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FACE SAVING IN CHINESE CULTURE: A DISCUSSION
AND EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF HONG KONG STUDENTS

By

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Abstract

This report begins with an overview of Chinese and Western discussions of the concept of face, focussing on face-saving and the functions it serves in social interaction. Based upon this introduction an experiment is proposed and then described. The experiment explored whether judges would modify their criticism of a fellow student's speech when the speaker's face was vulnerable to varying degrees. One hundred male and female subjects were convened in same-sex groups of five, with one member randomly selected as speaker. Evaluations of the speech were made under four conditions by the four remaining subjects: when evaluations would not be seen by the speaker, when evaluations would be read by the speaker in private, when evaluations would be read by the judge to the speaker in private, when evaluations would be read by the judge to the speaker in front of an audience. Both rating scales and unstructured comments were scored as dependent variables. On both measures of criticism differences were found across conditions for the average level of criticism per response. An analysis of these differences showed the speaker-uninformed condition as yielding responses of higher criticism than the informed-audience condition. The construct of empathy was proposed to explain the linear pattern of results across the four conditions.

Face Saving In Chinese Culture: A Discussion And
Experimental Study Of Hong Kong Students

人要臉，樹要皮 - "A man needs face like a tree needs

its bark." There are many such expressions about face in Chinese folk wisdom which underscore its importance in the subjective culture (Triandis, 1972) of the Chinese. In a seminal paper, Hu (1944) collected many of these sayings, grouping them into one of two categories. According to her analysis there are two basic categories of face in Chinese culture, lien and mien-tzu. Mien-tzu "stands for the kind of prestige that is emphasized in this country (America): a reputation achieved through getting on in life, through success and ostentation." (p. 45). Lien, on the other hand, "represents the confidence of society in the integrity of ego's moral character, the loss of which makes it impossible for him to function properly within the community." (p. 45). This linguistic difference reflects the difference in the conditions under which the two types of face are gained and lost.

In a recent article King and Myers (1977) have argued that the mien-tzu of Hu's (1944) paper corresponds to social/positional face, obtaining of which requires visible success in meeting well-established social-guidelines. As such, mien-tzu can only be won or lost when an audience exists to bestow or deny one face. Hu's lien, however, is a moral face whose dictates are typically internalized. As such, lien can be lost and a sense of guilt produced in the absence of an audience to witness the transgression.

Mien-tzu and lien thus differ in the conditions necessary for their loss, the former requiring an audience, the latter not.

Western analyses of face do not distinguish between these two aspects of face, although the distinction can be easily accommodated. The classic discussion in Western social science is that of Goffman (1955). He defined the term "face" as "the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact" (p. 213). Goffman argues that in any social contact each person communicates his view of the situation, of the other participants, and most importantly, of himself through his verbal and non-verbal acts. This line a person communicates about himself is the face he claims in this particular interaction.

Contacts flow smoothly as long as everybody's claim to face is supported by the events that occur during the contact. As Goffman (1955) puts it, "A person may be said to 'have', or 'be in', or 'maintain' face when the line he effectively takes presents an image of him that is internally consistent, that is supported by judgments and evidence conveyed by other participants, and that is confirmed by evidence conveyed through impersonal agencies in the situation." (p. 214). Sometimes however, events or people conspire to invalidate a person's claim to face. The interaction then breaks down, as all parties to the contact become uncomfortable, flustered, and nervous. The person whose face has been lost will, in addition, feel ashamed and embarrassed. At this point the terms

of the interaction need to be reconstructed before the contact can again proceed smoothly (Goffman, 1956).

