

In sum, *Ancestral Leaves* presents us with a faithful depiction of the Ye clan's experience of Chinese history. Individuals appear unembellished, at times vulnerable and equivocating and at other times as noble, dedicated individuals struggling to preserve their family or party's status. The pages also reveal how pragmatic strategists can promote personal or clan interests across a wide range of social and political circumstances. All in all, *Ancestral Leaves* is a great read and it will appeal to specialists and non-specialists alike.

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Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy. Edited by John Makeham. Dordrecht and New York: Springer, 2010. Pp. xliii + 488. €169.95/\$229.00.

An ideal road companion can be counted on to offer accurate information, well considered guidance, useful pointers, a helping hand over rough spots as well as lively conversation fostering a sense of discovery and stimulating further intellectual journeys. It follows that the *Dao Companion* under review is both something more and something less than an introductory survey. It is also a group effort, a collaborate undertaking beginning with an introduction defining and marking out of the terrain by John Makeham, its distinguished editor. This is followed by nineteen chronologically arranged essays starting in the eleventh century with Tze-ki Hon on Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 and concluding in the eighteenth century with Justin Tiwald on Dai Zhen 戴震. Each essay is authored by a sure-footed scholar who knows the terrain having studied his or her subject in depth. All are excellent company for their segment of the journey.

As announced by its title and stressed by Makeham, this is a companion to Neo-Confucian *philosophy* (not to the more broadly conceived “Neo-Confucianism in History” most recently discussed by Peter Bol¹) with Neo-Confucianism defined as “a category employed to describe a set of ‘family resemblances’ discerned across clusters of philosophical ideas, technical terms, arguments, and writings . . . in other words, concepts, ideas, and discourse rather than schools” (p. xii). The essays themselves vary in approach. To be sure this is primarily a “philosophical” companion to a phil-

¹ Peter K. Bol, *Neo-Confucianism in History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008).

osophical tradition but it also has a great deal to offer to intellectual historians, comparativists, and anyone interested in Chinese and East Asian thought.

Bracketing the question of when and how ordinary discourse rises to the status of philosophy, this volume like the Neo-Confucians it studies focuses on moral philosophy, moral psychology, and metaphysics. The sophistication and complexity of this philosophical discourse is exemplified by the richness of its terminology—Makeham introduces over thirty terms in his introduction.

The thinkers included in this volume are those featured in most accounts of Neo-Confucian philosophy. Thirteen of the nineteen essays are on Song thinkers thus giving the traveller a good start though leaving her to slug on by herself through long stretches of Yuan/Ming. While the two Neo-Confucian giants, Zhu Xi 朱熹 and Wang Yangming 王陽明 each rate two essays and a couple of essays discuss more than one writer, most focus on a single individual. Each essay begins with a very brief presentation of biographical data, and most end with a summary conclusion followed by a selective bibliography of works in Chinese, English and less consistently Japanese and German often with brief, but very helpful characterizations of the nature and contents of the cited text. This is one of the ways the *Companion* can serve as a reference work. The essays, not numbered into chapters, stand by themselves, but reading them all affords an overview both of Neo-Confucian philosophy and of the current state of the field.

The individual essays are not primarily concerned with providing a historical overview of earlier scholarship or with identifying contested issues but offer interpretative expositions, cogent summations and analyses of their subjects. Since their authors, some more senior than others, have all written and published more extensively on their topics, their *Companion* essays offer excellent entry into their other publications. Most have performed remarkable feats of compression. The authors, good company all, do not shilly shally—they present their own views and thus act not only as guides but as stimulating partners in dialogue as one works one's way (pardon the pun) into Neo-Confucian discourse. Many of the essays open up new vistas providing welcome company for the veteran traveller as well as for the well-equipped neophyte.

