Experience in Metrics and Measurements for N-Version Programming

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Abstract

The N-Version Programming (NVP) approach applies the idea of *design diversity* to obtain fault-tolerant software units, called N-Version Software (NVS) units. The effectiveness of this approach is examined by the *software diversity* achieved in the member versions of an NVS unit. We define and formalize the concept of design diversity and software diversity in this paper. Design diversity is a property naturally applicable to the NVP process to increase its fault-tolerance attributes. The baseline design diversity is characterized by the employment of independent programming teams in the NVP. More design diversity investigations could be enforced in the NVP design process, including different languages, different tools, different algorithms, and different methodologies. Software diversity is the resulting dissimilarities appearing in the NVS member versions. We characterize it from four different points of view that are designated as: structural diversity, fault diversity, tough-spot diversity, and failure diversity. Our goals are to find a way to quantify software diversity and to investigate the measurements which can be applied during the life cycle of NVS to gain confidence that operation will be dependable when NVS is actually employed. The versions from a six-language N-Version Programming project for fault-tolerant flight control software were used in the software diversity measurement.

Keywords: software fault tolerance, design diversity, software diversity, metrics and measurements, software reliability.

1 Introduction

Fault tolerance is a function of computing systems that serves to assure the continued delivery of required services in the presence of faults which cause errors within the system [AL86]. We say that a unit of software (module, CSCI, etc.) is *fault-tolerant* if it can continue delivering the required services, i.e., supply the expected outputs with the expected timeliness, after *dormant* (previously undiscovered, or not removed) imperfections or "bugs", called *software faults*, have become active by producing *errors* in program flow, internal state, or results generated *within* the software unit. When the errors disrupt (alter, halt, or delay) the service expected from the software unit, we say that it has *failed* for the duration of service disruption.

An N-Version Software (NVS) unit is a fault tolerant software unit that depends on a generic *decision algorithm* to determine a *consensus result* from the results delivered by two or more ($N \geq 2$) *member versions* of the NVS unit. The *process* by which the NVS versions are produced is called *N-Version Programming* (NVP) [AC77]. The major objective of an NVP process is to minimize the probability that two or more member versions will produce similar erroneous results that coincide in time for a decision (consensus) action in NVS [Avi85]. This is the concept of *design diversity* [Avi82].

The goal of design diversity is to minimize the chances of "fault leak" among independent design efforts. Furthermore, it is conjectured that the probability of a random, independent occurrence of faults that produce the same erroneous results in two or more versions is less when the versions are more diverse. A second conjecture is that even if related faults are introduced, the diversity of the member versions may cause the erroneous results not to be similar at the NVS decision. In achieving this goal, quality control of the individual software versions, using available software engineering technology and within the allowable time and cost constraints, should also be emphasized for the very simple reason that N failed versions can not produce a good result. The goal of software diversity is to describe the properties of the products of the NVP efforts. The effectiveness of the design diversity should be demonstrated by the achievement of software diversity among the NVS member versions, with respect to the goal of design diversity and the reliability improvement of the NVS unit over its member versions.

The objective of this research is to qualify the idea of design diversity, to formalize the

concept and notion of software diversity which quantifies the efficiency of the design diversity, and to measure the NVS software diversity resulting from an NVP process [LCA92]. The fault-tolerant flight control software developed for the Six-Language Project [ALS88] will be used as a case study.

The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the Six-Language Project. Section 3 defines several dimensions of design diversity which are applicable to NVP, and proposes a qualitative assessment to the resulting design diversity metrics. Section 4 defines and quantifies four characteristics of software diversity. Following that in Section 5, we show the results of applying the four quantitative metrics to the programs produced during the Six-Language Project. Conclusions and future work are pointed out in the Section 6.

2 The Six-Language Project

The study of the software diversity metrics is illustrated by using actual data obtained from an experimental implementation of a real-world automatic (i.e., computerized) airplane landing system, or so-called "autopilot." The software systems of this project were developed and programmed by six programming teams at the University of California, Los Angeles, using six different programming languages. A total of six programming teams (two persons per team for 12 persons) independently designed, coded, and tested the computerized airplane landing system, whose requirement specification was provided by Honeywell Commercial Flight Systems Division.