Using Goffman's (1955) analysis, a number of recent studies have explored the state of embarrassment and its effects on the subsequent behavior of the embarrassed person (Apsler, 1975; Berk, 1977; Brown, 1968, 1970; Brown and Garland, 1971; Garland and Brown, 1972; Modigliani, 1971). The standard technique for producing embarrassment experimentally involves putting the subject into a position where he loses face. So, for example, Apsler (1975) induced people to perform foolish tasks in front of an audience, thus making their implicit claim to face as mature and sophisticated undergraduates untenable. Under these and other threats to face, embarrassed people engage in a wide variety of behaviors in order to restore face.

The experimental work on face in the West has not been concerned with an actor's lien, as it is difficult and often unethical to manipulate this aspect of a person's self-concept. Rather, the experimental work has dealt with an actor's mien-tzu by bringing into doubt his implicit claim to such amoral features of a person's social/positional performance as his poise, his competence, or his maturity.

The question of face-saving also remains relatively unexplored. There have been no experiments exploring when actors behave to prevent damage to another's face from occurring. The study reported in this paper is a first step towards filling this gap.

Since a loss of face creates embarrassment and disrupts the smooth flow of the interaction, it is in the interests of all parties to avoid such an episode. In addition, Goffman (1956) has argued that, "Since the individual dislikes to feel or appear embarrassed, tactful persons will avoid placing him in this position." (p. 268). In effect the individual who causes another to lose face, may himself lose face if the situation did not justify his compromising the other person. Having inappropriately embarrassed someone, he can no longer support an identity as a kind or considerate person. Finally, Ho (1972) has observed that causing another to lose face is typically construed as an aggressive act by the person whose face has been discredited. So, to avoid conflict it is prudent to sidestep any behavior which could lead to another's loss of face. From many points of view, then, a reciprocal conspiracy of face-saving is a mutually beneficial regulator in social interaction.

Protecting another from losing face is an act of consideration, occasionally with some cost to the actor. In some cases one must put loyalty to the vulnerable person ahead of one's view of truth or correctness. In a public setting one runs the risk of being regarded as "uncritical" or "unobjective", in effect suffering a loss to one's own face.

One positive result for the actor, however, is a sense of grateful obligation on the part of the recipient. As one Chinese expression puts the matter, 山水有相逢. Loosely translated

the proverb warns that, "At different times and in different places, we will meet again." The implication of the remark, of course, is that we should therefore take care to assist one another for we ourselves may later be vulnerable.

In what kinds of society should one expect to see a greater emphasis on face-saving? As the above proverb suggests being known to one another rather than being anonymous will increase the incidence of prosocial behavior. Considerable experimental evidence indicates this to be the case (e.g., Bond and Dutton, 1975). Any society whose membership is geographically stable and whose numbers are relatively small should therefore have a stronger ideology about face-saving, as anonymity will be unusual in such a society.

In addition, the act of saving another's face promotes cohesiveness among group members who help one another in this way. This is particularly true when outsiders are present to witness the potential loss of face. A high value should then be placed on face-saving behavior in any society where members achieve identity more through group participation than through individual activities. Face-saving protects group integrity and will therefore be a valued behavior.

It is not surprising therefore that we have an elaborated social wisdom about face-saving in static societies focussed around group life but much less emphasis on face-saving in mobile societies focussed on individuals. This is not to

assert, as have Agassi and Jarvie (1969), that matters of face are pre-eminently an Oriental, rather than a Western concern. The authors agree with Ho (1975) that an understanding of face is of universal importance in conceptualizing human behavior. As Ho has written, "Anyone who does not wish to declare his social bankruptcy must show a regard for face: He must claim for himself, and must extend to others, some degree of compliance, respect, and deference in order to maintain a minimum level of effective social functioning. While it is true that the conceptualization of what constitutes face and the rules governing face behavior vary considerably across cultures, the concern for face is invariant." (pp. 26-27).

It is clear from the preceding argument about saving face why everyone must be careful when criticizing others. Regardless of how strongly the demands of the situation legitimize such criticism, there is always the risk of causing the other to lose face. For, criticism involves comparing a person's performance against certain standards and finding the performance deficient. Should the person being criticized regard adequate performance in this area as a part of his identity, his face thereby becomes threatened.

