學 大 文 中 港 香

心 中 究 研 會 社

Political Orientations in Hong Kong:
A Socio-psychological Approach

Stan Shively

SOCIAL RESEARCH CENTRE

THE CHINESE UNIVERSITY
OF HONG KONG

The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Social Research Centre

POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS IN HONG KONG
A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH

by

Dr. Stan Shively

May, 1972.

Two main thrusts into the study of political behavior have been directed toward what Bradbury Seasholes has so aptly labelled "taking part" and "taking sides."[1] In such studies researchers have primarily sought to explain the variance of political participation and of what might loosely be referred to as political ideology, namely on acts of participation in a liberal or a conservative direction. In accounting for political participation, for example, Paul Lazarsfeld equates non-voting with political apathy and proceeds to demonstrate that one reaction to various forms of "cross-pressure" is absenteeism from the polls.[2] Morris Rosenberg cites three general factors explaining political apathy: "(1) the threatening consequences of political activity, (2) the futility of political activity, and (3) the absence of spurs to interest and participation."[3] Campbell, et. al., find that participation in politics is associated with a high sense of political efficacy.[4] Gerhard Lenski suggests that persons who are experiencing status incongruencies seek to bring about change and therefore would be more apt to participate in politics.[5] A number of analysts see a relationship between non-participation and a basic satisfaction with the conditions of society.[6] Generally, there is impressive uniformity among empirical research findings which indicate that high political participation is associated with high education and income, high occupational prestige, males, middle aged and older people, married people, home-owners, and members of organizations.

[1] Seasholes, Bradbury, Voting, Interest Groups, and Parties. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1966. See chapters one and two.

[2] Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Berelson, Bernard, and Gaudet, Hazel, The People's Choice. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. Also, see Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1954.

[3] Rosenberg, Morris, "Some Determinants of Political Apathy," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 18, (Winter, 1954), p. 349.

[4] Campbell, Angus, Gurin, Gerald, and Miller, Warren E., The Voter Decides. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954.

[5] Lenski, Gerhard, "Status Crystalization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," American Sociological Review, Aug., 1954, pp. 405-413.

In one study Philip Hastings, controlling for age, sex, religion, education and income, found that the non-voter tends to withdraw from social activity, is more pre-occupied with immediate rather than long range matters, is "not even willing to think for himself as far as political matters are concerned" (manifested by his willingness to agree with his "superiors" on political matters), and in general exhibits "a personal sense of inadequacy and insecurity."[7] In much the same way as Thomas Pettigrew distinguishes between the "culturally deprived" and the "culturally enriched" sociological worlds in which people live.[8] Hastings is inadvertently distinguishing between "under-developed" and "well developed" cognitive worlds in which people live, and is suggesting that people who live in "under-developed" cognitive worlds tend to be politically inactive. Herein lies the major focus of this paper.

Most studies and inquiries into political participation have been conducted in the Western World, where the populace participates, and is even expected and encouraged to participate, in political matters mainly through voting in periodic elections.

In some societies around the world, however, political power is not distributed among the populace. This does not mean, of course, that the citizens therefore do not participate in political matters, or that they do not hold political orientations. It does mean that in order to study political orientations in such societies indices other than voting behavior must be called into play.

Hong Kong is just such a society where the indigenous population, in fact, is in many ways discouraged from participating in political affairs. Hong Kong is a Crown Colony in which nearly all political power is entrusted to career Colonial administrators from the United Kingdom.

---

[7] Hastings, Philip K., "The Voter and the Non-Voter," _American Journal of Sociology_, 62, 1956, p. 307.

[8] Pettigrew, Thomas, _A Profile of the Negro American_. Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964.

The only public offices open to the local Chinese residents
of Hong Kong are ten elected positions of the Urban Council which
consists of six ex-officio members (including the Chairman), ten
elected members, and not more than ten unofficial members appointed
by the Governor. Furthermore, eligibility for suffrage is greatly
limited by Section 17 of the Urban Council Ordinance to those residents
who can speak English (which means that a qualified elector must have
obtained at least a school diploma). There is also a financial and
occupational qualification which entitles only certain job holders and
tax-payers to vote.[9] This means that almost all the British in Hong
Kong are entitled to vote, while most of the Chinese are not. In fact,
in the Urban Council elections (the only political elections in Hong
Kong) of March 3, 1971, less than 0.4% of the total population actually
voted, roughly 5% of the potentially qualified voters actually voted,
and only about 26% of the registered voters actually voted.[10]

In addition, the political power of the Urban Council and
its functions are greatly limited. Its jurisdiction does not cover the
entire Colony. It has a very low degree of financial autonomy. It has
only informal control over the Urban Services Department, which carries
out the policies of the Urban Council. Further, the elected members of
the Urban Council constitute a minority membership within the Council,
as they are out numbered by the six ex-officio members and ten appointed
members. One may even view the Urban Council as a kind of democratic
decoration in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong society might, therefore, be said to be decidedly
not conducive to the development of political orientations. The roughly
four million Hong Kong residents -- over 99% of whom are Chinese -- find
themselves in a rather precarious political situation where they are
temporarily under British jurisdiction and not encouraged to be political.

---

[9] Walker, John, Under the White Wash. (Publisher Unknown) 1971,
     pp. 44-45.

[10] These figures where compiled from the Annual Report of the Director
      of Urban Services Department and Chairman of Urban Council for
      1969/70 and 1970/71.

At the same time it is common knowledge that the leaders of the People's Republic of China consider Hong Kong an integral part of China and will act accordingly when much of the British mandate is terminated in 1998. So, in terms of local political matters of an immediate nature the indigenous Hong Kong population is found to be powerless; and in the larger political arena and with respect to their destiny in the more distant future, the indigenous Hong Kong population can again be viewed as being powerless. At the same time traditional Chinese values, and Chinese history itself,[11] operate in such a way as to inhibit the development of political orientations.

Yet, despite their lack of political power, and a non-political tradition, one feels quite strongly in the Hong Kong of today a movement away from traditional Chinese values,[12] and one senses in the Chinese of Hong Kong a strong and frustrated desire to be in control of their own destiny. More simply, the social atmosphere in Hong Kong radiates the impression that the people of Hong Kong are not at all politically apathetic, and that their perhaps rather recently acquired political orientations are currently in the process of development.

Because the political situation in Hong Kong differs markedly from those of Western countries, in studying the political orientations of the people in Hong Kong by empirical methods one must seek measures of political orientation other than the standard observation of voting performances. It is the expressed purpose of this report to isolate such indices and to use them to document the extent to which the local Chinese population of Hong Kong is, in fact, politically oriented. Next, in addition to accounting for differences in political orientation by standard social characteristics, political orientations will be explored as they relate to indices of the cognitive worlds in which the respondents live.

---

[11] Townsend, James R., _Political Participation in Communist China_. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1967. See particularly Chapter Two.

[12] This movement is documented later in this paper.