The application used in the Six-Language Project was part of a specification used by Honeywell for the automatic landing of commercial airliners. The specification could be used to develop the software of a flight control computer (FCC) for a real aircraft, given that it was adjusted to the performance parameters of a specific aircraft. All algorithms and control laws were specified by diagrams which had been certified by the Federal Aviation Administration. The *pitch control* part of the auto-landing problem, i.e., the control of the vertical motion of the aircraft, was selected for the project in order to fit the 14-week software development time. The major system functions of the pitch control and its data flow are shown in Figure 1 .

Simulated flights began with the initialization of the system in the Altitude Hold mode, at a point approximately ten miles from the airport. Initial altitude was about 1500 feet, initial



Figure 1: Block diagram of the Flight Control Computer

speed 120 knots (200 feet per second). Pitch modes entered by the autopilot during the landing process, were: Altitude Hold, Glide Slope Capture, Glide Slope Track, Flare, and Touchdown.

The Complementary Filters preprocessed the raw data from the aircraft's sensors. The Barometric Altitude Complementary Filter (BACF) and Radio Altitude Complementary Filter (RACF) provided estimates of true altitude from various altitude-related signals, where the former provided the altitude reference for the Altitude Hold mode, and the latter provided the altitude reference for the Flare mode. The Glide Slope Deviation Complementary Filter (GSCF) provided estimates for beam error and radio altitude in the Glide Slope Capture and Track modes. Mode entry and exit was determined by the Mode Logic equations, which used filtered airplane sensor data to switch the controlling equations at the correct point in the trajectory.

Each Control Law consisted of two parts, the Outer Loop and the Inner Loop, where the Inner Loop was common to all three Control Laws. The Altitude Hold Control Law (AH) was responsible for maintaining the reference altitude, by responding to turbulence-induced errors in attitude and altitude with automatic vertical motion control. As soon as the edge of the glide slope beam was reached, the autopilot entered the Glide Slope Capture and Track (GS) mode

and began a pitching motion to acquire and hold the beam center. A short time after capture, the track mode was engaged to reduce any static displacement towards zero. Flare logic equations determined the precise altitude (about 50 feet) at which the Flare mode was entered. In response to the Flare control law, the vehicle was forced along a path which targeted a vertical speed of two feet per second at touchdown.

Each program checked its final result (the vertical control command) against the results of the other programs. Any disagreement was indicated by the Command Monitor output. The Display continuously showed information about the FCC on various panels, including the current pitch mode, the results of the Commend Monitors, and other sixteen flight-related signals.

3 Design Diversity Metrics

"Design diversity" is an attempt to eliminate the commonalities between the separate programming efforts in NVP, as they have the potential to cause related faults among the resulting NVS.

3.1 Random Diversity vs. Enforced Diversity

Different dimensions of diversity can be applied to the building of NVS systems. Design diversity could be achieved either by randomness or by enforcement. The *random diversity*, such as that provided by independent personnel, leaves the dissimilarity to be generated according to individual's training background and thinking process. The diversity is achieved somewhat in an uncontrolled manner by this way. The *enforced diversity*, on the other hand, investigates different aspects in several dimensions, and deliberately requires them to be implemented into different program versions. The purpose of such *required diversity* is to minimize the opportunities for common causes of software faults in two or more versions (e.g., compiler bugs, ambiguous algorithm statements, etc.), and to increase the probabilities of significantly diverse approaches to member version implementation.

3.2 A Qualitative Design Diversity Metric

There are four phases in which design diversity could be applied: the specification phase, the design phase, the coding phase, and the testing phase. Applicable dimensions of diversity include

different implementors, different languages, different algorithms, and different software development methodologies (including phase-by-phase software engineering, prototyping, computer-aided software engineering, or even the "clean room" approach [Dye88]).

A qualitative design diversity metric is proposed in Table 1. This assessment of diversity is an initial effort based on the experiences gained from previous NVP experiments and implementations [CA78, AK84, KA83, GV79, BEB+86, ABHM85, Tra88].

	implementors	languages	tools	algorithms	methodologies
specification	higher	higher	lower–	higher+	lower
design	higher+	lower	lower	higher+	higher
coding	higher+	higher+	lower	higher	higher
testing	lower	lower–	higher	lower	higher

Table 1: A Qualitative Design Diversity Metric.

This table suggests that in the specification phase, using different implementors, languages or algorithms might achieve higher diversity than applying other dimensions. In the design phase, using different implementors, different algorithms, or different methodologies tends to be more helpful. All dimensions except tools are considered effective in the coding phase. Finally, investigation of different tools or methodologies might be more favorable in the testing phase. Moreover, to compare rows and columns in Table 1, extra granularity is provided by using "+" (indicating "further" for "higher") and "–" (indicating "further" for "lower") signs. For example, diversity by using different implementors in testing (marked "lower") is considered lower than using them in the previous three phases, but that could still be higher than using different languages in testing phase, which is marked "lower–".