Here we can see the judge's dilemma of whether he should serve truth or serve the performer in making his evaluations. Obviously, people must develop some sophistication in judging when and how to criticize the performance of others and yet still protect the face of those being criticized. The aim of the present

experiment is to use conventional wisdom about face to suggest testable hypotheses about when criticism of others is avoided on the one hand or disinhibited on the other.

The ideal situation is to allow the persons criticizing to make their comments under the guarantee that the person being evaluated will not see the evaluations. This procedure eliminates the possibility of ingratiation tactics (Jones, 1964) by the judge and prevents embarrassment to the performer. Less ideal is to communicate your criticism to the performer anonymously. Here the performer's face is in jeopardy, but the judge cannot be identified and therefore need not face the consequences of embarrassing the other. A more awkward situation is one where the critic must convey his criticism to the performer in person. Here the judge must witness the embarrassment of the performer and face possible retaliation. The situation becomes more complicated if others are present when the judge gives his evaluation to the performer. For, here the damage to face is spread more widely, affecting the performer's relationship with others in addition to the judge. Again, retaliation is possible.

The net result of these considerations should be a decrease in critical behavior by the judges as we move through these four situations. The present experiment attempted to test this prediction by using a situation where judges assessed an impromptu speech under one of these four conditions.

Method

Subjects

55 female and 45 male undergraduates at the Chinese University participated in the study as partial fulfillment of the requirements for Introductory Psychology.

Procedure

Contact with subjects throughout the experiment was made by the second author using the participants' native language of Cantonese. Stimulus materials were also written in Chinese.

Subjects were recruited in same-sex groups of five persons. As they signed up, the experimenter asked the students not to join groups where their friends were already members.

As subjects arrived for the experiment, they sat outside two experimental rooms. On the doors to these rooms, the experimenter had placed large signs in Chinese saying "The Chinese University Exploration of Student Public Speaking".

When all five subjects had arrived for any session, the experimenter escorted them into Room 1, a moderate-size room empty except for some chairs at one end and a covered table with chairs in the middle. He explained to them that the Psychology Department was starting a program on public speaking. As a first step, students such as themselves were being asked to assess impromptu speeches given by their fellow students. Thus, one of them would be selected to deliver such a speech, the others to listen and assess. At this

point the experimenter checked to ensure that none of the participants were friends, as this might "destroy objectivity".

One subject was then chosen by drawing lots to give a three-minute talk on "The difference between high-school and university life". While the speaker was planning his presentation, the experimenter took the remaining subjects to the adjoining Room 2 and asked them to sit at pre-arranged desks.

These four desks all faced a one-way mirror and loudspeaker which connected Room 1 and 2. The desks were separated by partitions so that the judges of the speech could not see one another or what they would later be writing. The experimenter stood before the curtains drawn across the mirror to supervise the giving of instructions. On the table in front of all judges lay a booklet with an identical cover page which read "Chinese University Exploration of Student Public Speaking". Students turned the page and read an explanation of the study which was similar to the verbal presentation made earlier by the experimenter. The instructions underscored that they were to focus on both the strengths and the weaknesses of the speaker. This double focus was included to counteract too critical a set and provide some latitude of response for the judges.

After checking to ensure all the listeners understood their job, the experimenter asked them to read the next page which contained the experimental manipulations. There were four conditions,

one of which had been assigned to each desk before each session began using a Latin square design which separated the third and fourth conditions. This design assured that experimental condition was not confounded with viewing position.

The subject in the speaker-uninformed condition (condition one) read that his or her comments and ratings would be seen only by the experimenter. The experimenter would not discuss the evaluation with the speaker and would allow the judge to leave the experiment well before the speaker. In this condition, as in all others, it was noted that the experimenter himself would not read the evaluations until after both judge and speaker had left.