A. The Concept of Political Orientation

There may be some confusion at this point as to the precise meaning of "political orientation", as well as perhaps to the relationship between political participation and political orientation. It is quite clear that man is not, by nature, a political animal, and that, irrespective of its political structure, in any society one is apt to find individuals who are simply not interested in political matters. Robert Dahl addresses himself to this situation rather succinctly:

> "An elementary starting point for all political theory
> is the existential fact that members of the human
> species live together. With few exceptions human
> beings do not carry on their lives in complete isolation.
> Whatever may be the elements of instinct, habit, necessity,
> or choice that induce people to form societies, man has
> amply demonstrated for thousands of years that he is a
> social animal. Yet though man is a social animal, neither
> by instincts nor by learning is he necessarily a political
> animal -- at least not in quite the same sense. Even
> though they live in a society, men need not concern
> themselves with the politics of that society, nor cherish
> the political institutions and values of their society.
> Some people do, to be sure; but many, as we have seen,
> do not." [13]

Following Dahl's lead, the expression "political orientation" is used to represent the degree to which a person is concerned with, or psychologically involved with, the making of governmental decisions. Dahl, himself, distinguishes between four kinds of political orientations, or political involvement: [14] 1. the apolitical strata, consisting of people who are indifferent to politics, 2. the political strata, who comprise the politically concerned and involved. Among those who are move strongly involved in politics are the 3. power-seekers, and 4. the powerful, or office holders.

---

[13] Dahl, Robert A., "Political Man," in Larson, Calvin J., and Washburn, Philo C. (eds.), Power, Participation and Ideology. New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1969, p. 201.

[14] Ibid., p. 201

To Dahl, overt participation in the political decision making process constitutes only one dimension of involvement, or political orientation. He cites three others: "1. Interest -- how curious one is to know what is happening. 2. Concern -- how important one feels the decision is. 3. Information -- how much knowledge one has about the decision."[15] To these four dimensions of political orientations listed by Dahl, three others, at least, may now be added: 1. Political efficacy -- the extent to which the individual feels that he has the power to affect the course of events. 2. Time perspective -- the amount of future time over which the individual normally anticipates events and happenings of a political nature. 3. Political freedom, the extent to which the individual feels a freedom, or lack of freedom, to be a political person.

Political ideology, like active political participations, my may also be treated as a dimension of political orientation in that it indicates direction of participation, interest, concern, and involvement. In this study, however, political ideology and, for reasons already expressed, political participation will not be studied. In summary, then, by political orientation, is meant, simply, one's degree of involvement in political matters. Six indices of political orientation, besides active participation and political ideology, are identified as interest, concern, information, political efficacy, future political time perspective, and political freedom.

---

[15] Ibid., p. 201.

B. The Concept of "Cognitive Worlds"

Every individual lives in a unique set of worlds, certainly
including, at least, a sociological world, a psychological world, and
a cultural world. These separate worlds function together so as to
produce individualized worlds of cognitions. We frequently rationalize
the virtues of such things as travel and education by saying that
"travel is broadening," and "education is broadening." What, in fact,
is being broadened is the individual's sense of history, his sense of
the greater world around him, his sense of the destiny of man, his
understanding, his picture of himself with respect to all that which
is around him, in short, his cognitive world.

The cognitive apparatus of human beings is programmed in
different ways and to different levels. Generally speaking, one might
conceptually distinguish between two polar types -- the "under-developed"
and the "well developed." A person with an "under-developed" cognitive
world is characterized simply in the following manner: his world of
cognitions is rather limited; he has not developed the capacity to take
into account very many variables, in fact there is certainly a relation-
ship between one's cognitive world and the extent of his vocabulary;
those variables which do form a part of his cognitive world are sim-
plistic with respect to their level of abstraction and level of measure-
ment (he would tend to think dichotomously in terms of gross categories
such as good and evil, rich and poor, happy and unhappy, and so on);
his mental calculus is such as to allow him to form only the most
simple relationships between those variables which he does take into
account. He may be said to think in binary terms, and with bi-variate
analysis, and there would be much of the real world lying outside of
his comprehension. His is the world of the immediate -- the here and
now, and his behavior would tend to follow the consummatory pattern.[16]

The individual with a "well-developed" cognitive world, on
the other hand, can take into account many more variables. These
variables are of a higher level of abstraction and they are more
precisely measured. His mental calculus is more fully developed allow-
ing him to calculate more incremental relationship between the variables

---

[16] Frank, Lawrence K., "Time Perspectives," _Journal of Social
Philosophy_, Vol. 4, 1939, p. 298.

which he does take into account. His cognitive world includes the whole world. He has developed the capacity to look at the whole world with respect to the past, the present, and the future. As a result, his behavior tends to be instrumental.[17]

Actually, this conceptualization is not wholly new. It is analogous with Merton's classification of the "local" and the "cosmopolitan,"[18] with Lewin's models of "life space,"[19] with Rokeach's formulation of the "open and closed mind,"[20] and even, in a way, with Karl Popper's description of the "open society."[21] As a matter of fact this conceptualization of cognitive worlds is central to many diverse areas such as child development , socialization and re-socialization (including brain-washing and public opinion formation), the war on poverty, and the modernization of societies.

There is undoubtedly a vast number of dimensions to the concept of cognitive worlds and an endless string of indicators. Two dimensions which have been successfully used in the past are future time orientations,[22] or time horizon,[23] and spacial horizons.[24] Time horizon, which is here employed as one dimension of a person's

---

[17] Ibid., p. 298

[18] Merton,Robert K., Social Thoery and Social Structure. Glencoe, Ill.. The Free Press, 1957.

[19] Lewin, Kurt, Field Theory and Social Sciences. New York: Harper, 1951.

[20] Rokeach, Milton, The Open and Closed Mind. New York: Basic Books, 1960.

[21] Popper, Karl R., The Open Society and Its Enemies. New York: Harper, 4th ed., 1963.

[22] Back, Kurt W., and Gergen, Kenneth J., "Apocalyptic and Serial Time Orientations and the Structure of Public Opinion," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1963, pp. 427-442. Also see Back, and Gergen, "Aging, Time Perspective, and Preferred Solutions to International Problems," Journal of Conflict Resolution, June, 1965, pp. 177-186. Also see Back, and Gergen, "Individual Orientations, Public Opinion and the Study of International Relations," Social Problems, Vol. II, No. 1, Summer, 1963, pp. 77-87.

[23] Shively, Stanley E., Explorations into Time Horizons. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1966.

[24] Ibid.

cognitive world, is similar to the concept of future time perspective as expressed by Wallace,[25] and is defined as follows:

> "Time horizon is, therefore, defined as a temporal point or area located in the future beyond which a person cannot clearly perceive his world. It can be located by measuring the duration, or time span, lying between the present and the time threshold, in terms of standard units of time measurement. Clearly, one's time horizon is a function of two elements -- time length and clarity."[26]

Although the notion of time horizon can be a property of either individuals or collectivities, it is here used as an integral, and fairly stable, part of an individual's behavioral orientation.[27] Basically what it means is that some people have developed the capacity, more than others, to internalize the future in a rational way which allows them clearer anticipations of what the future can and may be like and which allows them greater control over their own futures. To the extent to which it is rationally institutionalized in society, politics, almost by definition, assumes that the political actors possess such capabilities. In fact, time horizon is a general form of "planning horizon," which is an important factor in decision making models.[28]

[25] Wallace, Melvin, "Future Time Perspective in Schizophrenia," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 52, 1956, pp. 240-245.

[26] Shively, op. cit., p. 110.

[27] Ibid., pp. 108-137

[28] Modigliani, Franco, and Cohen, Kalman J., "The Role of Anticipations and Plans in Economic Behavior and Their Use in Economic Analysis and Forecasting," Studies in Business Expectations and Planning. Urbana: Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of Illinois, 1961. Also see Nehnevajsa, Jiri, A Methodology for the Analysis of Political Futures. AFOSR-374, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, Air Research and Development Command, May 1, 1961.

