

Some Reflections on the Sung-Ming Understanding of Mind, Nature, and Reason*

Shu-hsien Liu

The Chinese University of Hong Kong

How Should We Name Sung-Ming Confucianism?

There are several terms for Sung-Ming 宋明 Confucianism: *tao-hsüeh* 道學 (studies of the Way), *li-hsüeh* 理學 (studies of principles), *hsin-hsüeh* 心學 (studies of the mind), and *hsin-ju-hsüeh* 新儒學 (Neo-Confucian studies). Each has its merit and demerit and I would like to discuss them as follows:

Firstly, the term *tao-hsüeh* had been used during the Sung. It is true, Sung-Ming Confucianism has devoted itself to the study of the Way and this preoccupation with the Way can be traced back to Confucius, who said, "In the morning, hear the Way; in the evening, die content!"¹ Unfortunately however, Confucianism does not have a monopoly of the term *tao*. In fact Taoism as a school is named after the term, even though it understands the Way rather differently. Besides, subsequently *tao-hsüeh* is used in ordinary language in a derogatory sense as in the phrase *tao-hsüeh-ch'i* 道學氣, meaning putting on a moralistic air. Hence there are problems with this term.

Secondly, the term *li-hsüeh* has been widely accepted by scholars for good reasons. *Li* 理 (principle, reason) is not only a major concept in Sung-Ming Confucianism, but a new concept as well. The term itself is old, but it receives completely new and rich connotations after the impact of Buddhism. Especially as the term applies to the most prominent Sung 宋 school of thought established by Chu Hsi 朱熹 (1130–1200) which was honoured as the orthodoxy from the Yüan 元 dynasty for more than seven hundred years, it is quite natural to extend the name to cover the whole of Sung-Ming Confucianism *Sung-Ming li-hsüeh*. The only drawback is, the term has a broader and a narrower meaning. Used in the latter sense it refers only to the so-called *Ch'eng-Chu li-hsüeh* 程朱理學 (school of principle) in contrast to the so-called *Lu-Wang hsin-hsüeh* 陸王心學 (school of mind). It seems inconvenient to include both *li-hsüeh in a narrower sense* and *hsin-hsüeh* within the scope of *li-hsüeh in a broader sense*. If it is possible, certainly it would be better for us to find another name for Sung-Ming Confucianism as a whole.

Thirdly, the term *hsin-hsüeh* has never been intended to mean Sung-Ming Confucianism as a whole, it has often been used to characterize Ming Confucian thought. But I would like to argue that both *li-hsüeh* and *hsin-hsüeh* is lacking in accuracy when used to characterize the positions of the Ch'eng-Chu school and the Lu-Wang school. If I can have my way, I

* This paper was presented at The Sixth International Congress of Chinese Philosophy held at The University of Hawaii at Hilo, July 24–29, 1989. My trip to Hilo was partially supported by Ming-Yu Foundation, New Asia College, CUHK.

1. Wing-tsit Chan trans. and comp., *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 26. Hereafter the book will be referred to as Chan, *Source Book*.

would like to recommend that both these terms be discarded.

After the elimination we are left with *hsin-ju-hsüeh* or *hsin-ju-chia* 新儒家 (Neo-Confucian school), the most popular terms in more recent times. I have made some attempts to trace the origin of these terms. I suspect that in the twentieth century Fung Yu-lan 馮友蘭 probably was the first to use this term. In the original *History of Chinese Philosophy* in Chinese published in the early thirties, the term *hsin-ju-chia* was used only a few times and was hardly likely to catch the eye of the reader. When Fung referred to Sung-Ming Confucianism, he used the term *tao-hsüeh*. The interesting thing is that when Derk Bodde translated the book into English, he rendered the term *tao-hsüeh* into *Neo-Confucianism* and used it in chapter headings.² Wing-tsit Chan 陳榮捷 also used the term.³ Then Carsun Chang 張嘉森 (君勳) published his *The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought*⁴ in two volumes. As a result, Neo-Confucianism has become a commonly accepted term in the English-speaking world. From these facts I come to the conclusion that the term Neo-Confucianism became popular in the West before its Chinese equivalent *hsin-ju-chia* became widely accepted in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mainland China. The only disadvantage with this term is that, following Derk Bodde's usage of the term, it has been stretched to cover even early Ch'ing 清 scholars such as Yen Yüan 顏元, Li Kung 李燾 and Tai Chen 戴震. But Yen, Li and Tai not only belonged to a different dynasty, their thought also pertained to a totally different paradigm for reasons I have specified elsewhere.⁵ Therefore I would like to suggest that we should restrict the use of the term to Sung-(Yüan)-Ming Confucianism only. The last great figure in that line was Huang Tsung-hsi 黃宗羲. After a break of about three hundred years, the thread was picked up again by contemporary Neo-Confucianism, represented by scholars such as Hsiung Shih-li 熊十力, Liang Sou-ming 梁漱溟, Hsu Fu-kuan 徐復觀, Tang Chün-i 唐君毅, Mou Tsung-san 牟宗三, and so on.