In the informed-anonymous condition (condition two), judges read that the speakers would be shown their evaluations by the experimenter. However, it was made clear that the judges would leave the experiment well before the speaker and that the experimenter would leave the room while the speaker was reading the evaluations. This latter precaution was necessary to prevent judges from saving the speaker's face in front of the experimenter.

In the informed-face-to-face condition (condition three), the judges were told that they would be taken to the adjoining room so they could read their comments and their ratings to the speaker privately. It was made clear that the experimenter would leave the room during this report and would not discuss the judge's evaluations with the speaker at any time. Again, these assurances were necessary to stop the judges from saving the speaker's face before the experimenter.

Finally, in the informed-audience condition (condition four), the judges were informed that they would read their comments and ratings to the speaker in the presence of the next group of five subjects. As before, the experimenter would not be present nor would he discuss the evaluations with the speaker.

All judges were asked to re-read their instructions. If they had any problems, they were to raise their hands so the experimenter could come over and clarify any confusions quietly. This procedure effectively prevented the subjects' learning that they had different instructions.

At this stage the experimenter checked to ensure that the speaker was ready. He then turned off the lights, opened the curtains in front of the one-way mirror and knocked on the glass, signalling the speaker to begin. Three minutes later, the experimenter again signalled the speaker to stop, closed the curtains, and turned on the lights.

The instructions on the next page of the booklet asked the judges to spend three minutes writing down the strong and the weak points of each speaker's presentation. Judges were asked to recall how their comments would be used.

A short period of time was given to allow maximum opportunity for face-saving to occur. In a longer period judges might have felt compelled to include everything they had noticed rather than being more selective.

Three minutes later the experimenter had the judges stop and proceed to the ratings of the speaker and the speech. These were

Likert-type scales; six for the speech, seven for the speaker, and one for an overall rating. Each scale had seven points, each point with its associated verbal label. So for example, judges were to check whether the speech was extremely fluent, fluent, mildly fluent, neither fluent nor halting, mildly halting, halting, extremely halting. All points on the scale were labelled, because judges in the informed-face-to-face and audience conditions knew they would be required to read their ratings later. All judges were reminded in their booklets of how their ratings would be used prior to filling out the scales.

After completing the ratings, judges were asked in the booklet to write down their general reactions to the task of evaluating the speaker. It was indicated that these comments were for the experimenter only.

The final page consisted of five, seven-point scales measuring the judges' reactions to their experience of evaluating a fellow student. The first three tapped perceived difficulty of the task, how carefree the judge felt, and how concerned he was about the speaker's possible reactions. The final two items mentioned the concept of "face" explicitly, first scale asking judges how much they worried about the speaker's face when evaluating, the final scale asking judges how much they were concerned about their own face.

When all judges were finished, the experimenter asked judges in conditions one and two to leave the room with him. He

then thanked and dismissed these subjects separately. Judges in conditions three and four remained, but their positions had initially been separated in the Latin square to avoid any discussion during the experimenter's absence.

He returned to the judges in conditions three and four about five minutes later. The experimenter took the judge in condition three to Room 1 where the judge read his comments and ratings to the speaker.

Meanwhile the experimenter returned to Room 2 and remarked to the judge in condition four that the next group of students had not yet arrived. Therefore, instead of reading his evaluations to the speaker in front of this audience, the judge would have to give his reactions to the speaker alone.

When the judge in condition three finished giving his feedback to the speaker, he was taken from Room 2 by the experimenter, thanked, and dismissed. The judge in condition four then followed the same procedure.

This process of dismissing the judges was designed to make it appear as if all were in the same experimental conditions and to prevent the opportunity to discover any difference concerning the experimental instructions.

All subjects were debriefed by mail following the experiment and given an opportunity to discuss the study and their reactions with the experimenters.