Space horizon also is incorporated in this paper as a dimension of cognitive worlds. It is defined as the amount of geographical space internalized by an individual as defined by a geographic barrier. Beyond this barrier lies that geographic space which the individual fails to take into account. Lewin, and Back and Gergen, connect temporal and spacial orientations[29] as aspects of a person's psychological world.[30] Elsewhere we find the following:

> "Three independent tests support the expected positive relationship between spacial and temporal horizons. It would seem surprising if the data had indicated a different relationship since spacial horizon and time horizon so clearly appear to be associated with the same thing, namely depth of a person's psychological world."[31]

Having thus discussed what is meant by political orientations and cognitive worlds, it now remains to empirically study the relations between them.

---

[29] Back, Kurt W., and Gergen, Kenneth J., "Individual Orientations, Public Opinion and the Study of International Relations," op. cit., pp. 78-79.

[30] Lewin, op. cit., p. 120

[31] Shively, op. cit., p. 197. Here the term "psychological world" is used synonomously with "cognitive world."

C. The Research Data

In October, 1970 a large grant was made to The Social Research Centre, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, by the Harvard Yenching Institute and The Chinese University of Hong Kong's Institute of Social Sciences to study a number of facets of life in Kwun Tong. Kwun Tong might best be described as a large suburb on the eastern edge of the city of Hong Kong. It was built by the Hong Kong Government over a fifteen year span as an experimental community in which the dwelling residences would be in close proximity to the places of employment -- predominantly factories.

The residencial portion of Kwun Tong is a complex of numerous large resettlement estate, the newest of which are estimated to house as many as 50,000 people. The internal structure of the resettlement estates consists of very small one-room flats which house an estimated average of 6,06 persons. In the older public housing estates the flats are quite small, toilet and bath facilities are communal, and there are no kitchens. The newer structures have slightly larger flats, and small private kitchens and baths. From a distance the entire Kwun Tong area, nestled between Victoria Harbor and the mountains, presents a rather pleasing impression, but when one wanders within the estates themselves one is confronted with a barrage noise, dirt, garbage, hawkers' stands, an increment of smells, and, of course, people.

In many ways the general area appears to be representative of most of Hong Kong, particularly the most populated section known as Kowloon. The population of Kwun Tong, however, is distinguished from most of the rest of Hong Kong by a somewhat lower socio-economic level. The population of Kwun Tong is estimated to be about 521,000. A representative sample of 1,400 was drawn from this population by the area sampling technique, and 1,065 interviews were subsequently conducted during the month of May, 1971.

One of the initial purposes of the grant was to study the attitudes of the people of Kwun Tong toward the quality of life in their area, and subsequently became known as the Kwun Tong "Life Quality" Study. A survey questionnaire was prepared for this purpose

which was pre-tested twice to refine the questions and the scales.
The second pre-test proved that the questionnaire was too long and had
to be shortened considerably. Both pre-tests demonstrated that the
respondents simply refused to respond to direct questions pertaining
to political attitudes. As a result, the number of questions of a
political nature were greatly reduced and the wording was changed to
make them less obtrusive. The term "political", for example, was
changed to "public affairs" or "public and governmental affairs."
The obvious apprehension of the respondents and their refusal to
answer direct political questions was understandably due not only to
the fact that the Chinese in Hong Kong are British subjects, but that
they are caught in an ideological cross-pressure relating to the
ideological feud between the People's Republic of China and the
government of Taiwan. Much of the population of Kwun Tong, as well as
Hong Kong, were actually at one time or another refugees from the
mainland.

Despite the trimming of the questionnaire, five questions of
a political nature remained, which allow for an exploration into the
political orientations of the respondents. Each question tapped a
separate dimension of political orientations, so that only five of the
seven previously isolated dimensions of political orientations can be
investigated in this study. To repeat, overt political participation,
as a dimension of political orientation, simply cannot be studied in
Hong Kong. The other dimension not included in this report is level of
political interest, or how curious one is to know what is happening.
Of course, the questionnaire was translated into Cantonese, the pre-
vailing dialect of the area, but the wording of the questions will be
given here in English.

The first political question pertains to the extent to which
the respondent feels that politics is important. The respondent was
provided a five-point scale[32] ranging from " ☐ ," for "not important

---

[32] The first pre-test of the questionnaire showed that the respondents,
many of whom are illiterate, and unaccustomed as they are to being
respondents, had considerable difficulty in responding to precise,
numerical scales. The second pre-test indicated that they did not
have these difficulties when the scales were reduced from eleven-
point scales (0-10) to five-point scales (0-4), and when the numbers
were replaced by stars ( ). The rating scales, then, parallelled
rating scales with which they were familiar, such as movies and TV shows.

at all," to "[* * * *]," standing for maximum or "extreme importance."
Twenty-three cards reflecting one aspect of life in Kwun Tong, were
then presented to the respondent in random order and the respondent was
directed "to look at each card carefully and determine how important
each of the areas of life are to you personally." An item entitled
"Public Affairs" was one of the twenty-three items.

The second political question relates to the dimension of
time perspective -- the amount of future time over which the respondent
normally anticipates events and happenings of a political nature.
Here the word political was actually used. Each respondent was handed
a card on which were printed the following scale categories:

    1. I can't see clearly at all

    2. 0 - 2 weeks

    3. 2 weeks to 2 months

    4. 2 months to 6 months

    5. 6 months to 1 year

    6. 1 year to 2 years

    7. 2 years to 3 years

    8. 3 years to 5 years

    9. 5 years to 10 years

    10. 10 years to 20 years

    11. More than 20 years

Each respondent was directed to use this scale and determine
"which time period . . . do you feel best indicated the distance into
the future over which you have a clear picture about the future of
political matters in the world."

The third dimension of political orientation which was tapped
was political freedom -- the extent to which the respondent felt free
to be a political person. Each respondent was given the statement:
"I feel perfectly free to discuss public affairs with anyone." He was
then asked to respond to this statement using a conventional five-point
Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree."

The fourth question indirectly measures the respondents political knowledge. He was asked, "About how often do you follow the accounts of public and government affairs?" The categories of response were "regularly," "from time to time," "never," and "other (Specify)."

Finally the respondents were asked, "How much do you think you can do about an unjust government regulation?" The choices of response to this question were, "a great deal," "some, but not much," "nothing at all," and "other (Specify)." This item directly relates to political efficacy as a dimension of political orientation.

Concerning the measures of one's cognitive world, the questionnaire included two different ways of measuring time horizon and one measure of spacial horizon. One measure of time horizon was borrowed from a previous study.[33] It was worded as follows: "People differ as to how far into the future they can see clearly with respect to their own lives and about things which may happen. Some people have a fairly clear picture about what will happen to them over a considerable period of time; others have a clear picture, but only for a very short time period. To put it a little differently, some people act in a sort of day-to-day fashion, and others take longer time periods into account when they think about what they are going to do. Considering your own feelings on this matter, how far into the future do you personally think you have a clear picture about your own future and about the kind of life you will have?" The respondent was then handed a card with the same scale categories which were used for the political item on the temporal dimension, ranging from "I can't see clearly at all" to "More than 20 years." The respondent was asked again: "Which time period on this card do you feel best indicates the distance into the future over which you have a clear picture about your own life and the world in which you will be living?"

----

[33] Shively, op. cit., chapter V.