As *hsin* 心, *hsing* 性 and *li* are major concepts in Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophies, here are some reflections on them in that order.

Some Reflections on the Sung-Ming Understanding of the Mind

Although the Lu-Wang school puts great emphasis on the mind, and because of the dominant position of Wang Yang-ming's 王陽明 thought in the Ming 明 dynasty, Ming thought is recognized as characterized by its emphasis on the mind, yet one must not be misled into thinking that the problem of the mind is not important for the Ch'eng-Chu school or for Sung thought. On the contrary, I submit that this problem is also a crucial one for the Ch'eng-Chu school. In this connection, it would be interesting to trace the development of Chu Hsi's

-
2. Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, trans. Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, two volumes, 1952, 1953), Vol. II, Ch. X and Ch. XV. Hereafter the book will be referred to as Fung, *History*.
 3. Wing-tsit Chan, *Religious Trends in Modern China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953).
 4. Carsun Chang, *The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought* (New York: Bookman Associates, two volumes, 1957, 1962).
 5. Shu-hsien Liu 劉述先, *Huang Tsung-hsi hsin-hsüeh te ting-wei* 黃宗羲心學的定位 [A Study of Huang Tsung-hsi's Philosophy of Mind] (Taipei 台北: Asian Culture Co., 1986), pp. 164-177, 195-198. Hereafter the book will be referred to as Liu, *Huang Tsung-hsi*.

thought.⁶ Chu Hsi studied under Li T'ung 李侗 (1093–1163) who in turn studied under Lo Ts'ung-yen 羅從彥 (1072–1135), whose teacher Yang Shih 楊時 (1053–1135) was, however, a disciple of the Ch'eng brothers. When Chu Hsi was young, he was profoundly influenced by Li T'ung. According to his own testimony, it was Li T'ung who led him away from Buddhism back into the fold of Confucianism. After Li died, Chu Hsi wrote a biography of Li in which he said,

Master [Li] studied under [Master Lo]. After studying the classics, he often sat and meditated the whole day in order to examine the state before feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused and try to capture what is central. After practicing this for a long time, he finally realized that the foundation of the world truly rested there.... Only if one can turn inward and find joy within the self, can he then step into the world of the sages and worthies. Hence his saying that the way of learning does not lie in a prolixity of words, but just in sitting and meditating, clarifying the mind, realizing that through the heavenly principle, if seen, even the rousing of only an iota of selfish desires would be attenuated. After devoting himself to this practice for a long time, he would become enlightened. It is only in this way that learning could become truly effective.⁷

Clearly Li's central teaching lies in the discipline of the mind. Today we still have the letter Li T'ung wrote to Lo Ts'ung-yen asking to study under him. He said,

You have been following Kuei-shan's 龜山 [Yang Shih's] teachings for years.... Now I am anxious to study under you, in order to learn something that is more important than profit and position. I have heard that the *tao* 道 can be followed to settle the mind, as food can be used to stop hunger or clothing can be used to keep off the cold. Those who are troubled by hunger and cold are anxious to work for food and clothing. They would never forget about such matters even in times of difficulty and confusion. But people die without worrying about the settling of the mind. Is it because they love their mouth and body better than their mind? This is the result of a lack of reflection....⁸

Chu Hsi himself acknowledged that sitting and meditating are the most important method handed down from one generation to another since Kuei-shan.⁹ And Huang Tsung-hsi went so far as to say that this is the blood path trodden from Ming-tao 明道 [Ch'eng Hao 程顥] to

6. Shu-hsien Liu, "On Chu Hsi's Search for Equilibrium and Harmony," in *Harmony and Strife: Contemporary Perspectives East and West*, edited by Shu-hsien Liu and Robert E. Allinson (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1988), pp. 249–270.

7. *Chu-tzu wen-chi* 朱子文集 [Collection of Literary Works by Chu Hsi], 97: 27b–28a, *Ssu pu pei yao* 四部備要 ed. Translation mine.

8. *Sung-Yüan hsüeh-an* 宋元學案 [Anthology and Critical Accounts of the Neo-Confucianists of the Sung and Yüan Dynasties, 960–1368] (Beijing 北京: Zhong-hua 中華, four volumes, 1986), Vol. II, pp. 1275–1276. Translation mine. Hereafter the book will be referred to as *Sung-Yüan hsüeh-an*.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 1291.