Rather than ungraciously indulging in a wish list of thinkers or issues which did not make it into this volume, I want to acknowledge and congratulate the editor for including essays on important thinkers inadequately represented in English language scholarship including Hu Hong 胡宏 (Hans van Ess), Zhang Shi 張栻 (Hoyt Cleveland Tillman and Christian Soffel), and especially Lü Zuqian 呂祖謙 (Kai Marchal). The latter merits singling out because Marchal addresses a long standing serious scholarly need for an in depth study of this key figure and also because his is the only essay devoted to political philosophy. A good number of the contributors,

beginning with Don J. Wyatt on Shao Yong 邵雍, stress or at least signal the importance of governance for their subjects, but Marchal alone highlights political philosophy and devotes a subsection to a nuanced and insightful discussion of Lü's views on the relationship between moral and institutional renewal. Marchal concludes by relating Lü's thought to China's and our present thereby joining most of his fellow contributors in maintaining that Neo-Confucianism still has relevance today.

There is not a single entry from which I did not learn something significant. For instance, it is common knowledge that Zhu Xi held that true understanding leads to action, but Kwong-loi Shun shows that he also equated knowing and acting (much like Wang Yangming) as when he compared knowing badness to putting one's hand in boiling water (p. 188). Frequently the *Companion* entries are the clearest summations of their subjects I have encountered. To discuss each individually would far exceed the functions of a review. Instead, I will limit myself to some general issues that I hope will be helpful to readers.

Mindful of Gadamer's adage that all research in the history of philosophy in itself philosophy,² we can nevertheless broadly and roughly distinguish the more philosophically minded contributors from those more drawn to intellectual history while acknowledging that most entries include some of both and applauding Ng On-cho's insistence in his analysis of Li Guandi 李光地 on the need for both approaches (pp. 383–84). As myself a historian, I did find myself asking whether elsewhere philosophy could be helped by history, as, for instance, by drawing on Chang Woei Ong's discussion of Zhang Zai 張載³ in thinking about the philosophy of that seminal thinker. But I reluctantly concluded that philosophy can stand alone here since nothing in Ong's book calls for modification of the excellent essay on Zhang that Robin R. Wang and Ding Weixiang contributed to this volume especially since this essay also includes an excellent account of the prior conceptual history of *qi* 氣 here rendered "vital energy."

Similarly but admittedly somewhat disconcertedly, the cogency of philosophical analysis in two of the essays is not diminished by their misidentification of Luoyang 洛陽 as the capital of the Northern Song (pp. 59, 89).⁴ Furthermore, in the discussions of *quan* 權 (moral weighing) I appreciated the discussions and insights offered by Ng who identified *quan* as "human agency" and those of Tiwald on the importance of

² See Jean Grondin, *Hans-Georg Gadamer: A Biography*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003).

³ Chang Woei Ong, *Men of Letters Within the Passes: Guanzhong Literati in Chinese History, 907–1911* (Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008).

⁴ On Song Luoyang see Michael Freeman, "Lo-yang and the Opposition to Wang An-shih: The Rise of Confucian Conservatism, 1068–1086" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1974).

moral weighing for Dai Zhen, but missed attention to *quan*'s connection to political authority and think Zhu Xi's views deserve greater attention.⁵

As already indicated, Neo-Confucian philosophical discourse and thus also this *Companion* centres on the key terms that mark the Way. What is not always clear, however, is whether or to what extent terminological differences between the essays reflect their use and role in the original texts and to what extent they reflect different interpretations and emphases on the part of the authors of the essays. An important example is the translation of *taiji* 太極: in the *Companion*'s first essay, "Zhou Dunyi's Philosophy of the Supreme Polarity," Tze-ki Hon offers a very helpful reading of the *taiji* diagram not only from top down but also from the bottom up and follows Joseph Adler in rendering *taiji* as "Supreme Polarity," but Hoyt Tillman and Soffel use the older and more conventional "Supreme Ultimate" in their essay on Zhang Shi. Next, "The Supreme Ultimate" is emphasized as the goal for self-cultivation in John Berthrong's impressive account of Zhu Xi's cosmology and situated at the core of "the kind of hopeful conflation of the 'is' and 'ought' that drives post-Hume Western philosophers wild" (p. 171). "Supreme Ultimate" remains the translation employed throughout the remainder of the book. This shift in English terminology seems sufficiently significant to warrant explication or commentary.

