看。¹⁷

For Zhu Xi, the mind is nothing other than the nature as intrinsic reality and the emotions as function—it is not a separate, distinct entity. That *ti-yong* relationship is what constitutes the mind. The mind is both the nature and the emotions and yet is also neither exclusively. I would suggest that these passages problematize Lee’s/Mou’s insistence that Zhu Xi treated the nature, the mind, and the emotions as three distinct entities.

¹⁴ Ibid., *juan* 5, p. 93.

¹⁵ “Da He Shujing” 答何叔京 (Reply to He Shujing [#29]), in *Zhu Xi ji* 朱熹集 (Collected works of Zhu Xi), ed. Guo Qi 郭齊 and Yin Bo 尹波 (Chengdu: Sichuan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996), *juan* 24, p. 1886.

¹⁶ *Zhuzi yulei*, *juan* 5, p. 90.

¹⁷ Ibid., *juan* 95, p. 2439.

For his part, Mou Zongsan claims that, for Zhu Xi, principle is “mere reason” (但理).¹⁸ This is consonant with his related criticism that, for Zhu Xi, *li*/reason is only “being” and not “activity”:

Reason is not the external object of innate moral knowing; rather, reason is determined by innate moral knowing itself. Innate moral knowing is both activity and being. With respect to knowing what is right and what is wrong, it is said to be activity. When we talk of reason’s objective significance, however, it is said that innate moral knowing is being.

理不是良知所知的外在對象，理是良知本身所決定的。良知本身即活動即存有，於知是知非說活動，於理上說客觀意義，而說良知是一 being (存有)。¹⁹

He similarly describes “the reality of the way” (道體) (equally cashed out as *xinti* 心體 or *xingtǐ* 性體) in the same terms:

The sense in which it is “being” refers to its aspect as reason; the sense in which it is “activity” refers to its aspect as mind and spirit. The reality of the way must possess and embody both aspects. Zhu Xi, however, deemed it only to be being and not also to be activity. With respect to the reality of the way, because he deemed reason and *qi* to be bifurcated, he deemed the reality of way to be the reason aspect only, and creative feeling, mind and spirit were classified as belonging to the realm of *qi*. With respect to the mind and the nature, Zhu Xi deemed them to be two, and so, because the mind and reason are two, one can no longer say “the mind = the nature = reason” because the mind is now classified as belonging to the realm of *qi*.

從理這方面說存有義，從心、神這方面說活動義。道體必須具體此兩方面。但朱子卻體會成只存有而不活動。在道體方面體會成理氣二分，道體只是理；寂感、心、神都屬於氣。在心性方面，則心與性為二，亦即心與理為二，不能說心即性即理，以心屬氣故。²⁰

¹⁸ This is Mou’s own translation. *Dan li* 但理 gives expression to the idea that Zhu Xi’s concept of *li* is only transcendent and not also simultaneously immanent. See Jason Clower, *The Unlikely Buddhist: Tiantai Buddhism in Mou Zongsan’s New Confucianism* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), pp. 116–27.

¹⁹ Mou, “Rujia de daode de xingshang xue” 儒家的道德的形上學 (Confucian moral metaphysics), in *Mou Zongsan xiansheng wanqi wenji* 牟宗三先生晚期文集 (Anthology of late writings of Mou Zongsan), vol. 27 of *Mou Zongsan quanji*, p. 213. See also Clower, *Late Works of Mou Zongsan*, p. 131.

²⁰ Mou, “Song Ming Ruxue de san xi” 宋明儒學的三系 (The three branches of Song and Ming Confucianism), in *Mou Zongsan xiansheng wanqi wenji*, p. 257. See also Clower, *Late Works of Mou Zongsan*, p. 159.

Given these claims, one is prompted to wonder just how Lee might explain Zhu Xi's account of principle in the following passages:

The difference between Confucians and Buddhists is precisely that we Confucians regard the mind and principle to be one whereas they take the mind and principle to be two.

儒釋之異，正為吾以心與理為一，而彼以心與理為二耳。²¹

In saying that the mind and principle are one, this does not mean that principle is there before you as a single thing. Principle is in the mind but because the mind cannot contain it, principle issues forth as the mind encounters things.