Yen-ping 延平 [Li T'ung].¹⁰ Granted that Chu Hsi in his later years drifted further and further away from such a path, as he remarked that this approach is rather one-sided,¹¹ there is no denial that the starting point for Chu Hsi's search is the problem of *chung-ho* 中和 based on the text of *The Doctrine of the Mean* which he studied with Li T'ung. His reflection is as follows:

Before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused it is called equilibrium (*chung*, centrality, mean). When these feelings are aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree, it is called harmony [*ho*]. Equilibrium is the great foundation of the world, and harmony its universal path. When equilibrium and harmony are realized to the highest degree, heaven and earth will attain their proper order and all things will flourish.¹²

In his monumental work on Chu Hsi Professor Mou Tsung-san shows decisively that in Chu Hsi's mature thought he followed the lead of Ch'eng I 程頤.¹³ Huang Tsung-hsi was quite right to point out:

"Self-cultivation requires seriousness; the pursuit of learning depends on the extension of knowledge." This is the right target for I-ch'uan 伊川 [Ch'eng I]. K'ao-t'ing 考亭 [Chu Hsi] keeps straight at this target without deviating from it. Even though his discussions and theories are numerous, they are but elaboration of such principles.¹⁴

Self-cultivation and learning are regarded as two wings of a bird or two wheels of a cart. They are both indispensable for the education of a person who is engaged in the so-called great learning. Clearly self-cultivation has to do with discipline of the mind, and even though learning and self-cultivation form a cycle going back and forth from one to the other, it is difficult to separate the two, yet comparatively speaking, the practice of self-cultivation must be regarded as prior to learning. Therefore it is not unreasonable to say that the Ch'eng-Chu school had also taught a brand of *hsin-hsüeh*, even though it was different in approach from the kind of *hsin-hsüeh* taught by the Lu-Wang school. Of course I am not trying to blur the distinction between the two schools. I am only saying that the emphasis on the discipline of the mind cannot be used as the differentia for distinguishing the two schools. Surely the two schools did have very different concepts of the mind, but these must be considered alongside other factors. We must not follow the simplistic approach which draws a hard and fast line between the two schools and claim that one school puts exclusive emphasis on *li*, while the other on *hsin*.

10. Ibid., p. 1277.

11. Ibid.

12. Chan, *Source Book*, p. 98.

13. Mou Tsung-san, *Hsin-t'i yü hsing-t'i* 心體與性體 [The Substance of the Mind and the Substance of the Nature] (Taipei: Cheng-chung 正中, three volumes, 1968–1969), Vol. III, pp. 42–55. Hereafter the book will be referred to as Mou, *Mind and Nature*.

14. *Sung-yüan hsüeh-an*, Vol. II, pp. 1554–1555. Translation mine.

Some Reflections on the Sung-Ming Understanding of Nature

On the surface all Sung-Ming philosophers followed the tradition of Mencius in agreeing that human nature is good. But on closer scrutiny there were substantial differences among the views of the various schools. In order to understand the issues involved, again we must take Chu Hsi as the point of departure.¹⁵

Chu Hsi endorsed the view of Chang Tsai 張載 who was perhaps the first to have made a sharp distinction between the so-called physical nature and the original (moral) nature. He also followed the lead of Ch'eng I who stated his position in the famous statement:

It would be incomplete to talk about the nature without including material force and unintelligible to talk about material force without including nature. (It would be wrong to consider them apart from each other.)¹⁶

Chu Hsi thought highly of the contributions made by Chang and the Ch'eng brothers. In a discussion with his disciples he commented as follows:

...I regard them as having enormously helped the School of the Sages, and as having done great service to the scholars who have come after. A reading of them fills one with a strong realization that, before their time, no one had touched on this point. Han Yü [韓愈], for example, in his *On the Origin of the Nature*, propounded the theory of the three grades (of the nature). Yet though what he said is true, he failed to state clearly that what he was speaking about is only the nature as found in the material force. For how, in the nature (as originally constituted), could there be these "three grades"?

When Mencius says that the nature is good, he speaks of it only with respect to its origin, and says nothing about it as found in the material force. Thus he, too, fails to make a clear distinction. Other philosophers have asserted that the nature is evil, or that in it both good and evil are intermingled. But if the doctrines of Chang and the Ch'engs had appeared earlier, there would have been no need for all this discussion and controversy. If, therefore, the doctrines of Chang and Ch'engs are admitted, those of the other philosophers go into discard.

Moreover, if we are to say that humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom alone constitute nature, how is it that there are some people born unruly in the world? It is only owing to the physical endowment that this is so. If one does not take this physical element into account, the theory will not be well rounded, and therefore will be incomplete. But if, on the contrary, one takes only the physical endowment into account, some of which may be good and some bad, while disregarding the fact that in the first place there were only these principles, then one will fall into obscurity.¹⁷

15. Shu-hsien Liu, "On Chu Hsi's Understanding of Hsing," in *The Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies* 清華學報, New Series, Vol. XVII, Nos. 1 & 2 (December, 1985), pp. 127-148.