This procedure for measuring time horizon was included in nearly half of the questionaires (N = 489), thus becoming "Version A" of the questionnaire. The second measure of time horizon was included in the rest of the questionnaires (N = 576), distinguished as "Version B. Only one measure of time horizon was thus included in any one questionnaire.

The measure of time horizon in Version B was quite different from that in Version A discussed above. The second measure of time horizon is constructed out of a series of ten items. The respondent is told that "People differ as to how clear a picture they have of the present world they are living in, and of the world in which they will be living in the future. Some people have a fairly clear picture about what might happen to them and their own future. Other people do not." At this point the respondent is handed another scale, this time a "clarity" scale ranging from " [ ] ", signifying "not clearly at all," to " [**********] ", meaning "total clarity." Next the respondent is asked, "What number of stars on this scale do you feel best expresses the clarity with which you see yourself and your personal world at the present time?"

This question is followed by nine further questions, all of which employ the use of the same clarity scale, and with each question extending further the referent time period: "What number of stars best indicates how clearly you picture yourself and your personal world 2 weeks from now?" "Two months from now?" "Six months from now?" and so on until the terminal question in this series of "Twenty years from now?"

The result is a sort of time horizon profile for each respondent which could, in fact, be analyzed in a number of ways. In this study each respondent, on the basis of his configuration of responses to all ten items, is classified into one of the following five mutually exclusive types:

"0" -- those respondents who indicated no clarity whatsoever for any of the time periods.

"1" -- those respondents who had some clarity for some time periods, but who had below average clarity and below average distance on the temporal dimension.

"2" -- those respondents who indicated higher than average clarity, but only for the more immediate future.

"3" -- those respondents who indicated low average clarity, but who could see farther than the average in terms of temporal distance.

"4" -- those respondents who indicated above average clarity and above average temporal distance.

The five types thus form a scale. However, types "2" and "3" on the scale could logically be interchanged. They both represent middle time horizon positions between types "1" and "4". For these reasons types "2" and "3" were subsequently combined yielding a more ordinal scale arrangement of types. This Version B scale will henceforth be referred to as "time-horizon-types," to distinguish it from the "time horizon" scale of Version A.

The spacial horizon scale was constructed in much the same manner as was the time-horizon-types scale. The assumption is made that if a person has internalized a certain geographical area, then he feels that this area is important to him. The approach is to have the respondent indicate the level of importance first for immediate geographical areas and then to continually increment the size of the areas. Again a series of questions were asked. Using the 0 to 4 star scale of level of importance, the respondents were asked to indicate the level of importance they personally felt with respect to the following items:

1. Matters pertaining to yourself
2. Matters pertaining to your family
3. Matters pertaining to your neighborhood
4. Matters pertaining to Kwun Tong
5. Matters pertaining to Hong Kong
6. Events pertaining to mainland China and/or Taiwan
7. Events that happen in Asia
8. Events that happen around the world

Again there are two aspects of space horizon -- level of
importance and level of geographic proximity. The importance scale
was dichotomized on the basis of the mean level of importance of 2.15,
and the level of geographic proximity scale was dichotomized as that
geographic space up to and including Hong Kong in one category, and
the areas beyond Hong Kong in the other category. Four quadrants of
the spacial horizon profile result, into which a respondent may fall:

"1" -- proximate area, but low level of importance

"2" -- proximate area, and high level of importance

"3" -- distant area, but low level of importance

"4" -- distant area, and high level of importance

Just as in the case of the time-horizon-types scale, and for
precisely the same reasons, the two middle spacial-horizon-types, "2"
and "3", were subsequently combined. This results in an ordinal scale
of space horizon consisting of the three categories of short, middle
range, and long.

Since all of the data to be analyzed have been measured by
the ordinal level, the Chi-square was selected as the statistical tool
to assist in the analysis of the significance of the relationships
between variables. In order to reduce the number of Chi-square cells
many of the scales were collapsed. This was always done in the most
isotropic way.

A final note might also be made in reference to the quality
of the data, which is felt to be quite high in terms of both reliability
and validity. This judgement is based on the "face validity" of the
marginal distributions, the logical and internal consistency, or
"construct" validity, observed in the many bi-variate distributions,
the results of several reliability checks built into the questionnaire,
and further on the fact of intensive supervision of the interviewers.

D. Research Findings

In order to lend some semblance of organization to the data
which have been analyzed, the findings will be presented below under
three general classes. First, the distribtion of respondents according
to the five dimensions of political orientation will be presented along
with the interrelationships between these five dimensions. Next, the
relationships between these five dimensions and certain standard socio-
logical variables will be explored. Third, the relationships between
the five political dimensions and the socio-psychological variables
relating to cognition levels will be investigated.

1. The Indicators of Political Orientations

As was described above the people of Hong Kong are not really
supposed to be politically oriented. Certainly they are discouraged
from active political activity. While it is true that this lack of
politicalization of the indigenous Hong Kong population would logically
result in considerable political apathy, some people, at least, might
be expected to depart from this norm. The 1,065 respondents in the
Kwun Tong Life Quality study were asked to indicate the extent to
which they felt that public affairs are important. The distribution
of responses is to be found in Table 1 below:

Table 1

Importance of Public Affairs

		N	%
0	Not important at all	162	15.2
1		237	22.3
2		260	24.4
3		134	12.6
4	Very important	75	7.0
Don't know		28	2.6
No answer		169	15.9
		1,065	100.0

$$\overline{X} = 1.68$$
$$S.D. = 1.19$$

Table 1 indicates a distribution on the importance of public affairs with a mean ($\overline{X}$ = 1.68) and a skewness in the direction of apathy on this dimension. Further testimony as to the general lack of importance attributed to public affairs is provided in Table 2. Actually, a large number of items, each of which represented a different aspect of life in Hong Kong, were given to the respondent and he was asked to indicate the level of importance of each item. Table 2 gives thirty-two items ranked in terms of average or mean importance. If public affairs were important this item would rank high, but it doesn't; of the thirty-two items public affairs ranks twenty-sixth.

Table 2

Rank Order of Importance of Selected Areas of
Life in Kwun Tong

Rank	Area of Importance	Mean Importance
1	Health	2.98
2	Filial Piety	2.80
3	Family Socialization	2.78
4	Employment	2.76
5	Transportation	2.74
6	Formal School Education	2.72
7	Crime and Vice	2.62
8	Dirt and Noise	2.58
9	Morality	2.57
10	Working Conditions	2.55
11	Housing	2.48
12	Marriage	2.46
13	Achievement	2.44
14	Food	2.41
15	Living Environment	2.37
16	Friends and Peers	2.25
17	Accumulation of Wealth	2.13
18	Over-crowdedness	2.03
19	Relatives	1.97
20	Physical Conditions	1.90
21	Propagation	1.79
22	Attitudes of the People	1.78
23	Population Increase	1.77
24	Recreation and Entertainment	1.76
25	"Face"	1.69
26	Public Affairs	1.68
27	Tradition	1.59
28	Leisure Time	1.58
29	Ancestor Worship	1.50
30	Fate	1.34
31	God and Church	1.07
32	Geomancy	0.87

In another question the respondents were asked to tell how frequently they follow public and government affairs. In this area even greater apathy is exhibited. Fifty per cent of the respondents claim to never follow public and government affairs, while only 6.6% claim to do so regularly. The distribution of responses to this question are given below in Table 3.