Conversely, I was left wondering at times whether an account of one thinker might not apply more widely. I am convinced by Philip J. Ivanhoe's explanation in his essay on Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵, that for Lu understanding is "a process of tallying or matching up the principles inherent in the heart/mind with the various phenomena of the world" (p. 254). I also found David W. Tien applying this interpretation to Wang Yangming 王陽明 (p. 302) very helpful. However, it does raise the question whether Zhu Xi and his followers would at all disagree with Ivanhoe or with Andrew Plaks's rendition of *gewu* 格物 as an informed eighteenth-century reader might understand it, that is as "extending to all things the correct conceptual grid."⁶

The keyword that is as central as it is untranslatable is *li* 理 discussed in the introduction by Makeham and identified in the index as: principle/pattern/coherence/coherent principle/norm/order/to order/creativity or life-giving activity/internal logic. The problem is, of course, that there is no single English term that covers the same

⁵ See Wei Cheng-t'ung 韋政通, "Chu Hsi on the Standard and the Expedient," in *Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism*, ed. Wing-tsit Chan (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 1986), pp. 255–72. Also Conrad Schirokauer, "Chu Hsi's Sense of History," in Robert P. Hymes and Schirokauer, eds., *Ordering the World: Approaches to State and Society in Sung Dynasty China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 208–13.

⁶ Andrew Plaks, trans., *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung (The Highest Order of Cultivation and On the Practice of the Mean)* (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 110.

semantic terrain, while in general the Neo-Confucians do seem to agree on its meaning. Part of our difficulty is a tendency to transform attributes into entities. Thus I prefer Berthrong's rendition of *li* as coherent principles rather than coherence *per se* and would even suggest these thinkers inhabiting a coherent lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) had no need to single out coherence as a separate quality that so strikes us in our fragmented world. After all, even the wildest seventeenth-century painters still produced works in which lines joined each other to render a coherent whole.⁷

Somewhat similarly, I would prefer "normative" as a quality of *li* rather than translating *li* as "norms" although Hans van Ess's essay sends me back to Hu Hong with new sensitivity to the role of *li* in his thought. Perhaps the conviction that they lived in a coherent (and organic) world can also help to explain that, as noted in a number of the essays, most, and probably all, of these thinkers did not aim at formulating a clearly articulated systematic philosophy and left fertile and complex legacies for their students and successors to interpret and develop.

Whatever the translation, *li* at times remains difficult to grasp. Huang Yong on Cheng Yi 程頤, Wong Wai-ying on Cheng Hao 程顥, and John Berthrong on Zhu Xi write cogently of "actualizing" *li* but left me straining to envision *li* that are not inherently "actual" and wondering whether my problem is philosophical or semantic.

Two renditions of keywords that struck me as particularly helpful are *cheng* 誠 as "human self-actualization" (Berthrong, p. 170) and *zhi* 志 (Angle, p. 325) as "commitment" rather than "will" as in several of the other essays, for "will" implies a separate mental faculty rather than a mental activity. On the other hand I need some cogent arguments before equating *xie* 邪 with sin (Marchal, p. 205).

While the Neo-Confucian discourse revolves around these and other key words and concepts, one concern of the *Companion's* contributors, as of their subjects, is to situate the various thinkers within the tradition historically and conceptually. This is important work but leaves less room for consideration of external intellectual alternatives. The scholars, again like their subjects, are inclined to go back to classical thought rather than investigating competitive or parallel Buddhist or Daoist discourse in any depth.

This mostly philosophical companion to Neo-Confucian philosophy is highly informative on moral philosophy and moral psychology intimately linked in Neo-Confucianism. Indeed the focus on moral psychology, in contrast to much Western moral philosophy, seems a hallmark of Confucian ways of thinking. Kwong-loi Shun's

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See Richard Edwards on Gong Xian 龔賢 in "The Orthodoxy of the Unorthodox," in *Artists and Traditions: Use of the Past in Chinese Culture*, ed. Christian F. Murck (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 194.

essay specifically focuses on Zhu Xi's moral psychology, but there is a great deal also in the other essays on human nature (*xing* 性). JeeLoo Liu even concludes that for Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 "moral essence" would be a more accurate translation (p. 365). And it is a central concern for Li Guangdi who, according to Ng, sought above all to re-establish *xing*'s goodness against the view that it is beyond good and evil thereby addressing a major seventeenth-century intellectual issue.