Content Analysis Of Comments

The first dependent measure taken was the judges' written comments about the speaker and the speech. Careful inspection of the protocols revealed a variety of types of comment made. To minimize the number of assumptions made, all types of comment were treated equally whether they referred to the speech, the speaker or the speaker's behavior. Each comment was given a score of plus or minus four depending on whether it was a positive or a negative remark.

The extremity of the statements made, however, was taken into account. Thus, any exaggeration in a comment such as, "The speaker continually fidgeted." increased the value of the comment by a half, in this case from minus four to minus six. Similarly a qualification such as, "The speaker was fairly poised.", reduced the value by a half, in this case from plus four to plus two.

One category worth noting separately was the situational reference. This was defined as any reference to the speaker's situation in giving the speech such as, "Despite the short time for preparation" Such situational references were scored as either qualifications of a negative remark or as accentuations of a positive remark, again changing the value of the associated remark by one half.

The experimenters then practiced scoring together until reasonable consensus was achieved. Finally each experimenter independently scored the protocols of all 80 subjects, the first author scoring the English translations, the second author scoring the Chinese originals.

Results

Treatment of Data

One problem in analyzing the data was that the level of competence in public speaking differed widely across the 20 speakers. So, there were some speakers who were unanimously rated in very negative terms by their four judges; some speakers who were rated positively. Such differences among speakers have the effect of seriously inflating the within cell variance relative to differences between the four conditions.

To eliminate speaker variance, therefore, the average level of speaker competence was equated in the following way. For any given measure, the four scores for any one speaker were added together and averaged. Deviations from that average were then calculated for each judge. 2 x 4 analyses of variance were performed on these deviations. This procedure had the effect of preserving the differences between conditions without adding speaker variance to the within cell variance which already existed due to differences among the 80 judges. Such a procedure meant, however, that differences in overall level of criticism between males and females could not be detected. This question was, however, of no interest.

Analysis of the Rating Scales

There were 14 scales used, seven to evaluate the speaker and six for the speech plus a final overall rating. The 13 specific scales each had a mid-point designated as "neither X nor Y" depending

on which attribute was being assessed. A check at this mid-point communicated neither praise nor criticism. In calculating the impact of the rating, therefore, only deviations from this mid-point were scored. These deviations ranged from 1 to 3 and were scored as plus or as minus depending on whether the positive or negative side of the attribute was chosen.

The overall impact of the ratings was of greater interest than differences on any of the particular 13 dimensions rated. Consequently, summed deviations were taken from each judge across the 13 scales to yield a total score from the ratings.

An analysis of variance on these total ratings yielded a significant effect across experimental conditions ($F_{3, 72} = 4.14$, $p < .01$) with an insignificant interaction ($F_{3, 72} = 2.54$, ns).

The linear component of the effect across conditions was also significant ($F_{1, 72} = 11.2$, $p < .005$). A Duncan's test on the differences among the means showed the speaker uninformed condition as generating more negative ratings than the informed audience condition ($p < .005$).

These differences across conditions could have resulted in one, perhaps two, ways. On the one hand, judges could have made more negative than positive ratings. On the other hand, those ratings which showed some deviation could have been made at a more extreme level. Either or both events could have affected the total ratings. These possibilities are examined below.

Number of negative minus positive ratings. The effect across conditions was significant ($F_3, 72 = 4.21, p < .01$); the interaction was not ($F_3, 72 = 2.07, ns$). A Duncan's analysis of the difference across conditions showed the speaker uninformed conditions as yielding more negative ratings than the informed anonymous ($p < .05$), informed face-to-face ($p < .05$) and informed audience ($p < .005$) conditions. The linear component of this main effect was also significant ($F_1, 72 = 11.46, p < .005$).

Amount of criticism per deviation. The analysis of this variable also showed a significant difference across conditions ($F_3, 72 = 4.76, p < .001$) and an insignificant interaction ($F_3, 72 = 2.56, ns$). A Duncan's test of the main effect showed both the speaker uninformed and informed anonymous conditions as producing higher average levels of criticism than the informed audience condition (p 's $< .001$ and $< .05$ respectively). Again the linear component of the effect across conditions was significant ($F_1, 72 = 13.76, p < .001$).