3.3 Cost-Effectiveness Evaluations

Since adding more diversity implies adding more resources, it is important to evaluate cost-effectiveness of the added diversity along each dimension. It is hypothesized that the main cost of NVP is dominated by the employment of extra implementors. Cost of adding other diversity dimensions should not be significant, especially when the resources in these dimensions

are abundant (e.g., languages, tools). If this hypothesis is valid, we can estimate that the development cost for NVP, comparing with that for single version software, would be:

1. In *requirement specification* phase: *5-10% higher*. The extra effort is needed to specify the NVS fault-tolerant architecture.

2. In *design and coding* phase: *slightly less than N times higher*. Employment of the multiple design (programming) team sharply increases the cost in this phase. However, the increase will be less than its N-fold since the designers (programmers) can share the design and programming environment.

3. In *testing* phase: *10%-20% higher*. Since test cases could be designed once and used in the multiple versions, the extra cost will mainly be the machine execution time. Besides, the existence of multiple program versions will help to determine program correctness more quickly and effectively.

In the Six-Language Project, applying different programming languages was considered as a cost-effective investigation in enforcing design diversity. Six programming languages of various programming style were chosen, consisting two widely used conventional procedural languages (C and Pascal), two object-oriented programming languages (Ada and Modula-2), one logic programming language (Prolog), and one functional programming language (T, a variant of Lisp). The extra cost of using multiple programming languages was almost nothing (except for the purchase of an Ada compiler), due the the availability of tools (compiler, debugger) and experienced programmers. It was postulated that different programming languages would force people to think differently about the program design and implementation, and to use different tools in their programming and testing activities, which could lead to significant diversity in the software development efforts.

4 Software Diversity Metrics

"Software diversity" is an attempt to describe the properties of the products of the NVP efforts, with regards to the goal of design diversity and the improvement of the qualities of the member versions. The distinction between design diverity and software diversity could be viewed as the distinction between an investigation and its return: Design diversity is the investigation on the

methods associated with NVP, while software diversity is the return of the investigation as shown by the diversity attributes on the resulting products. In this respect, software diversity can be specified in terms of four characteristics:

1. the structural differences among the software versions;
2. the differences between the faults found among the software versions;
3. the differences in fault-proneness among the elements of the software versions;
4. the differences in the failure behaviors among the software versions.

We will adopt the following naming scheme for the four characteristics of software diversity:

software diversity has the following aspects:

1. **structural diversity**;
2. **fault diversity**;
3. **tough-spot diversity**;
4. **failure diversity**.

4.1 Structural Diversity

Software is invisible and unvisualizable in that as soon as we attempt to depict software structure, we find it constitutes not one, but several general directed graphs superimposed one upon another [FPB87]. Therefore, to analyze the structural differences, we would like to look at the NVS from several dimensions, perhaps further determined by the specific application. Also, there have been efforts to measure the program complexity and thereby to predict the inherent fault density. All previous efforts were done with a single version of software in mind, gathering their statistics from many programs, with most of them having different specifications [CFS81, CDS86].

While one study [STUO81, MIO87] has shown that these complexity measures provide little improvement over just program size alone in predicting inherent faults remaining at the start of system test, another study [DL88] shows that the faults found during the maintenance phase are better predicted using measures other than program size. The metric measurements were usually applied at the level of separately compilable subprograms called modules, with each

module supporting one or more system functions [CDS86]. Comparison at the level of the whole application has seldom been done in the traditional software engineering activities. The common practice is to collect the statistics from many programs which have possibly related (maybe similar, but not the same) applications in mind. It is therefore quite interesting to measure and compare the metrics at the same application level.

For NVS, we postulate that it is possible to look at and compare the individual versions of software at the subprogram (or source file) level as well as at the whole application level. We shall only try to explore some of the complexity metrics commonly seen in the literature. These basic metrics are:

- Deliverable source lines (DSL)
- Noncommentary source lines (NCSL)
- Halstead's Software Science [Hal77]
  - Number of unique operators (η_1)
  - Number of unique operands (η_2)
  - Number of total operators (N_1)
  - Number of total operands (N_2)
- Decision count DE [CDS86]
  - The total number of decisions (branches) in a program
- McCabe's cyclomatic complexity V(G) [McC76]
  - Defined as V(G) = e - n + 2, where for a control flow graph of a program G, e is its number of edges, n is its number of nodes.