16. Chan, *Source Book*, p. 552, with modification.

17. Fung, *History*, Vol. II, pp. 554-555.

Thus we can see that Chu Hsi endorsed the views of Chang and Ch'eng brothers for good reasons. For Chu Hsi the physical nature in itself is not evil, nevertheless the origin of evils still lies in material force, as there is no room for evil in principles which are embodied in the original nature. I summarized his views elsewhere as follows:

...for Chu Hsi, principle or nature is without any qualification good, but nature must be embodied in material force to make the principles inherent in it manifest. When material force is received in its state of clearness, there will be no obscurity or obstruction and principle will express itself freely. But this is not always the case, if the obstruction is great, then human selfish desire will dominate. Chu Hsi believed that everyone has the same original nature, but receives different material force. Through proper discipline everyone's original nature may shine through different material force, though the difficulties one encounters may be greater or smaller. Those who are able to make principles embodied in nature eminently manifest are sages and worthies, they are the model for common people to follow. In other words, the original nature endowed by heaven is the same in everybody, but material force received is not the same, and the effort to recover one's original nature is not the same. It is here we find the difference between sages and worthies on the one hand, and common people on the other hand, even though in principle everyone can be sage, as each has received the same endowment of the original nature as the sages.¹⁸

Note that Chu Hsi made use of a pair of concepts: *li* (principle, reason) and *chi* 氣 (material force) in analyzing human nature, and found that there are the so-called *i-li chih hsing* 義理之性 (moral nature) and *ch'i-chih chih hsing* 氣質之性 (physical nature), the former being principle and the latter material force. Principle is incorporeal, eternal and unchanging. It constitutes the essence of things and is always good, thus not admitting a dichotomy of good and evil and it does not create things. Material force, on the other hand, is physical, transitory and changeable. It constitutes the material basis for things, and admits both of good and evil, and is the agent of creation. What is the status of the mind then? It is the subtlest kind of material force which comprises principle. Chu Hsi interpreted the distinction between *tao-hsin* 道心 (the moral mind) and *jen-hsin* 人心 (the human mind) in his own ways: the former is the mind which works according to principle, while the latter is the mind that is dominated by selfish desires. Through proper discipline the latter can be transformed into the former. The relation between the mind and principle is one of correlation, not of identity.

From the fact that for Chu Hsi the actual mind of a human being may be good or evil, Professor Mou Tsung-san argues that it is an empirical mind, not the original mind as understood by Mencius.¹⁹ Chu Hsi takes a gradual approach to rectify the mind. Hence it is impossible for Chu Hsi to say that the mind is principle, the only thing he can say is that nature is principle. Here we find that there is indeed a great discrepancy between the Ch'eng-Chu school and the Lu-Wang school concerning the understanding of *hsin* (mind)

18. Liu, "On Chu Hsi's Understanding of *Hsing*," p. 140.

19. Mou, *Mind and Nature*, Vol. III, pp. 439-447.

and *hsing* (nature) and of the relation between the two. For Lu-Wang the mind was understood as *pen-hsin* 本心 (the original mind) which is identical with *pen-hsing* 本性 (the original nature), the two being two sides of the same coin. This view is much closer to the view of Mencius who said that “the way of learning is none other than finding the lost mind.”²⁰ When the lost mind is recovered, what is endowed in one’s nature is realized. Lu Hsiang-shan 陸象山 followed Mencius faithfully when he said,

My learning is different from that of others in the fact that with me every word comes spontaneously. Although I have uttered tens of thousands of words, they all are expressions of what is within me, and nothing more has been added. Recently someone has commented of me that aside from [Mencius’] saying, “First build up the nobler part of your nature,” I had nothing clever. When I heard this, I said, “Very true indeed.”²¹

This nobler part of nature is exactly the original nature which distinguishes man from other animals. It is purely good, and is manifested through man’s mind-heart. The desires for food and sex are common among animals and man. They have nothing whatsoever to do with what is specifically human, and hence must not be regarded as part of what Mencius identified as human nature. Clearly Mencius was putting exclusive emphasis upon the nobler part of our nature. If the above analysis is correct, then Ch’eng-Chu did develop a new theory of human nature quite different from Mencius’ view of human nature. I find that,

...in later years Chu Hsi tended to put more and more emphasis on material force, as principle and material force are inseparable, so he accepted the distinction and was convinced the two-nature theory could help him to give answers to many puzzling problems.²²

As had been mentioned earlier, Chu Hsi himself pointed out quite explicitly that Mencius had neglected that aspect of material force. Therefore if Mencius’ theory is accepted as orthodoxy, then Chu Hsi’s view cannot but be regarded as a deviation from the orthodoxy.²³ It is here we find the ground to support Professor Mou Tsung-san’s view which sees that even though historically Chu Hsi was honoured as the orthodoxy, in fact it was an offshoot that assumed the position of orthodoxy.²⁴

Apart from the Ch’eng-Chu and Lu-Wang schools, Professor Mou pointed out that there was another line of thought represented by Hu Hung 胡宏 (Wu-feng 五峯) of the Hunan 湖南 school. Hu understood *hsing* (nature) as *wei-fa* 未發 (not manifested) and *hsin* (mind-heart) as *i-fa* 已發 (manifested). On the surface it appears that Hu took *hsin* and *hsing* to be

20. Chan, *Source Book*, p. 58.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 582.

22. Liu, “On Chu Hsi’s Understanding of *Hsing*,” p. 139.

23. Shu-hsien Liu, “The Problem of Orthodoxy in Chu Hsi’s Philosophy,” in *Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism*, edited by Wing-tsit Chan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986), pp. 437–460. Hereafter the book will be referred to as Chan, *Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism*.