These and the other *Companion* essays should be of interest to philosophers generally. The frequency and weight of references to Western philosophical discourse vary. Some refrain from explicit comparisons, others turn to it sparingly (Berthrong), but all are aware of the danger of reading alien ideas into their texts. Ivanhoe explicitly warns against importing Western philosophical idealism into our analysis of Lu Jiuyuan's thought.⁸ Ivanhoe and Huang are among those who most vigorously argue for Neo-Confucianism as a contemporary philosophical resource. Stephen C. Angle is most implicit in his "Wang Yangming as a Virtue Ethicist" focusing, like his Western counterparts, on a person's moral character, on becoming a good, fully virtuous person as contrasted to obeying the correct rules. This accounts for the focus on self-cultivation that is so prominent in Confucian discourse even as it links that discourse with contemporary philosophical discourse. This provides a good bridge into Neo-Confucianism and at the same time Angle's contribution can serve as a good introduction to virtue ethics for sinologists seeking to understand Chinese thought in a broader context.

There is relatively little exploration of how other comparisons can mislead or illuminate our understanding of Chinese thought or of philosophy *per se*, but hopefully this book will be widely consulted by philosophically minded scholars of all kinds and not just by specialists in China and East Asia.

Philosophy predominates in this collection, but I was delighted to see two contributions that are perhaps closer to intellectual history. Although other essays are concerned to define their subject's place in the tradition, Linda Walton's is the most revisionist in demonstrating that the supposed intellectual unity of "The Four Masters of Mingzhou" was a later fiction. She also shares a most pungent image when she quotes Yang Jian 楊簡 saying that "Zhuang Zhou drowned in the learning of emptiness" (p. 275). Analyses of metaphor and imagery are always well worth pursuing.⁹

⁸ I was appalled to discover that I myself allowed for such a reading and deserve the reprimand in note 15, p. 253.

⁹ A case in point is Mathew Levey, "The Clan and the Tree: Inconsistent Images of Human Nature in Chu Hsi's *Settled Discourse*," *Journal of Song Yuan Studies* 24 (1994), pp. 101–44. Several contributors refer to Levey's dissertation but seem unaware of this article published in a journal not dedicated to philosophy.

Also most worthwhile are analyses of literary forms and strategies such as Hilde de Weerd's contribution to this volume, "Neo-Confucian Philosophy and Genre: The Philosophical Writings of Chen Chun and Zhen Dexiu," which not only allows us to gain perspective on Chen Chun 陳淳 and Zhen Dexiu 真德秀 but opens up a promising line of inquiry into other texts including Korean, Japanese, and Vietnamese Neo-Confucian writings. The contributions of Korean philosophers came particularly to mind after reading Chung-yi Cheng's fascinating discussion of Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周 on the four feelings and seven desires, a topic that fascinated Korean thinkers. *Dao Companions* on Korean and Japanese philosophy are eagerly awaited.

Huang Yong, the series editor, in his essay on Cheng Yi writes "what is crucial is not only to do things according to moral principles, but to find joy in doing so" (p. 62). This *Companion* is hard on the bank account but gives joy to the mind.

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The Huainanzi: A Guide to the Theory and Practice of Government in Early Han China. Translated and edited by John S. Major, Sarah A. Queen, Andrew Seth Meyer, and Harold D. Roth. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Pp. xi + 986. \$75.00.

This first complete English-language translation of the *Huainanzi* 淮南子 is the product of a collaboration that lasted over a decade. Any such translation of this encyclopaedic text, one of the richest sources of information on pre-imperial and early imperial intellectual history, early text formation, and, as the subtitle notes, nascent formulations of a theory of imperial administration, would be welcome. In this case, the collaborative translation team decided not just to produce a lucid translation but also to graft onto it what is, between its introduction, informative footnotes, and useful appendices, effectively a scholarly monograph on this rich work. Following on Knoblock and Riegel's translation of the *Lüshi chunqiu* 呂氏春秋,¹ suddenly two of the most challenging textual ascents in Early China have been completed, quite a bit earlier than many of us would ever have imagined.

The "Introduction" not only situates the *Huainanzi* historically but proposes a method of reading the text by starting from the last chapter's summaries of the

¹ John Knoblock and Jeffrey Riegel, *The Annals of Lü Buwei: A Complete Translation and Study* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000).