The term "structural diversity" refers to some metrics used to compare program versions. In fact, they include both *structural metrics* and *size metrics* in the terminology of software metrics community.

4.2 Fault Diversity

The purpose of *fault diversity* is to demonstrate the differences between the faults introduced by the programming teams in an NVP process. For a certain set of programming teams and a given interval of the development cycle, we record and compare the faults found to determine how many kinds of faults and how many faults are detected for the set.

Def. *fault diversity* $(D_{fault}) = \frac{Number\ of\ distinct\ faults\ found}{Total\ number\ of\ faults\ found} = \frac{\eta_{fault}}{N_{fault}}$
(for an interval ΔT of the NVS development cycle)

The η_{fault} and N_{fault} in the above definition are similar to the ideas of η_1, η_2, N_1, and N_2 in Halstead's software science. For example, the ratio N_2/η_2 represents the average number of times operands are used. In a program where each operand is used only once, this ratio is 1. Similarly, in a group of NVS where all the faults found are different, the fault diversity is also a 1, its maximum. For the special case where no single fault is found in the set, the fault diversity is defined to be equal to 1.

Different criterion for deciding if two (or more) faults are distinct can be chosen based on which level we would like to observe the faults. It is possible to measure the fault diversity at the individual system function level of the specification and at the application level of the NVS. Furthermore, it might be interesting to observe the change of the fault diversity of the NVS as the life cycle progresses, i.e., ΔT increases.

4.3 Tough-Spot Diversity

In a large complex software project, the programmers often have difficulty with regard to certain parts of the specification. Also, it has long been agreed upon that human beings have certain blind spots when building programs [Wei71]. Egoless programming was advocated as a partial solution to this problem.

A simple, though certainly not exhaustive, indication of the difficulties can be the percentage obtained by dividing the number of faults found in the different parts of the program by the number of faults in the entire program. Moreover, the size of the various parts of the application should be taken into account when calculating the total number of faults found. One part of the application which requires a large size of code is likely to contain more faults than the one for

which a smaller size will be enough.

For NVS, a simple analysis based only on the percentage counts makes sense since we are treating each part of the application as an abstract entity and are interested in the diversity of the fault distributions among the different teams. We are curious to see what will happen when there are many teams working independently to build NVS using the same specification. If some amount of diversity of this phenomenon can be observed, it is certainly one more argument for using NVP to tolerate software design faults. Therefore, we define the "tough spots" as representing the particular system functions in a specification where a programming team has more trouble in building their software according to the specification.

There have been reports in the literature about the phenomenon of locality of faults in sections of a program [Mye79, YSD88]. What the locality implies is that the probability of the existence of more faults in a section of a program is likely to be high for the section where noticeable number of faults have already been found. It is interesting to investigate this phenomenon and its implications in the context of NVS. Also, tough-spot diversity is a more hierarchical view than fault diversity and can be observed as the life cycle progresses.

4.4 Failure Diversity

When we discuss the failures of a software unit, there is always a reference to a given set Σ of input cases. Such is also the case when we define *failure diversity*, which shows the diversity in failure behaviors of a certain combination of versions. Due to diversity, failures in the components of NVS do not necessarily lead to failures of the NVS.

Def. $failure\ diversity\ (D_{failure}) = \frac{Number\ of\ distinct\ failures\ found}{Total\ number\ of\ failures\ found} = \frac{\eta_{failure}}{N_{failure}}|_{\Sigma}$
(This definition applies with respect to the set Σ of input cases.)

In the following discussion, we will simply use D, η, and N instead of $D_{failure}$, $\eta_{failure}$, and $N_{failure}$ for the purpose of conciseness.

Def. Δ = extra number of identical references for a bad version to reach majority
e.g., for three-version software (m = 3), $\Delta = 1$; for m = 5, $\Delta = 2$; in other words Δ = majority - 1, assuming m is odd, $\Delta = \frac{m-1}{2}$.

Now let F_{NVS} denote the probability of failure of the NVS system. It can be shown that

$$F_{NVS} \leq \frac{(1-D)}{\Delta} \times \frac{N}{|runs|} \tag{1}$$

(Note: "=" happens when every occurrence of multiple failures is just enough to nullify the functioning of the NVS system, i.e., the number = $\Delta + 1$)

From the above equation, it could be seen that the probability of failure of the NVS system is related to the failure diversity, the reliabilities of the individual versions, and the number of versions employed.