24. Mou, *Mind and Nature*, Vol. I, pp. 41–60.

two different things. This explained why in an earlier stage Chu Hsi had subscribed to this view which had a great appeal for him, but later on he rejected his earlier view which erroneously took the relation between the two to be that of a temporal sequence: what has not yet been manifested is nature, and what has been manifested is mind.²⁵ It was in his mature thought that Chu Hsi identified nature as principle and mind as material force, and rejected Hu Hung's view as erroneous. But Chu Hsi had never really understood Hu Hung's teachings. According to Professor Mou the Hunan school took nature to be what is not manifested, it has to depend on the mind for manifestation, therefore the relation between the two is like that between the inner core and the outer manifestation. Hence even for Hu Hung *hsin* and *hsing* are the two sides of the same coin. Granted that his approach was somewhat different from that of Lu-Wang, in essence his teachings did not really contradict Lu-Wang's teachings which simply identified *pen-hsin* (the original mind) and *pen-hsing* (the original nature), except in the way he expressed his view. Professor Mou also pointed out that the Ming philosopher Liu Tsung-chou's 劉宗周 (Chi-shan's 戡山) thought seemed to have moved in the same direction. Liu happened to believe that nature has to manifest itself through the mind, even though Liu's thought did not seem to have been influenced by the Hunan school.²⁶ Hence Professor Mou proposed that there were three main schools of thought among Sung-Ming philosophy instead of only two as commonly acknowledged by scholars. Based on philosophical reasons alone I am quite willing to accept this proposal. But the Hunan school declined after Chu Hsi's time. From the perspective of the history of thought, since the school had not exerted any visible influence on the subsequent development of Neo-Confucian thought, it seems inappropriate to grant it a prominent position it does not deserve. Furthermore, I must hasten to point out that there was an important difference between Hu Hung's and Liu Tsung-chou's understanding of nature, which Professor Mou neglected to mention. While Hu thought that nature is totally beyond the characterization of good and evil, Liu insisted that nature is supremely good, as he was deadly against some followers of Wang Yang-ming who were regarded so degenerate as to accept the Buddhist view which blurred the distinction between what is good and what is evil.²⁷

Some Reflections on the Sung-Ming Understanding of Reason

As in our discussion of nature the concepts of *li* (principle, reason) and *ch'i* (material force) have already entered the picture and are considered to have important bearing on our understanding of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophies, we need to go still further in our reflection from the perspective of reason. When we have examined Sung-Ming philosophers' understanding of reason in some depth, we would be in a position to answer the question

25. Liu, "On Chu Hsi's Search for Equilibrium and Harmony," pp. 263-264.

26. Mou, *Mind and Nature*, Vol. II, pp. 512-535.

27. Liu, *Huang Tsung-hsi*, p. 44.

whether there was an anti-intellectualistic trend in Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian thought.²⁸

As is well known, *li* was only lightly touched upon in *The Mencius* and was never a major concept in ancient Chinese philosophy. It was through the efforts of Sung philosophers that *li* acquired new meanings and became something of crucial importance, resulting in Sung-Ming philosophy being known as Sung-Ming *li-hsüeh* (study of reason, principle). *Li* was a central concern for both Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang schools, only it was understood by them in different ways. We must consider it in conjunction with other important concepts such as *ch'i*, *hsin*, and *hsing*, so that we can get a comprehensive picture in which things are seen in their proper perspectives.

For Chu Hsi, there is no question that nature is principle, when nature is understood as man's moral nature. But it is not possible for him to say that mind is principle, as the mind is made up of material force, albeit the subtlest kind. The only thing he can say is that the mind comprises principle. He particularly appreciated one of the sayings by Shao Yung 邵雍 which he interpreted in such a way as to illustrate his own point of view. He said,

Shao Yao-fu [堯夫] (Shao-Yung) said that "nature is the concrete embodiment of the Way and the mind is the enclosure of the nature." This theory is very good. For the Way itself has no physical form or body; it finds it only in man's nature. But if there were no mind, where could nature be? There must be mind before nature can be gotten hold of and put forth into operation, for the principles contained in man's nature are humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, and these are concrete principles. We Confucianists regard nature as real, whereas Buddhists regard it as unreal. However, it is incorrect to equate mind with nature.²⁹

Nature in this context is the principle of individuation. The Way of Heaven flourishes and men and things receive their different natures. Principles are built into the nature, hence it is appropriate to say that nature is principle. But nature as principle cannot act, hence it must adhere to the mind. Therefore when Chu Hsi said that mind and principle are one, he could not have meant that they are identical, since he had explicitly refused to equate the two; what he really wanted to say is that through proper discipline the mind can act as one with principle. When the empirical mind of man has been transformed into the mind of *tao*, it becomes one with principle in the sense that it can act in accordance with principle. For Chu Hsi, the mind has, as it were, a structure of intentionality. It must direct itself toward principle. He often compared the mind to a mirror. If the mirror is kept clear, then it would give us a true reflection of things. But it would not make sense for the mirror to turn inward

28. Yu Ying-shih wrote several essays on anti-intellectualism in Chinese thought, they are now included in his book, *Li-shih yü ssu-hsiang* 歷史與思想 [History and Thought] (Taipei: Linking 聯經, 1976). He thinks in political philosophy generally Confucianism adopts an intellectualistic attitude while Taoism and Legalism adopt an anti-intellectualistic attitude. The article most relevant for us is the one on the intellectualistic tradition in Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism, pp. 87–119. Hereafter the book will be referred to as Yu, *History and Thought*.