心與理一，不是理在前面為一物。理便在心之中，心包蓄不住，隨事而發。²²

Although first there is this thing [i.e., principle] inside, yet in accord with what [the mind] senses, then naturally it issues forth. Thus, upon seeing a child about to fall into a well, there is the mind of pity and compassion; upon seeing a burglar, there is the mind of shame and dislike; upon seeing the elders, there is the mind of reverence and respect; upon seeing what is right, there is the mind that condones; upon seeing what is wrong, there is the mind that disapproves. From that slight crevice it bursts forth, just like rays of light released from the four sides of a pagoda.

惟是先有這物事在裏面，但隨所感觸，便自是發出來。故見孺子入井，便有惻隱之心；見穿窬之類，便有羞惡之心；見尊長之屬，便有恭敬之心；見得是，便有是之之心；見得非，便有非之之心，從那縫罅裏迸將出來，恰似寶塔裏面四面毫光放出來。²³

None of this strikes me as compatible with the claim that for Zhu Xi, principle is but “mere reason,” inactive and severed from the living, breathing world.

All of the essays have been revised, with considerable editorial intervention on the part of the editor David Jones. It is, however, not always clear where the division of labour lies, for in his Acknowledgments, Lee also states: “I have updated the articles with editorial revisions, material emendations, and supplemental content” (p. xiii). The editor notes in his Foreword: “At times, I have added some minimal text for clarity purposes and enhancement of his [Lee’s] points. In no way has the meaning or style of his text been altered. All edited and content contributions have been approved by Professor Lee” (p. x). Despite this, the editor’s interventions are, on occasion, problematic. I will cite two examples. The opening paragraph of Chapter

²¹ “Da Zheng Zishang” 答鄭子上 (Reply to Zheng Zishang [#14]), in *Zhu Xi ji*, *juan* 56, p. 2871.

²² *Zhuzi yulei*, *juan* 5, p. 85.

²³ *Ibid.*, *juan* 53, pp. 1288–89.

3 states: “As Michael Nylan writes in her edited book on the *Analects*, ‘The text is a patchwork . . . but on the whole, there are very few stylistic anachronisms: the language and syntax of most of the fragments is coherent and pertains to the same period’” (p. 41). Presumably the purpose in citing these remarks is to appropriate the scholarly imprimatur of Michael Nylan to support the claim of a relatively early date (mid–Warring States) for the composition of the *Analects*. The Nylan edited volume referred to is the 2014 reissue of Simon Leys’s 1997 translation, *Confucius: The Analects*. I am assuming that the Nylan reference and citation were contributed by the editor, because Lee’s original essay, published in 2005, makes no reference either to Nylan (obviously) or to Leys. The first problem is that the passage the editor attributes to Nylan was actually written by Leys (not Nylan) and is part of his original 1997 translator’s preface. The second problem is that in dating the composition of the *Analects*, Leys appeals to the authority of “the forthcoming work of E. Bruce Brooks (to be published by Columbia University Press).” E. Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks’s *The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and His Successors* was duly published in 1998. As we have now known for two decades, the Brookses are no fans of the view that “the language and syntax of most of the fragments [of the *Analects*] is coherent and pertains to the same period.” The Brookses propose that the accretional composition of the *Analects* occurred over the period between 479 B.C. to 249 B.C.

Chapter 2 also appears to have suffered from an excess of editorial intervention. The opening paragraph (p. 26) refers to “the third generation of Modern New Confucians,” and subsequently proceeds to identify its representative figures as Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, and Xu Fuguan. On p. 28, however, these same figures are identified as “the second generation of Modern New Confucians.” The “third generation” reference is not simply a typographical error, because note 1 to this chapter explicitly identifies a second generation of Modern New Confucians, consisting of Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 and Qian Mu 錢穆. Although I do not have ready access to the journal, *Bochumer Jahrbuch zur Ostasienforschung*, where Lee’s essay-cum-chapter was originally published, to confirm if the note is an editorial embellishment, I do find it unlikely that Ming-huei Lee would: (1) confuse the representative figures of the second- and third-generation New Confucians; (2) relegate his teacher Mou to a “third generation” of New Confucians; or (3) welcome Qian and Feng into the Modern New Confucian fold. Qian, of course, famously denied that he was a New Confucian.²⁴

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²⁴ See Yu Yingshi’s 1991 essay, “Qian Mu yu Xin Rujia” 錢穆與新儒家 (Qian Mu and the New Confucians), in idem, *Xiandai Ruxue lun* 現代儒學論 (Essays on modern Confucianism) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1998), pp. 170–228.