We can further show that, if m is the number of versions employed in the NVS system and is an odd number, then

$$\frac{1}{m} \leq D \leq 1 \tag{2}$$

The above equation also applies to D_{fault}, the fault diversity.

Now let $m = 2\Delta + 1$, where m is defined as above, and if f_i, $1 \leq i \leq m$, represents the probability of failure of the ith version, then we have the following relationship:

$$0 \leq F_{NVS} \leq \frac{2}{m} \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{m} f_i \tag{3}$$

An intuitive explanation for this phenomenon: in order to beat the NVS system's capabilities of fault tolerance, every failure must occur in over half the number of versions. This means that when the individual probabilities of failures are summed up to determine the total system probability of failure, we have actually overestimated by half the number of versions, i.e., a factor of approximately at most $\frac{1}{\frac{m}{2}}$ for the compensation. There is a smoothing effect involved in NVS operation.

A still more accurate upper bound for F_{NVS} can be found:

$$F_{NVS} \leq \min(\frac{1-D}{\Delta}, D) \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{m} f_i \tag{4}$$

Details on the proof of Equations (1) – (4) could be found in [LCA92].

Finally, let R (risk) be the multiplication factor $\min(\frac{1-D}{\Delta}, D)$. Then a curve can be drawn of R vs. D (from $\frac{1}{m}$ to 1) for an m-version system in Figure 2.



Figure 2: Relationship between Risk and Failure Diversity.

From the curve, it is clear that for diversity greater than $\frac{m+1}{2m}$, the multiplication factor, i.e., the R value, will always be lower than the R value of a multiple-hardware-channel system running the same software, which has a D value of $\frac{1}{m}$. This leads to the following definition:
Def. An NVS system with D (failure diversity) greater than $\frac{m+1}{2m}$ is called *diversity-acceptable*. An NVS system with D not greater than $\frac{m+1}{2m}$ is *diversity-unacceptable*.

Note that the definition of *diversity-acceptable* and *diversity-unacceptable* is only based on the multiplication factor in Equation (4), i.e., the $\min(\frac{1-D}{\Delta}, D)$ in $F_{NVS} \leq \min(\frac{1-D}{\Delta}, D) \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{m} f_i$. It would be interesting to take into account the individual failure probabilities as well as the failure diversity of the NVS system.

Suppose that $f_{min} = \min(f_i, i = 1, \ldots, m)$. We want to consider the following two NVS systems:

- **NVS1**: using m identical versions with probability of failure f_{min};
- **NVS2**: using m different versions with probabilities of failure $f_i, i = 1, \ldots, m$ (assume it is *diversity-acceptable*).

Clearly, then
$F_{NVS1} = \frac{1}{m} \cdot m f_{min}$

$F_{NVS2} = \frac{1-D}{\Delta} \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{m} f_i$, in the worst case $= \frac{1-D}{\frac{m-1}{2}} \cdot m f_{avg}$, where f_{avg} is the average probability of failure.

Now, for $F_{NVS2} \leq F_{NVS1}$

$\Rightarrow \frac{1-D}{\frac{m-1}{2}} \cdot m f_{avg} \leq \frac{1}{m} \cdot m f_{min} \Rightarrow 1 - D \leq \frac{m-1}{2m} \frac{f_{min}}{f_{avg}}$

$\Rightarrow D \geq 1 - \frac{m-1}{2m}\beta$, where $f_{min} = \beta f_{avg}, 0 \leq \beta \leq 1$

For the special case when $\beta = 1 \Rightarrow D \geq 1 - \frac{m-1}{2m} = \frac{m+1}{2m}$.

Let us consider the curve of R vs. D in Figure 3, with the the added broken line representing the diversity threshold when β equals 1, i.e., when every version has the same probability of failure.



Figure 3: Relationship between Risk and Failure Diversity. (Revised)

It should be clear that for β equals 1, $\frac{m+1}{2m}$ is the diversity threshold beyond which the NVS system consisting of m different versions of software pays off, but as β decreases, the threshold moves to the right. In particular, when β equals 0, the NVS system of m different software needs a diversity of 1 to be competitive. Putting aside the fact that NVS enables us to detect disagreement between versions during the operation, what this implies is that in configuring an NVS system, we should make the best effort to choose the versions with the maximum failure diversity and with as low and as compatible failure probabilities as possible.