Table 3

Frequency of Following Public and
Government Affairs

	N	%
Regularly	70	6.6
From time to time	453	42.5
Never	533	50.0
Other (Specify)	4	.4
Don't know	2	.2
No answer	3	.3
	1,065	100.0

The political apathy of the Kwun Tong respondents is even more pronounced with respect to the dimension of political efficacy. When asked how much he can do about an unjust government regulation, 81.9 per cent of the sample indicated that they could do "nothing at all." As can be seen in Table 4 below 13.1 per cent said they could do something about an unjust government regulation, but not much, while only .9 per cent stated they could do "a great deal."

Table 4

What the Respondents think they can do about an
unjust Government Regulation

	N	%
A great deal	10	.9
Some, but not much	140	13.1
Nothing at all	872	81.9
Other (Specify)	6	.6
Don't know	12	1.1
No answer	25	2.3
	1,065	99.9

Despite the fact that the political atmosphere in Hong Kong
is not conducive to prescribed and direct political action, the respon-
dents generally feel a certain permissiveness with respect to their
freedom to engage in political discussions. Table 5 gives the distri-
bution of agreement and disagreement to the statement, "I feel perfectly
free to discuss public affairs with anyone." This distribution, with
a mean of 0.51, in fact, is somewhat skewed in the direction of agreement
to this statement. A certain suspicion with this question may, however,
be reflected in the fact that 21.3 per cent of the sample either "didn't
know," or refused to answer the question.

Table 5

"I feel perfectly free to discuss public affairs
with anyone"

		N	%
-2	Strongly disagree	12	1.1
-1		54	5.1
0		332	31.2
+1		373	35.0
+2	Strongly agree	67	6.3
Don't know		29	2.7
No answer		198	18.6
		1,065	100.0

$$\overline{X} = 0.51$$

$$S.D. = 0.79$$

Turning now to the final dimension of political orientation, future political time perspective, we see that once again apathy is prevalent. Table 6 gives the responses to the question, "How far into the future can you see clearly about political matters in the world?" Less than 6 per cent of the respondents claim that they can see or anticipate further than one year into the future about political matters in the world, while 62.2 per cent can't see clearly into the future at all.[34] Of course this is both a difficult and a complicated question, as indicated by 24.7 per cent of the respondents who could not answer or did not answer. It relates to a very difficult concept -- anticipating the future. And it is complicated as well in that it asks about several things together -- distance into the future, clarity, and political matters in the world.

----

[34] These figures are based on an N of 489, instead of an N of 1,065, because this question was asked only in Version A of the questionnaire.

Table 6

Distance into the future over which respondents have
a clear picture about political matters in the world

		N	%
0	I can't see clearly at all	304	62.2
1	Less than 2 weeks	17	3.5
2	2 weeks to 2 months	8	1.6
3	2 months to 6 months	4	.8
4	6 months to 1 year	6	1.2
5	1 year to 2 years	4	.8
6	2 years to 3 years	1	.2
7	3 years to 5 years	3	.6
8	5 years to 10 years	14	2.9
9	10 years to 20 years	4	.8
10	More than 20 years	3	.6
	Don't know	72	14.7
	No answer	49	10.0
		489	99.9

The main political orientation of the Kwun Tong respondents, then, is clearly apathy. But not all members of the sample are apathetic. Some variance on the political variables has been noted. In fact, there is every reason to believe that the five measures of political orientation are themselves interrelated. Dahl, for example, writes, "In the United States, and probably in most societies, these four dimensions are correlated."[35] Elsewhere we find empirical results establishing a positive relationship between political interest and voting turnout,[36] degree of concern over election outcome and voting turnout,[37] level of political participation and familiarity with political issues,[38] and extent of political activity and level of interest, concern, and information.[39] The Chi-square values showing the interrelatedness of the five dimensions of political orientation in this study are provided below in Table 7.

[35] Dahl, op. cit., pp. 201-202.

[36] Campbell, Angus, et. al., The American Voter. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960, p. 103.

[37] Ibid., p. 104.

[38] Key, V.O., Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1961, p. 185.

[39] Lane, Robert, Political Life, New York: The Free Press, 1959, p. 143.

Table 7

Chi-square relationships between five
dimensions of political orientation

	Importance of public affairs	Time-political matters in world	Free to discuss public affairs	Follow public affairs
Time-political matters in world	3.07(4)			
Free to discuss public affairs	50.76(4)***	.71(4)		
Follow public affairs	56.67(4)***	14.61(4)**	34.67(4)***	
Unjust Government regulation	20.11(2)***	6.02(2)*	12.22(2)**	98.54(2)***

( )   Degrees of freedom

*   Significant beyond .05 level of significance

**   Significant beyond .01 level of significance

****   Significant beyond .001 level of significance

Table 7 indicates that of the five dimensions of political
orientation four are strongly interrelated while one is not. The
"importance of public affairs" is strongly related to "freedom to
discuss public affairs," to the frequency with which one "follows

public affairs," and to whether or not one feels they can do something about an "unjust government regulation." The frequency with which one "follows public and government affairs" is also strongly related with "freedom to discuss public affairs" and whether or not one feels they can do something about an "unjust government regulation." The time horizon dimension -- the distance into the future over which a respondent can see clearly with respect to political matters in the world -- does not relate at all well with the other four dimensions. This dimension relates to a lesser extent to the frequency of "following public and government affairs," and to the respondents' efficacy over an "unjust government regulation," but not at all to the "importance of public affairs," and "freedom to discuss public affairs." This is quite understandable, since the four dimensions which are closely related all concern local political matters, while the time horizon of political matters in the world clearly pertains to a much larger political arena.

2. Sociological Characteristics of the Politically Oriented

In all of Hong Kong, one of the areas where one would expect the least well developed political orientations is Kwun Tong. Here the illiteracy rate is high. Crowding is everywhere and living conditions are generally sub-standard. The people are lower in socio-economic status than in the general Hong Kong area. Yet, while most of the Kwun Tong population has been found to be non-political, not all are in this category.

McClosky notes three broad and simplistic categories of independent variables relating to political participation: (1) the social environment, (2) psychological variables, and (3) the political environment. The social environment includes such variables as education, occupation, income, age, race, religion, sex, mobility, and residence. Although in most studies these variables correlate with political participation, McClosky warns that, "It should be emphasized, however, that the correlations between participation and some of these variables are low and unstable and that they may vary from one cultural-political context to another."[40]

---

[40] McClosky, Herbert, "Political Participation," in Sills, David L. (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12. The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968, p. 256.

In general, in Western countries, high political participation
has been associated with the higher income groups, the better educated,
males, the middle aged, and the urban. In the Kwun Tong Life Quality
study one would tend to expect that these same characteristics describe
those persons who are more politically oriented along other dimensions.
The actual findings, with respect to these relationships, are summarized
in Table 8.

Table 8

Chi-square relationships between sociological factors
and dimensions of political orientation

Sociological Factors	Dimensions of Political Orientation				
	Importance of public affairs	Time-political matters in world	Free to discuss public affairs	Follow public affairs	Unjust government regulation
1. Age	5.87(4)	5.36(4)	27.86(4)***	54.34(4)***	19.82(2)***
2. Sex	4.96(2)	.66(2)	9.83(2)**	73.77(2)***	31.48(1)***
3. Education	30.33(4)***	24.35(4)***	46.21(4)***	134.80(4)***	66.17(2)***
4. Income	8.23(4)	2.59(4)	4.69(4)	28.54(4)***	4.57(2)
5. Urban - Rural	1.39(2)	1.23(2)	2.82(2)	37.09(2)***	10.13(1)**

( )	Degrees of freedom
*	Significant beyond .05 level of significance
**	Significant beyond .01 level of significance
***	Significant beyond .001 level of significance

Table 8 shows that of the five sociological variables education
stands alone as the best, and, in fact, quite an excellent, correlate of
political orientation. Not only is education the only factor which
significantly relates to all five dimensions of political orientation,
but the Chi-square values in all five cases are substantial. High
education, then, is clearly associated with a high level of political
orientation.