Insert Table 1 about here

The overall rating. The effect across experimental conditions on this single rating scale was not significant ($F_3, 72 = 2.41, ns$), although the linear component across experimental conditions was ($F_1, 72 = 5.49, p < .025$). The pattern of cell means was similar to that of the total derived from the 13 scales, correlating .74.

Analysis of the Unstructured Comments

The inter-judge reliability for the criticism scores derived from the unstructured comments was .98.

Total score. An analysis of variance on these scores yielded an $F_{3, 72}$ of 2.40 (ns) across conditions and an interaction $F_{3, 72}$ of 1.64, (ns). The linear component of the difference across conditions was significant, however ($F_{1, 72} = 4.38, p < .05$).

Number of negative minus positive statements. The inter-judge reliability for the number of statements made by the judges was .98. The few discrepancies were resolved by a decision of the senior author.

The analysis of variance showed no effect across experimental conditions ($F_{3, 72} < 1$) and no interaction ($F_{3, 72} = 1.49, ns$). The linear component of the difference across conditions was not significant. ($F_{1, 72} = 1.58, ns$).

Amount of criticism per statement. The effect across conditions for this variable was significant ($F_{3, 72} = 2.77, p < .05$); the interaction was not ($F_{3, 72} < 1, ns$). A Duncan's analysis of the main effect again showed the subject uninformed condition yielding more criticism per statement than the informed audience condition ($p < .05$). Again the linear component of the main effect was significant ($F_{1, 72} = 6.96, p < .025$).

Insert Table 2 about here

Judges' Reactions to the Task of Evaluating

None of the five scales showed any effects.

Discussion

Two different sources were used to measure the judges' tendency to be critical of the speakers: unstructured comments and rating scales. These two sources produced total scores which correlated .59. This correlation is high enough to suggest that both measures are tapping the same underlying process. Effects common to both measures should, therefore, indicate robust findings.

The average level of criticism per response was the measure which yielded differences across conditions for both types of criticism. In each case Duncan's test indicated that more critical levels of response were given in the speaker uninformed condition than in the informed audience condition. Inspection of the means shows the responses in the informed-anonymous and informed-face-to-face conditions falling about mid-point between these two extremes. Indeed the linear component across the four conditions was significant for both measures, accounting for more than 64% of the between cells effect.

This pattern of results would appear to confirm the hypotheses about face-saving made in the introduction with two qualifications. The first is that there was no suggestion of a difference in level of criticism between the informed anonymous and face-to-face conditions. The second was that the measure most likely to show the effects of face-saving was not the number of criticisms or the total level of

criticism but rather the average level of criticism per response.

The pattern of results rules out fear of retaliation as an explanation of the differences. For had only the speaker-uninformed and informed audience groups been involved, the moderation of criticism in the latter group could have been explained as resulting from the judges' fear that the publically criticized speaker would counter-attack. To forestall such unpleasantness, the judges might well have moderated their criticism.

Two considerations argue against such reasoning. First, the pattern of means indicates that the judges in the informed anonymous condition were also more moderate in their criticism than those in the speaker uninformed condition. Here there was no possibility of retaliation as the speaker was unaware of the judge's identity. Secondly, there was no suggestion of a difference between the informed-anonymous and the informed-face-to-face conditions. Criticisms in the face-to-face group should have been more moderate than those in the informed anonymous group had fear of retaliation been influencing the judge's behavior.

It should be noted in passing that there was no indication by any judge of any concern about a counter-attack from the speaker. Their written comments about the experiment itself and their comments to the experimenter upon dismissal showed no concern whatsoever about possible anger from the speaker.