5 Software Diversity Measurements

5.1 Results of Fault Diversity

During the phases of the Six-Language Project, two pairs of common faults were found: one in the unit test phase and the other in the operation test phase. A total of 93 faults have been found so far, making the fault diversity of the six programs equal to 91/93.

The two pairs of identical faults involved four teams. It is interesting to note that both the supposed causes of the common faults were due to the specification. Unfortunately, since only two kinds of identical faults were found, we think that the information is not sufficient for further analysis of the relationships between fault diversity and other metrics of interest.

5.2 Results of Structural Diversity

By tailoring some metrics analyzers [CN86], special tools were written for semi-automatically measuring the basic program metrics for the six different programming languages used in the Project. This has the desirable effect that the same counting rules are applied consistently across the six programs.

To obtain the metrics at the application level, the metrics of each program's source files are added to get the application metrics. The application metrics together with the total number of faults found (d_{total}) for each program are presented in Table 2.

Notice that except for the Prolog team, the η_1 counts among the other five programs are quite close to each other. Such is not the case for η_2 counts. Figure 4 is a plot of the total number of faults found after the end of all phases (d_{total}) against the number of unique operands (η_2) for each program. The linear regression line and the correlation coefficient (r) are also shown.

It is quite interesting to observe that even for a few data points, there is still a strong linear relationship between these two metrics. If further demonstrated by other research, this aspect of structural diversity can help us identify fault-prone programs in an NVS life cycle. It could also serve as a predictor for the quality of the acquired software versions.

Metric \ Team	Ada	C	Modula	Pascal	Prolog	T	Max/Min
DSL	2256	1531	1562	2331	2228	1568	1.52
NCSL	1248	936	1069	1220	1398	1230	1.49
η_1	225	259	227	200	305	212	1.53
η_2	599	839	593	687	1294	855	2.18
N_1	3126	2722	2425	2402	3264	2111	1.55
N_2	2178	1976	1873	2047	3180	2586	1.70
DE	107	127	81	123	88	112	1.57
V(G)	150	161	121	160	181	168	1.50
d_{total}	6	18	4	12	29	23	7.25

Table 2: Comparisons of Structural Metrics at the Application Level.

The relationships between other metrics and d_{total}, including DSL, NCSL, η $(\eta_1 + \eta_2)$, DE, and V(G), are examined in Figure 5 to Figure 9.



Figure 4: d_{total} vs. η_2 at the Application Level.



Figure 5: d_{total} vs. DSL at the Application Level.



Figure 6: d_{total} vs. $NCSL$ at the Application Level.



Figure 7: d_{total} vs. η at the Application Level.



Figure 8: d_{total} vs. DE at the Application Level.



Figure 9: d_{total} vs. $V(G)$ at the Application Level.

It should be clear that both η and V(G) have strong correlations with d_{total} (The hypothesis that η or V(G) is associated with d_{total} is accepted with a confidence level greater than 0.99).

NCSL is the third, while DE and DSL perform poorly. We also define a composite metric [CDS86] C based on η_2 and V(G): $C = \rho\eta_2 + (1-\rho)$ V(G), by varying the ρ between 0 and 1, to see if this weighted metric can perform even better. Figure 10 shows a plot of the correlation coefficients between C and d_{total} when ρ is varied.



Figure 10: Correlation Coefficient vs. Variation of ρ.

It can be seen that the correlation coefficient of C reaches its maximum when ρ is around 0.1, with an excellent r value. This combination which takes into account both the η_2 size count and V(G) logic structure complexity might be a better predictor for d_{total} for similar kinds of applications, regardless of the programming languages being used.

By going into the the source file level for each program, we can obtain similar pairs of d_{total} vs. the metrics of interest for every source file. In particular, we tried η_2, η, V(G), and NCSL. Table 3 summarizes, for each metric category and for each program, the correlation coefficients (r) with those of the application level in the last column for comparisons. The results show that the metrics measured at the source file level are not as impressive as those obtained at the application level. This implies the traditional approach of using source-file-level metrics (due to the lack of multiple occurrences of *exact* applications) to establish a predictive model for faulty

density could be misleading, and as a result, inconclusive.

r	Ada	C	Modula	Pascal	Prolog	T	Max/Min	Appl.
η_2	0.436	0.359	0.753	0.667	0.357	0.144	5.24	0.925
η	0.419	0.382	0.745	0.619	0.455	0.219	3.40	0.902
V(G)	0.159	0.113	0.644	0.299	0.579	0.032	20.28	0.890
NCSL	0.282	0.308	0.669	0.495	0.571	0.380	2.38	0.408
Max(r)	η_2	η	η_2	η_2	V(G)	NCSL		η_2

Table 3: Summary of r for Each Metric Category at the Source File Level.