29. Chan, *Source Book*, pp. 615–616. For a more detailed discussion of Chu Hsi's understanding of the function of the mind, cf. Shu-hsien Liu, "The Function of the Mind in Chu Hsi's Philosophy," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, Vol. V (1978), pp. 195–208.

and look for a reflection of itself. Hence he rejected the approach for the mind to seek mind,³⁰ for this would be like seeking a donkey while riding a donkey. He felt strongly that this was the wrong approach taken by the Buddhists or the Zen (Ch'an) 禪 followers. Unfortunately however, he went so far as to identify his rival Neo-Confucian philosopher Lu Hsiang-shan as a Zen follower, and as Lu on the other hand also made counter-charges that many of Chu's ideas were taken from Taoist sources, a serious controversy between the two was practically unavoidable. There was misunderstanding on both sides.³¹ Since we have already given an exposition of Chu Hsi's ideas, now we shall turn our attention to Lu Hsiang-shan's ideas.

In his debate with Chu Hsi, Lu Hsiang-shan insisted that it was wrong to take yin 陰 and yang 陽 as merely something that has physical form and is beneath the Way. Lu pointed out that the "Appended Remarks" of *The Book of Changes* explicitly stated: "The successive movement of yin and yang constitutes the Way (Tao)."³² From his perspective the Way is without any doubt implicit in yin and yang; in other words, *li* (principle) is immanent in *ch'i* (material force), and it is impossible to draw a line of demarcation between the two. He advocated a monistic view in contrast to Chu Hsi's dualistic outlook. In order to understand this line of thought, we may employ the following example for illustration: when a man is hungry, naturally he would want to eat, and when he eats the right amount of food, he is acting according to principle, but when he eats too much or too little, he is acting against the principle. Therefore it would be nonsensical to talk about a transcendent principle which has nothing to do with material force, as *li* is embodied in *ch'i*, and the so-called *li* is nothing but the *li* of *ch'i*. It is in this sense that *li* and *ch'i* are one. By the same token, although the empirical mind may act against principle—this is simply a natural state of affairs without needing a theodicy to justify its existence, yet the original mind is always acting according to the principles embodied in the original nature. Hence *pen-hsin* (original mind) and *pen-hsing* (original nature) are one, and the primary task of the discipline of the mind is "to recover the lost mind" as had been instructed by Mencius.³³ Since in this line of thought the original mind and the original nature along with the principles embodied in it correlate with one another without any deviation, they are literally one. Hence not only it is true to say that the nature is principle, but also that the mind is principle. Now we are in a position to identify the most crucial difference between the two schools: for Ch'eng-Chu, they can say that nature is principle, but can only say that the mind comprises principle, while for Lu-Wang, they can say both that nature is principle and that the mind is principle. Although they shared many things in common, there were also important differences in their understanding of the mind, nature, and reason. They may be regarded as two different branches of the same family. They had similar aspirations: what they sought was the realization of the Way in one's life, but their approaches were quite different from each other. In sum one common feature of all Sung-

30. Chu Hsi, "Kuan-hsin shuo" 觀心說 [An Essay on Observing the Mind], in *Chu-tzu wen-chi*, 67: 18b–20a.

31. Shu-hsien Liu, *Chu-tzu che-hsüeh ssu-hsiang te fa-chan yü wan-ch'eng* 朱子哲學思想的發展與完成 [The Development and Completion of Master Chu's Philosophical Thought] (Taipei: Student Book Co., 1982), pp. 427–483.

32. Chan, *Source Book*, p. 266.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

Ming Neo-Confucian philosophers was their commitment to reason, only they understood it in different ways.

Now we are ready to answer the intriguing question raised by Professor Yu Ying-shih 余英時: Was there an anti-intellectualistic trend in Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian thought? Professor Yu was careful enough to draw a distinction between anti-rationalism and anti-intellectualism. Obviously neither Ch'eng-Chu nor Lu-Wang can be regarded as anti-rationalist, but he seemed to argue that there was an anti-intellectualistic tendency among Wang Yang-ming and his followers.³⁴ Such an allegation deserves a closer examination.