Age and sex appear to be related to the five dimensions of political orientation in about the same way, and rank second to education in the strength of their relationships. There is no statistically significant relationship of age and sex to the importance of political affairs or to the respondents time horizon of political matters in the world. They do relate, however, in a fairly substantial statistical sense to freedom to discuss public affairs, to the frequency with which the respondents follow public affairs, and to the respondents' efficacy concerning an unjust government regulation. The data indicate in all cases that men are more politically inclined than women, and that, contrary to the findings in Western societies, younger people (people under 30) are more politically oriented than their older counterparts.

All of the respondents, of course, live in an urban environment. They were, however, asked the following question:"If you didn't have to worry about where you work, would you prefer to live in an urban or rural area?" Again, contrary to what one would expect to find in Western societies, it was the respondents who expressed a preference for rural life who are more highly politically oriented. This finding is true with respect to all five dimensions of political orientation, but is statistically significant only with respect to the respondents feeling free to follow public affairs and with high efficacy in connection with correcting an unjust government regulation.

Income also does not relate well to political orientation. Statistically a significant relationship was found to exist only between income and perceived freedom to follow public affairs. However, in relation to all five dimensions of political orientation the tendency is for people with higher incomes to be more political.

Other findings along these lines show that in the Kwun Tong "Life Quality" study there is almost no relationship between a person's being religious and his level of political orientations. Similarly, there is no real relationship between the particular religion a person may have internalized and his development of political tendencies. Political development and religious development, in this study, do not appear to be related.

If the head of the household, in which the respondent lives, has been affiliated with voluntary associations, such as clan associations, district associations, Kaifong associations, labour unions, or religious associations, there is somewhat of a tendency for the respondent to be more politically inclined. This is particularly true with respect to the respondent's tendency to follow political affairs and his efficacy regarding an unjust government regulation.

A somewhat stronger relationship was found to exist between a respondents level of agreement with three statements pertaining to corruption and the respondents level of political orientation. The three statements are: (1) "The primary reason for being a Government official is to 'make money.'" (2) "If a person wants to get a promotion or wage-increment, he should look for every opportunity to send gifts to his boss or superior." (3) "In asking a person to do a favor for you, you should invite this person to 'tea'." Generally speaking those respondents who might be called the "most corruptable" are also the least political. These findings regarding religion, associational membership of the head of the household, and corruption are summarized below in Table 9.

Table 9

Chi-square relationships between sociological factors
and dimensions of political orientation

Sociological Factors	Dimensions of Political Orientation				
	Importance of public affairs	Time-political matters in world	Free to discuss public affairs	Follow public affairs	Unjust government regulation
1. Are you religious	2.30(2)	+	1.47(2)	1.73(2)	4.57(1)*
2. What religion	2.94(4)	+	12.51(4)**	10.92(4)*	2.65(2)
3. Associational membership of head of household	5.15(4)	1.61(4)	7.70(4)	31.45(4)****	22.77(2)****
4. Corruption 1 – 'make money'	14.80(4)***	10.94(4)*	23.17(4)****	7.86(4)	2.13(2)
5. Corruption 2 – 'gifts'	34.10(4)****	5.37(4)	24.53(4)****	17.15(4)***	.60(2)*
6. Corruption 3 – 'tea'	27.74(4)****	13.16(4)***	24.87(4)****	18.72(4)****	7.02(2)*

( )   Degrees of freedom

+   Data not available

*   Significant beyond .05 level of significance

**   Significant beyond .02 level of significance

***   Significant beyond .01 level of significance

****   Significant beyond .001 level of significance

In this study, then, the more highly politically inclined respondents might be described as the better educated, younger, male, having a higher income, having a preference for rural living, less corruptible, and whose head of the household has been a member in

voluntary associations. The best sociological indicator of the level
of political development is education. It is perfectly logical that
this is the case. McClosky discussed the relationship between education
and political participation in the following statement:

> "Thus, education offers high and reliable correlations
> with participation, partly because it helps to develop a
> sense of civic duty, political competence, interest, and
> responsibility, as well as personality characteristics of
> self-confidence, dominance, and articulateness. Further-
> more, the schools themselves serve as settings in which
> the skills of participation are acquired: one learns to
> join organizations, fulfill duties, participate in meetings,
> discuss broad social questions, and organize to achieve
> group goals. Finally, the more educated are better able
> to transmit their political interest and knowledge to their
> children and, hence, to perpetuate the relationship between
> education and participation." [41]

3. Cognitive Levels and Political Levels

When you come right down to it politics is a highly complicated
business. Prerequisites of political role actors appear to be a high
level of political know-how, a high level of articulateness, and a
high degree of rationality. Even being a political "spectator" (one
who seeks political information, watches the political play unfold,
and so on), as opposed to being a political "gladiator"[42] (one who is
actually involved in the political drama and who may also be an office-
holder), requires not only time and interest, but also a cognitive
sophistication which would enable him to digest the complexities of
politics.

In the present study time horizon (the ability of the indi-
vidual to see or anticipate clearly into the future), and spacial
horizon (the amount of geographical area internalized by the individual)
are employed as indicators of the psychological, or cognitive, worlds
in which the individual lives. The time horizon capacity of the respon-

[41] Ibid., p. 257.

[42] Milbrath, Lester W., Political Participation: How and Why Do People
Get Involved in Politics? Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally, 1965,
pp. 16-22.

dents in the Kwun Tong "Life Quality" study are remarkably short. The actual distribution of responses to the Version A measure of time horizon is provided below in Table 10.

Table 10

Time Horizon (Version A) Distribtuion

Distance into Future	N	%
I can't see clearly at all	238	48.7
Less than 2 weeks	35	7.2
2 weeks to 2 months	38	7.8
2 months to 6 months	19	3.9
6 months to 1 year	20	4.1
1 year to 2 years	20	4.1
2 years to 3 years	19	3.9
3 yearstto 5 years	14	2.9
5 years to 10 years	16	3.3
10 years to 20 years	1	.2
More than 20 years	1	.2
Don't know	39	8.0
No answer	29	5.9
Total	489	100.2

Md = 0

This distribution is so heavily skewed in the direction of no time horizon what-so-ever that the median for the sample is zero, or "can't see clearly at all." Compared with comparable data, based on identically the same measure, from other societies it becomes obvious that the time horizon of the Hong Kong respondents is, even more obviously, quite low. Table 11 gives comparable average time horizons for samples of university students and legislators in eight other societies.[43]

---

[43] Shively, op. cit., p. 205.