A complexity metric describes *what it is, not what it has to be.* An interesting implication of the correlations between the number of faults and structural metrics of either source files or application programs is that the structural diversity of the different levels of redundancies present in the NVS can be taken advantage of in the life cycle to concentrate our testing resources and therefore to increase the reliabilities of the corresponding parts.

In case the diversity impact of different programming languages is not clearly seen in the structure diversity measure, the effect of programming language could be better revealed in the following two software diversity measures.

5.3 Results of Tough-Spot Diversity

Let us first examine the total faults found after all the phases. Figure 11 shows six histograms which plot the percentage of faults against all the system functions (from Main to Interface) for each team.

The Ada and Modula teams' histograms are flat because in each case, there is only one fault found in the corresponding system function. It is not clear whether to call them the tough spots or not.



Figure 11: Histograms of the Percentage Distribution of Faults among the System Functions.

System Function	Ada	C	Modula	Pascal	Prolog	T
Main	○				●	●
BACF	○		○			
RACF						
GSCF	○		○	●	●	
Mode Logic	○	●	○			
AH Outer						
GS Outer						
Flare Outer	○					
Inner Loop	○	●		●		●
Command Monitor						
Display			○	●		

Table 4: Tough Spot Distributions of Each Team.

Table 4 summarizes the top two tough spots for each team. Whenever there is a tie for the top two all the ties are listed. The interface is not considered here. Please note that the existence of the tough spot for a team is marked by a bullet (●) in the corresponding system function. For the cases where we are not sure of the existence of a tough spot, a circle (○) is presented.

It should be clear that *tough-spot diversity* also exists among the programming teams. If we summarize the top two tough spots for each team and for all six teams together before the operation test, the same results as in Table 4 are obtained (except for the Modula team) and the top two tough spots for all six teams occur in the Main, GSCF, and Inner Loop system functions. It is interesting to note that the identical fault committed by two teams (T and Prolog) and the faults found in the C team by flight simulations during the operation test all resided in Inner Loop, which is the most common tough spot for this particular project. We postulate that the distributions of tough spots for each team and for all the teams together can guide us in allocating appropriate resources in the testing process and in the configuration of NVS system.

It is postulated that there are at least three reasons which contribute to the tough-spot diversity among the programming teams:

- differences of their difficulties in grasping the concept of the application at the specification level;
- differences in their designs at the system function level (may rush forward with their first idea without giving further thoughts to other options [Ben86]);
- differences in their implementations at the file organization level (may choose different mappings between a system function and the source files).

An intuitive hypothesis that can be made about the effect of tough-spot diversity on the failure diversity is that a larger failure diversity might be expected using the program versions which, together, have higher tough-spot diversity. The reason is that if two software versions have faults left after all the testing and during the NVS operation, but the faults reside in the different system functions of the application, the chances of these two software versions both failing on the same input case with identical results should be very rare. Even if the faults reside in the same system function, different faults are more likely to cause the system to fail in a different way.

5.4 Results of Failure Diversity

Failure diversity metric is an intuitive measure of the degree by which different combinations of software versions may fail differently. After the acceptance test, many simulations matching the actual flight profile were executed during the operation test. A failure is declared if any of the intermediate or output variables deviate from those of the gold version beyond the threshold. No failures were found for the Ada, Modula, and Pascal versions. However, failures were identified for the other three versions during simulation. It was found that the Prolog and T versions had an identical fault which caused the two programs to fail identically, not counting the numerical differences introduced by the programming languages.

Identical failure is defined as two (or more) versions failing at the same time in the airplane flight path for the same input case. This is a loose criterion since the ability of NVS to mask and recover from the effects caused by faults is neglected.

In the Appendix we have established a criterion for deciding if the failure diversity for a certain NVS configuration is acceptable or not. Being acceptable means that the probability

of failure of the NVS will be lower than the average probability of failure of the N versions of software.