Let us start with Chu Hsi. I think Professor Yu argued convincingly that Chu Hsi adopted an intellectualistic approach, as he put emphasis on book learning, using it as a means to locate principles both in moral cultivation and natural investigation, and they would provide guidance for our concrete behaviour.³⁵ One distinct feature of Chu Hsi's thought was that he refused to accept the distinction made by Chang Tsai between the *te-hsing chih chih* 德性之知 (moral knowledge) and *wen-chien chih chih* 聞見之知 (sense knowledge). Here he went even beyond Ch'eng I who had endorsed Chang Tsai's distinction. But both Lu and Wang took the distinction seriously. Lu put almost exclusive emphasis on moral knowledge, as he accused Chu Hsi of failing to keep his eyes on the primary goal of learning. In a letter to Hsiang P'ing-fu 項平父, Chu Hsi said,

Generally speaking, since the time of Tzu-ssu 子思 “honoring the moral nature” (*tsun te-hsing* 尊德性) and “following the path of inquiry and study” (*tao wen-hsüeh* 道問學) have been the two basic methods of instruction according to which people are taught to exert themselves. Now, what Tzu-ching 子靜 [Lu Hsiang-shan] talks about are matters pertaining exclusively to “honoring the moral nature” whereas in my daily discussions I have placed a greater emphasis on “inquiry and study”... From now on I ought to turn my attention inwardly to self-cultivation. Thus by removing

34. In a conversation with me Professor Yu Ying-shih said that he had never accused Wang Yang-ming of anti-intellectualism. But Thomas Metzger in his *Escape from Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977) did make an explicit reference to Yu concerning Wang's anti-intellectualism. This aroused my curiosity. I checked the sources and found that Yu did refer to Wang's anti-intellectualism in his book *History and Thought* several times. (cf. pp. 98–99, 104–105) But in a more sophisticated discussion of the problem, Yu explicitly said that Wang's thought was supraintellectual, not anti-intellectual, he should not be held totally responsible for the anti-intellectualistic trend of his followers. (p. 132) Yu also pointed out that there was not much of an anti-intellectualistic tendency in Lu Hsiang-shan's thought because there was not yet an opposition between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism in Sung dynasty, it was through Ch'en Pai-sha 陳白沙 that anti-intellectualism became a trend in the Ming dynasty. (pp. 102–103) And it was in Yen Yüan of the Ch'ing dynasty that we find the climax of anti-intellectualism. (p. 139) Was Professor Yu contradicting himself? I think he shifted the meaning of the term in his discussion of the problem. When he contrasted the trend of intellectualism of Chu Hsi in the Sung dynasty and anti-intellectualism of the Ming dynasty, he was using the term in a loose sense, but when he discussed the individual cases of Lu and Wang, he was using the term anti-intellectualism in a more restricted sense. There is no denial that there was ambiguity in his discussion of the problem. What I have attempted is to try to remove some of the ambiguities, and I do not think there would be any objections on his part to my present clarification of his position.

35. Yu Ying-shih, “Morality and Knowledge in Chu Hsi's Philosophical System,” in Chan, *Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism*, pp. 228–254.

weakness on the one hand and gathering strength on the other, I probably would be able to prevent myself from falling into one-sidedness.³⁶

When Lu heard about this letter, his comments were as follows:

Chu Yuan-hui 元晦 [Chu Hsi] wanted to get rid of the defects and combine the merits of both sides. But I do not think this is possible. If one does not know anything about honoring the moral nature, how can there be inquiry and study in the first place?³⁷

From the debate we can see that Chu and Lu agreed that moral knowledge takes precedence over sense knowledge but that they differed in the relative importance they assigned to sense knowledge. Chu adopted a gradual approach and believed book learning and natural investigation are conducive to a comprehensive understanding of man and his position in the universe, while Lu believed that only by putting the emphasis on where man is different from animals that he can realize the best potential in his life. Clearly they had given expression to two very different outlooks. But Professor Yu did not detect an anti-intellectualistic tendency in Lu's thought.

Afterwards Chu's thought was established as the orthodoxy during the Yüan dynasty and Lu's influence was practically negligible. However, during the Ming dynasty the trend was reversed, scholars in droves turned away from Chu Hsi's approach as a result of the influence of Wang Yang-ming. Professor Yu seemed to have a rather ambivalent attitude toward Wang Yang-ming. From what he wrote it is not clear whether he meant that there was an anti-intellectualistic tendency in Wang's thought, or whether he only meant that Wang's position could inadvertently lead some of his followers to favour an anti-intellectualistic approach. I suspect that the latter is the case. And I would like to argue that there was no anti-intellectualistic tendency in Wang's own thought, and that it was through a twist of his thought that some of his followers such as those in the Tai-chou 泰州 school pushed his thought to one extreme resulting in an anti-intellectualistic trend which partially accounted for the decline of the Wang school in the early Ch'ing dynasty.

I have argued elsewhere that even though Wang was a great admirer of Lu he never followed Lu's problematic, but instead took Chu Hsi as his point of departure and eventually developed a philosophy of his own. Hence Chu Hsi was really an important source for Wang.³⁸ Wang also put emphasis on book learning. He rejected Chu's rearrangement of the text of *The Great Learning* and tried to revive the old text of the document. He also put a great deal of emphasis on investigation of things, only he believed that apart from the mind there could not be any investigation of things. Besides, he was a great military strategist and proved so successful in the battlefield, it is impossible to make charges against him that he neglected the practical affairs of the world. Owing to the limitation of space it is impossible for me to cite extensively from his writings to support my case. Suffice it to quote just one key passage from his *Instructions for Practical Living* as follows:

36. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 228.