Table 11

Median time horizons of respondents
of eight countries

Country	N	Median Time Horizon		
		Years	Months	Days
Brazil	309	0	11	24
Finland	278	1	7	16
France	262	0	11	24
Germany	159	0	9	22
India	191	3	6	6
Japan	264	2	0	26
Spain	278	3	10	15
U.S. - University of Oklahoma Students	323	2	7	21
Average for all Respondents	2064	2	1	6

Of course, it must be noted, the time horizons of students
and legislators would be expected to be considerably longer than the
Hong Kong residents of resettlement estates. Nevertheless, there is
every reason to expect considerably shorter time horizons among the
Chinese than is the case for Westerners. It is no secret, for example,
that in traditional Chinese thinking the whole concept of the past,
and all that it entails -- including the history of China, ancestor
worship, and family traditions, looms large in importance, while the
concept of the future, and thinking in future-oriented ways, is of

little importance at all.[44] The Chinese dialects, even, do not have future tenses.

The second measure of time horizon -- Version B, or time horizon profile -- yields results similar to the Version A measure. Since the two approaches to measuring time horizon are entirely different, the results are not directly comparable. About half (49.9%) of the 576 respondents who took Version B of the questionnaire could not see farther than two months into the future with any clarity more than "zero". It will be remembered that the distributions of responses to the five political orientation dimensions were also heavily skewed toward the apathy end of the measures. This heavy skewness, and resulting lack of variance, on both the time horizon measures and the political questions is bound to affect (most probably-lower) the size and stability of the Chi-square measures of relationship between them. These statistical measures of relationship between the indicators of the cognitive worlds of the respondents and the measures of their political orientations are summarized in Table 12.

All of the relationships reported in Table 12 are in the anticipated direction, that is, that broad cognitive worlds are associated with higher levels of political orientation. Not all of the relationships, however, are statistically significant.

---

[44] See, for example, the following:

1. Kluckhohn, Florence Rockwood, and Strodtbeck, Fred L., Variations in Value Orientations. Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1961, p. 14.

2. Fraser, J.T., The Voices of Time. New York: George Braziller, 1966, pp. 92-135.

3. Van Oort, H.A., "Chinese Culture-values, Past and Present," Chinese Culture, A Quarterly Review, Vol. XI, No. 1, March, 1970, p. 40.

4. Burkhardt, Valentine Rodolphe, Chinese Creeds and Customs, Hong Kong: 1955. The South China Morning Post.

Table 12

Chi-square relationships between cognitive world
indicators and dimensions of political orientation

Cognitive world indicators	Dimensions of Political Orientation				
	Importance of public affairs	Time-political matters in world	Free to discuss public affairs	Follow public affairs	Unjust government regulation
1. Time horizon, Version A	19.56(4)****	165.33(4)****	1.07(4)	3.97(4)	9.79(2)***
2. Time horizon types, Version B	18.77(6)***	+	6.18(6)	11.24(6)*	31.97(3)****
3. Space horizon types	106.75(4)****	7.50(4)	8.28(4)*	35.87(4)****	11.42(2)***

( )	Degrees of freedom
+	Data not applicable, varsion A only
*	Significant beyond .1 level of significance
**	Significant beyond .05 level of significance
***	Significant beyond .01 level of significance
****	Significant beyond .001 level of significance

Close scruting of Table 12 leads to the general conclusion
that the theory which explains the level of political orientation by
the level of one's cognitive world is rather well supported by the
actual data. The three measures of one's cognitive world -- time
horizon (Version A), time horizon types (Version B), and spacial
horizon types -- are very convincingly related to two of the five
dimensions of political orientation , namely, the extent to which
one holds that public affairs are important, and the extent to which
one feels he can do something about an unjust government regulation.
In these two cases the relationships are clear, strong, and consistent.

With respect to the distance into the future over which the respondent sees clearly about political matters in the world, and the extent to which the respondent claims to actually follow public and government affairs the relationships are less impressive. The relationship between time horizon and the future time over which one sees political matters in the world is exceedingly high (Chi-square = 165.33) as would be expected. The time horizon (Version A) measure was designed to be a general time horizon scale, and the time horizon concerning political matters in the world was designed as a specific time horizon measure. Space horizon types relates to this specific time horizon measure, but is statistically significant only beyond the .2 level. Space horizon is statistically very strongly related with the frequency of following public and government affairs.

The three indicators of cognition level do not relate well with whether or not one feels free to discuss public affairs. This, however, disturbs the central theory very little, if at all. And probably this is a poor indicator of political orientation, for the logical explanation is that everyone tends to feel free of restrictions when it comes to discussing politics. This is true even for those who are not even politically inclined and who may not even want to discuss politics.

The theory that people whose cognitive structure is well developed are better equipped to be politically oriented is well supported by the data. It might further be argued that people with under developed cognitive structures would tend to be less successful people generally and that their tendency toward failure would be internalized in the form of weak feelings of personal power. Self efficacy, therefore, might well be considered as an additional dimension of one's cognition structure. Hypothetically one would therefore expect to find efficacy positively related to level of political orientation. This expectation has considerable precedence. Numerous studies have linked political efficacy and political participation, and show also that "advanced education is the single most important factor contributing to high efficacy."[45]

---

[45] Prewitt, Kenneth, "Political Efficacy," in Sills, David L. (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12. The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968, pp. 225-228.

Three questions about personal efficacy were included in the
Kwun Tong questionnaire. Using a typical zero-to-ten point scale the
respondents were asked to indicate their (1) personal power to make
changes in the conditions of life in their "area" (or neighborhood),
(2) their power to make changes in their "family" and (3) their power
to make changes in their "own life."

The relationships between these three measures of efficacy,
treated here as further indicators of cognitive structure and complexity,
and the five political dimensions are summarized in Table 13.

Table 13

Chi-square relationships between efficacy and dimensions of political orientation

Personal Efficacy	Dimensions of Political Orientation				
	Importance of public affairs	Time-political matters in world	Free to discuss public affairs	Follow public affairs	Unjust Government regulation
1. Efficacy - your area	1.66(2)	31.48(2)**	5.29(2)	7.44(2)*	43.65(1)**
2. Efficacy - your family	7.39(4)	25.07(4)**	7.30(4)	25.20(4)**	29.72(2)**
3. Efficacy - own life	11.28(4)*	27.59(4)**	7.59(4)**	25.56(4)**	30.12(2)**

( )   Degrees of freedom

*   Significant beyond .025 level of significance

** • Significant beyond .001 level of significance

These findings more-or-less follow logical expectations.
Since "doing something about an unjust government regulation" is an
item pertaining to the dimension of political efficacy, the, if personal
efficacy measures relate at all to the political indicators, one would
most expect such an association to occur between the efficacy items.
This is exactly what has, in fact, happened. All three measures of
personal efficacy relate more strongly with political efficacy than with
the other political dimensions. All three indicators of personal
efficacy, furthermore, relate strongly with two other dimensions of
political orientation -- the time horizon of political matters in the
world, and frequency of following public affairs. They relate least
strongly to feelings of the importance of public affairs and perceived
freedom to discuss public affairs. This last finding, again, does not
detract from the central theme of this paper because anyone is liable
to feel free to discuss public affairs -- even the non-politically
oriented -- and, therefore, this dimension is perhaps not a valid
indicator of political orientation.

One final dimension of cognitive structure remains to be
explored. This one is perhaps most unique to Hong Kong. In Hong Kong
one finds a situation where the Eastern and Western cultures are colliding.
As a result some Chinese are caught up in the process of assimilating
Western culture.[46] Undoubtedly, whether or not a Hong Kong Chinese
internalizes Western culture is a function of many things, but these
do not operate in a random fashion. Certainly it can be argued that
cultural values, once they are internalized, become an important
aspect of one's psychological or cognitive structure, and also that
the process of rejecting one set of values and replacing it with
another set requires a fairly sophisticated cognitive apparatus to
begin with.