Among the $C(6,3) = 20$ possible 3-version configurations, ten have either no failures or D (failure diversity) = 1. Among the other ten configurations, there are three equivalence classes with different D, as shown in Table 5 using the 1000 flight simulations performed so far after the acceptance test (with abbreviations A for Ada, C for C, M for Modula-2, Pa for Pascal, Pr for Prolog, T for T, and N.C. for Number of Configurations). Typically, each flight simulation takes more than 250 seconds of simulation time, with one execution through the flight control laws every 0.05 second. Thus, each successful flight requires more than 5000 executions.

Equivalence Class	D	N.C.
Pr + T + (A, M, or Pa)	0.5	3
C + (Pr or T) + (A, M, or Pa)	0.972	6
C + Pr + T	0.629	1

Table 5: 3-version Configurations with Prob. of Failure > 0.

There are $C(6,5) = 6$ possible 5-version configurations in Table 6.

Configuration	D
A + C + M + Pa + Pr	0.972
A + C + M + Pa + T	0.972
* A + C + M + Pr + T	0.629
* A + C + Pa + Pr + T	0.629
A + M + Pa + Pr + T	0.5
* C + M + Pa + Pr + T	0.629

Table 6: 5-version Configurations.

Of the possible twenty 3-version configurations, there are four configurations with unacceptable diversity and probabilities of failure greater than zero. Of the six 5-version configurations, three configurations (marked with a "*") have a positive probability of failure, due to thirty iden-

tical failures found so far for the C, Prolog, and T programs. Each of these three configurations has acceptable diversity, with diversity equal to 0.629.

It is interesting to point out that among the thirty identical failures of the C, Prolog, and T programs, twenty-nine occur before 7 seconds of flight time have elapsed. One identical failure occurs at 43.30 seconds. This might suggest that for this kind of history-sensitive application which requires mainly real number computations, it is more likely that different faults will cause the versions to fail at the same time **early** in the simulation rather than **late**. Moreover, although there are thirty cases of C, T, and Prolog failing at the same time, we have not found any cases where they fail on identically the same combination of variables.

6 Conclusions

Design diversity and software diversity are multi-dimensional concepts. Our goals in the investigations of these concepts have been to study them in the Six-Language NVS products resulting from a well-defined NVP software process [AC77, Lyu88, Avi89]. We first propose a design diversity metric with qualitative assessments. Thereafter, we concentrate on the definitions and measurements for quantities of software diversity which are the result of design diversity. Our two major concerns, besides the assessment of the NVP process and its resulting product, are the intra-relationships of software diversity and the relationships between software diversity and other software attributes which can facilitate the building of NVS and increase the reliability of the final product.

Fault diversity of the six programs (91/93) is close to its maximum. No instance where a common fault occurred in more than two versions was found. While the structural diversity of the programs does not bear significant relationships with the other software diversity metrics, strong correlations between some structural metrics (η_2, $V(G)$, and $C = \rho \cdot \eta_2 + (1 - \rho)V(G)$) and the number of defects found in the software at the application level have been observed. As explained before, both the failure diversity and the reliabilities of the component versions can affect the reliability of NVS. What structural diversity can provide is to indicate the potential fault ridden software component to us so that appropriate resources can be given in the NVS life cycle to improve the reliabilities of the component versions. Incidentally, the three versions which failed in the flight simulations after the acceptance test have the highest values of the

three structural metrics η_2, $V(G)$, and $C = \rho \cdot \eta_2 + (1 - \rho)V(G)$.

A fair degree of tough-spot diversity also exists among the six programs. Several reasons for tough-spot diversity were suggested. The faults which caused the three versions to fail in the flight simulations all resided in the Inner Loop system function, the most common tough spot among the six programs. While structural diversity has the potential to help improve the reliability of the application, tough-spot diversity might indicate possible spots (system functions) inside the application where improvements can be very beneficial.

The interplay between tough-spot (in)diversity and failure diversity was observed during the flight simulations where the tough-spot (in)diversity contributed to the failures of three versions at the same simulation time. From the data, it was suggested that for this application, the coincidental failures tend to happen more often in the early phase. The implication for the recovery mechanisms is that it might be more effective to spend resources in recovery in the early phase since coincidental failures caused by different faults may be the triggers.

Besides the reliabilities of the component versions, the failure diversity of the NVS is the final determining factor of the dependability of NVS. Just as in the traditional software engineering activities where we observe the growth of software reliabilities through fault removal, failure diversity of NVS will also change through time, though not necessarily growing. Study needs to be done on this aspect of diversity change through time, and its impact on the NVS reliability growth.

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