37. Quoted in *ibid.*

38. Shu-hsien Liu, "On Chu Hsi as an Important Source for the Development of the Philosophy of Wang Yang-ming," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, Vol. XI, No. 1 (March, 1984), pp. 83-107.

Innate knowledge [*liang-chih* 良知] does not come from hearing and seeing, and yet all seeing and hearing are functions of innate knowledge. Therefore innate knowledge is not impeded by seeing and hearing. Nor is it separated from seeing and hearing.³⁹

Certainly Wang like Lu accepted the distinction between moral knowledge and sense knowledge and believed that moral knowledge should take precedence over sense knowledge. But he never belittled sense knowledge. In fact there is a dialectical relationship between moral knowledge and sense knowledge. Moral knowledge cannot be established merely through an accumulation of sense knowledge, but once moral knowledge is established, then sense knowledge would serve as function of moral knowledge. In fact Wang's thought was a serious attempt to make a synthesis between Chu's thought and Lu's thought. To conclude, I can find no anti-intellectualistic tendency in Wang, the anti-intellectualistic trend for some of Wang's followers was based on a distortion of Wang's thought. Virtually all schools of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism follow the dictum: "preserving the heavenly principles and eliminating human desires" with the understanding that normal desires are conforming to heavenly principles, only excessive ones are human desires. To take desire to be something of primary importance with a positive value of its own pertains to a paradigm quite different from the one commonly accepted by Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophies. Therefore I maintain that Ch'ing scholars such as Tai Chen should by no means be included in the scope of *hsin-ju-chia* or Neo-Confucianism.⁴⁰

39. Wing-tsit Chan, trans., *Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 150.

40. Only recently I learned that in 1941 Professor Ho Lin 賀麟 published an article: "Ju-chia ssu-hsiang te hsin-k'ai-chan" 儒家思想的新開展 [The New Development of Confucian Thought] in which he used the term *hsin-ju-chia* to refer to contemporary Neo-Confucianism. This was perhaps the first time that the term was used in such a way.

有關宋明儒對於「心」、「性」、「理」的了解之反省

(中文摘要)

劉述先

宋明儒學舊稱爲道學、理學或心學，晚近則流行新儒學(家)一名。我作了一番小小的考證。馮友蘭《中國哲學史》下卷於1934年出版，已經提到所謂新儒家之學，但他主要還是沿用道學一詞。後來卜德(Derk Bodde)把馮著譯爲英文(1953年)，在章節標題上把道學譯爲新儒學，陳榮捷先生也用這個譯名，張君勱先生更採用作書名。以後回流到中國，成爲大家習用的一個名詞。

首先讓我們反省宋明儒對於心的了解。陸王世稱心學，固然重視心，但這決不是說理學的源流就不重視心。事實上朱熹從學於延平，首先學的就是默坐澄心，而延平從學於豫章，求的正是治心之要，而梨洲謂這是明道、龜山傳下來的一條血路。朱熹的思想後來雖然有些變化，但心在他的思想之中始終佔據一樞紐性的地位。對於心的重視共通於理學與心學，這是對於宋明儒思想的一個很具有關鍵性的了解。

其次再反省宋明儒對於性的了解。陸王一系以本心即本性，二者之間乃同一關係。但程朱一系卻接受橫渠對於天地(義理)之性與氣質之性的分疏，認爲他的說法有進於孟子性善的見解。故此如果我們以孟子的思想爲正統的標準，那麼陸王之說顯然更接近於孟子，而朱子以理氣去解析心性乃是一種新的發展。牟宗三先生以朱子是「別子爲宗」的說法是有相當根據的。湖南一系五峯的思想表面上以心性爲二，其實心爲表、性爲裏，實質上更接近明道一本的思想。故朱子早年爲五峯思想所吸引，後來即採取嚴厲批評的態度。牟先生三系的說法，就思想的標準來看是可以成立的，但事實上湖南一系迅即式微，很難構成一個鼎足而立的局面。蕺山思想雖近於五峯，但彼此間無傳承的關係；又蕺山以性爲至善，五峯以性無善惡，在表達的方式上也有根本的差別，難以歸爲一系。

最後反省宋明儒對於理的了解。心學的源流也一樣重視理，只陸王以心即理，朱子則以心具衆理。余英時指出朱子不重視橫渠提出的德性之知與見聞之知的差別，強調格物致知，故有重智的傾向。他認爲宋明儒均不反理性，但王學卻有反智的傾向，對於陽明本人，則有不同的說法。本文則指出，陽明雖劃分良知與見聞，但他明言良知不由見聞而有，而見聞莫非良知之用。故陽明本人決不反智，只有王學末流束書不觀遊談無根，才有反智的表現。