In the Kwun Tong "Life Quality" study the respondents were
asked, using the typical five-point Likert scale, to agree or disagree
with a number of statements. Six of these items, clearly representing
traditional Chinese values, were combined to form a scale, ranging from

---

[46] It may be interesting to observe, and this is strictly the author's
observation, that this is a one-way process. Generally speaking,
one does not find Westerners who are internalizing Chinese cultural
values.

6 to 30, which measures the level of acceptance of traditional Chinese
values. The distribution on this scale is heavily skewed in favor of
acceptance of traditional Chinese values, but ample variance existed
in the distribtuion to allow the variable to be trichotomized for
further statistical operations.

In exploring the relationships between the "traditional
Chinese value" scale and the political variables it was found that
the greater the departure from such values the higher the level of
political orientation. The "traditional Chinese value" measure relates
most strongly with importance of public affairs (Chi-square = 23.53,
degrees of freedom = 4, statistically significant well beyond the .001
level), perceived freedom to discuss public affairs (Chi-square = 30.67,
degrees of freedom = 4, statistically significant well beyond the .001
level), and the frequency with which public and government affairs are
followed (Chi-square = 33.73, degrees of freedom = 4, statistically
significant well beyond the .001 level). The "traditional Chinese
value" measure also relates, but not as strongly, to efficacy concerning
an unjust government regulation (Chi-square = 11.95, degrees of freedom
= 2, statistically significant beyond the .01 level), and the time
horizon concerning political matters in the world (Chi-square = 6.72,
degrees of freedom = 4, statistically significant beyond the .2 level).

Speaking in socio-psychological terms, then, the findings
can be summarized in saying that the development of political orienta-
tions is strongly related to the development of one's cognitive structure.
The respondents who are more strongly politically oriented also tend to
have longer temporal and spacial horizons, have a higher sense of self-
efficacy, and are seen to be moving culturally away from traditional
Chinese values.

One must, of course, be cautious in making cause-and-effect
interpretations of these findings. It does appear logical, however,
that the development of an appropriate cognitive system is a prere-
quisite to the development of a political frame of reference. This is
why the children in democratic societies are not permitted to partici-
pate in politics, why also in democratic societies the illiterates and

more poorly educated tend to be politically apathetic, and why one
tends to find under developed political systems in areas where the
cognitive worlds of the population are also under developed.

E. Discussion

Hong Kong is quite a different city from the capitals of the world. London, Paris, Rome, New York, as examples, are all highly sophisticated cultural centers, whereas Hong Kong is strictly a center for commerce and industry. This fact, along with its singular geographical and political setting, has placed Hong Kong in the unique position of the "go-between" with respect to East and West relations. It is one pocket in the world where Eastern ways of living are colliding with the Western way of life. The consequent shock is resulting in an increment of change. At one level the change is tangible and can be seen everywhere. At another level the changes are non-empirical and more convert. They are found in the changes in the cognitive structure of the people.

Slowly the traditional Chinese culture is being eroded away. Changes in value orientations are taking place. These changes are not random -- they are programmed in certain ways. The trend is for the better educated to exhibit greater change in values (Chi-square = 67.60, degrees of freedom = 4, statistically significant well beyond the .001 level). The same trend can be seen among the younger people (Chi-square = 53.18, degrees of freedom = 2, statistically significant well beyond the .001 level). Those who speak more than one language or dialect (Chi-square = 18.41, degrees of freedom = 4, statistically significant beyond the .01 level), and those who speak English as well as Cantonese (Chi-square = 23.73, degrees of freedom = 2, statistically significant well beyond the .001 level) also exhibit greater change away from traditional Chinese values.

Other manifestations of the cognitive changes are a movement away from the traditional preoccupation with thinking in terms of the past and toward the more modern approach of thinking-in terms of the future. Hand in hand with time orientation changes comes a broadening of spacial horizons (Chi-square relationship between time horizon, Version A, and spacial horizon types) 16.75, degrees of freedom = 4, statistically significant beyond the .01 level; Chi-square relationship between time horizon types, Version B, and spacial horizon types = 21,91, degrees of freedom = 6, statistically significant beyond the .01 level).

In a similar way, the people of Hong Kong are starting to think less
in terms of their lot in life being determined by fate and more in
terms that they, themselves, can control what will happen to them.
This is to say they are becoming more efficacious. A broad and more
complex cognitive apparatus, as expressed by time and space horizons,
departure from traditional Chinese values, and higher efficacy, are
similarly related in a positive way with such sociological factors as
higher education, younger age, speaking English, and sex (in the Kwun
Tong study men are found to have broader cognitive structures than
women).

In this paper a study has been made of the relationship between
the cognitive, or psychological, world a person lives in and the level
of his political development. Since in Colonial Hong Kong it would be
near impossible to study political participation, other dimensions of
political orientation have been explored. The extent to which one's
cognitive structure has been developed has been found to be strongly
related in a positive way to the extent to which one feels public
affairs are important, his ability to anticipate into the future with
respect to political matters in the world, the frequency with which he
follows public and government affairs, whether or not he feels he can
effectively do something about an unjust government regulation, and,
to a lesser extent, to the extent to which he feels free to discuss
public affairs. In short, levels of cognitive development have been
found to strongly relate to the level of development of a person's
political orientations.

The practical implications of these findings for Hong Kong
are rather obvious. As compulsory school attendance at the primary
and secondary levels becomes instituted, and as educational improve-
ments continue, cognition levels in the population will rise. Along
with the general cognitive development one can expect increased
politicalization. Increase in Westernization can be expected to result
in further changes in cognition and increases in levels of political
orientations. More highly developed political orientations with no
institutionalized avenue of political participation is most apt to
result in frustration. These forces, especially when there is a gap

between what people want and what they get,[47] logically lead toward more radical political thinking and behavior. Based both on the findings of this study and on recent Hong Kong history, increases in political radicalism can be most expected among the young and the higher educated.

The theoretical implications of these findings should not be overlooked. "Social scientists," writes McClosky, "aim to develop gneral theories of human behavior that will account for as many relevant facts as possible with the smallest number of assumptions and explanatory variables. So far, no general theory of participation even approaches this ideal."[48] An attempt has been made in this paper to provide just such a theoretical framework in which political behavior can be better understood. The empirical findings have been encouraging. Cognition variables have been found to explain political orientations. Sociological variables are found to relate to levels of political orientation. And sociological variables are related to cognitive variables. Of all the sociological factors studies, and as one would expect, education is most consistently and most strongly related, not only to political orientations, but to cognitive worlds. Education, in fact, may well be treated as an indicator of cognitive development.

It is felt that further exploration into the relationship between cognitive structure and political behavior would be both desirable and profitable. Certainly the importance of the conceptualization of "cognitive world" is not limited solely to the study of politicalization. Well developed, or culturally enriched, cognitive

---

[47] Davies, James C., "The Circumstances and Causes of Revolution: a Review," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XI, No. 2, June 1967, p. 256.

[48] McClosky, Herbert, op. cit., p. 256.

worlds are generally found in greater numbers in well developed, modern societies. Under-developed cognitive structures are found in greater numbers in under-developed societies. What is meant by "modern", in fact, is not only a healthy gross-national-product, but also a composite of cognitively sophisticated people who are cognitively equipped to master and enjoy the complexities they find about them. The people of Hong Kong appear to be headed in this direction.