Increasing empathy (Stotland, 1965) seems a much more reasonable explanation for the increasing moderation of criticism

seen across conditions. The method of selecting speakers by a random draw probably increased the judges' empathy for the speaker in all conditions by enhancing perceived similarity of the judges to the speaker (Stotland and Dunn, 1963).

Such empathy would have been absent in the speaker-uninformed condition as the judges knew that the speaker would not have access to the evaluations. Hence there was no fear of hurting the speaker with their criticism. In the informed-anonymous and informed-face-to-face conditions, however, the speaker would possibly have suffered as a result of the judge's criticisms and so the criticisms were moderated. In the informed-audience condition, the criticisms would have become public, extending beyond the judge-speaker dyad. Here the potential for loss of face and embarrassment of the speaker was magnified. The judge's empathy for the speaker was correspondingly greater, and so the criticisms were moderated further.

This empathetic concern was shown in many of the written comments made by judges in the informed conditions following the experiment. One subject wrote, "I am worried that the speaker will be unhappy when he reads my comments and hope he doesn't take them too seriously, because after all he had no time for preparation and the situation was strange. I hope he doesn't mind." (informed-anonymous condition). Another wrote, "I don't want my criticisms to hurt another's confidence and self-concept." (informed audience condition). These, and other similar comments, indicate the judges' worry about the possible effects of their comments on the speakers.

Despite such examples of solicitude, none of the post-experimental questions relating to a concern for the speaker's possible reactions showed any differences across conditions. An analysis of the comments written by the judges after the experiment suggests why no differences were found.

The most striking feature of these comments was the judges' desire to be "good" evaluators by providing "objective", "accurate", and "reliable" feedback to the speakers and to the experimenter. Despite the attempt to ensure subjects that their personal perceptions were valuable, the judges repeatedly saw their own comments as "too subjective" or "too biased" and described themselves as "unskilled" or as "inexperienced".

Part of this general reaction reflects the subjects' reluctance to criticize others, even strangers. By pointing to their lack of expertise, the judges were in effect qualifying the criticisms they were required to make as experimental subjects.

The comments also indicate that subjects saw themselves as participating in a scientific enterprise requiring objective responses from them. This concern of the judges for providing accurate evaluations probably explains why none of the post-experimental measures tapping concern for the speaker's reactions showed any differences across experimental conditions. The judges after all had to maintain their own "face" as responsible and truthful observers, uninfluenced by personal considerations.

Despite the press for objectivity, the basic dilemma involved

in all evaluation still existed. As one judge put it, "If the speaker is not good, I must simply tell him so, even though I can't get rid of my uneasy feeling." Fortunately, the criteria for evaluation in this situation were sufficiently imprecise that consideration of the speaker's face could operate to temper the criticism despite the demands for objectivity. As one judge wrote, "To criticize a speech is not an easy thing, but there are no accepted standards, so we often add in our subjectivity when evaluating." Face can be given as long as the criteria for evaluation remain flexible.

It will be recalled that judges gave face by moderating their judgments, not by making fewer critical responses. This approach allowed the judges to satisfy both sides of their dilemma: they maintained their own face as objective evaluators by making the "standard" number of criticisms, but they saved the speaker's face by being more moderate in their comments.

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Footnotes

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Table 1

Average Total Score on 13 Rating Scales
 Divided by Number of Deviations from Zero

	Speaker Uninformed	Informed Anonymous	Informed Face-to-Face	Informed Audience	
Male Judges	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.5	0.2
Female Judges	-0.3	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.2
	-0.1	0.1	0.2	0.5	

Table 2

Average Total Score from Unstructured Comments
Divided by Number of Comments

	Speaker Uninformed	Informed Anonymous	Informed Face-to-Face	Informed Audience	
Male Judges	-1.3	-0.5	-1.1	-0.2	-0.8
Female Judges	-1.1	-0.3	0.2	0.2	-0.3
	-1.2	-0.4	-0.4	0.0	